« AnteriorContinuar »
have known, of this defective condition. compensate him for such future disability, This thought was embodied in onc of the pain, and suffering as the evidence shows it instructions given by the trial court, and is reasonably probable will result to him defendant has no cause of complaint. in the future from such injuries.” The
3. Instruction 10, which reads as follows, first point made with reference to this is is complained of: "If you find from the that there is no testimony on which to base evidence that the stile in question was con- an allowance for future disability. The structed partly upon the ground of defend- evidence clearly shows that plaintiff was ant company, and that the same was ordi- suffering from his injuries at the time of narily and generally used by those who trial, and the experts testified that his were passengers on defendant company's injury would probably be permanent.
means of egress from said Plaintiff testified that he was earning $50 grounds, where the railway of defendant per month before the injury, and had not terminated, and that there was no other been able to earn more than $10 since. reasonable
of egress from said This was sufficient to take the case to the grounds, and that said defendant company jury. Smith v. Sioux City, 119 Iowa, 50, knew that said stile was so used by pas- 93 N. W. 81; Winter v. Central lowa R. Co. sengers upon its in leaving said 80 Iowa, 443, 45 N. W. 737; Ashley v. grounds, and that it permitted them to do Sioux City (Iowa) 93 N. W. 303. Next it so; and you further find that said stile, by is argued that the instruction runs counter reason of its narrowness, or by reason of to the rules announced in Fry v. Dubuque the fact that there was no railing thereon & S. W. R. Co. 45 Iowa, 416, and Laird v. or by reason of the fact that said stile was Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Co. 100 Iowa, 336, constructed of light and defective lumber, 69 N. W. 414. A reading of these cases if such you find the fact to be, was not such will sufficiently demonstrate the incorrectmeans of egress from said grounds as an ness of this proposition. Abstractly conordinary person would provide under simi- sidered, the instruction has support in lar circumstances, you will be justified | Bailey v. Centerville, 108 Iowa, 20, 78 N. W. in finding the defendant guilty of negli- 831; Miller v. Boone County, 95 Iowa, 5, 63 gence, as charged. If, however, you find N. W. 352; Smith v. Sioux City , 119 Iowa, that the said stile was such as an ordinary 50, 93 N. W. 81. person would employ under similar circum- 5. Lastly it is argued that the verdict is stances as a means of egress from said contrary to the instructions.
The pringrounds, then there would be no negligence cipal contention here is that there was anupon the part of defendant.” The criti- other means of egress from the defendant's cism is that there was no evidence upon grounds, whereby plaintiff could have which to base it. Suffice it to say that we reached his destination with safety. There find in the record ample testimony to jus- was testimony to the effect that there was tify the instruction,
an opening in a barbed-wire fence 40 rods 4. Instruction 19, relating to the meas- away, but it was not a place which afforded ure of damages, is also challenged. It a reasonable means of egress from defendreads as follows: “If you find him entitled ants terminal. Another opening in the to recover, he should be allowed a fair and fence, 400 or 500 feet away, was spoken of reasonable compensation for his injuries. In by one witness, but it was not in sight, and estimating his damage, no precise rule can the witness said that
may have been be given for the amount to be allowed, as closed on the day of the accident. It was they are not in their nature susceptible of clearly a question for the jury to say exact money valuation. You are to use whether or not there was another reasonyour own sense and judgment, and be guid- ably safe, and accessible place of exit from ed by the evidence, in allowing him such the grounds where the railway terminated,
as will reasonably compensate him. and as to whether or not plaintiff was negIn making up this amount, you should ligent in not taking it. award, as may appear from the evidence, In conclusion, we may say that the case the reasonable value of the time lost be- was submitted to the jury on two theories : cause of the injury, the amount he has One, that the stile, by reason of its narrowpaid for medical attendance and nursing, ness, or for want of railings, or because it and fair compensation for the bodily pain was constructed of light or defective maand suffering caused by the said injury; terials, was not such means of egress as an and if you further find that plaintiff's in- ordinarily prudent person would provide, in juries are permanent, and will, to some ex- which event defendant might be found tent, disable him in the future, and cause guilty of negligence; and the other, that the him pain and suffering hereafter, you injury was due to defective board should also allow him such further sum in said stile, in which event defendant as, paid now in advance, will reasonably I would not be guilty of negligence, unless it
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care , sibility. See cases hitherto cited. Deshould have known, of its defective condi- fendant's contention that it is not liable be tion. The latter theory, was bottomed on cause the stile was erected by a stranger the thought that the stile itself was not is unsound in principle, and not sustained dangerous, save as it had a defective board. by authority. When it invited its passenWhat we have said in the first division gers to use this stile, it, in effect, repof this opinion has reference to this last resented that it was reasonably safe for the contention. On the other proposition, de purposes intended; and, when injury ocfendant was liable for the defective condi- curred by reason of its unsafe or faulty tion of the stile, although it was erected by construction, it should not be allowed to a stranger. Defendant had full knowl- shield itself behind another, and to say that edge of the construction of the stile, and it did not know of its defective construcimpliedly invited its passengers to use it. tion. Gulf, C. & 8. F. R. Co. v. Glenk, 9 Under such circumstances, its liability is Tex. Civ. App. 599, 30 S. W. 278, and cases the same as if it had itself set up and main- cited. tained the device. See cases hitherto cited The instructions were even more favorand McDonald v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. able to the defendant than it was entitled 26 Iowa, 124, 95 Am. Dec. 114; Beard v. to. We are not to be understood as approv. Connecticut & P. Rivers R. Co. 48 Vt. 101; ing all of them. Suffice it to say that deGilmore v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 154 Pa. fendant was in no manner prejudiced either 375, 25 Atl. 774; Watson v. O.xanna Land by those given, or by the refusal of the Co. 92 Ala, 320, 8 So. 770. This rule is court to give those asked by it. Our obserbottomed on the proposition that the duty vations in the second paragraph of this of a carrier of passengers does not end when opinion must be construed with reference the passenger has alighted from its cars. to these suggestions. It must also provide reasonably safe means There is no prejudicial error in the recof access in and from its stations or ter- | ord, and the judgment must be, and is, afminals for the use of its passengers, and firmed. the passengers have a right to assume that the means of egress provided are reasonably Bishop, J., took no part. safe. This duty it cannot delegate to another so as to relieve itself from respon. Petition for rehearing overruled.
TEXAS SUPREME COURT. James W. SWAYNE et al., Piffs. in Err., the First Supreme Judicial District to
RROR to the Court of Civil Appeals for LONE ACRE OIL COMPANY. review a judgment modifying a judgment
of the District Court for Jefferson County Tex.......
in plaintiffs' favor in an action brought to
establish an interest in petroleum produced 1. The life estates created by statute, from land in which plaintiffs claimed an giving a surviving husband or wife one-third
undivided interest. Affirmed. interest for life in the real estate of the other, are subject to the incidents of com
The facts are stated in the opinion. mon-law life estates, although they are not Messrs. Amos L. Beaty, W. D. Gorthe same as the common-law estates; and don, and E. C. McLean, for plaintiffs in the life tenant is therefore impeachable for waste.
The widow's estate is not confined to the 2. One entitled to undivided life
surface of the land, but includes the minestate under a statute giving a surviving husband or wife a one-third
erals beneath; and the case must be adinterest in the real estate of the other can judged accordingly. not demand absolutely any part of the pro- Tex. Rev. Stat. art. 1689; Benavides v. duction of oil wells subsequently opened upon Hunt, 79 Tex. 383, 15 S. W. 396; Koen v. the property by the remainder-men, but is entitled only to the income upon one third Bartlett, 41 W. Va. 559, 31 L. R. A. 128, 56 of the oil produced.
Am. St. Rep. 884, 23 S. E. 664; Seager v.
McCabe, 92 Mich. 186, 16 L. R. A. 247, 52 (April 27, 1905.)
N. W. 299; Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. NOTE.--As to right of dower in mines, see, in 31 L. R. A. 128 ; Williamson v. Jones, 25 L. R. this series, Seager v. McCabe, 16 L. R. A. 247. A. 222, with note as to nature of property in and note.
mineral oil and gas, also 38 L. R. A. 694; Mar As to rights of life tenants generally in oil shall v. Mellon, 35 L. R. A. 816, and Wilson in place, see, in this series, Koen v. Bartlett, Hughes, 39 L. R. A. 292.
425, 34 Atl. 564; Wilson 1, Youst (Wilson precisely the same footing in regard to all
Hughes) 43 W. Va. 826, 39 L. R. A. 292, questions of waste. 28 S. E. 781; MacSwinney, Mines, 32; Atty. Gen. ex rel. Churchill v. MarlborTiedeman, Real Prop. 2; Co. Litt. 4a; 1 ough, 3 Madd. 539; Smythe v. Smythe, 2 Washb. Real Prop. 3; 2 Bl. Com. 16-18, Swanst. Bridges v. Stephens, 2 144; Lewis v. Branthuaite, 2 Barn & Ad. Swanst. 157, note; Coffin v. Coffin, Jac. 72; 437.
4 Kent, Com. 12th ed. 78, note b. Since the life estate comes by inheritance, The legal life estate in question under and vests solely by operation of law, the our statute--a freehold estate of inheri. widow, though having only a life estate,' tance,-does not “necessarily” imply immight drill for oil without being guilty of peachability for waste. waste, and is consequently entitled to her The congress of Texas did not adopt the proportion of the oil produced, less the ex- common law of England as a rule of proppenses of producing and marketing. erty. The common law was adopted only
Tex. Rev. Stat. art. 1689; Higgins Oil as a rule of decision. Fuel Co. v. Snow, 51 C. C. A. 267, 113 Fed. Considering that the Republic up to that 439; Seager v. McCabe, 92 Mich. 186, 16 L. time had been under the civil law, where an R. A. 247, 52 N. W. 299; Branbridge, Min. estate of this character was under no reing, 55; 4 Wait, Act. & Def. 424.
| strictions as to use, but where the usufrucThe remainder-man having drilled wells | tuary had a right to seek for and open and devoted the land to mining purposes, every kind of mine (1 Domat, Civil Law. the widow is entitled to her proportion of 843; 2 Domat, Civil Law, 945, 968), is it the proceeds of the oil, after deducting the 'not reasonable that congress intended to fix expenses of producing and marketing, re- the time or duration in which the estate gardless of whether she would have been al- ! could be enjoyed, rather than to hedge lowed to sink wells and extract oil.
about with limitations the use thereof inHiggins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Snow, 51 C. C. herent in certain estates of this character A. 267, 113 Fed. 439; Koen v. Bartlett, 41' at common law ? W. Va. 559, 31 L. R. A. 128, 56 Am. St. Cartwright v. Hollis, 5 Tex. 164; ThompRep. 884, 23 S. E. 664; Gillum v. St. Louis, son v. Duncan, 1 Tex. 489; Bradley v. McA. & T. R. Co. 5 Tex. Civ. App. 338, 23 S. ''
Crabb, Dallam (Tex.) 508; Campbell V. 717; Lenfers v. Henke, 73 Ill. 405, 24 Am. Everts, 47 Tex. 102; Klein v. Gehrung, 25 Rep. 263; Priddy v. Griffith, 150 Ill. 560, Tex. Supp. 238, 78 Am. Dec. 565; 3 Kent, 41 Am. St. Rep. 397, 37 N. E. 999; Allen Com. 448; 2 Bl. Com. p. 403; Houard ». V. McCoy, 8 Ohio, 418.
North, 5 Tex. 298, 51 Am. Dec. 769. The life estate cast by the Texas statute The widow's estate is equal to the childoes not carry the inherent restrictions as dren's in all of its uses. to use that hedge about conventional life McGowan v. Bailey, 179 Pa. 470, 36 Atl. estates or dower and curtesy, and is not 325; Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 35 L. impeachable for waste.
R. A. 816, 57 Am. St. Rep. 601, 36 Atl. In conventional life estates, if the grant. 201; Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 or did not prohibit the grantee, or life ten- Atl. 564; Wilson v. Youst (Wilson ant, the latter was not punishable for Hughes) 43 W. Va. 826, 39 L. R. A. 292, waste prior to the statutes of Marlbridge ! 28 S. E. 781; Lunn v. Oslin, 96 Tenn. 28. and Gloucester.
33 S. W. 561; Owen v. Hyde, 6 Yerg. 334, 28 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 891; 2 BI. 27 Am. Dec. 467; Gaines v. Green Pond Com. 123.
Iron Min. Co. 33 N. J. Eq. 612; Sayers v.
Hoskinson, 110 Pa. 473, 1 Atl. 308; Snyder, It is in every instance a conventional ! “life estate" to which the doctrine of waste
Mines, § 941. has been applied.
When the remainder-man, as such and as Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. tition and without the joinder of the life
cotenant, entered upon the land before par564; Wilson v. Youst (Wilson v. Hughes) tenant, and drilled oil wells, and devoted th 43 W. Va. 826, 39 L. R. A. 292, 28 S. E. hitherto unused land to mining purposes, 781; Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 35 thereby destroying all other possible uses, L. R. A. 816, 57 Am. St. Rep. 601, 36 Atl. mining thereby became a lawful mode of 201.
use, and the proceeds, when severed and There was at common law “a life estate sold, became a product of the land, and of the legal kind, as contradistinguished the accounting is due on a basis of profit, from conventional."
and not corpus. 2 Bl. Com. p. 125.
Gillum v. St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. 5 Tex. A tenant for life without impeachment Civ. App. 338, 23 S. W. 717; Koen v. Bart. for waste, and a tenant in tail after possi- lett, 41 W. Va. 559, 31 L .R .A. 128, 56 Am. bility of issue extinct, seem to stand upon St. Rep. 884, 23 S. E. 664; Seager v. Mo
Cabe, 92 Mich, 186, 16 L. R. A. 247, 52 N. | Am. St. Rep. 891, 27 S. E. 410; Marshall v. W. 299; Donahue, Petroleum & Gas, chap. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 35 L. R. A. 816, 57 Am. 4, § 3.
St. Rep. 601, 36 Atl. 201; Wilson v. Youst Messrs. Smith, Crawford, & Sonfield, (Wilson v. Hughes) 43 W. Va. 826, 39 L. R. for defendant in error:
A. 292, 28 S. E. 781. The common law was adopted as the rule A tenant for life has no ownership or inof property in Texas in 1840, and has been terest in minerals underlying the land, unin force ever since, and was in force in less at the time that the life estate is cast, 1848, when the statute casting an estate or prior thereto, mines have been opened on for life on the surviving husband or wife the land. was enacted. Therefore, the estate con Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa, 371, 35 L. R. ferred by the statute not being further de. A. 816, 57 Am. St. Rep. 601, 36 Atl. 201; fined than "an estate for life," the charac- Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. ter of the estate was such as had been fixed 564; Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 402 ; and construed by the common law.
Coates v. Cheever, 1 Cow. 460; Williamson Hartley's Digest, art, 127; Black, Constr. v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 38 L. R. A. 694, & Interpretation of Laws p. 130; MC-64 Am. St. Rep. 891, 27 S. E. 410; WestCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 467, 17 L. ed. 220 moreland Coal Co.'s Appeal, 85 Pa. 344; United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 209, Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Min. Co. 33 N. Fed. Cas. No. 15,494; United States v. J. Eq. 603; Reed v. Reed, 16 N. J. Eq. 248; Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 24 L. R. A. Hendrix v. McBeth, 61 Ind. 473, 28 Am. 73, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 443, 7 C. C. A. 58, Rep. 680; Billings v. Taylor, 10 Pick. 460, 19 U. S. App. 36, 58 Fed. 58; Kircher v. 20 Am. Dec. 533; Gerkins v. Kentucky Salt Murray, 8 C. C. A. 448, 23 U. S. App. 214, Co. 100 Ky. 734, 66 Am. St. Rep. 370, 39 S. 60 Fed. 50; Boone v. Hulsey, 71 Tex. 189, W. 444; Tiedeman, Real Prop. $$ 73-75; 9 S. W. 531; Babb v. Carroll, 21 Tex. 771. Donahue, Petroleum & Gas, p. 41, § 1; Hig.
Where the statute confers upon the sur- gins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Snow, 51 C. C. A. viving wife "an estate for life in one third 267, 113 Fed. 438; Barnsdall v. Boley, 119 of the lands of her deceased husband,” such Fed. 195; Bond v. Godsey, 99 Va. 564, 39 S. estate is no greater than that of a life ten- E. 215; Maher v. Maher, 73 Vt. 243, 50 Atl. ant at common law.
1063; Neel v. Neel, 19 Pa. 323; Franklin Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 744; Hendrix Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 Md. 549, 33 Am. v. McBeth, 61 Ind. 473, 28 Am. Rep. 680; Rep. 280; Moore v. Rollins, 45 Me. 493; Tiedeman, Real Prop. $ 72; 1 Washb. Real Griffin V. Fellows, 81* Pa. 114; 4 Kent, Prop. 4th ed. p. 139.
Com. p. 41. A tenant for life has only the right to The life tenant's possession and right full enjoyment and use of the land and all where no mines have been opened when the its temporary profits during his estate life estate is cast are only in the surface. therein. He is entitled to none but tempo Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Tex. 390, 15 S. W. rary profits, and is prohibited from doing 396; Ames v. Ames, 160 Ill. 599, 43 N. E. anything with the land which would con- 592; Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475, 72 Am. stitute waste.
Dec. 760; Caldwell v. Copeland, 37 Pa. 427. 2 Bl. Com. p. 122; Tiedeman, Real Prop. 78 Am. Dec. 436. $ 72; Ft. Worth & N. 0. R. Co. v. Pearce, If plaintiffs, holders of the life estate of 75 Tex. 281, 12 S. W. 864; Cook v. Caswell, Mrs. Snow, are entitled to any share in the 81 Tex. 678, 17 S. W. 385; Barnsdall v. Bo- oil or other minerals, such right is limit. ley, 119 Fed. 195.
ed to interest on the investment of the net Waste is an unlawful act or omission of proceeds of one eighteenth of the oil produty which results in permanent injury to duced. the inheritance, and any act which does Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. damage to the reversioner, and is not one of 564; Lenfers v. Henke, 73 Ill. 405, 24 Am. the ordinary uses to which the land is put, Rep. 266; Dickin v. Hamer, 1 Drew. & S. is waste.
284; Wilson v. Youst (Wilson v. Hughes) Tiedeman, Real Prop. $$ 72, 73.
43 W. Va. 826, 39 L. R. A. 292, 28 S. E. Oil is a mineral; oil in situ is a part of 781. the land, -the inheritance.
Messrs. Greer, Greer, Nall, & Parker Bryan, Petroleum & Natural Gas, p. 21; and Crane, Greer, & Wharton also for Brown v. Spilman, 155 U. S. 669, 39 L. ed. defendant in error: 305, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 245; Gerkins v. Ken Where a statute is enacted, using a welltucky Salt Co. 100 Ky. 734, 66 Am. St. Rep. understood, common-law, technical phrase, 370, 39 S. W. 444; People's Gas Co. v. Ty the statute will be construed as using the ner, 131 Ind. 277, 16 L. R. A. 443, 31 Am. phrase in its technical sense, and with the St. Rep. 436, 31 N. E. 59; Williamson v. same meaning it had at common law. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 38 L. R. A. 694, 64 Cayce v. Curtis, Dallam (Tex.) 404;
Williams v. State, 12 Tex. App. 395;Mon- | and the part in controversy is now very roe v. State, 23 Tex. 210; Powell v. State, valuable for the oil which it is producing. 17 Tex. App. 351; Black, Constr. & Inter The stipulation of the parties as to the pretation of Laws, p. 130; Laird v. Briggs, judgment to be rendered is as follows: L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 22; Adams v. Turrentine, “(1) Upon the foregoing statement of 30 N. C. (8 Ired. L.) 147; McCool v. Smith, facts judgments shall be rendered by the 1 Black, 467, 17 L. ed. 220; United States v. court on the issue of title as to the land deJones, 3 Wash. C. C. 209, Fed. Cas. No. scribed in plaintiffs' petition. (2) In case 15,494; United States v. Trans-Missouri it is held by the court that the plaintiffs Freight Asso. 24 L. R. A. 73, 4 Inters. Com. have no interest in the land, then, of course, Rep. 443, 7 C. C. A. 58, 19 U. S. App. 36, 58 judgment shall be rendered that the plainFed. 58; State v. Phelps, 24 La. Ann. 493; tiffs take nothing by their suit, and pay State v. Whitener, 93 N. C. 590.
the costs thereof. (3) In case it shall be
held by the court that they are entitled to Gaines, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of an estate for the life of said Annie E. the court:
Snow in one eighteenth of the land in conThis is an action of trespass to try title, troversy without any interest in the oil or and was brought by the plaintiffs in error its proceeds, then the plaintiffs must get to recover of the defendant in error an es their quantum of land from the Gladys tate for the life of Annie E. Snow in an un- City Oil, Gas, & Manufacturing Company, divided one eighteenth interest in a small and judgment shall be rendered that the parcel of the John A. Veatch survey, and plaintiffs take nothing by their suit, and also to recover a like proportion of the net pay the costs thereof. Likewise, if it shall value of certain petroleum which had been be held that the plaintiffs must take their extracted from the land. The plaintiffs re- quantum of the land out of the land owned covered in the trial court to the full extent now by the Gladys City Oil, Gas, & Manuof their claim. Upon appeal the court of facturing Company, or out of that sold by civil appeals affirmed the judgment as to it subsequent to the sale to the defendant. the land, but reversed and modified it as to (4) If it shall be held by the court that the recovery for the oil. The case was tried they are entitled to an estate for the life of by the court upon an ilgreed statement of said Annie E. Snow in one eighteenth of facts, together with a written stipulation, the land in controversy, and in substance signed by the attorneys for both parties, as or effect that they are entitled to have one to the judgment to be rendered, according eighteenth of the net proceeds of the oil that to the determination of certain questions of has been extracted and marketed after de. law affecting the respective rights of the ducting all expenses of producing and marplaintiffs and the defendant.
keting invested or put at interest, and to We will state the facts necessary to a receive only the interest thereon during her decision of the case; and this as briefly as life, the corpus of the fund at her death to practicable. It appears from the agreed belong to the remainder-men, then judgment statement that one Andrew A. Ve::tc inher. shall be rendered for the plaintiffs against ited from his father a sixth undivided in the defendant for such life estate, and for terest in the Veatch survey of 3,400 acres the value of their interest in the proceeds in Jefferson county, of which his father of oil taken and marketed, to wit, $300. was the original grantee; that upon the (5) If it shall be held by the court that death of Andrew, in 1871, his interest de- they are entitled to an estate for the life scended to his surviving widow, Annie E., of the said Annie E. Snow in one eightand their two children,—that is to say, one eenth of the land in controversy, and also third to each of the children in fee, and a to one eighteenth of the net proceeds of the life estate in the other third to the widow, oil extracted and marketed, after deducting with remainder to the children; that she all expenses of producing and marketing, subsequently intermarried with Henry A. judgment shall in that event be rendered Snow; and that by purchase the plaintiffs for the plaintiffs against the defendant for are the owners of her interest. It also ap- such life estate and for their one eightpears that the defendant is the owner of eenth of the net proceeds of the oil marketthe entire tract in controversy save the life ed, amounting to $500.” estate which descended to Mrs. Veatch, the The trial court and the court of civil widow of Andrew A. Veatch. The entire appeals both held that the plaintiffs in erVeatch survey was unoccupied and unin-ror were entitled to a third interest for life closed at the death of Andrew Veatch, but in the land in controversy, and that holdwas adapted to agricultural and pastoral ing is not questioned by either party. The purposes. No oil wells had been or were real question in the case is, What are the being bored upon it at that time. Oil, rights of the plaintiff's in error as life tenhowever, was discovered upon it in 1891, 1 ants in the oil under the land? The trial