tially provided for before the proclamation, by orders directing military commanders not to return slaves who came within their lines. No proclamation was necessary for that purpose; but an additional order for their removal, so that they would be beyond the future control of their masters, might have been but an act of justice to them, especially if they had been actively engaged in aiding the prosecution of the hostilities on our part. A successful warfare would, upon these principles, make the emancipation one of large measure, sufficient to satisfy reasonable men. Taken in connection with the restriction of slavery in the territories, it would probably give a death-blow to slavery.

But those who have so vigorously urged "the adoption of a policy" and the issue of a "proclamation of emancipation," do not consider this the limit of the emancipation which is to be effected by it. I understand that you give it a much broader scope, as I believe you are authorized to do. You say that it threatens the people in each rebel State "with the emancipation of all their slaves" and speak of "the day when every slave under the rebel power shall be (so far as our Government is concerned) irrevocably free;" and it is, doubtless, for this reason that you call it "the great proclamation." It is, of course, to give freedom after the return of peace, (if it does not prevent our arms from being victorious,) to slaves who have never been within our power during the war, - to slaves in the interior, who may never have heard of the proclamation, — to slaves where martial law never had an existence, to slaves who, during all the war, and up to the . return of peace, were as perfectly and as peaceably under the full control of their masters as they were before the war commenced; and who, during the war, had been engaged in the same services which they had performed before war existed; and it pledges the military and executive power to maintain the freedom thus bestowed. It is to operate therefore as a decree, or law, for the emancipation of probably half, perhaps more, of the slaves in the States designated, not as a punishment of rebels, for it operates on friends also, - not because martial law ever reached them, not because there was in fact any subversion of the power and control of the master during the war, and not because such emancipation

was necessary to the prosecution and success of the war; for the fact that they remain in slavery until the military operations have ceased, completely negatives any such "military necessity." The military necessity upon which you and others rely to sustain the proclamation, and under the guise of which you and they are willing to surrender all the liberties of the freemen of the United States, and to subject them to a most absolute military despotism, in order to subserve your favorite project of giving freedom to all the slaves, -is thus shown to be either a careless or ignorant assumption, or a mere excuse, perhaps a hollow pretence, in some instances I fear a wicked subterfuge; - by which those who contend that the President may do anything which is required by the military necessity,—and that he is the sole judge when the necessity exists, and what it requires, hope to accomplish an unconstitutional purpose, at the risk of a final disruption of the Union and the formation of several Confederacies. Professor Patterson, of Dartmouth College, in a recent speech, accepting a Congressional nomination, pledged himself to support, unconditionally," "every military necessity to which the constituted authorities may deem it proper to resort, to crush the rebellion." That expresses the character of the thing with admirable precision. The Professor understands it perfectly. The military necessity to proclaim the emancipation of all the slaves is not one which the rebellion and the progress of the war have thrust upon the Government, requiring the measure for the public safety; but it is, emphatically, a necessity to which the constituted authorities have deemed it proper to resort. It is not a necessity which has pressed itself upon them, but one which they have sought out, and are endeavoring to press into their service. It is, literally, a necessity which "knows no law." This is the first time, perhaps, in which a "necessity" has been drafted into service, but we read of those who, in other times, "have sought out many inventions."

And now for your argument in support of the power to emancipate the slaves, which you base upon the fact that the President may do certain other things in time of war. The fact that this emancipation by means of the proclamation is to operate in a great measure at the close of the war,

shows the wide and almost entire difference between this exercise of power, and its exercise in those cases which you put by way of illustration and argument, in the above extracts; in each of which, respectively, the power to destroy and the power to seize and take, is a power to act during the war, and one which cannot lawfully be exercised after the cessation of hostilities, even upon an order issued prior to that time. The President may "bombard cities," "burn villages," and "mow down regiments of men in battle," in the actual prosecution of a war; but he can do none of those things, nor order that they shall be done, at the close of the war. He, or a military commander, may seize private property, when needed for military purposes, while the war lasts; he may take cotton, provisions, forage, horses, and all sorts of cattle, from the loyal as well as the disloyal," if the necessity of the hour require it, in the prosecution of the campaign; but he cannot perpetuate a necessity so to seize and take after the war is over, even by an order issued before its termination. Perhaps the military authorities may seize and take provisions, &c., to supply the necessities of the army, after the close of the war, until it can be withdrawn; but the proclamation does not propose to emancipate the negroes, for the time being, to supply the necessities of the soldiers. Your argument is a very perfect non sequitur.

By way of illustrating your own views, and the difference between you and Dr. Cheever, who I understand would have the proclamation denounce slavery in good round terms, as well as exterminate it, you refer to the power of the Mayor of New York, under the city charter and acts of the Legislature, to blow up buildings in order to prevent the spreading of fire. Now suppose Mayor Opdyke, during the time that a fire is raging, should order a few buildings to be blown up to check it; and should further order, that as soon as the fire was subdued, a few squares more should be blown up, by way of preventing the possible breaking out of another fire, at some indefinite time afterwards, do you not think that the people would "blow him up?”

I give your "common sense" the credit of perceiving, by this time, that you have been talking, very oracularly, about matters respecting which you are profoundly ignorant; and

people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free, and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons." The forthcoming proclamation is to designate the States or parts of States.

The emancipation of all the slaves within the territory designated is to result from these acts, whether there has or has not been any practical severance of the relation of master and slave in the course of the war. The proclamation is of itself to be an act which gives freedom to all the slaves, whether of loyal or disloyal masters, not only during the time of the rebellion, but ever afterwards, so that it becomes legally operative, of itself, as a charter of freedom. It is intended to be an act of enfranchisement that the slaves may plead hereafter in the courts of justice, if necessary, to establish their right to freedom. The President is represented, in a recent paragraph, as placing it on that ground; and as saying that this may be done as a war measure, "but not as a measure issuing from the bosom of philanthropy." Such is substantially your doctrine. The enfranchisement is not to result from the operation of the war upon the slave, by an actual subversion of the power of the master, but from the proclamation of the President, subverting the power of the master. In other words, the power of the President, exerted through and by the proclamation, is, of itself, proprio vigore, to give freedom, without aid from anything else, without any military operation connected with it, but by the mere force of the President's declaration that it shall be so.

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Upon what constitutional or legal principle is this to be sustained? What must be the legal character of this act, supposing it to possess any legality?

It is clear that it is not a lawful act of the President, as the chief executive magistrate of the United States. The Executive department possesses no such power to deprive a citizen of his property held under the laws of a State. The chief executive magistrate of a State has no such power. If Governor Andrew should issue his proclamation that the title of the fifty-four thousand persons who voted against him at the last election, to the property which they had pre

viously possessed, should, from the date, be annulled, and held of no further force or effect; and that any person who should take possession of any of the goods of the said "guerillas of Jefferson Davis," might plead his proclamation in defence of any suit which should be brought against him therefor; the courts of Massachusetts would have no difficulty in disposing of his proclamation. But he has just as much right to do this, as an act of Executive power, as President Lincoln has to do an act of a similar character. Such a change of title, or subversion of title, is not within the scope of Executive power.

If it were claimed that the proclamation was in the nature of a judgment or decree of emancipation, that would be in its nature an exercise of judicial power. But the President has no judicial power for such a purpose.

If it be said that it is a law of enfranchisement, which is doubtless its true character, if it has any character, it is equally clear that the President has no power to make a law. All the legislative powers, under the Constitution, are expressly vested in Congress.

So far as I am aware, it is not contended that the President, as President, can liberate the slaves.

But it is alleged that the President, as Commander-inchief, may, in time of war, liberate the slaves, although he may not do it as President, by virtue of his powers as an executive magistrate. That, I think, is substantially the position. To this I answer that the act of emancipation, so far as it is not accomplished by the war itself, but depends solely upon the proclamation, is, in its character, a law, that it is in its nature a legislative act, and that the objection already stated applies in full force. The President has, as Commander-in-chief, no legislative power. The emancipation in the West Indies, by Great Britain, was by Parliament, in the District of Columbia, by Congress, - in the Northern States, by law also.

Again: It is said, that although the President cannot emancipate by a law, he may do so in time of war by a military order; and it has been alleged that the proclamation, although not in form, is, in effect, a military order. But if the emancipation is not to be accomplished by the operations of