pleases upon Constitutional law. Third, You know, that in my reply to your letter I expressed no opinion that your cheeks ought to tingle with shame because you have had the effrontery to differ from Mr. Justice Curtis. It was "the exposure of your utter incapacity to deal with a grave Constitutional question," and "the effrontery of your assumption of a right to sit in judgment upon the legal opinions of Judge Curtis, and to talk of his mournful fallacies," that I thought ought to make your cheeks tingle. Accusing Judge Curtis of "writing a pamphlet to aid and comfort the rebels, by pushing with all his might such heresies," and saying that Prof. Parsons's communication in the Daily Advertiser "explodes the mournful fallacies of the unfortunate Judge," is something more than differing from Mr. Justice Curtis. You say in another part of your letter, "I did speak of the mournful fallacies of Judge Curtis's pamphlet. I thought it. As a citizen I had the right to say it-respectfully, as I did." You most surely have strange ideas of respect. There is no "respectfully" in any part of your notice of it, either in words, or manner, in form, or substance. Whether you are singular in your opinion is not the question. I have not undertaken to discuss that; but I may say that neither the President, nor many members of the public bodies you name, would exhibit their respect or courtesy by similar remarks respecting Mr. Justice Curtis, and his opinions.

Again, you say, "Now the question is, whether I, as a citizen-though a clergyman and an editor- have not as much right as you or your colleague can have, to express an opinion on this same matter, which is practical alike to all." Permit me to say that the question is no such thing. You enter into an elaborate defence of your right to form your own opinions, to express them, and to vote as you think fit. You know, or ought to know, that I have never denied that right. With respect to all that you say about a clergyman's sharing the rights and duties common to other citizens of the right of any citizen to study for himself all interests involved in the election, to form his own judgment, and to vote as he pleases, I have no controversy whatever. I have never denied any of these rights, and shall not begin to do so now. I admit the right of all persons, clergymen of course

included, -to express their opinions upon proper occasions, and in a suitable manner, with a view of inducing others to adopt the same opinion. I call no man a traitor because he votes differently from what I do. That is reserved for you and those like you, who assume the right to determine how men shall vote, or be denounced for exercising the freedom of their own wills. I do not accuse large bodies of men of flank movements in aid of the rebellion, and of giving aid and comfort to the rebels, even if they sustain by their votes the cry for universal emancipation, by a proclamation, although I have an undoubting opinion that there is no authority in any branch, or all the branches of the United States Government, to do any such thing; and I believe, (though I do not assume that familiarity with the rebel councils that you claim to possess,) that nothing would gratify them more than a paper attempt at emancipation - emancipation of the slaves of the loyal, as well as the disloyal - because nothing would serve better to unite them in a determination to fight to the uttermost, on the plea that such an attempt was, or would be, inconsistent with the Constitutional rights of the several States; - which they do not need anybody at the North to tell them.

Again. I find in your letter the following sentence: "Allow me to say, that for you now, simply as a lawyer, to declare that the people of these United States cannot understand the Constitution which they have made without coming to you to find out what it means, and what they may do under it, is an 'arrogance' and an 'impertinence' and an 'effrontery,' quite equal to anything of which you assume any clergyman ever to have been guilty."

I cannot allow you to say any such thing, because it implies, as you well know, that I have, in some form, substantially made such a declaration; which you either know, or ought to know, is an implication without the least foundation. This kind of argument, assuming that pretensions have been set up, which were never even thought of, — which is worthy only of a pettifogging lawyer in the lowest purlieus of criminal jurisprudence, will not serve your purpose.

Finally. In reply to my question whether, in speaking of

this flank movement, you intended to imply that the rebellion was the movement in front, in aid of which this movement in Massachusetts was an attack upon the flank of the Government, and thus to give significance to your talk about "treason" and the "rope's end?" You say, "I did mean 'to imply just that."

You stand convicted, then, by your own declaration, of a deliberate intention to charge those engaged in the "People's movement" with the crime of treason. You know that a flank movement in aid of the movements of the rebels in front, is, of course, either by the enemy, or by an ally of the enemy. It is a direct participation in the war. It is as treasonable as the movement in front, having the same general object and purpose. And you meant deliberately to charge this upon large numbers of the people of Massachusetts. If there is a depth of political prostitution lower than this, you will probably sound it yet, but I am not just now advised what it can be. It will not do to say that you accuse no member of the People's party of the intent to commit treason in action, for there can be no such flank movement in aid, without an intent; and there is no treason without an intent either express, or at least implied from the circumstances.

If you are content to stand before the people in the position in which you have thus placed yourself, I am content to leave you there.

With due respect, as before.

CAMBRIDGE, Nov. 22, 1862.

TO THE REV. LEONARD BACON,, D. D.,

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

No. 1.

SIR, I have undertaken the performance of a duty which some one owes to the profession of the Law, and to the community generally; and the obligation rests upon me, perhaps, equally with others. It is the duty of vindicating the right of the gentlemen of the Bar to form their opinions upon legal subjects, and especially upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States, and to express those opinions in any manner consistent with due courtesy to others, without being subjected to censure, sneers, abuse, and vituperation, by a class of clergymen who assume to know more of Constitutional law than the tribunals and officers created and constituted for the purpose of discussing and determining legal questions. So long as this assumption by clergymen was confined to dogmatic opinions, sneers, and mere censure, it might be, and was in a great measure, overlooked; but when, as has lately been the case, clerical gentlemen have proceeded to denounce lawyers who differ from their notions of Constitutional law as "disloyal," "sympathizers with the rebels," " traitors," &c., the matter assumes a more grave aspect; and it becomes important that the pretensions. of this portion of the clergy to a better knowledge of the rules by which the meaning of the Constitution is to be ascertained should be fairly examined. This is not a mere matter of professional esprit. If the clergy really have the best set of rules by which to determine our Constitutional rights and duties, then those rules should be recognized, so that the construction of the different clauses of the Constitution, and of the powers of those who administer the government under it, may be as uniform as the nature of the case will admit. If, on the other hand, the mode of reasoning which this class of clergymen apply to the subject is altogether fallacious and inconclusive, leading to inconsistencies and contradictions, then it is quite time that it should

not be made the basis upon which the opinions of lawyers are to be depreciated and substantially overruled, and those who entertain the opinions denounced as the enemies of the government and of liberty.

I am fully aware that among the lawyers themselves there is a difference of opinion upon various questions of Constitutional law. But that is not at all material to the present inquiry, which has no reference to the differences of construction by different lawyers, but is, whether clergymen are entitled to pass final judgment, and overrule any and all lawyers with whom they differ on such subjects.

Connected with the inquiry, in the present instance, is another, to wit, what are the reasons upon which this class of clergymen found their support of the Proclamation of Emancipation, as a measure authorized by the Constitu tion?

In pursuit of the object above indicated, my studies, for a few days past, have been somewhat more than usual within the columns of "The Congregationalist;" and I find in the number issued October 31, certain "Views from a Watch Tower," respecting "the Great Proclamation." The contents of the article seem to place it within the scope of my inquiries; and an editorial note in another column says,

66

Many of our readers who for several weeks have been looking for Dr. Bacon's views of the Proclamation, will find them given at length in the Watch Tower' column." I address this letter therefore to you.

You say, in the outset, that you "have not been in a hurry to give out your thoughts on the President's great Proclamation," and that what you say in the article "is the result of some deliberate thinking." The matter is of course entitled to a more grave consideration than it would have been had you been "among those who spoke first," in which case, as you well say, you "might have spoken inconsiderately."

Having endeavored with some care to ascertain the "Views" expressed after such deliberation, it appears that, so far as they are material to the present purpose, they may be summed up as follows:

1. That

"The proclamation is made at a time when its necessity, as a war measure for the preservation of the Union, can no longer be doubted