these objects of convenience and comfort in the building in front of which it was have been subject to proper regulation, as located. It was not any more exposed than they always are and should be, they have was essential for its proper and useful lonever been regarded as nuisances, either cation." And in the conclusion of the public or private. And, in the case of a opinion it was said: "It would be extending carriage step or block, it is of such reason- the rule of the liability of municipal corpoable convenience and such a necessary ap- rations far greater than has yet been done purtenant to dwellings and places of busi- in any decided case, to hold that they are ness on the streets of a city that the right liable for assenting to the placing of stepto maintain it, of a proper size and in a ping stones on the edge of sidewalks in front proper position, has seldom been attempted of hotels, stores, public buildings, and to be questioned. The legal existence of private residences. The courts have gone carriage steps or blocks was fully recognized quite far in holding such corporations to a in this city long before the occurrence of the very strict responsibility in reference to acaccident, the subject of the present action, cidents caused by a failure of their officers and they have been regulated by both the to keep the streets and sidewalks in a proper building and police regulations prescribed and safe condition; but it would be adding by municipal authority. Their legal exist- to the corporate liability beyond reasonable ence has been explicitly recognized by this limits to hold that stepping stones, which court in the case of Howes v. District of are almost a necessity in providing for the Columbia, 2 App. D. C. 188, and that case is interest, comfort, and convenience of the in accordance with decisions of the highest public in the maintenance of walks, aveauthority elsewhere. nues, and streets, constitute a nuisance or obstruction, and that [municipal] corporations are liable for damages by reason of accidents caused thereby."

In the case of Dubois v. Kingston, 102 N. Y. 219, 55 Am. Rep. 804, 6 N. E. 273, it was the unanimous opinion of the court of appeals of New York that a stepping stone in In the more recent case of Robert v. the front of a public building, just inside Powell, 168 N. Y. 414, 55 L. R. A. 775, 85 the curb of the sidewalk, was not such an Am. St. Rep. 673, 61 N. E. 699, the same obstruction as would render a city liable for principle is very fully laid down. In this an injury sustained by a person falling latter case the action was brought against over it, even though others had been previ- the owner of the dwelling in front of which ously injured by falling over the step. It the carriage block was placed. It was held appeared that the plaintiff was injured by the unanimous opinion of the court that while running to a fire, which appeared to the block, being of an ordinary size, and be in the direction of his own house, in the placed in the usual position at the curb, was city of Kingston, by falling over a stepping not an unlawful obstruction of the sidewalk, stone lying in the sidewalk in one of the and the plaintiff could not recover for instreets of the city. The stone was 3 feet 4 juries received by stumbling over the step. inches in length, 20 inches wide, and 14 In that case, on the night of the accident, inches high. It lay lengthwise with the the plaintiff, while walking rapidly on Fiftycurb and on the side thereof, in front of the eighth street, crossed the street diagonally building containing the postoffice, a music from the defendant's house, in order to take hall, and several stores. In the opinion, the a cab, and stumbled over a stepping stone court said: "Actions against municipal or carriage block maintained by the decorporations for injuries sustained by indi- fendant in front of her residence. The stone viduals while using or passing along its over which the plaintiff fell was 18 inches streets are founded upon the ground of high, 13 inches long, and 16 inches wide. negligence of its officers in the performance In the opinion the court said: "The stepof their official duties, and cannot be main-ping stone in his case, located upon the tained without evidence showing that they sidewalk in front of a private house, was a have been derelict in this respect, by means reasonable and necessary use of the street, of which the injury has been sustained. We not only for the convenience of the owner of think there was no such proof upon the trial the house, but for other persons who desired of this action. The stepping stone over to visit or enter the house for business or which the plaintiff fell and was injured was other lawful purpose. It did not interfere not of unusual size or of an improper con- in the least with the use of the roadway or struction, nor was it located at an improper bed of the street; nor did it interfere to any place. It was placed in a position on the appreciable or unreasonable extent with the sidewalk most convenient for persons who use of the sidewalk. There were 8 feet of should alight from a wagon or carriage or a clear, open space upon the sidewalk for get into the same from the sidewalk, and the use of travelers, and the fact that the thus it was a means of accomodation to plaintiff, while hurrying in the nighttime those who had business at the postoffice, or to take a cab, stumbled over the stone,

plaintiff in stumbling and falling over the
stone.

when the place was well lighted and the ob-
ject plainly visible, does not prove, or tend
to prove, that the defendant was guilty of
any wrong or breach of duty in maintaining
the stepping stone in front of her house. It
is true that the plaintiff was injured, but
that was the result of an accident, due,
possibly, to his own fault, but at all events
not to any fault on the part of the defend-
ant, or to any unlawful obstruction by the
defendant of the street. The question in-
volved in the case is, we think, well settled
by authority. Dubois v. Kingston, 102 N.
Y. 219, 55 Am. Rep. 804, 6 N. E. 273;
Dougherty v. Horseheads, 159 N. Y. 154, 53
N. E. 799. While it is said that these
cases involved only the question of liability
on the part of a municipality for negligence,
they also decided that the existence of ob-
jects of this character in the streets is law-
ful. If the city could not be held liable for
permitting them to be there after notice,
neither can the defendant be held liable for
placing them there. The question involved
in this class of cases is whether the object
complained of is usual, reasonable, or neces-
sary in the use of the street by the owner of
the premises, or anyone else."

But the plaintiff contends that, even conceding that the carriage block in question was not an unlawful obstruction, and did not constitute a public nuisance, yet the street in that particular section was defectively and insufficiently lighted, and, because of such defective and insufficient lighting of the street and sidewalk, the plaintiff ran against and stumbled over the block or stepping stone and was injured, and that the defendant corporation is liable for such injury, because of the neglect to properly light and keep lighted the street and sidewalk where the accident occurred. But, whatever insufficiency may have existed in the light upon the occasion of the accident (if any insufficiency did in fact exist), such an action as the present is not the remedy for the consequences of such defect. Money is annually appropriated by Congress for lighting the streets of the city; but whether such appropriation be sufficient or insufficient, the courts cannot determine: nor can they determine how the lights shall be distributed through the city; or how any particular street or section of a street shall

same

There are other courts than those of New be lighted,-whether by few or many lights, York that have maintained the or whether by gas or electricity. These are principle. Cincinnati v. Fleischer, 63 Ohio matters that are confided exclusively to the St. 229, 58 N. E. 568; Macomber v. Taunton, judgment and discretion of the municipal 100 Mass. 255; Cushing v. Boston, 124 Mass. authorities. 434; Horner v. Philadelphia, 194 Pa. 542, 45 Atl. 330.

Finding no error in the ruling of the court below directing the verdict for the defendant, we must aflirm the judgment, and it is so ordered.

Judgment affirmed.

Upon general principle, as well as upon authority, we are clearly of opinion the carriage block or stepping stone in question was not an unlawful obstruction of the street or sidewalk, and that the defendant is not liable for the injury received by the

GEORGIA SUPREME COURT.

Hattie H. MORRISON, Piff. in Err.,

v.

James L. DICKEY.

(...... Ga.......)

*1. Mutual confidence being the foundation of the partnership relation, the mere fact that a member of a partnership is not the owner of property which he

Affirmed by Supreme Court of United
States January 3, 1905.

*Headnotes by COBE, J.

NOTE. AS to business partnership between husband and wife, see also, in this series. Gilkerson-Sloss Commission Co. v. Salinger, 16 L. R. A. 526, and note; Fuller & F. Co. v. McHenry, 18 L. R. A. 512; Vail v. Winterstein, 18 L. R. A. 515; Haggett v. Hurley, 41 L. R. A. 362; and Hoaglin v. Henderson, 61 L. R. A. 756.

has embarked in the partnership enterprise
the same belonging to a third person, who
has consented that it may be so used for his
benefit, but whose interest is not disclosed
to the other member of the partnership does
not cause a partnership relation to arise be-
tween the other partner and the concealed
principal of his copartner.

2. A partner may make an agreement
with a third person for a division of
the profits coming to him from the part-
nership enterprise, and, if the character of
the agreement is such as to disclose the essen-
tials necessary to a partnership, a subpart-
nership is thereby formed between the part-
ner and the third person; but such person
does not become a member of the first part-
nership, nor is he liable for the debts of that
partnership.

3. Husband and wife may, in this state,

liable for it.

lawfully transact business as copart-, his wife's business, would not render her ners, and therefore there may be a subpart nership between a husband and wife in reference to the profits of a business in which the husband is a partner.

Blount v. Dugger, 115 Ga. 109, 41 S. E. 270.

Messrs. Felder & Rountree, for defendant in error:

It is not material that the contract of

purchase was signed "J. L. Dickey, President, and J. J. Morrison." The partners were liable, at least inter se, for the debt.

4. In a subpartnership of the character above referred to, where the members are husband and wife, a gift by the wife to the husband of a portion of her interest in the profits which the husband would derive

from the first partnership is valid; and the

use by him, or by his copartner, of such profits to discharge a debt of the husband would not render his partner liable to the wife on account of having used her money for the purpose of paying her husband's debt. 5. The verdict for the defendant was demanded by the evidence, and any

errors that may have been made by the judge in his instructions to the jury did not require the granting of a new trial.

error:

The debt was that of the husband, and his alone, both morally and legally; and plaintiff is absolutely disqualified by the statute from making any contract to assume it or pay it.

a

Partnership, as between the partners, is contractual relationship, and cannot arise in any other way, though a liability as to third parties may arise, by estoppel, on the part of one who is not a partner.

Ibid.; Civil Code, § 2626. See also § 2629; Huggins v. Huggins, 117 Ga. 151, 43 S. E.

759.

The law of concealed agency, which makes the principal liable, when discovered, at the election of the other party, operates alone for the protection of the other party to the contract.

Williams v. Merle, 11 Wend. 80, 25 Am. Dec. 605; Ga. Civ. Code, §§ 3024, 3539; Maddox v. Wilson, 91 Ga. 40, 16 S. E. 213; Rosser v. Darden, 82 Ga. 219, 14 Am. St. Rep. 152, 7 S. E. 919.

Maddox v. Wilson, 91 Ga. 40, 16 S. E. 213; Lenney v. Finley, 118 Ga. 718, 45 S. E. 593.

The mere fact of the purchase of this machine by Morrison, even though it may have been intended for use in connection with

Mrs. Morrison was originally liable for the debt. She was liable upon the principle of ratification and estoppel.

Code, §§ 2626, 5150; Murray v. Walker, 44 Ga. 58.

A party who has received the benefit of a contract made by a husband concerning property owned by the wife cannot resist performance on the ground of the wife's coverture and the absence of her statutory assent to the contract.

Code, § 2488.

The mere fact that Mr. Morrison was the agent of his wife in the conduct of her business, he being in possession of the property and the apparent owner, would not make Dickey her partner.

This was an action by Mrs. Morrison against Dickey to recover a sum of money

2 Lawson, Rights, Rem. & Pr. p. 1190, which she alleged had been wrongfully ap

635.

propriated by Dickey to the payment of her husband's debt. The jury found in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff assigns error upon the overruling of her motion for a new trial.

Texas & St. L. R. Co. v. Robards, 60 Tex. 545, 48 Am. Rep. 268; Hathaway v. Payne, 34 N. Y. 92; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Flanagan, 113 Ind. 488, 3 Am. St. Rep. 674, 14 N. E. 370.

The creation of a partnership by an agent without authority may be ratified and made valid by the principal, notwithstanding that intervening rights are thereby cut off, where such rights rest on an inferior equity to that of the principal.

Williams v. Butler, 35 Ill. 544.

Cobb, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

Mrs. Morrison was the owner of a business which was conducted by her husband in his name. Her ownership was not disclosed to the world, nor was there anything to indicate to those who dealt with Morrison that he was not the owner of the business. Dickey, while ignorant of Mrs. Morrison's ownership, bought from Morrison a half interest in the business. This sale was made, if not with the approval, certainly without the disapproval, of Mrs. Morrison. Morrison and Dickey purchased a machine, which, if not necessary, was adapted to and useful in the business they were carrying on, and was actually used in that business. The contract for the purchase price was signed, not by the partnership, but by Mor

Suit was

rison and Dickey individually.
brought upon this contract, and judgment
obtained against Morrison and Dickey as in-
dividual joint promisors. Up to this point
it seems that Dickey was still in ignorance
of the fact that the business into which he
had been admitted as a partner with Mor-
rison was in reality the business of Mor-
rison's wife, but this fact was subsequently
disclosed to him. Dickey, having ascer-
tained that Mrs. Morrison was the real
owner of the business, negotiated with her
for the purchase of her remaining one-half
interest; and an agreement was reached by
which Mrs. Morrison sold this interest to
Dickey for the sum of $2,500, $1,000 of
which was to be paid in cash. The stipu-
lation in the contract with reference to the
remaining $1,500 was in the following
words: "The balance of the amount, being
fifteen hundred dollars, I hereby give and
convey to him, my said husband, J. J. Mor-
rison, for the affection I have for him, to-
gether with some compensation for his long
service in it. Of course he can do as he
pleases with that, provided I get one thou-
sand dollars or its equivalent." Dickey as-
sumed all debts and liabilities of the firm.
Morrison agreed with Dickey that the $1,-
500 above referred to should be left in the
latter's hands, to be appropriated first to the
payment of one half of the judgment against
Dickey and Morrison above referred to, and
the remainder, so far as necessary, to the
payment of one half of the other debts of
the firm. Dickey subsequently paid the bal-business carried on by Dickey and Morrison,
ance due on the judgment, and it is claimed nor would she be liable for the debts of that
by Mrs. Morrison that this payment was partnership; but she would be liable for any
made from the proceeds of the business in debts which might be considered as debts
which her money had been placed by her of the subpartnership existing between her-
husband, and therefore that one half of this self and her husband. 1 Bates, Partn. §§
money paid on this judgment was hers, and 168, 169; 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed.
should have been paid to her, and the pay- p. 17. Mrs. Morrison therefore could not
ment of it by Dickey on her husband's debt have been held bound on the contract for the
was illegal, and she was entitled to recover purchase of the machine above referred to,
the amount from him; it being also claimed as this purchase was made before the fact
that the arrangement by which $1,500 of the of her interest in the business came to the
purchase money of her remaining interest knowledge of Dickey, and therefore before
in the business should be left in the hands there could have been, in law, any partner-
of her husband, and the subsequent arrange- ship relation existing between them. But
ment between Dickey and her husband that Morrison was bound, not only by virtue of
this sum should be appropriated in part to the partnership relation existing between
the payment of the judgment, was merely himself and Dickey, but by the express terms
a scheme or device to use her money for the of the contract itself. When Dickey dis-
purpose of paying her husband's debt. No covered that Mrs. Morrison was the real
partnership relation existed between Mrs. owner of the business which he had former-
Morrison and Dickey prior to the time that ly carried on as a partner of her husband,
he knew that the business was owned by he had a right to deal with her as such own-
her. The partnership up to that time was er, by either admitting her into the partner-
one composed of Dickey and Morrison. The ship, or by purchasing from her her interest
relation created by a partnership agreement therein. The contract, therefore, between
is one founded so essentially upon mutual Dickey and Mrs. Morrison, by which he pur-
confidence that there can be no such thing chased her remaining one-half interst in
in the law as a partnership between persons the business, was valid and lawful, and after

unless the persons are known to each other,
and each has an opportunity to determine
whether that relation shall be formed be-
tween them. Partnership is founded upon
agreement and consent, and there can be no
consent to the formation of a partnership
with a person who is not known. 1 Bates,
Partn. § 158; 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d
ed. p. 15. The relation which existed be-
tween Morrison and his wife after Dickey
had been admitted as
a partner into the
business carried on by Morrison was in the
nature of a subpartnership, which made
Morrison and his wife partners as between
themselves; and as such they assumed all
of the responsibilities that would be incident
to a partnership created between two per-
sons, where one furnished the capital, and
the other the skill and labor, necessary in
carrying out the enterprise. 1 Bates, Partn.
§§ 164, 169. How profits between them-
selves as members of this subpartnership
would be divided would be immaterial, and
therefore the mere fact that Mrs. Morrison
was to receive the entire profits of the busi-
ness thus carried on in her husband's name
for her benefit would not deprive the busi-
ness relationship between them of the essen-
tial elements of a subpartnership. It is now
the settled law of this state that husband
and wife may lawfully engage in business as
partners. Ellis v. Mills, 99 Ga. 490, 27 S.
E. 740. But this relation existing between
Morrison and his wife as to each other
would not make the wife a partner in the