a difference between good and evil. These we are all made to know, and herein we may not fail. Whofoever doth not know these things, it is matter of his fhame, and a sign that he hath greatly neglected himself. For who doth not know that it is better for a man to live in love and good-will than to live in malice, envy, hatred, &c. Who doth not know, it is better for a man to be sober, just and temperate, than to be wanton and lascivious? For a man to govern himself according to nature and reason, than for to abuse himself? Who doth not know, that it is better to honour God, and to give him thanks, than to blafpheme him? That is the fecond, when we leave fin out of judgment and fenfe of its filthinefs and bafenefs, when we do our duty out of respect to God, and in obedience to his laws, and love to him.

3. A man cannot be faid to return from his wickedness, unless he doth conceive displeasure at it and resolve never to have to do with it again. Thus when a man leaves fin, with displacency and abhorrence ; he may be faid to turn away from it, otherwife it is but forbearance for a while, upon fome reason, and as a matter of prudence, like that of Felix, Acts xxiv. 25. God fpeaks peace unto his people, but let them not return again to folly, as the Pfalmift hath it, Pfal. lxxxv. 8. If a man do not continue in a good courfe, it cannot be faid that he is turned from his wickedness, nor that it proceeded from the change of his nature, but was rather a fufpenfion, than a dislike of his former ways. They that love the Lord, and do fincerely turn to him, hate evil

Pfal

Pfal. xcvii. 10. We must not only depart from e vil, and do good, but we must hate evil, as the apoftle directs, Rom. xii. 9. We must abhor evil, and cleave unto that which is good. This is the third particular, when men leave their fins out of difplacency, and take offence at them; otherwise it may be forbearance upon fome prudential account, but doth not amount to turning away from their wickedness. So that you fee this alteration is by the motion of the mind and understanding; and is made by the choice of the will; the mind is changed, and other judgment is made, fo that this man differs from himself. As a man differs that was in a deadly difease, and is restored; fo doth a man differ from himself, after he leaves fin, and doth return to his duty. And fo much for the third thing, when a man be faid to return from his wickedness.

may

IV. In the next place, I am to give you an account of lawful and right. When the wicked man turns away from his wickedness, and doth that which is lawful and right. Here are two words for one and the fame thing; and the one is explicatory of the other. Now, this is that which we all ought to do; and there is no pretence of power and privilege to the contrary. And if every body did confine himself to that which is right, juft and fit, we should have a new world; and there would be nothing of wrong or hard measure found among us; we fhould then be the better one for another. But here is the mifchief, fome go beyond their bounds and do not confine themselves to that which is lawful and right; which are but two words for the fame thing.

Right gives rule to the law, and the law doth declare what is right; and it is not a law, if it be unrighteous and unjuft. This must be true of all human laws; for I am fure it is true of all the laws of God. The psalmist faith, Pfal. cxix. 142. That thy law is truth; that is, it is as it should be; for right is the boundary of power and priviledge; for it is not power, if it be not in conjunction with right and truth; for God declares that his throne is eftablifhed in righteousness, Pro. xxv. 5. It is not power to be able to do that which ought not to be done; for ungoverned appetite is not power but weakness. It is not power to do evil, but impotency, weakness and deformity. Free-will, which we so much contend for, and brag fo much of, it is no abfolute perfection, and we need not be fo proud of it. For free-will, as it includes a power to do wrong, as well as right, is not to be found in God himself and therefore it is no perfection in us. For this is true of God, that all his ways are ways of righteoufness, goodness and truth; and there is not in him a power to do otherwise than is just and right. And if we were God-like, as we should be, the fruit of the fpirit in us would be in allrighteousness, goodness and truth, Eph. v. 9. If this were the religion of the world, where would be revenge, malice, spite, and and doing wrong one to another? And as God doth that in all cafes, which is juft, fit, right and good, fo doth he require of us, nothing but what is juft, right, fit and good and this he doth require of us,under the promise of a reward, tho' it is our duty so to do, and our righteousness to be found in

fuch

;

fuch ways. And God prohibits us nothing that is right and good; and wherefoever he doth impofe a law upon us, he fhews us that it is fit for us to be restrained, and shews us that his laws are easy and profitable for us. I am not far from the opinion of those men that think the prohibition laid upon Adam in paradife, was not so much to fhew his power, as monitory; that the fruit was not good for man, and would do him harm if he meddled with it. If it be fo, then it doth take off that, which fome men think doth reflect upon the divine goodnefs. But for this let him receive it that fees caufe.

Now if it be fo, that God commands nothing but what is reasonable, just and fit, and prohibits nothing but what is noxious to us, and for our hurt and prejudice; then how comes it to pafs, that we, forry, impotent creatures, pretend to power and priviledge, otherwise than what is right and just, or for the beft? How comes it to pass that we are fo addicted to fet up will for a rule, and for a law will contrary to God, and to the reafon of the thing, which is a law antecedent to the very creation & For upon this fuppofition, that God will make fuch a creature as man, the reason of things requires that he should be made under fuch a law, and under fuch obligations. For if God do make a creature that is voluntary and intelligent; we must leave him to the direction of his faculties, otherwise he fhould controul his own workmanship. Now will is no rule at all, nor gives any warrant faws of nature ought not to be varied from; that is, what is reafon, what is right and fit.

the

Will ftands

for

for nothing, in disjunction from reason and right. There is nothing gives more offence, than for a man proudly and malpertly to fay, he will, becaufe he will. Our apprehenfions of right, are regulated by the nature of things; and we have a lie in our minds, if we act otherwise. For truth is first in things, and then is the truth in our understandings. Truth lies in our regularity and conformity with our apprehenfion of the reason of things: and I am therefore in the truth, because I conceive of things as they are. But things give law to notion and apprehenfion. This is a gallant theme that I am u pon, and a more generous argument there is not under the fun; and that which would tend to the fettlement of the world, and every body in their dues and right.

But a man may philofophife never fo well in generals; if he do not bring down things to particulars, it will not do. Now therefore go along with me, and I will particularife this in notion and cafes.

There is a rule of right in all cafes, and 'tis the charge of all perfons in the use of power, to judge and determine according unto that rule. And he is weak that cannot judge what is the right of the cafe; and wicked, that for ends and purposes will vary from it. Now that there is a rule of right in all cafes, I will fhew you in particular inftances, And

ft. I will begin with the relation that is between parents and children, and fhew you what is right for parents to do with their children, and children to their parents. 1. For the parent, who is, in a

fort,