In a number of instances the court of equity of one state or country has exercised its jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in another state or country with respect to real property located in the latter.

In Bunbury v. Bunbury, 1 Beav. 318, an injunction was granted, on terms, to restrain proceedings instituted in a foreign country to recover real estate there. It was said, however, that, if nothing more than an insulated question of title to the land were in litigation be tween the parties, the injunction would be denied; but that the controversy between the parties involved the determination of questions relating to the conflict of laws, and the effect of the laws of England upon the rights of the parties.

In Beckford v. Kemble, 1 Sim. & Stu. 7, all the parties being in England, an injunction was granted to restrain mortgagees of a West India estate from proceeding on a bill of foreclosure in a colonial court, filed after a decree made in England which directed an inquiry to ascertain the amount of the mortgage debt on a bill to redeem.

In Hope v. Carnegie, L. R. 1 Ch. 320, an order restraining the administration of real and personal estate in the Netherlands, of a de cedent who died domiciled in England, was affirmed as to both species of property, though one of the two judges who heard the appeal was of the opinion that the appellant ought to have been left at liberty to carry on the administration as to the real estate, if she could do so without proceeding as to the personal estate. The other judge was of the opinion that, if it were possible to proceed as to the real estate without proceeding as to the personal estate, it was incumbent upon the ap pellant to show that fact. He also queried whether proceedings, even as to real estate only, ought not to be restrained.

A court of New York has jurisdiction to restrain a trust company incorporated in that state, its officers, agents, and attorneys, from proceeding, in a suit brought by it in another state, to foreclose a mortgage upon real property in the latter state, pending the final hearing and determination of an action in New York for its removal as trustee upon the ground that it had acted in bad faith in the prosecution of the foreclosure action. Gibson V. American Loan & T. Co. 58 Hun, 443, 12 N. Y. Supp. 444.

The right to take jurisdiction of a suit for an injunction affecting lands in another state is to be distinguished, upon the one hand, from the discretion with respect to the exercise of such jurisdiction, and, upon the other, from the merits of the case,-in other words, the question whether a proper case for interference by injunction has been made out. In a number of cases the court while assuming, or at least not denying the right to assume jurisdiction, has, in the exercise of its discretion, refused to entertain the suit, or has denied the injunction on the merits. Thus, the court, in Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 681, held that an encumbrancer of immovable property situate in a foreign country, who has instituted legal proceedings in that country for the purpose of enforcing his rights, will not be restrained by injunction from prosecuting such proceedings, even though the mortgagor is a company in the course of winding up; at all events, if the party seeking to restrain him may appear before the foreign tribunal and assert his rights.

In White v. Hall, 12 Ves. Jr. 321, the Lord Chancellor refused an injunction to restrain a sale, under a decree of the colonial court, of real property in Demerara, which had been made security for the discharge of a debt in instalments, although he intimated that, if he had had jurisdiction, he would have held, contrary to the decision of the colonial court, that there had been no such default as to subject the property to sale.

So in Jones v. Geddes, 1 Phill. Ch. 724, an injunction granted on a suggestion of fraud, to restrain a resident of England from prosecuting a suit in Scotland to enforce a legal security against lands in that country, was dissolved on appeal, because the question between the parties could be more conveniently litigated in Scotland.

In Norton v. Florence Land & Public Works Co. L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 332, the court denied a motion on behalf of the holders of obligations of a company with an office in London and having real property in Italy, to restrain a bank, also having a London office, from enforcing, in priority to the holders of the obligations, a mortgage held by it upon the Italian property. The decision, was not upon the ground of absolute lack of jurisdiction, but was made as a matter of discretion.

Durant v. Pierson, 19 N. Y. Civ. Proc. Rep. 203, 12 N. Y. Supp. 145, refused a motion by defendant, pending an appeal by him from a judgment in favor of plaintiff to set aside an assignment as fraudulent, to stay proceedings taken by the plaintiff in another state to collect his claim out of real estate there situated. Bowers v. Durant, 43 Hun, 348,-infra, III.

A court has no power to enjoin a citizen of a foreign state or sovereignty from causing a levy to be made on lands which are situated in the foreign state and beyond its territorial jurisdiction, because it has appointed a receiver of such property, unless the person so enjoined is a party, either in person or by representation, to the litigation in which the receiver has been appointed. Schindelholz v. Cullum, 5 C. C. A. 293, 12 U. S. App. 242, 55 Fed. 885.

in that case that the courts of New York should have jurisdiction.

In Harris v. Pullman, 84 Ill. 20, 25 Am. Rep. 416, and Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige, 402, the jurisdiction to enjoin the further prosecu tion of actions already commenced in other states with respect to real property was denied, upon the ground that, under the rule in the United States, one state has no power, by process of injunction, to restrain proceedings previously commenced in the court of another state. The general question of jurisdiction suggested by these cases, whether a court of one state may in any case entertain a suit to

their persons by their appearance, has jurisdiction to compel an accounting with respect to the proceeds and profits arising from land outside the state. Wood v. Warner, 15 N. J. Eq. 81.

The courts of one state have jurisdiction of an action for an accounting as to the management and disposition of lands in another state, and the uses made of their proceeds, where the

tion of conveyance.

See also Henderson v. McBee, 79 N. C. 219; Dickinson v. Hoomes, 8 Gratt. 353, 410; Clopton v. Booker, 27 Ark. 482,-supra, III.,

a.

A court of equity has ample jurisdiction of a suit for an accounting of the proceeds and profits arising from real property in another state or country. Thus :

An action may be brought in behalf of an infant for an account of the proceeds of real property in St. Christophers. Roberdeau v. Rous, 1 Atk. 543.

A bill between joint tenants of land in Ireland, for an accounting of the profits and for a partition of the lands, is good as to the profits, which are in the personalty, but not so as to the partition, which is in the realty for a commission to make partition cannot be awarded into Ireland. Cartwright v. Pettus, 2 Ch. Cas. 214, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 133.

In Mercantile Invest. & General Trust Co. v. River Plate Trust Loan & Agency Co. [1892] 2 Ch. 303, the court asserted the jurisdiction of an English court to compel, at the instance of the holders of debenture debts secured by an equitable charge on land in Mexico, an accounting in respect of the proceeds of such property by an English company which purchased the land subject to the payment of the obligations, though, as a matter of discretion, the court refused to appoint a receiver upon the ground that such relief would be useless.

The court, in Re Hawthorne, L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 743, dismissed for want of jurisdiction, a suit for an accounting of the proceeds of a sale of real property in Saxony, notwithstand ing that the parties were temporarily in England and within the jurisdiction of the court; it appearing that the rights of the parties depended primarily upon the law of Saxony, as to the devolution of property in that country, there being no contract, fraud, or trust in the

case.

The California superior court has jurisdiction of an action to compel an accounting of the profits realized by a California corporation from its operation of a cannery and the use of the personal property of its debtor, under an agreement entered into as security for a debt then due, although the property is situated in Alaska. Peninsular Trading & Fishing Co. v. Pacific Steam Whaling Co. 123 Cal. 689, 56 Pac. 604.

In Hayden V. Yale, 45 La. Ann. 362, 40 Am. St. Rep. 232, 12 So. 633, the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction in personam, compelled a resident creditor of an insolvent to turn over to a syndic or assignee the proceeds of real property of the insolvent in another state, which such creditor had procured to be sold under attachment in the latter state. A court of equity of the state in which de

v. Haggin, 58 Hun, 450, 35 N. Y. S. R. 585, 12 N. Y. Supp. 368.

A court of equity of one state may maintain a suit against a railroad company and a mortgage trustee to compel an accounting, in orde to determine what amount of net earnings of the railroad has been wrongfully diverted from the payment of the bonds secured by the mortgage, and to restrain similar further payments, although the mortgaged property is in another state. Buel v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. 24 Misc. 646, 53 N. Y. Supp. 749.

It was held in Moss's Estate, 138 Pa. 646, 21 Atl. 206, that a court of Pennsylvania had jurisdiction to require the application of the proceeds of a sale of land in West Virginia to the discharge of liens covering both that land and land in Pennsylvania, in order to protect subsequent encumbrancers having liens on the Pennsylvania land only.

Local courts have jurisdiction of a fund arising from the sale of real property in another country, when the fund is in the hands of a citizen of whose person they have jurisdiction. Kessler v. Kessler, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 522.

An objection, in a suit for an accounting and settlement of the partnership business, to an order for the sale of the partnership lands, upon the ground that, as the lands lie in different states, the order cannot be enforced except as to lands within the state in which the court is sitting, is not well founded. Such order does not require the agency of an officer out of the jurisdiction of the court; the order is to act upon the parties in the cause; and the transfer of title is to come from them, and not from the person through whose agency the sale shall be made. Lyman v. Lyman, 2 Paine, 11, Fed. Cas. No. 8,628.

In the last case the bill, in addition to a prayer for an accounting, contained a prayer for the sale of the land in order to pay the amount due the complainants. The decree, however, did not direct such a sale; and the court said that it was unnecessary to consider whether it could at all interfere either with the sale of the land, or with the disposition of the proceeds of such sale.

The jurisdiction of the courts of equity extends to all matters necessary to wind up the affairs of a partnership, including the sale of real estate; and the jurisdiction is not local, even though a part of the assets consists of real property situated in another state. While the decree itself in such case would not directly effect the transfer of title, it binds the consciences of the parties, and can be enforced by the court within the territory where the property is located. Dunlap v. Byers, 110 Mich. 109, 67 N. W. 1067. In this case a court of Michigan gave effect to a decree rendered in Ohio in a suit for a dissolution of a partnership and an accounting, which directed a sale of land of the partnership in Michigan, the land having been purchased by one of the par

cannot, if desirable, assume jurisdiction of the suit, even if the land is beyond the territorial jurisdiction, if the circumstances are such that it can do justice between the parties by requir ing mutual conveyances and releases in severalty without sending commissioners into the state where the property is located; nor why, if a partition in kind is inexpedient, the court cannot, in analogy to foreclosure cases, grant effective relief by a decree requiring a judicial sale and conveyances to the purchaser by the owners of the undivided interests, at least, if the parties sustain contractual relations toward each other so as to bring the case within the rule as stated by Chief Justice Marshall. See supra, II., a.

In Page v. McKee, 3 Bush, 135, 96 Am. Dec. 201, the court held that the title of minor heirs to real property in Kentucky was not devested by a decree of a court of Indiana (where the intestate and all the parties were domiciled), in a suit for the partition of the Kentucky land and land in Indiana; and that a conveyance by the guardian of the minors was equally ineffectual to devest them of their title. The Kentucky court said that the Indiana court had jurisdiction of all the parties and all the subject-matter of the suit, save the Kentucky land; that, while it could not perfect its judgment of partition by an enforced conveyance, yet the adult heirs were voluntarily bound by the judgment, and then voluntarily joined in the conveyance; and that, so far as they were concerned, they were estopped to set up any claim; but that it was otherwise as to the minor heirs. The intimation that an enforced conveyance from the adults would not have de vested their title is obiter. The principle referred to in infra, IV., that the conveyance, in order to be effectual, must be made by the very person whose title or interest is to be affected, would be sufficient to justify the decision as to the minor heirs, without disputing the general proposition that a court of one state, having Jurisdiction of parties sui juris, may grant effective relief in a suit, the purpose of which is to partition lands in another state or country, by the requisition of mutual conveyances or re

leases.

A court of one state has no jurisdiction, in a suit in chancery for the construction of a will, to determine the manner in which lands in another state belonging to the testator at the time of his death, or the proceeds thereof in case of sale, are to be distributed. Parsons V. Millar, 189 Ill. 107, 59 N. E. 606.

In Bowers v. Durant, 43 Hun, 348, which affirmed an order restraining defendant from prosecuting partition suits in Iowa and Nebras ka in respect of lands situated in those states in violation of his agreement that a partition might be brought in the courts of New York for the purpose of partitioning all the real estate of his father, whether the same was situated in that state or elsewhere; and that the agreement might be pleaded as conferring jurisdiction; and that he would execute deeds in accordance with any judgment that might be rendered in such action,-the court said that, having secured, by means of such agreement, his ends in securing the probate of his father's will, he is estopped from denying the jurisdiction of the courts of New York.

k. Appointment of receiver.

tion over suits, the specific purpose of which is to secure the appointment of a receiver of real property situated in another state or country, or to subject such property to a receivership; and does not deal with the general subject of the power of a receiver appointed in one state or country over real property in another. It will be observed that this distinction is a specific application of the distinction outlined at the beginning of the note in defining its scope. In v. Lindsey, 15 Ves. Jr. 91, a receiver was appointed of an estate in the East Indies, no question being raised as to the jurisdiction.

In Hibbert v. Hibbert, 3 Meriv. 681, a receiver was appointed of the real and personal estate of the testator in the West Indies, no question being raised as to the jurisdiction.

In Houlditeh v. Donegal, 8 Bligh, N. R. 301, 2 Clark & F. 470, the Lord Chancellor held that the court of chancery of England, acting in personam, had jurisdiction to appoint a receiv er of real property in Ireland, which was subject to a trust for the payment of debts; although he assumed that the assistance of a court of Ireland would be necessary to make such appointment effectual, since a foreign judgment is merely prima facie evidence or ground of an action, and is not conclusive.

The supreme court of New York has power to compel a judgment debtor to convey lands in another state to a receiver for the benefit of his creditors in such a manner as to vest in the grantee the legal title. Bailey v. Ryder, 10 N. Y. 363.

Smith v. Tozer, 11 N. Y. Civ. Proc. Rep. 343, denied the power of a court to direct a conveyance to a receiver, appointed in supplementary proceedings, of lands of the debtor in another state. The decision, however, was upon the ground that under the Code of Civil Procedure, the property of a judgment debtor cannot be reached in supplementary proceedings, unless the judgment is a lien thereon.

1. Miscellaneous.

In Tulloch v. Hartley, 1 Younge & C. Ch. Cas. 114, the court, without mentioning any doubt as to the jurisdiction, entertained a bill to settle the boundaries of real estate in Jamaica.

In Athol v. Derby, 1 Ch. Cas. 220, a contract respecting the Isle of Man, though out of the jurisdiction, was enforecd by a court of chancery in England.

That land of a testator, charged by his will with the payment of legacies, is beyond the limits of the state and of the district in which a Federal court is sitting, does not prevent it from granting appropriate relief to the legatee. It is true that the court cannot, in such a case, order the land to be sold for payment of any decree which it may make in favor of the plaintiff; but it is not without power to act efficiently to cause the defendants to pay any such decree. Lewis v. Darling, 16 How. 1, 14 L. ed. 819.

A residuary legatee in a will executed in North Carolina by a person domiciled in that state, which appointed four executors (two of whom resided in Tennessee), and directed the executors to raise from land in the latter state such sum as would be sufficient to pay all his debts, cannot maintain a bill in North Caro

decree.

As to the form and effect of the decree in the various kind of suits, see the appropriate subdivision of III.

A court of equity may entertain a suit by a wife to obtain a settlement out of her equitable estate if the husband is within its jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the real property involved is in another jurisdiction. Guild v. Guild, 16 Ala. 121.

The courts of a state have jurisdiction of a suit to rescind promissory notes, executed and made payable in that state to a resident thereof, which are secured by a mortgage, recorded therein, of land therein situated, although they were given to secure payment of the purchase price of land situated in a foreign country, notwithstanding that the restoration by the plaintiffs of the property in the foreign country for which the notes were given is a condition of relief. Loaiza v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. 11, 9 L. R. A. 376, 20 Am. St. Rep. 197, 24 Pac. 707.

In Pike v. Hoare, 1 Ambl. 428, the Lord Chancellor dismissed a bill by an heir at law for an issue to try the validity of a will, mainly because the land lay in Pennsylvania: though he said that, under the circumstances of the case, he would have dismissed the bill even if the will had concerned lands in England.

An English court will not entertain a bill of discovery to obtain inspection of documents in the defendant's possession in England, in aid of proceedings about to be taken for the recov ery of land in India the defendant being capable of being sued in India. Reiner v. Salisbury, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 378.

A bill cannot be maintained in behalf of an infant to compel the delivery of possession of lands in a foreign country. Roberdeau v. Rous,

1 Atk. 543.

A suit to subject land descended to an heir to the payment of a debt of the ancestor is in rem, and can only be maintained in the jurisdiction in which the land is situated. Williams v. Ewing, 31 Ark. 229.

Ross v. Ross, 23 Ont. Rep. 43, denied a motion for judgment by plaintiff in a suit asking for a declaration that real property in the Northwest territory the title to which was in the name of the plaintiff's father at the time of his death, belonged to the plaintiff, and praying that defendants, the administrators and heirs of the deceased, be ordered to convey it to him. notwithstanding that the adult defendants admitted the plaintiff's right to the land, and that the guardian of the infant defendants submitted their rights to the court. Street, J., said that the action was one for directly determining the title to land lying outside of the province and, in reply to the contention that, the defendants all being residents of the province. the court could act upon them in personam, he said he would first of all have to inquire whether. by the lex rei site, the land belonged to the plaintiff or defendants, and that, if he found that point in favor of plaintiff, he would then have to find some method of effectually vesting in him the estate then vested in the infant defendants.

As has been shown in supra, II., b, the ability to grant effective relief by a decree in personam is the test of the jurisdiction of a court of equity of a suit, the purpose of which is to affect land in another state or country. The mere fact however, that, if the land to be affected were in the state or country where the court is sitting a decree in rem, acting directly upon the land, would be the appropriate form of relief, does not necessarily defeat the jurisdiction when the land to be affected is in another state or country; for the powers of a court of equity are adequate to adjust the form of relief to the exigencies of the case arising from the location of the property beyond the territorial jurisdiction, so long as it does not undertake to grant, in the form of an equitable decree in personam, relief to which the parties are not entitled in any form of action, or which is properly only obtainable in an action at law. It would not be competent for a court of equity to grant relief, in respect of land beyond the territorial jurisdiction, by the requisition of a conveyance or other decree in personam, in a suit which was, in substance, ejectment directly involving the title to the property, and presenting no ground of equitable intervention. In a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage, however, which is essentially an equitable suit, and in which the relief, when the land is within the territorial jurisdiction, is usually granted in the form of a decree in rem directing the sale of the property without requiring a conveyance or release by the mortgagor or owner of the equity of redemption, the court may, if the property is beyond the territorial jurisdiction, mould the relief into the form of a personal decree by the requisition of such a convey

ance.

Enos v. Hunter, 9 Ill. 211, though merely involving the jurisdiction of a court of one county in respect of land situated in another county in the same state, contains a clear statement of the scope and extent of the jurisdiction of suits affecting land beyond the territorial jurisdiction, and of the mode and manner in which such jurisdiction may be effectively exercised. It said, in this connection, speaking of the suit for the specific performance: "The court can grant the necessary relief by coercing the person of the defendant no matter where the land may be situated. The fact that the land is beyond the control of the court makes no difference in relation to the extent of the relief which the court may give, except that probably the court will not compel the defendant to deliver possession to the complainant after the execution of the deed, which it might do if the premises were within its own jurisdiction. That, however, is not essential to the substantial part of the relief sought, and is a matter of discretion with the court, rather than of strict right to the party. The inability to give the party possession will not prevent the court from securing to him the legal title, which the party may convey as well in one place as in another."

In some instances, when the land is beyond the territorial jurisdiction, the court grants a decree which is both in rem and in personam,