before proceeding to examine your argument, to consider the rules by which lawyers exercise this "law logic" in determining questions respecting the true interpretation and meaning of different parts of the Constitution and other documents; and to institute a comparison of those rules with the rule which you appear to regard as a much more safe and certain one than "law logic."

Blackstone says,

"The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law."

He makes a short commentary upon each of these, as follows (omitting his illustrations):

1. "Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known significations; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and popular use."

2. "If words happen to be still dubious, we may establish their meaning from the context; with which it may be of singular use to compare a word or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal or intricate."

3. "As to the subject-matter, words are always to be understood as having regard thereto; for that is always supposed to be in the eye of the legislator and all his expressions directed to that end."

4. "As to the effects and consequence, the rule is, that when the words bear none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of them."

5. "But lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it."

Mr. Justice Story, in his " Commentaries upon the Constitution," has a chapter upon the "Rules of Interpretation." My limits will not admit of extensive quotations. A few extracts will suffice. He says,

"The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms, and the intention of the parties;"-"that in construing the Constitution of the United States, we are in the first instance to consider, what are

its nature and objects, its scope and design as apparent from the structure of the instrument, viewed as a whole, and also viewed in its component parts. When its words are plain, clear and determinate, they require no interpretation, and it should therefore be admitted, if at all, with great caution, and only from necessity, either to escape some absurd consequence, or to guard against some fatal evil.”

He then proceeds to give rules applicable where the words are not plain and clear; and adds:

"Where the words are unambiguous, but the provision may cover more or less ground, according to the intention, which is yet subject to conjecture; or where it may include in its general terms more or less, than might seem dictated by the general design, as that may be gathered from other parts of the instrument, there is much more room for controversy; and the argument from inconvenience will probably have different influences upon different minds. Whenever such ques

tions arise, they will probably be settled — each upon its own peculiar grounds; and whenever it is a question of power, it should be approached with infinite caution, and affirmed, only upon the most persuasive reasons. In examining the Constitution the antecedent situation of the country, and its institutions, the existence and operations of the State Governments, the powers and operations of the Confederation in short, all the circumstances, which had a tendency to produce or to obstruct its formation and ratification, deserve a careful attention. Much, also, may be gathered from contemporary history, and contem porary interpretation, to aid us in just conclusions."

"A power given in general terms is not to be restricted to particular cases, merely because it may be susceptible of abuse — and, if abused, may lead to mischievous consequences."

"On the other hand a rule of equal importance is not to enlarge the construction of a given power beyond the fair scope of its terms, merely because the restriction is inconvenient, impolitic or even mischievous. If it be mischievous, the power of redressing the evil lies with the people by an exercise of the power of amendment."

He closes his statement of some of the more important rules to be employed in the interpretation of the Constitution, by adverting to a few belonging to mere verbal criticism, the first of which is:

"Every word employed in the Constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify and enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expres

sion, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness, or juridical research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them; the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning, or any extraordinary gloss.”

After divers observations upon the construction to be given to words which have different shades of meaning, and technical words, he says:

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But the most important rule, in cases of this nature is, that a constitution of government does not, and cannot, from its nature, depend in any great degree upon mere verbal criticism. Such criticism may not be wholly without its use; it may sometimes illustrate or unfold the appropriate sense; but unless it stands well with the context and subject-matter, it must yield to the latter." "That must be the truest exposition which harmonizes with its design, its objects, and its general structure." Story's Commentaries on the Constitution,

octavo edition, pp. 136, 137, 142, 144, 157, 161, 162.

Such are some of the most important rules long established and recognized by the most able jurists, by means of which the "law logic" upon which you cry "shame," attempts to solve legal questions, and to arrive at just conclusions.

On the other hand your rule of construction, by means of which the powers given by the Constitution are to be ascertained, is, I admit, of a different character. It is quite simple, if not quite certain. You state it as if it were the common sense of the people, but it appears to be your own common sense. That is to answer in lieu of all other rules, not merely to ascertain the meaning of words for which it might be admissible, but to settle all other questions which may arise respecting the Constitutional power of the President, at least. You say in the 9th extract that you must "be permitted to remember that lawyership is not the same thing with statesmanship; and to insist that the Constitution of the United States, like the Bible, is to be interpreted by the common sense of the people." But just afterwards you say, "I find," &c., and again, " I find," &c., and again, "I find," &c., and then you add, "To my common sense, the right and duty to make war against the enemies of the

United States, be they foreigners or rebels, involves or rather is the right and duty of crushing them by every legitimate method of war." It is quite evident that when you insist that the Constitution is to be interpreted by the common sense of the people, you mean that it is to be interpreted by the common sense of Dr. Bacon; and your reasoning is based upon that as your rule of construction. It is quite idle, if not something worse, to talk about a decision by the common sense of the people at large, in favor of the authority of the President to issue the proclamation. It is very apparent that no uninfluenced popular vote could exhibit the common sense of the people upon any question of Constitutional construction, and if the vote were to be influenced by persistent assertions that all whose opinions were adverse to the power of the President, had "so long paid a debasing homage to slavery for the sake of saving the Union, that they are now willing to sacrifice the Union for the sake of saving slavery ;" and that all such persons "are in fact disloyal to the Constitution," the common sense of the people might be quite as much mystified thereby as by any "law logic" which could be presented to their consideration.

You have no expression of the common sense of the people, meaning thereby the expression of the popular will, upon the subject, and it is entirely deceptive to talk of a construction of the Constitution by such a rule. The popular meaning of words may ordinarily be found by a resort to the dictionaries, but popular conclusions are not recorded there. Individuals express their opinions, and a certain aggregation of "Views" may thus be obtained. But there is no mode of taking the opinions of the people at large on such subjects. There has been no action of the people since the proclamation was talked of, which can be supposed, even in a remote degree, to give the results of their common sense respecting the authority to issue it, unless it is to be found. in the recent elections, and thus far it is decidedly adverse to your conclusions.

I proceed to an examination of the logic of your common. sense as exhibited in the "Views" which you have furnished to the community.

One of your positions, in support of the right of the Pres

ident to issue the proclamation, is, in substance, that the Government may exercise all the rights of a belligerent, in the territory of a State which has rejected the Constitution and made war upon the Union. Your phraseology is, that "though a hundred lawyers should attempt to convince me" -"that there is any one of the rights of a belligerent which it [the Government] may not exercise in the territory of a State," &c., "they can never impose that absurdity upon me,. nor upon any man who is not willing to abnegate his own common sense in favor of somebody else's professional sense."

As these "rights of a belligerent" are offered to show that the proclamation might lawfully be issued, they are not of course acquired by or through the proclamation, but exist independent of it. If the Government has such rights, they date back to the commencement of the war. There has been, so far as I am aware, no time since the period when the Government brought its armies into active warfare, that it has assumed or acquired any rights as a belligerent which it did not possess, say at the first battle of Bull Run.

I suppose it may be understood that by "the rights of a belligerent," in this connection, you mean something more than the right to suppress an insurrection by forcible means, which means, from the magnitude of the rebellion, have assumed the proportions of war. In other words, you must intend that the Government has all the rights of a belligerent which would be recognized by the law of nations in a foreign war. Unless the proposition means that, it means nothing to the purpose of your argument. Whether, meaning that, it is to the purpose, we will consider hereafter.

I have no doubt that the Government, by acknowledging the Confederate States as a belligerent, as England and France have done, may assume to itself all belligerent rights. But I think it may safely be asserted, that there is no war, foreign or domestic, in which one of the parties is entitled to all the rights of a belligerent, as recognized by the law of nations, unless the other party is also entitled to the same rights.. Practically, there cannot be a war in which there is only one belligerent; and it seems that there can be no war in which one of the belligerents can be recognized as having