though conceding that the decree in rem, if it stood alone, would be entirely ineffective. An illustration of this is furnished in suits for the foreclosure of mortgages upon land lying partly without the jurisdiction, where the usual form of relief is a decree directing the sale of the property (which in itself would be ineffectual to transfer the title so far as the land in the other state or country is concerned), and re quiring the mortgagor or owner of the equity of redemption to convey or release to the purchaser at the sale. If a court of equity, having personal jurisdiction of the necessary parties in a suit presenting a proper case for equitable intervention, requires a conveyance, by the owner of the title or interest to be affected, of land in another state or country, such conveyance, when duly executed pursuant to the decree, and in the manner required by the lex rei sitæ, is as effective, not only in the state or country where the decree is rendered, but in that where the land is located, as if it had been voluntarily executed. This is assumed in all of the cases cited at the close of supra, II., b. A decree of the court of one state, requiring and directing lands in another state to be conveyed, or charged, or otherwise disposed of, may be enforced by their process; and when enforced or submitted to by the execution of a conveyance, mortgage, or other instrument, as di rected, such conveyance, mortgage, or other instrument is effective in the situs rei. Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 27 L. R. A. 213, 46 Am. St. Rep. 528, 30 Atl. 676. of the parties, are competent to entertain a suit for specific performance, or to establish a trust, or for a conveyance, although the contract, trust, or fraudulent title pertains to lands in another state or country. But a decree in such a suit imposes a mere personal obligation enforceable by injunction, attachment, or other like process, against the person, and cannot operate upon lands in another jurisdiction to create a transfer or vest a title. Lindley v. O'Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 636, 1 L. R. A. 79, 7 Am. St. Rep. 802, 15 Atl. 379. A decree of a court of chancery is not erroneous so far as it adjudges that a deed for land in another state is inoperative and without legal force for want of delivery, where it further directs that either of the parties shall be at liberty to apply to the court of chancery for further aid and direction as occasion may require. Vreeland v. Vreeland (N. J.) 24 Atl. 551. The court said that the decree could not change or affect the title to the Missouri land directly, but that the chancellor could render the decree effective by constraining the grantee in the deed referred to, to execute a reconveyance. Under the law of Ohio, a decree for the conveyance of land operates as a conveyance; but, in order that a decree shall thus operate, the land itself must be within the jurisdiction of the court. If the land is within a foreign jurisdiction, the decree cannot operate as a conveyance; it must be enforced by attachment, or otherwise, as the case may require. Daniels v. Stevens, 19 Ohio, 222. In Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474, 15 Am. Rep. 624, however, I was held that the decree, even without such a conveyance, is conclusive of all the rights and equities of the A court of equity may compel a person of whom it has jurisdiction either to bring prop erty in dispute, or to which the complainant claims an equitable title, within the jurisdiction of the court, or to execute such a convey-parties who acted therein, when pleaded in the ance or transfer thereof as will be sufficient to vest the legal title, as well as the possession of the property, of the lex loci rei site. Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606, 22 Am. Dec. 669. A court of equity which has jurisdiction of the person may, by the ordinary process of injunction and attachment for contempt, compel him to desist from commencing a suit at law, either in the state or in any foreign jurisdiction and it may, in the same manner, com pel him to execute a conveyance or release in such form as may be necessary to transfer the legal title to the property according to the laws of the place where the same is situated, or which may be sufficient in law to bar an action in any foreign tribunal. Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige, 402. It is the conveyance pursuant to the decree. however, and not the decree itself, that passes the title; and the decree without the conveyance does not affect the legal title. Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25, 10 L. ed. 873; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464, 19 L. ed. 976; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87, 35 L. ed. 640, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 960; Tardy v. Morgan, 3 McLean, 358, Fed. Cas. No. 13,752; Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 27 L. R. A. 213, 46 Am. St. Rep. 528, 30 Atl. 676; Lindley v. O'Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 636, 1 L. R. A. 79, 7 Am. St. Rep. 802, 15 Atl. 379; Johnson v. Kimbro, 3 Head, 557, 75 Am. Dec. 781; Paschal V. Acklin. 27 Tex. 173; Morris v. Hand, 70 Tex. 481, 8 S. W. 210. In cases of contract, trust, or fraud, the equity courts of one state, having jurisdiction courts of the state in which the land is situated; and may be relied upon as a defense in a suit in the latter state for the possession of the land, where the statute of that state allows equitable, as well as legal, defenses. A court of equity may enforce obedience to its decree requiring a conveyance of land beyond the territorial jurisdiction by a proper process against the defendant. See Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464, 19 L. ed. 976; Seixas v. King, 39 La. Ann. 510, 2 So. 416. This is, of course, implied in all the cases which uphold the jurisdiction to decree a conveyance of land in another state or country. A decree in personam, requiring a conveyance, must, however, be enforced by the courts of the state or country in which it was granted and the courts of the state or country in which the land is located will not ordinarily enforce the decree by compelling a conveyance. Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 115; Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474, 15 Am. Rep. 621. A decree rendered in New York, directing defendant to execute a mortgage, as security for the payment of alimony, upon lands in New Jersey, does not affect the lands; and a court of equity of New Jersey will not compel the defendant to perform the obligation imposed upon him by the New York decree. Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 27 L. R. A. 213, 46 Am. St. Rep. 528, 30 Atl. 676. In Dunlap v. Byers, 110 Mich. 109, 67 N. W. 1067, however, a court of Michigan gave effect to a decree rendered in Ohio, in a suit for the dissolution of a partnership and an ac counting, which directed a sale of land of the partnership in Michigan; the land having been purchased by one of the parties to the suit, and the other party having been ordered by the decree to quitclaim, but never having done so. So, it was held in Roblin v. Long, 60 How. Pr. 200, that a court of New York, having acquired jurisdiction of the person of defendant, may compel him to convey lands in Canada, as required by a decree of a court of Canada. Not only is a decree without a conveyance ineffectual to pass a title, but the conveyance must be executed by the very person whose title or interest is to be affected. A conveyance by a master, or commissioner, or other officer appointed by the court for that purpose is ineffectual. Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25, 10 L. ed. 873; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464, 19 L. ed. 976; Watts v. Waddle, 1 McLean, 200, Fed. Cas. No. 17,295; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Postal Teleg. Co. 55 Conn. 334, 3 Am. St. Rep. 53, 11 Atl. 184; McLawrin v. Salmons, 11 B. Mon. 96, 52 Am. Dec. 563; Burnley V. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474, 15 Am. Rep. 621; Moseby v. Burrow, 52 Tex. 396; Morris v. Hand, 70 Tex. 481, 8 S. W. 210. The last point is also illustrated by the cases cited in supra III., a, holding that a trus tee appointed by the court of one state cannot pass the title to real estate in another state; and by cases holding that a court of one state or country cannot confer upon an administrator power to sell the real property of the decedent in another. Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 26, 10 L. ed. 873; Sheldon v. Rice, 30 Mich. 296, 18 Am. Rep. 136; Nowler v. Coit, 1 Ohio, 519, 13 Am. Dec. 640; Allen v. Shanks, 90 Tenn. 359, 16 S. W. 715; Brown v. Edson, 23 Vt. 435. A deed of real property in Alabama, executed by the widow and administratrix of the deceased owner (she having, by the law of Alabama, no power to dispose of the real estate of her husband, except for the payment of the debts of his estate), pursuant to a decree rendered by a court of Massachusetts, in proceedings under a statute of that state founded on a title bond given by the deceased, is not valid, and does not affect the title. Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25, 10 L. ed. 873. The chancery court of Tennessee cannot compel the heirs of a decedent to convey land located in another state to a commissioner appointed by the court for the purpose of having the land sold for the payment of the debts of the estate. Robinson v. Johnson (Tenn. Ch. App.) 52 S. W. 704. A curatrix, acting under authority of the probate court of Louisiana, cannot make a valid conveyance of land belonging to the ward situated in Texas. Wren v. Howland (Tex. Civ. App.) 75 S. W. 894. So, a committee of a lunatic appointed in one state cannot convey land in another. Morris v. Hand, 70 Tex. 481, 8 S. W. 210; Hotchkiss v. Middlekauf, 96 Va. 649, 43 L. R. A. 806. 32 S. E. 36. Nor may a court of equity in one state charge the land of a lunatic in another state, or its proceeds in the hands of his heir, for his past support. Allison v. Campbell, 21 N. C. (1 Dev. & B. Eq.) 152. In McGee v. Sweeney, 84 Cal. 100, 23 Pac. 1117, the California supreme court affirmed a decree which directed defendant, in whom the title stood, to convey the title to real property in Pennsylvania to the plaintiff; and provided that, in default of such payment, a commissioner appointed by the court should execute a conveyance. Nothing is said in the opinion, however, with respect to the portion of the decree directing a conveyance by a commissioner, the court merely saying that a court of equity has power to compel a reconveyance of property outside of its jurisdiction by reason of its control over the parties before it. Van Dyke's Appeal, 60 Pa. 481, illustrates the manner in which equity may, in suits indirectly affecting real property in another state, mould its decree so as to give the parties adequate relief, without exceeding its jurisdiction in respect of the land. The will of a testator domiciled in Pennsylvania gave certain legacies to the testator's daughters, and attempted to devise certain real property in New Jersey to his sons. It, however, was not executed in the manner required to pass the title to real property in New Jersey, and the prayer of the bill was that the daughters (some of whom were minors) should be put to their election either to give effect to the whole will by relinquishing their claim upon the New Jersey property, or from their legacies to compensate the sons for their loss in consequence of the daughters sharing with them the New Jersey property. The court said that, as its decree could not authorize the guardians of the minors to execute releases of their right and title to the New Jersey lands which would be effectual in that state, the last alternative of the prayer furnished the more appropriate form of relief, and, accordingly, decreed that the executors pay to the daughters such sum less than the amount of their respective legacies as would compensate the sons for the value of the daughters' shares in the New Jersey real estate. V. Summary. The foregoing review of the authorities seems to warrant the following propositions with respect to the jurisdiction of equity over suits the avowed purpose of which is to affect real property in another state or country: 1. The case must, independently of the location of the land beyond the territorial jurisdiction, be a proper one for equitable intervention; and, according to the usual form of statement with respect to this jurisdiction, must have arisen out of fraud, trust, or contract. The jurisdiction does not extend to a suit that, in its essence, involves merely the title or possession of the land, and presents no ground of equitable intervention. (II., a.) 2. The jurisdiction is confined to suits in personam, and does not extend to suits in rem. (I.) 3. The ability to grant effective relief by a decree in personam is a necessary condition of the jurisdiction. (II., b.) 4. The defendant, whose title or interest is to be affected, must be personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court. If a nonresident, he must either have appeared, or have been personally served within the jurisdiction; constructive or substituted service outside of the state is not sufficient in case of a nonresident. (II. b.) 5. The residence within the jurisdiction of the person whose title or interest is to be affected is not on principle a necessary condi Messrs. Walker & Payne, for appel tion of the jurisdiction, though his nonresi- 6. The decree, in order to be effective, must be in personam. (IV.) 7. A deed of land in one state or country, executed by the owner of the title or an interest therein pursuant to a decree of a court of equity of another state or country, which had jurisdiction of his person in a proper case for equitable intervention, is as binding and effective in both jurisdictions as if it had been voluntarily executed. (IV.) 8. The decree requiring the conveyance, however, without the conveyance itself, does not affect the legal title. (IV.) 9. Obedience to the decree requiring the conveyance must be enforced by the courts of the state or country where it was rendered, and will not be enforced by the courts of the state or country in which the land is located. (IV.) 10. The conveyance must be executed by the very person whose title or interest is to be affected; a conveyance by an officer of the court is ineffectual. (IV.) 11. The relief may be varied to suit the exigencies of the case arising from the location of the land beyond the territorial jurisdiction, so long as it does not undertake to grant, in the form of an equitable decree in personam, relief to which the parties are not entitled in any form of action, or which is properly procurable only in an action at law. (IV.) 12. For the specific application of these principles to particular classes, see the various subdivisions of supra, III. G. H. P. A servant, in order to recover for an injury for defects in appliances, is required to establish three propositions: (1) That the appliances were defective; (2) that the master had notice thereof, or ought to have had; (3) that the servant did not know of the defect, and had not equal means of knowing with the master. Goldie v. Werner, 151 Ill. 551, 38 N. E. 95; Howe v. Medaris, 183 Ill. 288, 55 N. E. 724. There is no rule for building scaffolds; they must be adapted to each locality and purpose. There is not one word of evidence to show whether inspection was ever made or not, or that the defect in the material was one which a proper inspection would have revealed, had it been made; which proof is essential before recovery can be had. Sack v. Dolese, 35 Ill. App. 636, Affirmed in 137 Ill. 129, 27 N. E. 62. That an accident occurs, does not prove that, if an inspection had been made, a defect would have been discovered, and the misfortune averted. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470, 42 Am. Rep. 311; Butler v. Townsend, 126 N. Y. 105, 26 N. E. 1017; Schultz v. Pacific R. Co. 36 Mo. 32. Counsel, having chosen to try this case upon the issue as to negligent construction, cannot submit the case on negligence in providing improper material for the construction of the scaffold. Wabash Western R. Co. v. Friedman, 146 Ill. 583, 30 N. E. 353, 34 N. E. 1111; Bloomington v. Goodrich, 88 Ill. 558; Ayers v. Chicago, 111 Ill. 406; Illinois C. R. Co. v. McKee, 43 Ill. 119. Appellee cannot recover against these appellants for the negligence relied upon. A custom prevails in Chicago, of more than a quarter of a century's duration, that, when work is being performed upon buildings of this kind, it is the brick-mason contractor's duty to provide and maintain the scaffolding on the building; and the stone-setting contractors never provide a scaffold for their work, but use the brick mason's scaffold, the brick-mason contractor retaining control of the scaffold, making all repairs and changes necessary. Unless the evidence shows that appellants undertook, promised, or agreed to furnish a scaffold for deceased's use, or assumed charge or control of the one actually used, appellants cannot be held liable for defects in the material, or in the construction of it. Appellants could not have built a scaffold if they wanted it. The owner paid the another contractor, the liability of the master for their safety and sufficiency is the same as if the master had built the machine or appliances himself. brick-mason contractor for furnishing one ery or appliances furnished and built by on the building, to be used by the other contractors, and only one scaffold could be placed on the premises at the same time. There was only one thing to do, and that was to use the brick mason's scaffold, or abandon the work. Deceased knew it, accepted the employment with full knowledge of it, knew that appellants spent but little time at the building, that there was no one in appellants' employ whose duty it was to inspect the scaffold, unless himself; and, in accepting and continuing in the employment, he assumed the risk. Channon v. Sanford Co. 70 Conn. 573, 41 L. R. A. 200, 66 Am. St. Rep. 133, 40 Atl. 462; Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co. 56 N. Y. 124, 15 Am. Rep. 387; Brady v. Norcross, 172 Mass. 331, 52 N. E. 528; Kelly v. Howell, 41 Ohio St. 438. If a servant cannot recover against a master for a defective scaffold when the scaffold was constructed by an independent contractor, how can a recovery be had against the master in this case, where the custom of the trade provides that the stone-setting contractor shall not furnish the scaffold, but the owner shall contract with the brickmason contractor to furnish the scaffold for the stone setters? Scammon v. Chicago, 25 Ill. 424, 79 Am. Dec. 334; Hale v. Johnson, 80 Ill. 185; Jefferson v. Jameson & M. Co. 165 Ill. 133, 46 N. E. 272; Foster v. Wadsworth-How land Co. 168 Ill. 514, 48 N. E. 163; Whitney & S. Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 Ill. 177, 50 N. E. 242; East St. Louis v. Giblin, 3 Ill. App. 219; Arasmith v. Temple, 11 Ill. App. 39; Chicago City R. Co. v. Hennessy, 16 111. App. 153; Pack v. New York, 8 N. Y. 222; Hexamer v. Webb, 101 N. Y. 377, 54 Am. Rep. 703, 4 N. E. 755; Conners v. Hennessey, 112 Mass. 96; Morgan v. Smith, 159 Mass. 570, 35 N. E. 101; Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Gray, 349, 63 Am. Dec. 743; Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121; Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. 213; Devlin v. Smith. 89 N. Y. 470, 42 Am. Rep. 311; Mulchey v. Methodist Religious Soc. 125 Mass. 487; Killea v. Faxon, 125 Mass. 485; Butler v. Townsend, 126 N. Y. 105, 26 N. E. 1017. On petition for rehearing. He who provides the working place or appliance is the party liable for their nonsafety. Then we have, (1) an invitation to use; (2) an overt act affecting another; both of which must, by diligence, be safe-guarded by the providing party. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Avery, 109 Ill. 314; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Maroney, 170 Ill. 520, 62 Am. St. Rep. 396, 48 N. E. 953; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Scanlan, 170 III. 107, 48 N. E. 826; Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. Ross, 142 Ill. 9, 34 Am. St. Rep. 49, 31 N. E. 412; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 242, 18 L. R. A. 215, 32 N. E. 285; Rice & B. Malting Co. v. Paulsen, 51 Ill. App. 123; East St. Louis Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Crow, 52 Ill. App. 573. The duty of the master to furnish a safe place in which, and a safe appliance with which, to do the work, cannot be delegated to another. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Avery, 109 Ill. 314; Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. Ross, 142 Ill. 9, 34 Am. St. Rep. 49, 31 N. E. 412; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Maroney, 170 Ill. 521, 62 Am. St. Rep. 396, 48 N. E. 953; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Scanlan, 170 Ill. 107, 48 N. E. 826; Rice & B. Malting Co. v. Paulsen, 51 Ill. App. 124; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 243, 18 L. R. A. 215, 32 N. E. 285. It is the duty of the master to inspect the machinery, and see that it is safe. The same rule applies whether the appliance belongs to other persons, or is furnished by the master himself. Whitney & S. Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 Ill. 177, 50 N. E. 242; Sack v. Dolese, 137 Ill. 129, 27 N. E. 62; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Avery, 109 Ill. 314; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 243, 18 L. R. A. 215, 32 N. E. 285. The master is chargeable with notice of all defects in the machinery or appliance (not latent) if the defect existed at the time the appliance was built. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Maroney, 170 Ill. 521, 62 Am. St. Rep. 396, 48 N. E. 953; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Hines, 132 Ill. 161, 22 Am. St. Rep. 515, 23 N. E. 1021; Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Ligas, 172 Ill. 315, 64 Am. St. Rep. 38, 50 N. E. 225. The master cannot delegate this duty, although the appliance is built by an independent contractor, if the master assumes use and possession if it. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Maroney, 170 III. 521, 62 Am. St. Rep. 396. 48 N. E. 953; Monmouth Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Evling, 148 Ill. 521, 39 Am. St. Rep. 187, 36 N. E. 117; Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. Ross, 142 III. 9, 34 Bright v. Barnett & R. Co. 88 Wis. 299, Am. St. Rep. 49, 31 N. E. 412; Chicago & 26 L. R. A. 524, 60 N. W. 418. A. R. Co. v. Scanlan, 170 Ill. 107, 48 N. E. Messrs. William Garnett, Jr., and Ira 826; Rice & B. Malting Co. v. Paulsen, 51 C. Wood, for appellee: Ill. App. 124; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Where a master adopts and uses machin- Laack, 143 Ill. 243, 18 L. R. A. 215, 32 N. 225. If two methods are used in doing the work, and both are considered about equally safe, the employee may choose either. Rice & B. Malting Co. v. Paulsen, 51 Ill. App. 124; Monmouth Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Erling, 148 Ill. 521, 39 Am. St. Rep. 187, 36 N. E. 117; East St. Louis Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Crow, 52 Ill. App. 573; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 243, 18 L. R. A. 215, 32 N. E. 285. E. 285; Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Ligas, | "was improperly and carelessly construct172 Ill. 315, 64 Am. St. Rep. 38, 50 N. E. ed," and that the defendants failed to test it to see that it was safe; and while the deceased, with due care and diligence, was using said scaffold, pursuing his work, it broke, throwing him to the ground, causing his death. The second count is substantially the same, except that it avers "that it then and there became and was the duty of the defendants, as employers of the said Thomas Rawle, to provide and maintain proper, suitable, secure, strong, and safe scaffolding to be used by him in the prosecution of his work; yet they provided him with an improper, unsuitable, insecure, weak, and unsafe scaffolding." On a plea of not guilty issue was joined, and the cause submitted to a jury, resulting in a verdict of $5,000 for plaintiff. From a judgment of affirmance in the appellate court, defendants prosecute this appeal. Where there are several methods of doing work, and competent judges are not agreed as to their relative merits, the selection by the master, or servant, of one rather than the other, cannot be regarded as negligence. East St. Louis Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Sculley, 63 Ill. App. 147. Actual notice to the master of defects is not necessary to render the master liable. Whitney & S. Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 Ill. 177, 50 N. E. 242. The master is bound to provide a reason ably safe place, and is liable for neglect so to do, unless the servant actually knows of the danger, and thereafter remains in the exposed position. The theory of plaintiff's case is that it was the duty of appellants to furnish the deceased, as their servant, a safe place in which to work, and that his death was caused by their failure so to do. Several defenses were relied upon at the trial, and urged before the appellate court, predicated upon the evidence; but, all controverted Pioneer Fireproof Constr. Co. v. Howell, questions of fact being now settled adverse189 Ill. 123, 59 N. E. 535. The material question is whether the employee knew of the danger. This is a question for the jury. ly to those defenses, the only grounds of reversal urged in this court are, that the trial court erred in refusing to direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, and Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Stevens, 189 Ill. in refusing to give certain instructions 226, 59 N. E. 577. Even in manufactured appliances bought from a reputable maker, of standard make, the master is bound to inspect, and is chargeable with notice of visible and patent defects. Bailey, Mast. & S. pp. 98-100. asked on behalf of defendants. The first of these grounds is based upon the proposition that the plaintiff failed to prove, or introduce testimony tending to prove, that it was the duty of defendants to furnish the deceased a scaffold upon which to do the work which he was employed to perform. The uncontradicted evidence offered by Wilkin, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of plaintiff shows, and respective counsel so the court: This is an action by appellee, as administratrix of the estate of Thomas Rawle. deceased, in the superior court of Cook county, to recover damages for wrongfully causing the death of her intestate. Ap pellants were stone-setting contractors, and had a contract for setting the cut stone on the Historical Building in the city of Chicago. Thomas Rawle, the deceased, was in their employ, working upon this building by the day, as an expert stone setter. The first count of the declaration avers that on the 16th day of May, 1893, the defendants were prosecuting the work on this building, and provided the said Thomas Rawle with a certain scaffold upon which to stand while at work; that said scaffold agreed upon the trial, that in the construction of a stone-veneer building, such as this was, a recognized custom prevailed in Chicago that it is the duty of the persons in charge of the brick work to build the scaffold to be used by both the brick masons and the stone setters. The brick masons erect the scaffold, and as the building progresses the stone setters place the stone in position, and are followed by the brick masons, who back up the work with brick. It also appeared from the evidence that such custom was followed in the construction of the building in question, the scaffolds for each floor, as the building rose, being built by brick masons. While the deceased was setting stone on a scaffold some 40 feet above the ground, the scaffold |