in accordance with the law, and that the motion for a new trial was properly overruled.

The judgment is affirmed.

PITTSBURGH, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO, & ST. LOUIS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appt.,

υ.

William J. MONTGOMERY.

(152 Ind. 1.)

1. An employee injured by the negligence of another while both are acting in the line of duty as employees of a corporation has a right of action against the company, under the Indiana employer's liability act of 1893.

2.

der the laws of that state, valid against both the makers. The notes, being valid under the laws of Illinois, are equally valid and enforceable in this state, by the principle of comity, unless their enforcement would be contrary to good morals, or in violation of public policy, or forbidden by positive law. It is clear that a contract of suretyship by a married woman, executed in a foreign state, is not in itself immoral, nor is its enforcement forbidden by our laws. In some states, where the common-law disabilities of married women still exist, it has been held that the enforcement of such an alleged contract against them would be contrary to the public policy of the state, and that it was nonenforceable within that jurisdiction. Almost all the states of the Union have removed substantially all the disabilities of married women to contract, and in the interests of commerce and business, and upon the principle of comity among the states, have sustained and enforced contracts validly executed elsewhere, although the particular contract, if executed within such states, would have been unauthorized and invalid. In the case of Baer Bros. v. Terry, 105 La. 479, 29 So. 886, the supreme court of Louisiana, speaking to this point, said: "Nor do we agree with the counsel's contention that, assuming defendant to have been liable on the notes before she came to this state the law of this state prohibiting wives from binding themselves for the debts of their husbands precludes recovery against her. That law is satisfied, and its whole object and purpose is accomplished, when Louisiana wives are protected against binding themselves for the debts of their husbands. This protection is not extended to Missouri wives, 7. The exemption of municipal corpora

and, if these bind themselves in the state of their domicil for the debts of their husbands, they cannot be permitted to come to this state to be divorced from their obligations. When defendant crossed our borders as an immigrant to our soil the debt was already hers, and it has continued to be such. There is nothing in the atmosphere of Louisiana law and Louisiana jurisprudence to disintegrate or dissolve valid obligations. To such it is a healthful and bracing atmosphere." See also Wright v. Remington, 41 N. J. L. 48, 32 Am. Rep. 180.

We hold, in accord with the great weight of authority, that the enforcement of the notes in suit against appellant, Lida M. Gar

A provision creating a new liability is within the title of a statute, "An Act Regulating Liability of Railroads and Other Corporations."

3. The employer's liability act changing the law as to the defense in case of negligence of fellow servants of corpora tions is not within a constitutional provision as to local or special laws "regulating the practice in courts."

4. The question whether a general law can be made applicable to a particular case is for the legislature, and not for the court, to determine.

5. Railroad corporations are persons within the constitutional provisions as to equal privileges and immunities of citizens and the equal protection of persons.

6. A question of the unconstitutionality of a statute as to other corporations cannot be raised by a railroad company as to which the act is valid.

tions from a statute making other corporations liable to a servant for negligence of a fellow servant does not make the statute invalid.

S. A statute making void a contract by a corporation for the release or relief from liability to an employee for negligence of a fellow servant is not unconstitutional.

9. A prohibition of contracts releasing corporations from their liability to injured employees is within the main subject expressed in the title, which is the regulation of liability in such cases.

10. An agreement by a railroad em

ployee that the acceptance of benefits from a relief fund shall operate as a release of all claims against the railroad company is void, under the employer's liability act of 1893, although the release is only conditional.

on motion of the court itself is not ground

rigue, is in no sense violative of the public 11. The excusing of a competent juror policy of this state. There is no suggestion that any unfair means or undue influence was used to procure the execution of the notes, and, their collection not being in conflict with our public policy, we affirm that the verdict is sustained by the evidence, and

NOTE. As to validity of statute imposing liability for injury by fellow servant, see Johnson v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. 8 L. R. A. 419, and Funk v. St. Paul City R. Co. 29 L. R. A. 208, also the case following this one.

Rodenbarger v. Bramblett, 78 Ind. 213; Harrison v. Wright, 100 Ind. 515, 50 Am. Rep. 805; Waterman v. Morgan, 114 Ind. 15. A manifest clerical mistake in copy- 237, 16 N. E. 590; Leake v. Ball, 116 Ind.

1

neapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. | 86 Tenn. 272, 6 S. W. 401; State v. Divine, S. 210, 32 L. ed. 109, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1176; 98 N. C. 778, 4 S. E. 477. Bucklew v. Central Iowa R. Co. 64 Iowa, 611, 21 N. W. 103; Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 31 Minn. 11, 47 Am. Rep. 771, 16 N. W. 413.

Laws must not only be uniform in their application throughout the territory over which the legislative jurisdiction extends, but they must apply to all classes of citizens alike.

Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co. 71 Fed. 931. Such contracts have been upheld, and the answers based thereon sustained, in

The vocation of an employer, as well as that of his employee, is his property.

Depriving the owner of property of one of its attributes is depriving him of his property under the provisions of the Constitution.

People ex rel. Manhattan Sav. Inst. v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48; State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co. 33 W. Va. 188, 6 L. R. A. 359, 25 Am. St. Rep. 891, 10 S. E. 288; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. Graft v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 5 Sadler, 789, 22 S. W. 350; Frorer v. People, 141 (Pa.) 94, 8 Atl. 206; Fuller v. Baltimore & Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395; 0. Employees' Relief Asso. 67 Md. 433, 10 Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 14 L. R. A. Atl. 237; Owens v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 1 325, 31 Am. St. Rep. 533, 28 N. E. 1126; L. R. A. 75, 35 Fed. 715; State use of Black Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 17 L. R. A. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 36 Fed. 655; Mar- 853, 32 N. E. 364; San Antonio & A. Pass. tin v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 41 Fed. 125; R. Co. v. Wilson, 4 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. Com. v. Equitable Beneficial Asso. 137 Pa. (Willson) p. 565, 19 S. W. 910; Harding v. 412, 18 Atl. 1112; Lease v. Pennsylvania | People, 160 Ill. 459, 32 L. R. A. 445, 52 Am. Co. 10 Ind. App. 47, 37 N. E. 423; Johnson St. Rep. 344, 43 N. E. 624; Ritchie v. Peov. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 163 Pa. 127, 29 Atl. 854; Ringle v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 164 Pa. 529, 44 Am. St. Rep. 628, 30 Atl. 492; Donald v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 93 Iowa, 284, 33 L. R. A. 492, 61 N. W. 971; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bell, 44 Neb. 44, 62 N. W. 314; Vickers v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 71 Fed. 139; Otis v. Pennsylvania Co. 71 Fed. 136; Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co. 71 Fed. 931; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Cox, 55 Ohio St. 497, 35 L. R. A. 507, 45 N. E. 641; Maine v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 109 Iowa, 260, 70 N. W. 630, 80 N. W. 315; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Curtis, 51 Neb. 442, 66 Am. St. Rep. 456, 71 N. W. 42; Eckman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 169 Ill. 312, 38 L. R. A. 750, 48 N. E.

496.

Section 5 of said act is in conflict with the 14th Amendment to the Constitution and the acts of Congress passed for the enforcement thereof.

State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 29 L. R. A. 257, 50 Am. St. Rep. 443, 31 S. W. 781; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 515, 30 Am. Rep. 323; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 37 Am. St. Rep.

206, 35 N. E. 62; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 25 Am. St. Rep. 863, 10 S. E. 285; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; Re Parrott, 6 Sawy. 349, 1 Fed. 481; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29; Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550, 36 Am. Rep. 47; Ragio v. State,

ple, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315, 40 N. E. 454; Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 9 L. R. A. 482, 20 Am. St. Rep. 226, 24 Pac. 737; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 43 Am. St. Rep. 670, 59 N. W. 362; State ex rel. Luria v. Wagener, 69 Minn. 206, 38 L. R. A. 677, 65 Am. St. Rep. 565, 72 N. W. 67; Re House Bill No. 203, 21 Colo. 27, 39 Pac. 431; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465, 17 N. E. 343; Wallace v. Georgia, C. & N. R. Co. 94 Ga. 732, 22 S. E. 579; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.) 41 S. W. 680; Fraser v. McConway & T. Co. 82 Fed. 257; Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37, 16 Am. Rep. 611: Vanzant v. Waddel, 2 Yerg. 270; Madison & I. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217.

This section does not seek to regulate the terms and conditions upon which a right may be enjoyed, but it denies to both the employer and the employee the right to contract at all. If contracts such as this section forbids are, or can be, classed as liable to be injurious to public morals or public safety, or as in any way jeopardizing the public welfare, they might be subject to

reasonable restrictions, but not forbidden.

Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473, 60 Am. Rep. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462; Diamond Match 464, 13 N. E. 419; United States Chemical Co. v. Provident Chemical Co. 64 Fed. 946; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231.

Messrs. D. H. Chase, S. O. Pickens, and G. W. Funk also for appellant.

Messrs. McConnell & Jenkines and Nelson & Myers for appellee.

McCabe, J., delivered the opinion of the | follow four subdivisions, specifying the cases

court:

in which liability is to attach, the fourth of which, and the one on which this action is founded, reads thus: "Where such injury was caused by the negligence of any person in the service of such corporation, who has charge of any signal, telegraph office, switch yard, shop, roundhouse, locomotive engine, or train upon a railway, or where such injury was caused by the negligence of any person, coemployee, or fellow servant en

This action was brought by the appellee against the appellant to recover damages suffered by him on account of the alleged negligence of the defendant, resulting in a personal injury to the plaintiff. A demurrer to the complaint for want of sufficient facts, and a demurrer to the second paragraph of the answer, were overruled, and the issues joined were tried by a jury, resulting in a special verdict and judgment, over defend-gaged in the same common service in any ant's motion for a new trial, for $3,000 of the several departments of the service of damages. The errors assigned call in ques any such corporation, the said person, cotion the rulings on deniurrer, the refusal of employee, or fellow servant, at the time acta new trial, overruling motions for a venire ing in the place, and performing the duty de novo, for judgment in appellant's favor of the corporation in that behalf, and the on the special verdict, and sustaining appel-person so injured, obeying or conforming to lee's motion for judgment on the special verdict in his favor.

The only objection urged to the complaint is that it shows that the plaintiff was a freight brakeman in the defendant's service on its railroad, and that it was the negligence of the engineer of the train on which he was serving that caused his injury, and that, under the fellow-servant rule, there was no liability. The injury occurred on July 1, 1893, after the act approved March 4, 1893, took effect, touching the liability of railroads, commonly called the "employer's liability act." Acts 1893, p. 294; Burns's Rev. Stat. 1894, §§ 7083-7087 (Horner's Rev. Stat. 1897, §§ 5206-5206v).

Appellant's learned counsel contend that it is settled law that the employer is not liable to an employee for injuries caused by the negligence of a coemployee in the same general service, unless the employer was guilty of some negligence in employing the servant, with knowledge of his negligent habits or incompetency, or retained him after knowledge of such negligence or lack of skill. There is no showing of any such negligence on the part of the appellant, as employer, in the complaint. Appellee concedes this to be the common-law rule, and that it prevailed in this state prior to the enactment above mentioned. Indeed, it is conceded by the appellee that his complaint depends upon that act for its sufficiency in its facts to constitute a cause of action, and is founded thereon.

the order of some superior at the time of such injury, having authority to direct; but nothing herein shall be construed to abridge the liability of the corporation under existing laws." Appellant's learned counsel say: "The complaint lacks two allegations to make it good under this provision. (1) That the engineer at the time was acting in the place and performing the duty of the corporation in that behalf; and (2) that appellee was obeying or conforming to the order of some superior at the time of such injury, having authority to direct. It was not alleged that the engineer was acting in the place or performing the duty of the master, or that appellee was acting in obedience to a superior," etc.

This language, together with other parts of appellant's brief, indicates that appellant's learned counsel construe the language of the statute above quoted as conveying the meaning that the right to recover against an employer for the negligence of a coemployee or fellow servant rests upon the condition that such negligent coemployee was at the time acting in the place and performing the duty that the master or employer owed to his or its servants or employees generally; and yet they do not say so in so many words. The majority of the court are of the opinion that the decision of that question is not necessary to the decision of this case. They hold that the only part of the 4th subdivision of said section which is necessary to be considered in determining the sufficiency of the complaint is the following: "Where such injury was caused by the negligence of any person in the service of such corporation who has charge of any locomotive engine

It is first contended by the appellant that the act does not change the common-law rule, and it would seem to follow, if that is true, that the complaint is clearly bad. The 1st section provides: "That every railroad or other corporation, except municipal, operating in this state shall be liable in damages for personal injury suffered by any employee while in its service, the employee so injured being in the exercise of due care and diligence, in the following cases." Then the complaint should state that the alleged

or train upon a railway, . . and the person so injured, obeying or conforming to the order of some superior at the time of such injury, having authority to direct;" and that, hence, it was not necessary that

tended that the subject is not expressed in the title, in that the title is "An Act Regulating Liability of Railroads and Other Corporations except Municipal," while the provisions of the act itself are, as claimed by appellant, to create a liability which up to that time had no existence. The precise question here involved was decided adversely to appellant's contention, on a statute similar to our own, under a Constitution an exact copy of our own in this respect, in McAunich v. Mississippi & M. R. Co. 20 Iowa, 338. We feel content to follow that case, without extending this opinion by repeating its reasoning, and, accordingly, hold that the subject is sufficiently expressed in the title.

The same rule has been, in effect, followed by this court in holding that the title of an act need not go into details. It is sufficient if it indicates with reasonable precision and clearness the subject it embraces. Nor is an act invalid because it includes details not mentioned in the title, provided the details are germane to the general subject designated in the title. Bitters v. Fulton County, 81 Ind. 125; Crawfordsville & S. W. Turnp. Co. v. Fletcher, 104 Ind. 97, 2 N. E. 243; Benson v. Christian, 129 Ind. 535, 29 N. E.

negligent engineer, at the time he committed the alleged negligent injury, as provided in such concluding clause, was acting in the place and performing the duty of the corporation in that behalf; while the writer hereof is of the opinion that the whole of the 4th subdivision must stand together, and that the words quoted from the concluding clause qualify the liability created in the first clause or clauses. But the duty of the corporation therein mentioned, in the opinion of the writer, means, not the duty it owes to its servants, but the duty it owes to the public in carrying on its business; and the words, "acting in the place of such corporation," with the other words quoted, were used to convey the idea that, in order that the liability mentioned should exist, the negligent person, coemployee, or fellow servant must be acting as such employee, in the line of his duty, at the time of his negligence. The writer is of opinion that the complaint is good under this construction; and the holding of the court is that, in order to make the complaint good under the first part of the subdivision quoted, as to the point in question, it is only required that it state that the engineer, while in the service of appellant, in charge of a locomotive engine, negligently injured the appel-26; State ex rel. Terre Haute v. Kolsem, 130 lee, both being at the time acting in the line of duty as employees of the appellant. That being so, the averments of the complaint, showing, as they do, that at Hartford City, Indiana, the freight train upon which appellee was brakeman stopped to In the course of some of the briefs filed switch out loaded cars; that the conductor in other cases involving the validity of the of said train, acting in the service of appel-act, it is contended that the act is void, in lant, the authority and position of said conductor making it appellee's duty to obey his orders in respect to said train and switching, ordered appellee to go between said cars to make couplings, and while so engaged the engineer in charge of said train, also in appellant's service, and in the line of his duty, without signal, carelessly, negligently, and recklessly reversed said engine and applied full steam, whereupon said cars were driven and jammed together with terrific force, without notice to appellee, whereby appellee's entire right hand was caught between the bumpers and mashed off, without any fault on his part,-make the complaint sufficient, under the statute, as to the objection thereto urged.

Ind. 434, 14 L. R. A. 566, 29 N. E. 595; State ex rel. Duensing v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168, 33 L. R. A. 213, 51 Am. St. Rep. 174, 41 N. E. 145; Lewis v. State, 148 Ind. 346, 47 N. E. 675.

that it violates § 22 of article 4 of the state Constitution, providing that "the general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: Regulating the practice in courts of justice." That the act does not violate the provision quoted is settled by Woods v. McCay, 144 Ind. 316, 33 L. R. A. 97, 43 N. E. 269, and cases cited; Mode v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 306, 42 N. E. 727, and cases there cited; Jackson County v. State, 147 Ind. 476, 46 N. E. 908. Also that it violates § 23 of the same article, requiring all laws to be of general and uniform operation throughout the state, where such a law can be made applicable. But that is a question for the legislature, whose determination is final and conclusive on the courts. Mode v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 306, 42 N. E. 727, and cases there cited; Woods v. McCay, 144 Ind. 316, 33 L. R. A. 97, 43 N. E. 269, and cases there cited.

The next contention against the sufficiency of the complaint is that the act is unconstitutional, that being confessedly the foundation of the action. It is first contended that it violates § 19 of article 4 of the state Constitution, which provides that "every act It is next contended that the act violates shall embrace but one subject and matters § 23 of article 1 of the Constitution, proproperly connected therewith; which subjectviding that "the general assembly shall not shall be expressed in the title." It is con- grant to any citizen, or class of citizens,