pation of the place where they are found by the forces of the United States, (by reason of the rebellion of their masters,

We copied several passages from Blackstone, to show that the forfeiture of personal property arose upon conviction before judgment. G. T. C. says, that Blackstone, "although a most elegant, was not always the most accurate of writers," and says, that he “has made a very imperfect statement of the common law on this subject." Now let us see what Coke says:

"If a felon be convicted by verdict, confession, or recreancie, he doth forfeit his goods and chattels, &c. presently. For where a reason hath beene yeelded in our bookes, that the praying of his clergie was a refusall of the law, and for that cause he forfeited his goods and chattels, that doth not hold; for if a man be convict of pettie treason, or murder, or any other crime for which he cannot have his clergie, yet by the verie conviction he forfeiteth his goods and chattels before attainder. And Stanford (speaking of a felon convict by verdict) saith that he shall forfeit his goods which he had at the time of the verdict given, which is the conviction in that case,” &c. "So as by a conviction of a felon, his goods and chattels are forfeited; but by attainder that is by judgment given, his lands and tenements are forfeited, and his bloud corrupted, and not before.". Co. Lit. 391, a.

It may very well be true that the king could not seize the goods to the use of the crown, nor grant them away to any applicant until after judgment. This is perfectly consistent with the fact that they were forfeited. It was the just policy of the same law which caused the forfeiture to occur upon conviction, to permit the goods to be applied to the support of the traitor and his family, and to the payment of his debts, notwithstanding the forfeiture. (Considerations on the Law of Forfeiture in High Treason, 81, 82.) And this shows the reason why the king could not seize the goods, nor grant them to another, in the intermediate time between the conviction and the judgment. It would seem from some of the older authorities that the goods might be inventoried, and security taken, after indictment, and prior to the conviction. (See 2 Hawkins, P. C., ch. 49.) It is said to be the better opinion that the party might take the mean profits of his land up to the judgment, although the forfeiture related back to the time of the offence. (Ibid., sec. 32.)

We submit that there is nothing in the authorities cited by G. T. C. which conflicts with these views; and it is quite evident that his labored argument to show that the forfeiture of goods and chattels is “worked” by the attainder has no sound foundation. It will be noted that we have nowhere contended that there is in this country any forfeiture arising from conviction.

There is another matter to show the true construction of the Constitution. G. T. C. says: "If the Reviewer had a clause which read, 'No attainder of treason shall work forfeiture of real estate, except during the life of the person attainted,' he would have a better ground from which to criticise my construction. Even then, however, he would find it difficult to discover why the framers of the instrument should have assumed that an ‘attainder' had nothing to do with personalty." And

but without any trial of the question of rebellion,) is but another mode of enacting emancipation, the captivity being figurative, and the emancipation being the reality. It looks very much like a bill of attainder by Congress, which is forbidden by the Constitution, and there is the further objection to it, that it does not appear on whom it is going to operate, until its operation is practically perfected.*

with reference to our remark, that "a forfeiture of a life estate in personal property, of which the traitor had the absolute title, would certainly be an anomaly," he says: "It is not denied that they limited the forfeiture of real property to an estate for the life of the traitor. Is that not as much of an anomaly, in reference to the old common law, with all its searches into every possible interest in land, as the forfeiture of a life interest in personalty?" We answer, that it is not. But suppose it were so, what has that to do with the argument? If we have no clause of the Constitution which reads, "No attainder of treason shall work forfeiture of real estate, except," &c., we have the fact that such was the law of England prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and the framers of it undoubtedly had reference to the change which had been made in the law there. The "old common law" was altered by the Statute of 7th of Anne, ch. 21, which contained a proviso that, after the decease of the Pretender, &c., "no attainder for treason shall extend to the disinheriting of an heir, nor to the prejudice of the right or title of any person or persons, other than the right or title of the offender or offenders during his, her, or their natural lives only; and it shall and may be lawful to every person or persons to whom the right or interest of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, after the death of any such offender or offenders, should or might have appertained if no such attainder had been, to enter into the same." (See 2 Hawk. P. C., ch. 49, sec. 52.) Was G. T. C. not aware of this statute, or was his reference to the "old common law" in connection with the Constitution, instead of a reference to this statute, another instance of his peculiar mode of discussion? It may well be assumed, we think, that this provision of the Statute of Anne was the foundation of the clause which was inserted in the Constitution, in fewer words, but with the same meaning. And thus there is not only no anomaly, but a perfect accordance, between the constitutional provision and the law of England as it was in force after the Statute of Anne.

We suggest to G. T. C. that, the next time he takes occasion to controvert the positions of the North American, it may be well for him to state them and their consequences fairly, and without any attempt to get up an argument founded on a misrepresentation, either express or implied; and we commend this matter to his particular consideration.

* Mr. T. D. Elliot, a Representative in Congress, who made a speech, September 9, at Worcester, the evening before what has been called "the Republican Convention was held at that place, is thus reported: -"After the war,' said he, there

All the accounts from the army uniformly represent that the soldiers who have thus far fought our battles have neither part nor lot in these projects for universal emancipation. "Let it once be understood," said an educated and intelligent colonel of a regiment which had seen hard service, "let it once be understood that this is a war for the emancipation of the negro, instead of a war in defence of the Constitution, and three quarters of the army would lay down their arms." It is those who stay at home and make impassioned speeches about liberty for the slave, and those who sit and listen and shout, but do not fight, that seek to make emancipation the object of the war. They have two ideas among them. Some, and the greater portion, of those who shout are philanthropists, part of them by profession, a majority by the genuine kindness of their hearts. These have not the faculty of reason strong enough to enable them to consider and judge into what a gulf of perdition any breach of the Constitution by the North at this time may plunge us; nor the caution which counsels not to give up a certain good for an uncertainty. They forget the eloquent peroration of Mr. Webster, in his speech on Nullification. Their idea is emancipation for the sake of emancipation, and some of them would prefer that the Union should be dissolved if slavery cannot be abolished. Another portion of them, consisting of the speech-makers in general, and their body-guard, are striving to avail themselves of the philanthropy of the portion first named, by securing its support for all the various offices of which they are among the most diligent seekers under the face of the heavens. Their idea is office,

can be no status unte bellum.' Mr. Elliot was sure that the time would come when we, joining hands with the Democrats, should demand freedom for the slave, and service for the freedman." - Boston Daily Advertiser, September 10.

It may therefore be supposed that this is to be the watchword. The meaning, if we understand it, is that the slave shall be emancipated by compulsion, and then the master required to hire him.

office, office. It would seem as if many of them would give up their chance of heaven for an office; and perhaps, humanly speaking, the bargain might be regarded as a good one. In senate-chambers and on stumps, in pulpits and at picnics, in camp-meetings and at commencements, "the everlasting negro" is supposed to be the best bid for the votes of those whose hearts are better than their heads, who act as if slavery were the only form of oppression on earth, and who place no great estimate on the blessings of a free government, in comparison with emancipation, because after emancipation is once effected we shall have reached their millennium.

The question which is presented by the leaders of this party, at the present time, is whether we are ready to usurp a power not conferred by the Constitution of the United States, violate all the oaths which we have taken to support it, make this a war upon State rights, destroy a portion of the sovereignty of the States, which they unquestionably possessed upon the declaration of independence and the treaty of peace with Great Britain, and have never parted with, and thereby break up the union of the States under the Constitution. unhesitatingly answer, No, a thousand times, No. be a revolution on the part of the North, and we that an attempt to conduct the war on this basis must result in the final acknowledgment of the independence of the seceding States.

To this we
This would

are satisfied

We desire not to be misunderstood, and we shall be glad not to be misrepresented. Our opposition to slavery knows none but constitutional and prudential limits. We have labored with all our powers for the restriction of slavery in the Territories, which we have no doubt is constitutional, the opinion of half a dozen judges of the Supreme Court to the contrary notwithstanding, and we should most heartily rejoice if some mode could be devised for the extinction of slavery in the States, without entailing upon the country worse evils. But

we denounce with unqualified condemnation the philanthropy, or the treason, call it which you please, that would violate the Constitution of the United States, and subvert the constitutions even of the seceding States, and thereby destroy the union of the States, and the hopes of constitutional liberty for the white race, in order to give freedom at once to four millions of slaves, seven eighths of whom would not know how to use it when they had obtained it, and who must suffer incomparably greater hardships, under existing circumstances, from such a gift, if it could be conferred on them by a Presidential proclamation, than they have thus far by the servitude to which they are subjected, which is unquestionably bad enough. If this insane persistence in the call for emancipation, either by proclamation or by confiscation first and trial afterward, shall result in divided counsels and divided effort at the North, and thereupon the rebellion shall by any possibility be successful, we do not propose to be numbered among those upon whose miserable heads the storm of popular indignation will fall, rightfully and pitilessly, and perhaps to a bitter end.

If the Union of the States is dissolved, the non-slaveholding States may possibly for a time remain united under one government. But we have no assurance that the free navigation of the Mississippi might not, at no distant day, induce the Western States to join the Southern Confederacy. Their material interests would in that case to some extent be advantaged thereby. It has already been held out as a lure to them to desist from their opposition.

In conclusion, we would say that we are in favor of the prosecution of the war with the greatest possible vigor. It has been forced upon the North, as we have shown, under circumstances of the most atrocious character. We could not refuse to fight without dishonor. We cannot fail of victory without subjugation. The rebel Provost Marshal of Frederick