for that purpose, July 9, 1778, and by others from time to time, the last ratification being that of Maryland, March 1, 1781. These articles, without doubt, formed a compact. The third article expressly declares that "the said States hereby enter into a firm league," "binding themselves to assist each other."

There was no regular legislative, executive, or judicial department, but to some extent the articles conferred upon the Congress assembled under them powers of a national character; such as the power of determining on peace and war, with certain exceptions; of entering into treaties, granting letters of marque and reprisal, appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and other powers, comprising legislative, executive, and judicial functions. They contained divers limitations upon the powers which each of the States would otherwise have possessed, so that the action of the States should not interfere with that of Congress; and they imposed certain duties upon the States. As these Articles remained in full force up to the time of the adoption of the Constitution, it is in no sense true that the States at and immediately before that adoption were in all respects sovereign States. The second Article, in these words, "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled," admits that to that extent they had parted with their sovereignty. By the thirteenth article, it was agreed that "every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them."

Now, with this admitted character of a compact, it is quite clear that no State, after the adoption of the Articles, could secede at pleasure from the Confederation. So far from it, no one could retire without the assent of all the rest.

Waiving for the present the consideration of the particular

provisions of the Articles, which show this conclusively, and examining the case as it is presented by the character of the Articles as above set forth, it is perfectly apparent that there was no right of secession. It is the nature of a contract to be binding upon the parties according to its terms, and the scope and operation it was designed to have. This compact prescribed duties to the States, and gave powers to the Congress. The purposes which were to be effected by it were of indefinite continuance. The duties of the States were without limitation of time. The powers of Congress were of the same character. Each party to the compact had duties to perform, and could not withdraw itself until those duties were discharged. Such are the legal rules in relation to contracts generally. And if this is true of the Articles of Confederation, it must be at least equally true of the Constitution itself, regarding it as a compact substituted for the Articles.

But it is alleged that this compact has been broken by some of the parties to it in divers particulars, principally relating to slavery, and that the other parties are therefore no longer bound by it, but may withdraw from further performance on their part. If we were to admit the breach as alleged, the conclusion does not follow. There are cases in which, on the failure or refusal of one party to a contract to perform his part of it, the other party may treat the contract as rescinded. But this case is not within that rule; for it is equally well settled, as a general rule, that one party cannot treat a contract as rescinded unless all the parties can be placed in the condition in which they were before they entered into it, and that if there has been a partial performance, from which one party has derived a benefit, he cannot retain what he has received, and treat the contract as rescinded by reason of any failure or refusal of another party to perform the residue. There are, therefore, at least two valid reasons why the supposed breaches of the compact give no right to any State to secede. It is clear the parties could not be placed in statu quo; and certainly the

seceding States, instead of placing the United States as far as they might in that position, did, when they broke the compact on their part, not only retain all the benefits they had received, but, by the seizure of forts, arsenals, mint, navy-yard, and the other common property, they endeavored to appropriate to their own use all the property which, in consequence of the compact, the United States had placed within their limits, but to which they had no title whatever. There is no principle of law by which one party to a contract is entitled to grab all the property which the contract has been the means of placing within his reach, and at the same time to say that, on account of some partial failure of performance on the other side, he rescinds the contract, and withdraws from its obligations.

There is still another reason why, on the compact theory, there has never been any right of secession. That theory, as we have seen, is, that the Constitution is a compact to which "each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party, its coStates forming as to itself the other party." The Kentucky Resolutions distinctly so state it. Now South Carolina herself will not for a moment allege that all the co-States have broken the compact. She makes no such accusation against her dear sisters Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. She does not even aver that Mississippi broke the compact when she attempted to impair the obligation of her own bonds, in contravention of an express provision of the Constitution prohibiting such a procedure. She alleges that Congress has heretofore passed unconstitutional tariff laws, and that Massachusetts and Wisconsin and some other States have passed laws in contravention of the clause of the compact in relation to fugitive slaves, which are void. But if the compact is by each State, as one party, with all the co-States as the other party, neither Congress, nor Massachusetts, nor Wisconsin, nor any dozen of the other States constitutes the other party to the compact; and although they may have severally done those things which they ought not to have done, and left undone those things which they sev

erally ought to have done, the compact is not broken. "The other party" did not agree that they should do no unlawful acts. On this theory, then, what right has South Carolina, by a disruption of the Union, to injure New Jersey and Delaware, Indiana and Missouri, California and Oregon, against whom she charges no grievance, because she does not approve of the acts of Maine, Michigan, and Massachusetts ? The former States cannot control the acts of the latter, nor those of Congress, and are not responsible for them. And so "the other party" with whom South Carolina made her contract has not been guilty of the alleged breach of contract, and has the right to hold her to her bargain. This is a legitimate conclusion from the construction of the compact, as set forth by the learned doctors who study constitutional law with the Kentucky Resolutions for their text-book, and who attempt to justify their acts of insurrection and treason, in levying war upon the United States, on the ground that their States (through their instrumentality it might be added) have previously passed acts of secession. The statement serves to show that the theory of secession sits in judgment upon itself, and is its own executioner.

There is no reasonable escape from these results, if the ordinary rules which govern the obligation of contracts are applicable to the case.

It seems to be supposed, however, that there are different principles or rules in relation to compacts between States from those which govern contracts between persons, because there is no tribunal to determine controversies between the former; and that for this reason each State is the sole judge of its wrongs, and of the mode and means of redress. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 are relied upon by Mr. Jefferson Davis to sustain this proposition. Those resolutions, it is well understood, had their origin in the alien and sedition laws passed by Congress in 1798. They relate entirely to unconstitutional acts of Congress, and not to those of States or individuals; and no small part of their object was to assert and main

seceding States, instead of placing the United States as far as they might in that position, did, when they broke the compact on their part, not only retain all the benefits they had received, but, by the seizure of forts, arsenals, mint, navy-yard, and the other common property, they endeavored to appropriate to their own use all the property which, in consequence of the compact, the United States had placed within their limits, but to which they had no title whatever. There is no principle of law by which one party to a contract is entitled to grab all the property which the contract has been the means of placing within his reach, and at the same time to say that, on account of some partial failure of performance on the other side, he rescinds the contract, and withdraws from its obligations.

There is still another reason why, on the compact theory, there has never been any right of secession. That theory, as we have seen, is, that the Constitution is a compact to which "each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party, its coStates forming as to itself the other party." The Kentucky Resolutions distinctly so state it. Now South Carolina herself will not for a moment allege that all the co-States have broken the compact. She makes no such accusation against her dear sisters Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. She does not even aver that Mississippi broke the compact when she attempted to impair the obligation of her own bonds, in contravention of an express provision of the Constitution prohibiting such a procedure. She alleges that Congress has heretofore passed unconstitutional tariff laws, and that Massachusetts and Wisconsin and some other States have passed laws in contravention of the clause of the compact in relation to fugitive slaves, which are void. But if the compact is by each State, as one party, with all the co-States as the other party, neither Congress, nor Massachusetts, nor Wisconsin, nor any dozen of the other States constitutes the other party to the compact; and although they may have severally done those things which they ought not to have done, and left undone those things which they sev