gather together small and minute quotations, taking a sentence here, a word there, and a syllable in a third place, dovetailing them into the course of remark, till the printed discourse bristles with inverted commas, in every line, like a harvest-field. I look to the general tenor of the invitations, and I find that we are asked to take part only in such things as concern ourselves. I look still more carefully to the answers, and I see every proper caution, and proper guard. I look to the message, and I see that nothing is there contemplated, likely to involve us in other men's quarrels, or that may justly give offence to any foreign State. With this, I am satisfied.

I must now ask the indulgence of the Committee to an important point in the discussion, I mean the Declaration of the President in 1823. Not only as a member of the House, but as a citizen of the country, I have an anxious desire that this part of our public history should stand in its proper light. Sir, in my judgment the country has a very high honor, connected with that occurrence, which we may maintain, or which we may sacrifice. I look upon it as a part of its treasures of reputation; and, for one, I intend to guard it.

Sir, let us recur to the important political events which led to that declaration, or accompanied it. In the fall of 1822, the allied sovereigns held their Congress at Verona. The great subject of consideration was the condition of Spain, that country then being under the government of the Cortes. The question was, whether Ferdinand should be reinstated in all his authority, by the intervention of foreign force. Russia, Prussia, France, and Austria, were inclined to that measure; England dissented and protested; but the course was agreed on, and France, with the consent of these other continental powers, took the conduct of the operation into her own hands. In the spring of 1823, a French army was sent into Spain. Its success was complete. The popular government was overthrown, and Ferdinand reestablished in all his power. This invasion, sir, was determined on, and undertaken, precisely on the doctrines which the allied monarchs had proclaimed the year before, at Laybach; and that is, that they had a right to interfere in the concerns of another State, and reform its government, in order to prevent the effects of its bad example; this bad example, be it remembered, always being the example of free government. Now, sir, acting on this principle of supposed dangerous example, and having put down the example of the Cortes in Spain, it was natural to inquire with what eyes they would look on the colonies of Spain, that were following still worse examples. Would King Ferdinand and his allies be content with what had been done in Spain itself, or would he solicit their aid, and was it likely they would grant it, to subdue his rebellious American Provinces.

Sir, it was in this posture of affairs, on an occasion which has already been alluded to, that I ventured to say, early in the session of December, 1823, that these allied monarchs might possibly turn their attention to America; that America came within their avowed doctrine, and that her examples might very possibly attract their notice. The doctrines of Laybach were not limited to any continent;

Spain had colonies in America, and having reformed Spain herself to the true standard, it was not impossible that they might see fit to complete the work by reconciling, in their way, the colonies to the mother country. Now, sir, it did so happen, that as soon as the Spanish King was completely reestablished, he did invite the cooperation of his allies, in regard to South America. In the same month of December, of 1823, a formal invitation was addressed by Spain to the courts of St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, proposing to establish a conference at Paris, in order that the Plenipotentiaries, there assembled, might aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of her revolted provinces. These affairs were proposed to be adjusted in such manner as should retain the sovereignty of Spain over them; and though the cooperation of the allies, by force of arms, was not directly solicited-such was evidently the object aimed at.

The King of Spain, in making this request to the members of the Holy Alliance, argued, as it had been seen he might argue. He quoted their own doctrines of Laybach; he pointed out the pernicious example of America; and he reminded them that their success, in Spain itself, had paved the way for successful operations against the spirit of liberty on this side the Atlantic.

The proposed meeting, however, did not take place. England had already taken a decided course; for, as early as October, Mr. Canning, in a conference with the French minister in London, informed him distinctly and expressly, that England would consider any foreign interference, by force or by menace, in the dispute between Spain and the colonies, as a motive for recognising the latter, without delay.

It is probable this determination of the English government was known here, at the commencement of the session of Congress; and it was under these circumstances, it was in this crisis, that Mr. Monroe's declaration was made. It was not then ascertained whether a meeting of the Allies would, or would not, take place, to concert with Spain the means of reestablishing her power; but it was plain enough they would be pressed by Spain to aid her operations; and it was plain enough also, that they had no particular liking to what was taking place on this side the Atlantic, nor any great disinclination to interfere. This was the posture of affairs; and, sir, I concur entirely in the sentiment expressed in the resolution, of a gentleman from Pennsylvania, (MR. MARKLEY,) that this declaration of Mr. Monroe was wise, seasonable, and patriotic.

It has been said, in the course of this debate, to have been a loose and vague declaration. It was, I believe, sufficiently studied. I have understood, from good authority, that it was considered, weighed, and distinctly and decidedly approved by every one of the President's advisers, at that time. Our government could not adopt, on that occasion, precisely the course which England had taken. England threatened the immediate recognition of the Provinces, if the Allies should take part with Spain against them.-We had already recognised them. It remained, therefore, only for our government to say how we should consider a combination of the Allied Powers, to effect objects in America, as affecting ourselves; and the

message was intended to say, what it does say, that we should regard such combination as dangerous to us. Sir, I agree with those who maintain the proposition, and I contend against those who deny it, that the message did mean something; that it meant much; and I maintain, against both, that the declaration effected much good, answered the end designed by it, did great honor to the foresight, and the spirit of the government, and that it cannot now be taken back, retracted or annulled, without disgrace. It met, sir, with the entire concurrence, and the hearty approbation of the country. The tone which it uttered found a corresponding response in the breasts of the free people of the United States. That people saw, and they rejoiced to see, that, on a fit occasion, our weight had been thrown into the right scale, and that, without departing from our duty, we had done something useful, and something effectual, for the cause of civil liberty. One general glow of exultation-one universal feeling of the gratified love of liberty-one conscious and proud perception of the consideration which the country possessed, and of the respect and honor which belonged to it-pervaded all bosoms. Possibly the public enthusiasm went too far; it certainly did go far. But, sir, the sentiment which this declaration inspired was not confined to ourselves. Its force was felt everywhere, by all those who could understand its object, and foresee its effect. In that very House of Commons, of which the gentleman from South Carolina has spoken with such commendation, how was it there received? Not only, sir, with approbation, but, I may say, with no little enthusiasm. While the leading minister expressed his entire concurrence in the sentiments and opinions of the American President, his distinguished competitor in that popular body, less restrained by official decorum, and more at liberty to give utterance to all the feeling of the occasion, declared that no event had ever created greater joy, exultation, and gratitude, among all the free men in Europe; that he felt pride in being connected by blood and language, with the people of the United States; that the policy disclosed by the message, became a great, a free, and an independent nation; and that he hoped his own country would be prevented by no mean pride, or paltry jealousy, from following so noble and glorious an example.

It is doubtless true, as I took occasion to observe the other day, that this declaration must be considered as founded on our rights, and to spring mainly from a regard to their preservation. It did not commit us at all events to take up arms, on any indication of hostile feeling by the powers of Europe towards South America. If, for example, all the States of Europe had refused to trade with South America, until her States should return to their former allegiance, that would have furnished no cause of interference to us. Or if an armament had been furnished by the allies to act against provinces the most remote from us, as Chili or Buenos Ayres, the distance of the scene of action diminishing our apprehension of danger, and diminishing also our means of effectual interposition, might still have left us to content ourselves with remonstrance. But a very different case would have arisen, if an army, equipped and maintained by these powers, had been landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced the war in our own immediate neighbourhood.

Such an event might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves, and, on that ground, to have called for decided and immediate interference by us. The sentiments and the policy announced by the declaration, thus understood, were, therefore, in strict conformity to our duties and our interest.

Sir, I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a bright page in our history. I will neither help to erase it, or tear it out; nor shall it be, by any act of mine, blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the government, and I will not diminish that honor. It elevated the hopes, and gratified the patriotism, of the people. Over those hopes I will not bring a mildew; nor will I put that gratified patriotism to shame.

But how should it happen, sir, that there should now be such a new-born fear, on the subject of this declaration? The crisis is over; the danger is past. At the time it was made, there was real ground for apprehension: now there is none. It was then possible, perhaps not improbable, that the allied powers might interfere with America. There is now no ground for any such fear. Most of the gentlemen who have now spoken on the subject, were at that time here. They all heard the declaration. Not one of them complained. And yet, now, when all danger is over, we are vehemently warned against the sentiments of the declaration.

To avoid this apparent inconsistency, it is, however, contended, that new force has been recently given to this declaration. But of this, I see no evidence whatever. I see nothing in any instructions or communications from our government changing the character of that declaration in any degree. There is, as I have before said, in one of Mr. Poinsett's letters, an inaccuracy of expression. If he has recited correctly his conversation with the Mexican minister, he did go too far: farther than any instruction warranted. But, taking his whole correspondence together, it is quite manifest that he has deceived nobody, nor has he committed the country. On the subject of a pledge, he put the Mexican minister entirely right. He stated to him, distinctly, that this government had given no pledge which others could call upon it to redeem. What could be more explicit? Again, sir: it is plain that Mexico thought us under no greater pledge than England: for the letters to the English and American ministers, requesting interference, were in precisely the same words. When this passage in Mr. Poinsett's letter was first noticed, we were assured there was and must be some other authority for it. It was confidently said he had instructions, authorising it, in his pocket. It turns out otherwise. As little ground is there to complain of anything in the Secretary's letter to Mr. Poinsett. It seems to me to be precisely what it should be. It does not, as has been alleged, propose any cooperation between the government of Mexico and our own. Nothing like it. It instructs our ministers to bring to the notice of the Mexican government the line of policy which we have marked out for ourselves-acting on our own grounds, and for our own interests; and to suggest to that government, acting on its own ground, and for its own interests, the propriety of following a similar course. Here, sir, is no alliance, nor even any cooperation.

So, again, as to the correspondence which refers to the appearance of the French fleet in the West India Seas. Be it remembered, that our government was contending, in the course of this correspondence with Mexico, for an equality in matters of commerce. It insisted on being placed, in this respect, on the same footing as the other South American States. To enforce this claim, our known friendly sentiments towards Mexico, as well as to the rest of the new States, were suggested-and properly suggested. Mexico was reminded of the timely declaration which had been made of these sentiments. She was reminded that she herself had been well inclined to claim the benefit resulting from that declaration, when a French fleet appeared in the neighbouring seas; and she was referred to the course adopted by our government on that occasion, with an intimation that she might learn from it how the same government would have acted if other possible contingencies had happened. What is there, in all this, of any renewed pledge, or what is there of anything beyond the true line of our policy? Do gentlemen mean to say that the communication made to France, on this occasion, was improper? Do they mean to repel and repudiate that declaration? That declaration was, that we could not see Cuba transferred from Spain to another European power. If the House mean to contradict that-be it so. If it do not, then, as the government had acted properly in this case, it did furnish ground to believe it would act properly, also, in other cases, when they arose. And the reference to this incident or occurrence by the Secretary, was pertinent to the argument which he was pressing on the Mexican government.

I have but a word to say on the subject of the declaration against European colonization in America. The late President seems to have thought the occasion used by him for that purpose to be a proper one for the open avowal of a principle which had already been acted on. Great and practical inconveniences, it was feared, might be apprehended, from the establishment of new colonies in America, having a European origin and a European connexion. Attempts of that kind, it was obvious, might possibly be made, amidst the changes that were taking place, in Mexico, as well as in the more Southern States. Mexico bounds us, on a vast length of line, from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. There are many reasons why it should not be desired by us, that an establishment, under the protection of a different power, should occupy any portion of that space. We have a general interest, that through all the vast territories rescued from the dominion of Spain, our commerce might find its way, protected by treaties with governments existing on the spot. These views, and others of a similar character, rendered it highly desirable to us, that these new States should settle it, as a part of their policy, not to allow colonization within their respective territories. True, indeed, we did not need their aid to assist us in maintaining such a course for ourselves; but we had an interest in their assertion and support of the principle as applicable to their own territories.

I now proceed, Mr. Chairman, to a few remarks on the subject of Cuba, the most important point of our foreign relations. It is