erally ought to have done, the compact is not broken. "The other party" did not agree that they should do no unlawful acts. On this theory, then, what right has South Carolina, by a disruption of the Union, to injure New Jersey and Delaware, Indiana and Missouri, California and Oregon, against whom she charges no grievance, because she does not approve of the acts of Maine, Michigan, and Massachusetts ? The former States cannot control the acts of the latter, nor those of Congress, and are not responsible for them. And so "the other party" with whom South Carolina made her contract has not been guilty of the alleged breach of contract, and has the right to hold her to her bargain. This is a legitimate conclusion from the construction of the compact, as set forth by the learned doctors who study constitutional law with the Kentucky Resolutions for their text-book, and who attempt to justify their acts of insurrection and treason, in levying war upon the United States, on the ground that their States (through their instrumentality it might be added) have previously passed acts of secession. The statement serves to show that the theory of secession sits in judgment upon itself, and is its own executioner.

There is no reasonable escape from these results, if the ordinary rules which govern the obligation of contracts are applicable to the case.

It seems to be supposed, however, that there are different principles or rules in relation to compacts between States from those which govern contracts between persons, because there is no tribunal to determine controversies between the former; and that for this reason each State is the sole judge of its wrongs, and of the mode and means of redress. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 are relied upon by Mr. Jefferson Davis to sustain this proposition. Those resolutions, it is well understood, had their origin in the alien and sedition laws passed by Congress in 1798. They relate entirely to unconstitutional acts of Congress, and not to those of States or individuals; and no small part of their object was to assert and main

tain a strict construction of the Constitution, and to deny the authority of the judicial and other departments of the United States to determine conclusively the extent of their powers under it. They endeavor to maintain, in general terms, a right in the States to judge and determine respecting the extent of the powers of the general government under the Constitution, and they declare the acts mentioned unconstitutional. But it is quite clear that those who adopted them did not suppose that these resolutions had any effect to nullify those laws within the respective States adopting the resolutions. They called for the co-operation of the other States; but it is by no means certain that it was supposed that similar declarations of unconstitutionality, even by all the States, would have any effect, except as they might operate upon Congress to induce a repeal of the obnoxious laws, or perhaps upon the judges, whenever the courts should be required to pronounce a decision. The closing part of the last of the Kentucky Resolutions shows clearly that it was not supposed that the declarations of that State had had any effect to arrest the operation of the acts. It is in these words:

"That this Commonwealth does, therefore, call on its co-States for an expression of their sentiments on the acts concerning aliens, and for the punishment of certain crimes hereinbefore specified, plainly declaring whether those acts are or are not authorized by the Federal compact. And it doubts not that their sense will be so announced, as to prove their attachment unaltered to limited government, whether general or particular, and that the rights and liberties of their co-States will be exposed to no dangers by remaining embarked on a common bottom with their own: That they will concur with this Commonwealth in considering the said acts as so palpably against the Constitution, as to amount to an undisguised declaration that the compact is not meant to be the measure of the powers of the general government, but that it will proceed in the exercise over these States of all powers whatsoever: That they will view this as seizing the rights of the States, and consolidating them in the hands of the general government with a power assumed to bind the States, not merely in cases made federal,

but in all cases whatsoever, by laws made, not with their consent, but by others against their consent: That this would be to surrender the form of government we have chosen, and to live under one deriving its powers from its own will, and not from our authority; and that the co-States, recurring to their natural right in cases not made federal, will concur in declaring these acts void and of no force, and will each unite with this Commonwealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of Congress."

The seventh of the Virginia Resolutions, which calls for a similar co-operation, is as follows:

"That the good people of this Commonwealth having ever felt, and continuing to feel, the most sincere affection to their brethren of the other States, the truest anxiety for establishing and perpetuating the union of all, and the most scrupulous fidelity to that Constitution which is the pledge of mutual friendship, and the instrument of mutual happiness, the General Assembly doth solemnly appeal to the like dispositions of the other States, in confidence that they will concur with this Commonwealth in declaring, as it does hereby declare, that the acts aforesaid are unconstitutional, and that the necessary and proper measure will be taken by each for co-operating with this State in maintaining unimpaired the authorities, rights, and liberties reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

The resolutions were transmitted to the other States, and by several of them the principles asserted were as emphatically denied. As they are usually referred to by the advocates of secession as an authority sustaining their positions, we copy also the general declarations which are relied on for that purpose, being the first of the Kentucky and the third of the Virginia Resolutions. The following is the first of the Resolutions of Kentucky, passed Nov. 10, 1798:

"Resolved, That the several States composing the United States of America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government, but that by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special purposes, delegated

to that government certain definite powers, reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force: That to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party, its co-States forming as to itself the other party: That the government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself, since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress."

We now quote the third of the Virginia Resolutions, passed in the House of Delegates, December 21, 1798, yeas 100, nays 63, and subsequently in the Senate, 14 to 3:

"That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views the powers of the Federal Government as resulting from the compact to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the States, who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them."

The first remark which occurs in relation to both of these resolutions, in their connection with this subject, is, that they do not suggest that the election of a President from one section rather than another, or of one who entertains opinions in which certain sections do not concur; or any anticipation of measures which may or may not be adopted; or that any act of a State, especially any such act which may come under the cognizance of the judicial tribunals and be declared void, furnishes a case in which a State may "inter

pose for arresting the progress of the evil." In the next place, they assert no right of secession as a State remedy for the exercise by Congress of powers not granted by the compact, nor for any other grievance. If they intend to insist on a right of revolution as a measure of redress, they may be in accordance with received principles. If they mean anything else, the specification of it is not apparent. Mr. Madison, who must have known something of their meaning, denied that they sanctioned nullification, and they give as little support to secession. But, further, if they had contained an explicit declaration of a right of secession, this would prove nothing. The resolutions and platforms of political parties, in times of party excitement, whether in or out of the halls of legislation, do not furnish any authentic expositions of the principles of constitutional law.

While there is nothing in the Constitution, even supposing it to be a compact, which can sustain the position that each State may judge respecting infractions of it, and may withdraw from its obligations when she pleases to consider herself aggrieved, there seems to be nothing in the principles of public law to give countenance to such a right. Compacts between States are, in principle, as binding as those between persons. There is no court to interpret and enforce them, and each party may therefore insist upon its own construction. If they do not agree, however, the result is not that the compact falls, and its obligations cease, nor that either party may declare it no longer in force, or secede from it on an allegation of infraction by the other, that other being bound to submit to this judgment and determination; but each party has the right to insist on the performance of the agreement, and the mode of enforcing or of obtaining satisfaction for any breach of it is War. We are not aware that a right of peaceable withdrawal from a treaty is recognized anywhere, unless the terms of the treaty, or the circumstances, show such to have been the intention of the parties to it; or unless an