respective localities and not beyond. Geraty v. Reid, (1879) 78 N. Y. 64, reversing 13 Hun 313; Hoag v. Lamont, (1875) 60 N. Y. 96, modifying 16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 91; People v. Daley, (1908) 124 App. Div. 562, 108 N. Y. S. 1056; Ziegler v. Corwin, (1896) 12 App. Div. 60, 42 N. Y. S. 855; Baird v. Helfer, (1896) 12 App. Div. 23, 42 N. Y. S. 484; Pierson v. Fries, (1896) 3 App. Div. 418, 38 N. Y. S. 765; Peterson v. Welles, (1896) 1 App. Div. 8, 36 N. Y. S. 1009; People v. Upson, (1894) 79 Hun 87, 29 N. Y. S. 615; Carroll v. Langan, (1892) 63 Hun 380, 18 N. Y. S. 290; Bocock v. Cochran, (1884) 32 Hun 521. See also Brandon v. Avery, (1860) 22 N. Y. 469; Failing v. Grounds, (1914) 160 App. Div. 71, 145 N. Y. S. 427. Wherefore, chapter 282, Laws of 1871, is unconstitutional in so far as it attempts to extend the jurisdiction of the City Court of Brooklyn to parties residing without the county of Kings. Hoag v. Lamont, supra. The provisions of section 3226 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provide that the Municipal Court of the city of Rochester is deemed a Justice's Court; each judge thereof is deemed a justice of the peace, and the city of Rochester is deemed a town of Monroe county, attempt to confer upon the local city courts jurisdiction over the county outside the city and are unconstitutional. Ziegler v. Corwin, (1896) 12 App. Div. 60, 42 N. Y. S. 855. And the city judge of the city of Poughkeepsie has no jurisdiction of bastardy proceedings where the complainant and the defendant reside in the town of Poughkeepsie but not in the city of that name, and the defendant was not arrested or served with process within the city. People v. Daley, (1908) 124 App. Div. 562, 108 N. Y. S. 1056.

Conferment of general jurisdiction on pre-existing court. While this section limits the legislature in establishing new tribunals to the creation of local courts, and therefore forbids the grant of general jurisdiction to any court of legislative origin, that limitation has application to such courts only as have been or may be created after the adoption of this provision in 1846. It has no effect on courts created prior to that date. Thus, it does not affect the City Court of Albany inasmuch as that tribunal was instituted a quarter of a century before the adoption of the constitution of 1846. Wherefore, chapter 603, Laws of 1910, authorizing the service in any town adjoining the city of Albany of process issued by that court is constitutional. Failing v. Grounds, (1914) 160 App. Div. 71, 145 N. Y. S. 427. In that case the court said: "The constitutional prohibition which limits the legis

lature to the creation of 'local' courts was not in the constitution in 1821 when this court was originally created. (See Laws of 1820-21, ch. 47.) It first came into the constitution of 1846 on January 1, 1847, when that constitution, so far as applicable, took effect, but the city court of Albany, under whatever name it may then have existed, was recognized by the same constitution and was there established and confirmed by the constitution itself. Section 12 of article 14 of the constitution of 1846 says: 'All local courts established in any city or village . . . shall remain, until otherwise directed by the legislature, with their present powers and jurisdictions.' These words of recognition and confirmation continued in the constitution until the new constitution of 1894. Therefore it is seen that the constitution has continuously recognized the city court of Albany with all its powers and jurisdiction. At one time the legislature seems, by section 3223 of the Code, to have narrowed the jurisdiction of this court; but, of course, if the legislature could narrow it, the legislature could broaden it. Therefore we conclude that the first sentence of section 18 of article 6 of the constitution does not refer to the city court of Albany, but refers only to such local courts as may have been created and established subsequently to the constitution of 1846."

Creation of new civil division of state for judicial purposes.— A local court within the meaning of this section is, too, a court exercising jurisdiction in a recognized civil division of the state. The legislature has, therefore,

only the power to establish courts within such divisions and is not competent to create a new division and to erect a local court therein. People v. Porter, (1882) 90 N. Y. 68, affirming 26 Hun 622; People v. Dooley, (1902) 69 App. Div. 512, 75 N. Y. S. 350, affirmed, (1902) 171 N. Y. 74, 63 N. E. 815; Irwin v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., (1899) 38 App. Div. 253, 57 N. Y. S. 21. See also Failings v. Grounds, (1914) 160 App. Div. 71, 145 N. Y. S. 427. Thus, the Act of 1881 (ch. 415, Laws of 1881) creating the Niagara police district out of territory not coterminous with the boundaries of any county, town, city or village, and establishing a police court therein, is unconstitutional. The court said: "A court established for one or more counties, or for several towns, cities or villages, embracing contiguous territory, or for a part of a town, is undoubtedly a local court within the general and broad meaning of the word 'local,' and as distinguished from a court established for the whole state. . . . But we are of opinion that the language of this section must be construed to refer to local courts, as historically known, that is, courts established for and within one of the recognized territorial divisions of the state, and as a part of the system of local government, and that it cannot be so construed as to authorize the legislature to carve out from the territory of the state, a district for judicial purposes, not bounded by town or county, city or village lines, and erect therein a local court. This construction is confirmed by what has been called the political tendency of the constitution. The intention of the instrument was to define, as far as practicable, all the courts of the state, and so far as they are defined, they are either courts of general jurisdiction, coextensive with the whole state, or courts of counties, towns, villages or cities. . . . It would not, we think, comport with the spirit of the constitution, to allow a portion of a town, or of a county, not constituting either a city or village, to be dissevered for local judicial purposes, from the rest, leaving it a unit for all other purposes of civil government. It would tend to a separation and confusion of interests, and impair the usefulness of the system of town and local government, plainly fostered by the constitution." People v. Porter, (1882) 90 N. Y. 68, affirming 26 How. 622.

Courts-martial. The fact that courts-martial are not included in the courts authorized to be created by the provisions of this section does not by implication prohibit their establishment. People v. Daniell, 50 N. Y. 274. Board of audit as court. The persons designated by chapter 420, Laws of 1901, to audit certain claims against the city of Syracuse do not constitute a court and are not made such by reason of the fact that they are empowered to take testimony in respect to the matters before them. The power of the legislature with respect to the designation and jurisdiction of that board is not, therefore, limited by this section. Syracuse v. Hubbard, (1901) 64 App. Div. 587, appeal dismissed, (1901) 168 N. Y. 668, 61 N. E. 1128. Creation of court with jurisdiction similar to that of justice of peace.— The power to create inferior local courts. . . is a power to create additional courts and magistrates to those specifically named in the constitution, but not a power to create courts or magistrates in place of, or as substitutes for, or in destruction of, those specifically named." Since, therefore, provision is made in section 17 of this article for justices of the peace in towns, the legislature is not competent to create a local inferior court with jurisdiction equivalent in every respect, territorially and otherwise, to that of justices of the peace. People v. Howland, (1897) 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347, affirmed, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, 41 L. R. A. 838. See also People v. Lane, (1900) 53 App. Div. 531, 65 N. Y. S. 1004. See further as to this point, section 17 of article 6. Section 17 does not, however, inhibit the legislature from establishing local courts having the same jurisdiction within their locality as is exercised by justices of the peace within towns. On the contrary, the legislature is competent, by virtue of this section, to create such courts. People v. Terry, (1888) 108 N. Y. 1,

14 N. E. 815, reversing 42 Hun 273, 5 N. Y. St. Rep. 120; Geraty v. Reid, (1879) 78 N. Y. 64; Brandon v. Avery, (1860) 22 N. Y. 469; People v. Lane, (1900) 53 App. Div. 531, 65 N. Y. S. 1004; People v. Whitney, (1898) 32 App. Div. 144, 52 N. Y. S. 695; People v. Howland, (1897) 17 App. Div. 165, 45 N. Y. S. 347, affirmed, (1898) 155 N. Y. 270, 49 N. E. 775, 41 L. R. A. 838. See also People v. Dutcher, (1874) 2 Hun 156. See further as to this point, section 17 of article 6. Section 17 "does not prevent the legislature in the exercise of its prerogative from establishing 'inferior local courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction'. . . even though in the execution of their duties such courts may act concurrently with the justices of the peace of the town and thus in effect lessen the duties and the emoluments which would otherwise belong to the latter officials. That results necessarily from the creation of an inferior court of like authority with that of the justice. The number of the justices is not prescribed by the constitution, but is left to the legislature to fix, and if that body should add to the number in each town the effect would be to abridge the revenues and duties of those already sitting. That result, however, does not impair the power of the legislature." People v. Lane, (1900) 53 App. Div. 531, 65 N. Y. S. 1004. Thus, section 182 of chapter 414 of the Laws of 1897, which gives to the police justice of the village exclusive jurisdiction of charges of misdemeanor committed within a village and triable by a Court of Special Sessions, is not unconstitutional, conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon a police justice of a village, and in this way restricting the criminal jurisdiction of the justice of the peace to the balance of the town. People v. Whitney, (1898) 32 App. Div. 144, 52 N. Y. S. 695.

Particular courts.— By virtue of this section the legislature had the power to create a municipal court of the city of New York. Matter of Schultes, (1898) 33 App. Div. 524, 54 N. Y. S. 34. The legislature is likewise competent to establish an inferior municipal court of civil and criminal jurisdiction. Curtin v. Barton, 139 N. Y. 505, 34 N. E. 1093.

Selection of officers.-Apparently, the provision of this section that “except as herein otherwise provided, all judicial officers shall be elected or appointed at such times and in such manner as the legislature may direct makes it clear that the "election or appointment are alternatives and not coincidents." The clause confers upon the legislature the power to adopt but one method of selecting a particular class of officers, either that of election or that of appointment; and the legislature cannot direct the use of both methods at the same time "either to suit the caprice of a day or the exigencies of a political condition." People v. Dooley, (1902) 171 N. Y. 74, 63 N. E. 815, affirming 69 App. Div. 512, 75 N. Y. S. 350.

II. EQUITY JURISDICTION; JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURTS.

Purpose of limitations. The purpose of the provisions prohibiting the legislature from allowing any local court equity jurisdiction or greater jurisdiction in other respects than is conferred upon county courts by this article was to prevent the establishment of local courts with jurisdiction equal in their locality to that of the Supreme Court, the existence of inferior courts of such jurisdiction being subversive of the scheme of this article to vest all original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. "The framers of the constitution did not intend to permit local courts to grow up into courts of general jurisdiction even within the locality wherein they were situated." Worthington v. London Guarantee, etc., Co., (1900) 164 N. Y. 81, 58 N. E. 102, reversing 47 App. Div. 609, 62 N. Y. S. 591; Lewkowicz v. Queen Aeroplane Co., (1912) 154 App. Div. 142, 138 N. Y. S. 983, affirmed, (1913) 207 N. Y. 290, 100 N. E. 796; Irwin v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., (1899) 38 App. Div. 253, 57 N. Y. S. 21.

Conferment of equity jurisdiction. The inhibition of this section prohibiting the legislature from granting an inferior local court of its creation any equity jurisdiction is absolutely binding. Any evasion thereof is unconstitutional. Thus section 2224 of the Code of Civil Procedure governing the answer in summary proceedings if construed to empower the Municipal Court of the city of New York to determine questions of fact and law upon which the right to specific performance depends, would be unconstitutional, although it did not purport to authorize that court to enter a decree of specific performance. The judgment of the Municipal Court would be conclusive as to the question on which the right to specific performance depended provided that court had jurisdiction of these questions, and the tribunal having power to enter a decree of specific performance would be compelled to enter a decree on proof of the judgment of the Municipal Court. The determination, by the Municipal Court, of the questions on which the right to specific performance depends would therefore be tantamount to the exercise by it of the equitable function of compelling specific performance and hence is within the inhibition of this section. Simon v. Schmitt, (1910) 137 App. Div. 625, 22 N. Y. S. 421. Scope of prohibition against conferment of greater jurisdiction than of county courts. The provision prohibiting the legislature from conferring on local or inferior courts of its creation any greater jurisdiction than that vested in county courts by this article, relates to jurisdiction with respect to subject matter and not with respect to nonresident parties or territory and while no greater general jurisdiction may be allowed an inferior court of legislative origin than that possessed by a County Court, the former court may be given 'greater territorial jurisdiction than the latter or may be vested with a jurisdiction in respect to nonresident parties that is specifically forbidden the latter. "The framers of the constitution, in contemplating the creation of inferior local tribunals by the legislature and limiting its power, were not dealing with the jurisdiction of these future courts as to territory, non-resident parties defendant or foreign corporations, but as to subject-matter; they were not to have, in a general way, greater powers, importance and dignity than a county court." Worthington v. London Guarantee, etc., Co., (1900) 164 N. Y. 81, 58 N. E. 102, reversing 47 App. Div. 609, 62 N. Y. S. 591. To the same effect Routenberg v. Schweitzer, (1900) 165 N. Y. 175, 58 N. E. 880, reversing 50 App. Div. 218, 63 N. Y. S. 746; Dodge Mfg. Co. v. Nassau Show Case Co., (1899) 44 App. Div. 603, 61 N. Y. S. 111; Kantro v. Armstrong, (1899) 44 App. Div. 506, 60 N. Y. S. 970; Irwin v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 38 App. Div. 253, 57 N. Y. S. 21. Thus, although the legislature is denied, by article 6, section 14, the power to give a County Court jurisdiction of actions to recover money only wherein a nonresident of the county is a defendant, section 1364 of the Greater New York Charter is not unconstitutional in conferring on the Municipal Court of New York city jurisdiction of a foreign corporation, having an office in that city. Worthington v. London Guarantee, etc., Co., (1900) 164 N. Y. 81, 58 N. E. 102, reversing 47 App. Div. 609, 62 N. Y. S. 591. Similarly, the legislature had power to confer jurisdiction upon the Municipal Court of the city of New York to determine actions for the recovery of money only against nonresident natural persons having a place of business in the city though such jurisdiction is forbidden the county courts. Routenberg v. Schweitzer, (1900) 165 N. Y. 175, 58 N. E. 880, reversing 50 App. Div. 218, 63 N. Y. S. 746. And the statute creating the Municipal Court of the city of New York (Laws of 1897, ch. 378) is not unconstitutional because it extends the jurisdiction of that court over more than one county. Kantro v. Armstrong, (1899) 44 App. Div. 506, 60 N. Y. S. 970; Irwin v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., (1899) 38 App. Div. 253, 57 N. Y. S. 21.

Greater jurisdiction with respect to amount involved than that of county courts. Since by section 14 of this article the jurisdiction of the county courts is limited where the action is for the recovery of money only, to cases

wherein judgment is sought for sums under two thousand dollars, the legislature is not competent to confer on a local or inferior court of its creation jurisdiction to entertain causes for the recovery of money only wherein judgment is demanded for a larger sum than that amount. Wherefore, since "the power to render judgment is as integral a part of the jurisdiction of the court as is the power to entertain the cause of action," the amendment to section 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure by chapter 569, Laws of 1911, which raised the amount for which the City Court of the city of New York was authorized to render judgment in actions for the recovery of money only from the sum of $2,000 to the sum of $5,000, is in conflict with this section. Lewkowicz v. Queen Aeroplane Co., (1913) 207 N. Y. 290, 100 N. E. 796, affirming 154 App. Div. 142, 138 N. Y. S. 783; Siegel v. Corvan Co., (1913) 157 App. Div. 422, 142 N. Y. S. 264. See also Seeley v. Osborne, (1914) 161 App. Div. 844, 147 N. Y. S. 116.

Dispensation of necessity of jury trial.- An act (ch. 70, Laws of 1909, as amended by ch. 228, Laws of 1910) permitting the City Court of Buffalo to impose without trial by jury any sentence that the county courts can impose, does not confer any greater jurisdiction on the City Court than rests in the county courts under this section, although in the county courts the right to a trial by jury is guaranteed. People v. Forbes, 79 Misc. 442, 140 N. Y. S. 464.

Applicability of prohibition to pre-existing court. The stipulation forbidding the legislature to confer on any local or inferior court of its creation greater jurisdiction than that possessed by the county courts, applies as well to local or inferior courts created by the legislature prior to the adoption of this section as to those subsequently established. "The provision that no inferior local court thereafter created shall be a court of record, and the provision that the legislature shall not thereafter confer on any court of its creation any greater jurisdiction than that conferred on the county courts, are found in separate sentences and constitute separate and distinct restrictions. If it were intended that the second restriction should apply only to courts subsequently created, there would have been no reason for the change of language found in the two sentences. The natural manner of expressing such an intent would be to continue the first sentence so as to read, 'no inferior local court hereafter created shall be a court of record, nor shall the legislature confer upon it any equity jurisdiction, nor any greater jurisdiction than is conferred by this article upon county courts.' Lewkowicz v. Queen Aeroplane Co., (1913) 207 N. Y. 290, 100 N. E. 796, affirming 154 App. Div. 142, 138 N. Y. S. 983. Compare Routenberg v. Schweitzer, (1900) 165 N. Y. 175, 58 N. E. 880, reversing 50 App. Div. 218, 63 N. Y. S. 746; Worthington v. London Guarantee, etc., Co., (1900) 164 N. Y. 81, 58 N. E. 102, reversing 47 App. Div. 609, 62 N. Y. S. 591.

Effect on pre-existing jurisdiction in excess of county courts.-This provision does not operate to deprive inferior courts of the jurisdiction which they possessed prior to its adoption in excess of that conferred on county courts. Routenberg v. Schweitzer, (1900) 165 N. Y. 175, 58 N. E. 880, reversing 50 App. Div. 218, 63 N. Y. S. 746; Worthington v. London Guarantee, etc., Co., (1900) 164 N. Y. 81, 58 N. E. 102, reversing 47 App. Div. 609, 62 N. Y. S. 591; Seeley v. Osborne, (1914) 161 App. Div. 844, 147 N. Y. S. 116; Lewkowicz v. Queen Aeroplane Co., (1913) 154 App. Div. 142, 138 N. Y. S. 983, affirmed, 207 N. Y. 290, 100 N. E. 796. See also Siegel v. Corvan Co., (1913) 157 App. Div. 423, 142 N. Y. S. 267. Thus, the Municipal Court of the city of New York being a continuation, consolidation and reorganization of the district courts of the old city of New York and the justices' courts in the first, second and third district of the old city of Brooklyn under a new name, the provision of section 1364 of "the Greater New York charter," that such court shall have jurisdiction "of a foreign corporation having an office in the city of New York," is not unconstitutional.