villages at some distance from each other. This was what the Carlist chief wanted. He surrounded two battalions stationed at Alegria with their general. They were cut to pieces, and O'Doyle, with a hundred officers, taken prisoners: they were all shot. On the next morning Osma moved out with four battalions and five pieces of artillery. He was met by Zumalacarréguy at Ulitarri, who attacked his left wing with such impetuosity that the entire force was soon routed. The Cristinos were pursued to the very gates of Vittoria, where they took refuge. The loss of the army in those two affairs amounted to 1500 men, killed and prisoners. Two guns and one standard also fell into the hands of the enemy, whilst the success of Zumalacarréguy, within the last twenty days, procured him 4000 muskets, 200 horses, and a great moral influence. Mina entered Pamplona on the 30th of October, and found the Cristino army in a state of the most complete demoralisation. He had been led to suppose that the army of Navarre about to be placed at his disposal would amount to 24,000, but he found that the force under his command did not exceed 10,000, effective men; 3000 were in hospital, and the rest distributed amongst the different forts. The soldiers were in a state of absolute privation, and having been badly commanded, and suffering from the incapacity, or treachery, of their generals, had no longer any confidence in their superiors. Following the example set them by their own officers, they daily quitted their respective regiments, without even going through the ceremony of asking, or obtaining, leave. The first care and principal object of the new general was the restoration of discipline. With the men he found much difficulty, but with the officers it became almost impossible, as they were every day resigning, until at length the government, yielding to his earnest desire, sent him others.

It would far exceed the limits of our sketch were we to detail the various occasions in which the superiority of Zumalacarréguy was still maintained over his formidable rival, and how the once invincible guerilla chief witnessed his own arts, and his own plans of campaign, turned against him. We shall merely observe that the same causes which had, in former times, given to Mina all his influence, were now in favour of his opponent; and, that in combating against the political sympathies of the country, he lost all his value in the eyes of those rude men who had, on former occasions, been excited to fanaticism by these same sympathies; that his military reputation was, in a great measure, the result of his influence, and of his situation in the country, which he ruled by terror, or by affection, and that the same causes being, at the present moment, in favour of his adversary, should of necessity produce the same or similar results. In addition to which he soon became aware that the population was against him, and, consequently, that he should have neither deserters nor volunteers; whilst the few that did present themselves only served to prove the rule. He announced, therefore, to the government that he should require 10,000 additional men to put down the insurrection. Neither was Mina any longer in the flower of his age, or the vigour of his strength. His body was wasting away under the influence of a slow, but incurable, disease, and the decline of his mental faculties and energies followed fast upon the decay of his worn-out frame. On many occasions, when scarcely able to move without assistance, the once terrible destroyer of the legions of Napoleon was stung to madness at beholding the same arts practised, with the same success, against himself, of which he had been so renowned a master, and which he had so well taught to the mountaineers of Navarre; and the disgraced and helpless chieftain mourned in silence over his affliction. He was at length obliged to entrust the army of the North to General Cor

dova, a young man without experience, and whose political honesty was not of a very pure character. Several months were wasted away in attempts to crush his wary and indefatigable enemy, but without effect: the results were mostly in favour of the Carlist troops; and if any advantages were obtained, they were not of such a kind as to counterbalance the prevailing ill-success which attended the queen's arms. At length matters were brought to a crisis. On his return to Pamplona on the 3d of April, 1835, from an ineffectual expedition in the valley of the Bastan, Mina became so dangerously ill as to be obliged to send a courier in all haste to Madrid, to announce his situation, and to request that he should be immediately replaced in the command. His resignation was accepted by the government, and Valdez, who had become minister of war, once more assumed the direction of the army, and again went forth on that perilous mission, the unhappy issue of which had almost annihilated the physical and moral energies of his celebrated predecessor. It was during the second command of Valdez that a stop was put to the terrible system of extermination heretofore practised by both parties on their respective prisoners, and that the stipulation, or convention, was agreed to by the contending parties, which is known by the name of the Elliot treaty.

The first attempt made by Valdez took place on the 21st of April, at the head of three divisions, commanded by Seoane, Aldama, and Cordova; and, with eighteen battalions, he encountered Zumalacarréguy near Eulate. The battle was so well sustained by the Carlists, that, on the following morning, Valdez was obliged to retreat on los Arcos, and thence to Logroño, followed by clouds of skirmishers, who threw his force into great disorder. He arrived at Estella on the 27th, beaten and demoralised. His baggage fell into the hands of Zumalacarréguy, together with 150 prisoners, and 5000 muskets!

In the midst, however, of these advantages, the cause of Don Carlos was soon about to receive a blow, from which, in spite of subsequent temporary triumphs, it never recovered. The city of Bilbao was encompassed on the 10th of June, 1835, by eighteen Carlist battalions, and summoned, on the 12th, to surrender, by Zumalacarréguy himself in person. The capital of Biscay is not a town capable of defence; it is commanded nearly on all sides by heights, and these were at the present moment in possession of the enemy. Its garrison amounted to about 4000 men, formed of the depôts of ten regiments, and the urbanos, or national guards, of the place. It was also badly provisioned, and was sadly deficient in most of the munitions de guerre. Its fortifications were of so slight a nature as rather to court an attack, than to protect it from one. Under all these disadvantages, the Count Mirasol, who commanded there, replied to the summons of Zumalacarréguy, as a soldier and a man of honour should answer to such a message. He refused to surrender, and on the 14th the attack was commenced. On the very first day the Carlists became masters of the river Nervion. The town was now in a most helpless condition. Valdez was at Miranda del Ebro with the principal part of the army; the bodies of reserve, under Las Heras, were at Vittoria, and the division of Biscay, under the orders of Espartero, was at Portugalette, about two leagues and a half distant, at the mouth of the river. Jaureguy, with the division of Guipuzcoa, was at San Sebastian, and could only send two battalions to Espartero. Zumalacarréguy had made his arrangements well; the greater part of his army was before Bilbao, and the remainder was stationed at Durango and Villara, in order to keep Vittoria and Orduña in check. The attack was continued incessantly till the 15th, and at that moment every thing announced the fall of

the town, when an unforeseen occurrence saved it from destruction. At half-past ten o'clock on the morning of the 15th, a spent musket-ball, fired from an English battery, struck Zumalacarréguy in the right leg, as he stood on a balcony at 1500 feet distant, watching the erection of a battery. The shot took effect a little below the knee, and during the first day no evil consequences, beyond a temporary inconvenience, were dreaded from it. The symptoms, however, soon becoming of a serious character, he was conveyed to the house of his brother, the curate of the village of Segama, at a short distance from Ormaisteguy, his native place. Here he gradually grew worse, and mortification so rapidly set in, that it was found necessary to have recourse to amputation. In order to perform this terrible operation with less anguish to the patient, an unusually large dose of opium was administered; he fell into a deep slumber, from which he never afterwards awoke !

Various opinions have been expressed as to the real cause of his death. No one for a moment thought of assigning it to the wound itself, which was of too slight a character to merit serious attention. The anxiety of mind under which he laboured, his quick and impatient temperament, his robust and sanguine constitution, and his temporary and unwilling prostration, so different from the activity of the last two years, have been accounted for as the causes of the inflammation, and the brain fever which preceded his dissolution, whilst deeper and more criminal reasons have been suggested by others. Immediately after his wound he was conveyed to the interior, contrary to the advice of an English surgeon, who was then serving in the Carlist army, and who pledged himself to his recovery in a few days if left under his care. He had long been regarded with deep hatred and jealousy by the priests, and the other fanatical scum, that surrounded the person of Don Carlos, whose miserable vanity also was often wounded at the very trifling respect paid to his sacred person by his general; and this feeling was carried to such an extreme, that, at the period of the siege of Bilbao, the savage Moreno, he who met retributive justice some months since at the hands of the partisans of that exemplary priest, Echevaria, was privately named to supersede him in the command of the army. It is well known that Don Carlos was congratulated by his confessor and his courtiers on being at length freed by the hand of Providence from the thraldom in which he had been kept. It was also said that Don Carlos was not ignorant of the crime, if crime was indeed committed; and neither his subsequent affectation of sorrow, nor the publication of the royal decree of May, 1836, by which the widow of Zumalacarréguy was created Duchess of Victory, and Countess of Zumalacarréguy, with the perpetuation of the honours and dignities of a grandee of Spain of the first class in her family, whether male or female, nor the announcement of the most solemn funeral obsequies at the exhumation of his ashes, could do away with the belief that the devout prince was an accomplice in the work of assassination. Zumalacarréguy left a wife and three daughters, who, we believe, are still living. Whatever may have been his personal vices, avarice or extortion was not of the number; his entire wealth, at the moment of his death, consisted of twelve ounces of gold, (about 387. sterling) and four horses.

Apart from the cause in which he was engaged, the career of Zumalacarréguy is one which must challenge admiration. That his talents were of a high order cannot, indeed, for a moment be denied.* The peasants of

In a pamphlet, entitled "Policy of England towards Spain," published by Ridgway in 1837, and attributed to Lord Clarendon, at that time our minister at Madrid, it is remarked with rather amusing naïveté, " Any man with firmness of character, and with a fixed resolution not to depart

Navarre were organised and disciplined by him without the aid of any of those resources which are supposed to be indispensable to the formation of armed bodies. Out of the rudest materials he constructed a regular force, whose arms, equipments, food, and clothing were, in most cases, taken from the enemy. The moral power of the insurrection was raised, by his enterprising genius, to an amazing point of excellence, when we take into consideration the means at his disposal; and his death occurred at the moment when his reputation was highest, and when his ultimate success was more than probable. His perfect knowledge of the country, which was, for the most part, the theatre of his combats, enabled him to work out with precision the plans of campaign which he had laid down, and from which he rarely departed; but those talents must, indeed, be of a high order which enabled him to vanquish the hero of the guerilla, even on his own ground. Without going so far as to say that Zumalacarréguy was a great general, in the extensive application of the term, it will be only necessary to reflect, for a moment, on what he has done, to arrive at the conclusion that, in the warfare of the mountain, Spain has never produced his superior; and to show that his powers are not even thus limited, we have only to remember that at the head of a force, created by himself, eight times, and not rarely ten times, smaller than that which he had to oppose, he neutralised the efforts of Sarsfield, beat Valdez from the field, utterly vanquished Quesada, routed Rodil, baffled Mina, put to flight Lorenzo, Oráa, Jaureguy, Espartero, Osma, chiefs who had the population of Spain with them, who were favourably regarded, to say the least, by the governments of France and England; and that from the month of April, 1835, until June of the same year, he made more than 4000 prisoners, took 92 horses, and 23 pieces of artillery.

It has been said that Zumalacarréguy was at one time a Constitutionalist, and it is still believed that his political feelings were really not illiberal. The holy hatred borne against him by the apostolical followers of Don Carlos, and his undisguised contempt for their narrow views, and bigoted principles, may be admitted as an argument in his favour. When in temporary command at Ferrol, in 1832, he issued, on the occasion of some popular outbreaks, a proclamation which ended with the expression "Viva El Rey, viva la Reyna, y viva su descendencia," thus marking by this unusual addition, that his views were not then, at least, of a hostile nature towards the daughter of Ferdinand. The original proclamation in MS., signed by himself, is still preserved by his youngest brother, one of the most faithful supporters of the queen, for some years past a deputy to the Cortes, and chief judge of a court of appeal in Burgos; and we have reason to believe that, but for the gratuitous insult flung on him by the overbearing Quesada, Zumalacarréguy might never have borne arms against the queen. We scarcely think it necessary to advert to the acts of cruelty and ferocious severity with which his memory is stained, because a counterpart can easily be found in the conduct of his adversaries. Spaniards possess an instinctive eagerness to shed blood, and, considering the deadly hatreds fostered during civil war in such a country as Spain, it may become difficult to whom to assign a superiority in acts of cold-blooded atrocity.

from the plan laid down, could have been able to produce the same results as Zumalacarréguy, and by the same means that is, any one with the same talents, and the same powers of developing them, would produce the same effects. The writer seems to sneer at the assertion that the Carlist general possessed great talents for war, and he fortifies his dissent by the above remark. We certainly agree with him, as we also should if he had said that any man, possessing the same genius, the same resources, and the same opportunities as the great Napoleon, would have gained the battles of Lodi, Marengo, or Austerlitz! Never was the truism of probabilities better enunciated, or the doctrine of ifs more cautiously enforced.

In his private character it is said that Zumalacarréguy was a disinterested and faithful friend.* His detestation of meanness and religious hypocrisy was fierce and unbounded. He was a fond husband and a tender father; and amidst his engrossing and perilous occupations, his happiest moments were those which he could pass with his family. In his manners he was rather brusque and abrupt, but in his moments of good-humour, became softened down to unaffected familiarity.

Zumalacarréguy is worshipped by his admirers as a perfect hero; by his enemies he is represented as a blood-thirsty monster. He was neither. His talents being of a military nature, an inflexible and severe character was the basis on which they were maintained. But whatever may be the conclusion as to his merits, or demerits, his virtues, or his vices, it must be regretted both for the sake of freedom as well as humanity, that any pretext should have been given to such a man for upholding the cause of despotism and superstition. Had Quesada been less insolent and more honest, the civil war, if commenced at all, might not have lasted three months.

TRANSPORTATION.

WE are glad to see the waters troubled on any question affecting our systems of Secondary Punishment. In the first place, they are for the most part a crude, demoralising, wicked compound; and in the second, the popular discussion of the general principles of penal management is a promising indication, not only in connection with penal legislation, but the intellect and moral feeling abroad. There are few more difficult questions in agitation at present than how to dispose of our convicts. Their accumulation in home penitentiaries is admitted to be fraught with most trying evils, even by those who abstractedly approve that form of punishment above any other; while the past experiences of transportation are not such as in ordinary circumstances to justify committing our felons to a distant and unchecked discretion. The difficulty is peculiarly a practical one; for it refers not only to penal infliction, and not only to the expense of home and foreign systems as an economical question, but it embraces first the economical, and thence the moral, influence of accumulated criminal-labour competition, in a market whose surplus supply of labour, low wages, and uncertain employment, are the ultimate causes of much of the crime committed.

The suggestion of these remarks is to be found in the last Report of the Transportation Committee; the Report of the Inspectors of Prisons for the Home District; and the Speeches, just published in pamphlet form, of his Grace the Archbishop of Dublin and Sir William Molesworth on Transportation. The aim of the archbishop and the honourable member for Leeds in the pamphlets before us, is to prove that transportation, independently of any particular arrangements in working it out, is necessarily and irremediably worse than any other punishment; but in this ultra argument we apprehend both have signally failed. No doubt the peculiar processes under which transportation has been carried out are very bad; but that transportation is any more necessarily identified with those processes than the jails of England are with the crimes and vices of which Howard found them the hot-bed- and of which the Inspectors of Prisons' report shows us, his Grace may still find many of them the nursery, if he will but turn his

• His friendship for the Baron de los Valles was most disinterested and warm, and only terminated with his life. The very last letter which he wrote, a short time before his death, was addressed to his enterprising and gallant friend.