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this purchase he became the owner of the entire business. It was lawful for him to pay her $1,000, and agree to pay her $1,500 in the future, and it was also lawful for her to make a gift of the latter amount to her husband. This is the legal effect of the contract upon its face, and, if the gift became complete, it was immaterial for what purposes her husband used the money which was the subject of the gift. He might use it for the purpose of paying his debts, and the subsequent agreement between him and Dickey that a portion of the money given to him should be applied by Dickey to the judgment against Morrison and himself was a transaction free from legal infirmity. Morrison would then be paying his own debt with his own money, and not with the money of his wife. In addition to this, while Mrs. Morrison was not at all bound by the judgment against Morrison and Dickey, and not in any way liable upon the contract which was the foundation of that judgment, this liability of Morrison and Dickey was one of the liabilities of the partnership between them; and, when Mrs. Morrison saw fit to disclose her ownership of the business, and Dickey saw proper to recognize her as a partner, she then took her position for the first time as a partner in the business with Dickey, and she then became liable, upon an accounting as to the affairs of the partnership, to account to her partner for all claims or demands which, as between the partners, would be lawful charges against the partnership business; and, if the partnership had gone into liquidation, there would have been, in an accounting between the partners, no legal obstacle in the way of Dickey insisting that the money expended for the machine should be treated, as between him and Mrs. Morrison, as a liability of the firm, and one for which she should account for one half. This is true notwithstanding the fact that at the time the machine was purchased, when her ownership of the business was not known to Dickey, she gave her husband special instructions not to purchase the machine; it appearing that the machine was actually purchased and used in carrying on the business of the partnership. Take still another view of the matter. The subpartnership, or relation in the nature thereof, existing between Mrs. Morrison and her husband, rendered her liable to account to her husband for all legitimate and necessary expenses incurred in realizing, or attempting to realize, profits from the partnership between him and Dickey; and, if the purchase of the machine was necessary or proper for the conduct of the business, and was actually used in the business, before Mrs. Morrison could demand from her husband the profits of the
business she would have to account to him for the amount for which he rendered himself liable on account of such purchase. Her protest against its purchase would not avail her as an excuse for not so accounting, if the profits claimed by her were the result of the business in which the machine had been actually used.
So that it seems to us that, under any view of the law and facts of the case, no other legal judgment could have been rendered than one in favor of the defendant. There is nothing in the case to authorize a finding that the transaction was a mere scheme or device to use Mrs. Morrison's money for the purpose of paying her husband's debt. It was either the use of her money to pay a liability which Dickey would have a right to claim against her when she admitted her ownership, and accepted position as a partner with him, or it was a payment by Morrison of his debt with his money, title to which he had derived by a voluntary gift from his wife, or the payment of a sum which Mrs. Morrison would have been bound to pay in an accounting with her husband. While the instructions of the judge are not at all in accord with some of the principles above laid down, still, under the undisputed facts of the case, the verdict for the defendants was demanded, and any errors committed in charging the jury were harmless. Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
EMPLOYING PRINTERS' CLUB et al., Plffs. in Err.,
DOCTOR BLOSSER COMPANY.
*1. A combination of two or more persons to injure one in his trade by inducing his employees to break their contract with him, or to decline to longer continue in his employment, is, if it results in damage, actionable.
2. A former member of an illegal combination, whose connection with it was severed before the filing of the suit, will not be denied the protection of a court of equity
*Headnotes by EVANS, J.
NOTE. As to conspiracy by trade union to procure discharge of nonunion men, see, in this series, Flaccus v. Smith, 54 L. R. A. 640, and Erdman v. Mitchell, 63 L. R. A. 534.
As to boycott or conspiracies by trade unions or strikers generally, see Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, No. 3, 12 L. R. A. 193, and note; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Penn
against an illegal act of such combination | have the remedy of arbitration exhausted because of his previous connection therewith. before appealing to the law.
3. The malicious procurement of a National Protective Asso. v. Cumming, breach of contract of employment result170 N. Y. 321, 58 L. R. A. 135, 88 Am. St. ing in damage, where the procurement was during the subsistence of the contract, is an Rep. 648, 63 N. E. 369; Parks v. Andrews, 56 Hun, 393, 10 N. Y. Supp. 344.
The plaintiffs in error and the labor unions had a legal right to agree and act in harmony with each other, and they had a perfect right to make it a part of this agreement, and stipulate that the members of the unions should not work for any printer in Atlanta except the parties to this agreement.
Willis v. Muscogee Mfg. Co. 120 Ga. 597, 48 S. E. 177; National Protective Asso. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 321, 58 L. R. A. 135, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648, 63 N. E. 369.
Messrs. Kontz & Austin and Howard Van Epps, for defendant in error:
The case discloses an illegal combination teeth of the law. conducting its operations squarely in the
4. A court of equity will interpose by injunction to prevent the several members of an illegal combination from enforcing an illegal agreement to the hurt and injury of one engaged in competitive business.
(March 25, 1905.)
ERROR to the Superior Court for Fulton County to review a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to enjoin defendants from interfering with plaintiff's employees. Affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Smith & Wright, for plaintiff's in error:
Where parties are concerned in illegal agreements or transactions, whether they are mala prohibita, or mala in se, courts of equity, following the rule of law as to participation in crime, will not grant relief to either party in accordance with the maxim, In pari delicto, etc.
Harrington v. Bigelow, 11 Paige, 349; Warburton v. Aken, 1 McLean, 460, Fed. Cas. No. 17,143; Atwood v. Fisk, 101 Mass. 363, 100 Am. Dec. 124; Swartzer v. Gillett, 1 Chand. (Wis.) 207; Davies v. London & Provincial Marine Ins. Co. L. R. 8 Ch. Div.
469; Bromley v. Smith, 2 Hill, 517; Vandyck v. Hewitt, 1 East, 96; Howson v. Hancock, 8 T. R. 575.
When the scheme is malum in se, and the parties to it are in pari delicto, the law refuses to aid either of them against the other, but leaves them where they have placed themselves by their own act.
Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349, 20 L. ed. 453; Smith v. Hubbs, 10 Me. 71; Schermerhorn v. Talman, 14 N. Y. 94; Knowlton v. Congress & E. Spring Co. 57 N. Y. 518; Nellis v. Clark, 20 Wend. 24; Smith, Contr. 3d Am. ed. 187; Burt v. Place, 6 Cow. 431; LeWarne v. Meyer, 38 Fed. 191; Keel v. Larkin, 83 Ala. 146, 3 Am. St. Rep. 702, 3 So. 296.
Blosser is bound, as a member of the club, by its rules; and he is bound by the decision on complaint. He is also bound to
sylvania Co. 19 L. R. A. 395; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. 19 L. R. A. 387; Waterhouse v. Comer, 19 L. R. A. 403; Coeur D'Alene Consol. Min. Co. V. Miners' Union, 19 L. R. A. 382: Lucke V. Clothing Cutters' & T. Assembly No. 7.507 K. of L. 19 L. R. A. 408; Macauley Bros. v. Tierney, 37 L. R. A. 455; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, 42 L. R. A. 407; Marx Hass J. Clothing Co. v. Watson, 56 L. R. A. 951; and
Brown v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co. 115 Ga. 41 S. E. 553; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 429, 57 L. R. A. 547, 90 Am. St. Rep. 126,
Defendant in error was not in pari de
Whenever the plaintiff can make out his case without invoking the illegal contract to his aid, he is entitled to recover.
Equitable Loan & Secur. Co. v. Waring, 117 Ga. 633, 62 L. R. A. 93, 97 Am. St. Rep. 177, 44 S. E. 320; Civil Code, § 3937; Ingram v. Mitchell, 30 Ga. 547; Clarke v. Brown, 77 Ga. 606, 4 Am. St. Rep. 98; Holleman v. Bradley Fertilizer Co. 106 Ga. 163, 32 S. E. 83; Raleigh & G. R. Co. v. Swanson, 102 Ga. 761, 39 L. R. A. 275, 28 S. E. 601.
The club could not enforce against defendant in error the rules and regulations of its illegal constitution and by-laws.
Ertz v. Produce Exchange, 82 Minn. 173, 51 L. R. A. 825, 83 Am. St. Rep. 419, 84 N. W. 743; Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 64 L. R. A. 260, 102 Am. St. Rep. 341, 69 N. E. 1085; Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1, 43 L. R. A. 803, 76 Am. St. Rep. 746, 42 Atl. 607.
If one maliciously interferes in a contract between two parties, and induces one of them to break that contract, to the injury
Gray v. Building Trades Council, 63 L. R. A. 753.
As to liability for inducing breach of contract generally, see, in this series, Boysen v. Thorn, 21 L. R. A. 233, and note; Raycroft v. Tayntor, 33 L. R. A. 225; Gore v. Condon, 40 L. R. A. 382; Doremus v. Hennessy, 43 L. R. A. 797; West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. 56 L. R. A. 804; and Raymond v. Yarrington, 62 L. R. A. 962.
of the other, the party injured can maintain | 9 Atl. 559; Curran v. Galen, 2 Misc. 553, an action against the wrongdoer.
Angle v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 151 U. S. 13, 38 L. ed. 62, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216; Bigelow, Torts, 1st ed. p. 108; Jones v. Blocker, 43 Ga. 331; Salter v. Howard, 43 Ga. 601; Smith v. Goodman, 75 Ga. 198; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456, 22 Am. Rep. 475; Huff v. Watkins, 15 S. C. 82, 40 Am. Rep. 680; Daniel v. Swearengen, 6 S. C. N. S. 297, 24 Am. Rep. 471; Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601, 16 Am. Rep. 780; Hewitt v. Ontario Copper Lightning Rod Co. 44 U. C. Q. B. 287.
22 N. Y. Supp. 826; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 9 Am. St. Rep. 689, 17 N. E. 307; Van Horn v. Van Horn, 52 N. J. L. 284, 10 L. R. A. 184, 20 Atl. 485; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co. 28 C. C. A. 99, 49 U. S. App. 709, 83 Fed. 912; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 3 Am. St. Rep. 23, 8 Atl. 890; Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 26 Am. St. Rep. 755, 16 S. W. 111; Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 788, 62 Fed. 803; Crump v. Com. 84 Va. 927, 10 Am. St. Rep. 895, 6 S. E. 620.
It is only necessary that the relation of master and servant exist. It matters not whether the contract valid or not, or whether the employee is employed at will or for a definite period of time.
Conspiracies to injure the business of another by inducing employees or others under contract to quit work and break, contracts, and by otherwise maliciously interfering, are un wfu
16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 1111, note 8, 1114, note 8; Webb's Pollock, Torts, Am. ed. pp. 278, 279; Gunter v. Astor, 4 J. B. Moore, 12, 21 Revised Rep. 733; Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 52 L. R. A. 115, 83 Am. St. Rep. 289, 59 N. E. 125; Noice v. Brown, 39 N. J. L. 569; Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 611, 16 Am. Rep. 780; Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 11 Am. St. Rep. 367, 1 So. 934; Saiter v. Howard, 43 Ga. 601; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385, 20 Am. Dec. 623.
Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. 19 L. R. A. 387, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 522, 54 Fed. 730; Murray v. McGorigle, 69 Wis. 483, 34 N. W. 522; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881; State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 690, 32 Atl. 814; Cœur D'Alene Consol. Min. Co. v. Miners' Union, 19 L. R. A. 382, 51 Fed. 260; O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236, 38 L. R. A. 382, 61 Am. St. Rep. 702, 37 Atl. 843; Jones v. Stanly, 76 N. C. 355; Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. ed. 1092, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; Boyson v. Thorn, 21 L. R. A. 233, note, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492; Wabash R. Co. v. Hannan, 56 Cent. L. J. 314, note; Walsh v. Master Plumbers' Asso. (Mo.) 56 Cent. L. J. 253, note; 1 Jaggard, Torts, §§ 204-207; 2 Addison, Torts, pp. 739 et seq. Contracts in restraint of competition and
Lumley v. Gye is now the law of England.
Quinn v. Leathem  A. C. 495; Read v. Friendly Soc.  2 K. B. 738; Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 333.
The doctrine is generally recognized in trade are void and against the policy of this America. state.
Ames, Lead. Cas. on Torts, pp. 608, 612; Heaton Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Dick, 55 Fed. 23, 52 Fed. 667; Lally v. Cantwell, 30 Mo. App. 524.
As respects enticing away servants, the authorities all seem to agree that a right of action lies.
Read v. Friendly Soc.  2 K. B. 732; Temperton v. Russell  1 Q. B. 715; Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 333; Angle v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 151 U. S. 1, 38 L. ed. 55, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240; Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 52 L. R. A. 115, 83 Am. St. Rep. 289, 59 N. E. 125; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 8 Am. Rep. 287; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 51 L. R. A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330, 57 N. E. 1011; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 43 L. R. A. 797, 68 Am. St. Rep. 203, 52 N. E. 924, 54 N. E. 524; Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 11 Am. St. Rep. 367, 1 So. 934; Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. 48; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. Supp. 264; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 59 Am. Rep. 710,
Brown v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co. 115 Ga. 429, 57 L. R. A. 547, 90 Am. St. Rep. 126, 41 S. E. 553; Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 188, 69 Am. St. Rep. 154, 30 S. E. 735; Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Ga. 789, 51 L. R. A. 335, 36 S. E. 932; United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 46 L. R. A. 122, 29 C. C. A. 141, 54 U. S. App. 723, 85 Fed. 271; Bailey v. Master Plumbers' Asso. 102 Tenn. 99, 46 L. R. A. 561, 52 S. W. 853; People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251, 23 L. R. A. 221, 36 Am. St. Rep. 690, 34 N. E. 785; Anti-monopoly Legislation from the Days of Elizabeth to the Anti-Trust Act of 1890, 55 Cent. L. J. 144; United States v. Northern Securities Co. 120 Fed. 721; Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592, 23 L. R. A. 588, 36 N. E. 345, 37 N. E. 14; Gregory v. Brunswick, 6 Mann. & G. 205.
Any combination the object of which is to attempt by force, or threats, or intimidation, to control an employer in the determination as to whom he will employ or the wages he will pay is an unlawful conspiracy.
Eddy, Combinations, p. 506; Brown v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co. 115 Ga. 429, 57 L. R. A. 547, 90 Am. St. Rep. 126, 41 S. E. 553.
Evans, J., delivered the opinion of the received for work done in the city." This combination or club had a written constitution and by-laws, a copy of which was appended to the petition. Among the objects of the club, as recited in its constitution, were "the maintenance of legitimate prices, the suppression of undue rivalry, and mutual protection from abuses or infringement upon our rights by others." The rules provided for a fixed minimum scale of prices, that no member should give any rebate or concession to a customer, and for a uniform discount only to other members of the association. Rule 8 was: "Never give customer an itemized estimate." The scheme of the defendants, who confederated under the name of the "Employing Printers' Club," was as follows: If a customer desiring to have printing or publishing done made application for a bid to any one of the members constituting the club, it was the understanding and agreement among all of the members thereof that the printer receiving the bid for work should name the price for which he was willing to undertake it, and thereupon should list the application, the name of the customer, and the proposition for doing the work, giving a complete description of the job to a manager appointed for that very purpose, and salaried by the members of the combination; and they in turn were bound severally to each other that, if they were also invited to make competitive bids, they would fix the price for such equal to or higher than that proposed by the first printer receiving the application and listing the bid. It was alleged that the combination enforced a rule between themselves, establishing a systematic way of handling the public printing for the city of Atlanta, under the operation of which each printer was to have his turn; the manager to keep track of this branch of the business, and notify the different members, when the city of Atlanta asked for bids, whose turn it was to do the work. They were to make the price and add 10 per cent, and charge the city, not only the fixed, arbitrary price, but also the additional 10 per cent on the fixed price. It was alleged that a committee from the Employing Printers Club, who also represented the defendants, as members of the club, waited on the plaintiff, and advised its officers that it could not continue to employ union labor in its shop unless it became a member of the club. Plaintiff inquired of the committee the purpose and scope of the club, and was informed that it was a secret institution, and that it was necessary to become a member before
The Doctor Blosser Company, a corporation, brought an action against a number of printing concerns using the club or trade name of the "Employing Printers' Club of Atlanta," and composed of individuals, firms, and corporations engaged in the book and job printing trade in the city of Atlanta, and whose names are set out in the record, asking an injunction and praying damages. The court granted the injunction, and exception is taken to this order. On the interlocutory hearing the defendants urged by demurrer the insufficiency of the facts pleaded to authorize the relief prayed. Notwithstanding the demurrer admitted the truth of all the facts which were well-pleaded, the plaintiff submitted proof tending to sustain all the essential allegations.
among bidders for printing of any sort to be done in the city of Atlanta, and for maintaining an arbitrary and extortionate scale of prices upon any contracts that might be
1-3. The complaint is that the defendants formed a combination among the employing printers to control and fix the price of print ing done in the city of Atlanta, and, because the plaintiff refused to affiliate with the combination, they wrongfully interfered with the plaintiff's business, and maliciously induced its employees to break their contracts with it, and refuse to continue in its employment, to its injury and damage. A combination of individuals engaged in a particular line of business to compel one engaged in a similar business to sell his product at prices fixed by it is contrary to public policy, and void; and the members of such a combination, individually, and collectively, may, by appropriate injunction, be restrained from wrongfully interfering with the business of the one who is not a member of the combination. This principle is laid down in the well-considered case of Brown v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co. 115 Ga. 429, 57 L. R. A. 547, 90 Am. St. Rep. 126, 41 S. E. 553, is supported both by reason and authority, and its application to the case in hand is readily apparent.
The facts alleged in the petition were as follows: The plaintiff was engaged in the city of Atlanta in the general business of a printer for the public, enjoying a large trade and doing a prosperous business. The defendants were also engaged in the printing business, and formed a combination or trust, called the "Employing Printers' Club of Atlanta, Georgia." This combination embraced nearly the entire printing and publishing fraternity of Atlanta except the newspapers, and its organization was "for the single and sole purpose of restraining trade, of absolutely defeating and destroying competition
its employment. The plaintiff refused to comply with the club's demand, and declined to affiliate longer with the club as a member. notifying it of this resolve. Then the club caused the pressmen, feeders, printers, and binders employed by the plaintiff to quit work, thereby shutting down the plaintiff's establishment, and rendering it impossible for it to conduct its business, or to execute existing contracts, or to undertake further employment in the line of its trade. Actual damages were alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff in the sum of $10.000. On the interlocutory hearing it appeared that some of the employees returned to the work, and that their respective unions refused to call a strike in the plaintiff's shop. The defendants then threatened that. unless the unions would call out its labor from the plaintiff's shop they would no longer observe the union regulations. In pursuance of this threat, some of the defendants had posted their respective businesses as "open shops," and the plaintiff's peti tion was filed at this juncture of affairs.
its secrets could be imparted. To prevent the club would cause all union labor to leave being deprived of union labor, which was the only labor obtainable, and ignorant of the real purposes of the club, the plaintiff became a member thereof. About October 1, 1901, plaintiff made a contract with the managers of the Wesleyan Christian Advocate to publish that periodical, and was proceeding to execute the contract, when it was notified by the Employing Printers' Club that it had violated the rules of the club in accepting such contract, and was fined $468 for taking the contract. The club decided that the right to print that periodical belonged to the Foote & Davies Company, one of the defendants, and that the plaintiff should not have underbid that company. In addition to imposing the fine, the club ruled that at the end of the year 1902 the publication price of the Advocate for the year 1903 should be fixed by the Foote & Davies Company. The plaintiff was dissatisfied with this ruling, and resigned its membership in the club, whereupon plaintiff was notified by a committee from the club that, unless it paid the fine and came back into the club, all union labor would be called out of its shop. The plaintiff, persisting in its refusal to resume relationship with the club, was assured by a committee from the club that it had been reorganized on a legal basis. Upon this assurance the plaintiff resumed its membership in the club, and the fine was reduced to $125. The major part of this fine was paid, and plaintiff resumed its membership because of the threat to call out the union labor from its shop, and to avoid the damages incident to the loss of this class of labor. In October, 1902, the Wesleyan Christian Advocate's managers applied to the plaintiff to print that paper during the year 1903, stating that they were aware of the existence of the printers' combination, but before they would pay more than they were paying they would withdraw their work from Atlanta, and place it elsewhere. Thereupon the plaintiff made them a bid which afforded a reasonable net profit on the proposed work. The Employing Printers' Club then met and sat in judgment on the plaintiff's action in taking the contract for the second time for the publication of this periodical, and adjudged that the plaintiff pay the Foote & Davies Company $300 in cash to partly reimburse it for the loss of the profit on the publication of the Wesleyan Christian Advocate, and that the naming of the price for the publishing of this periodical "revert irrevocably" to the Foote & Davies Company at the expiration of the present contract. Several attempts were made to induce the plaintiff to comply with this edict, and it was threatened that, if it did not comply,
There can be no doubt that the facts alleged in the petition, if true (and the demurrer admits their truth), establish, not only a conspiracy to fix and control the price of printing in the city of Atlanta, but also a malicious interference with the business of the plaintiff. The scope and purpose of the Employing Printers' Club was to create a monopoly and stifle competition in the printing business. A mere agreement to do wrong is not actionable; but when the parties to such agreement do an overt act in furtherance of the illegal combination, resulting in injury to a third person, the conspiracy becomes actionable, and the conspirators are liable to the injured party for damages proximately flowing from their illegal conduct.
It is contended by the plaintiffs in error that, conceding that the combination among the defendants was an illegal one, the plaintiff in the court below was a party to it. and cannot be heard to complain in a court of equity. It is true that at one time the plaintiff was a member of the trust, but. when the trust essayed to discipline it, it repudiated the club, and informed its officers that it would no longer affiliate with the club. It was then that the club was proceeding to punish it by calling out its employees. The maxim that one must come into a court of equity with clean hands means that he must do equity as respects the defendant's rights in the particular matter of the suit. 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 397. "The rule that a complainant must come into equity with clean hands does not go so far as to prohibit a court of equity from