C. DEPREDATIONS OF THE BELLIGERENTS

1 The American commerce, during this period, was often interrupted, by depredations, committed under illegal orders, decrees and blockades of the two great belligerents, France and Great Britain. These depredations commenced, under the French decree of May 9th, 1793, and others which followed, and under the British order of the 8th of June, 1793, prohibiting flour and meal from being carried to France, or to any port occupied by French armies. This was followed, by other British orders, in relation to neutral trade with the French West Indies. The proceedings of the British government, under these illegal orders, as well as other acts strongly indicating hostile intentions, would, probably, have brought the United States, into open war with Great Britain, as early as 1794, had not President Washington interposed a peaceful mission to that country, and which ended in a treaty, concluded by Mr. Jay, on the 19th of November of that year; and under which, the merchants of the United States, received more than ten millions of dollars, as a compensation for property illegally taken, under the British orders referred to.

France considered this treaty as a violation of prior engagements made with her, on the part of the Americans; and its final ratification in 1796, was immediately followed, by a general seizure and condemnation of American vessels, under several illegal decrees of the Executive Directory.

This brought the United States into partial hostilities with France, and which ended by a treaty made with the first consul in 1800. The treaty of Amiens, in 1801, gave a short respite to Europe. The war, however, was renewed in 1803, with more determined animosity, than before; and the law of nations was disregarded, not only between the belligerents themselves, but between them and neutrals. In this renewed contest, such was the maritime superiority of Great Britain, that the commercial vessels of France, Holland and Spain, were almost driven from the ocean; and these nations were dependent upon a neutral flag, for their colonial, as

1 Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America, PP. 373-376.

well as other supplies; and the United States became their sole carriers. This interference of neutrals, in the commerce of her enemies, Great Britain considered, as unjustly depriving her of the only means she had, of annoying them and as preventing her from bringing them, to just terms of peace; and was at last carried to such an extent, that in 1805, she considered it as a cover of enemy's property; and denominated it "war in disguise." A pamphlet, under this imposing name, was published in Great Britain, in that year, well calculated to excite, not merely the jealousy, but the hostility of that country, against neutrals. In this celebrated pamphlet, the American people, were referred to, as "a new power that had arisen on the western shore of the Atlantic, whose position, and maritime spirit, were calculated to give new and vast importance, to every question of neutral rights, especially in the American seas." And the author, also, declares, "that not a single merchant ship, under a flag inimical to Great Britain, now crosses the equator, or traverses the Atlantic Ocean."

Under impressions, which such language as this, would naturally produce, the British government and the admiralty courts, were confirmed and supported, in the revival of the rule of 1756, by which, it was claimed, that neutrals, in time of war, could carry on no trade, which they had not been accustomed to carry on, in time of peace.

Great Britain had not before objected to the Americans bringing colonial and other produce into the ports of the United States, there securing the duties, and then again reshipping it, with a drawback of most of the duties, to any foreign country. She now, claimed that the allowance of this, was only a relaxation of the rule of 1756; and, on the 22nd of May, 1805, an American vessel, called the Essex, Orme master, was condemned, together with her cargo, under the rule before mentioned, now, for the first time, applied during this war. In consequence of this admiralty decision, many American vessels, in the same situation as the Essex, were seized and brought into British ports. This immediately became a subject of complaint, on the part of the American merchants. It will be remembered, that, at this time, the United States had no treaty with Great Britain, in relation to commerce; the commercial

part of that concluded by Mr. Jay, having expired in 1804. The British government, however, proposed in that year, a renewal of this treaty, to continue, until two years after the close of the new but this was declined, by the American Executive.

war

In this peculiar state of things, a new negotiation was set on foot; and Mr. William Pinckney, who had been one of the commissioners under Mr. Jay's treaty, to adjust the claims of the American merchants, was associated with Mr. Munroe, in conducting it. The important subject of impressment, as well as the colonial trade was, also, to claim the attention of the American negotiators.

On the 31st of December, 1806, Messrs. Munroe and Pinckney, during the short period of the Fox administration, with much difficulty concluded a treaty with Great Britain. With respect to the colonial and other trade, the eleventh article provided, in substance, that, during the then existing war, European products, might be carried to any port of any colony, belonging to the enemy of Great Britain, provided they had been entered and landed in the United States, and paid the ordinary duties; and on re-exportation, should, after the drawback, have been subject to a duty, equivalent to not less than one per cent. ad valorem, and were bona fide the property of American citizens. And the produce of the colonies of the enemies, might, also, be brought to the United States, there entered, landed, and having paid the duties, might be re-exported, to any part of Europe, subject to a duty, after the drawback, of not less than two per cent. ad valorem. This treaty, it is well known, was rejected by Mr. Jefferson, without even consulting his constitutional advisers; principally, for the want of an express stipulation, against future impressments—a stipulation which, after immense sacrifices, from commercial restrictions, for four years, and a war of two and a half years more, the successor of Mr. Jefferson, was unable to obtain. And we beg leave here to remark, that, although the American commissioners could not procure a treaty stipulation, on this important subject, in strict accordance with their instructions; yet the British commissioners, in a written communication, gave such assurances of security, against the future abuse of the practise of impressment, as satisfied the American commissioners, on this point.

Mr. Munroe, in his letter to the President, of the 28th of February, 1808, giving his reasons, for assenting to the treaty, on this point, says "We were, therefore, decidedly of opinion, that the paper of the British commissioners, placed the interest of impressment, on ground, which it was both safe and honorable for the United States, to admit; that, in short, it gave their government the command of the subject, for every necessary and useful purpose. Attached to the treaty, it was the basis or condition, on which the treaty rested." The consequences of the failure of the negotiation, are, by Mr. Munroe, described in the following language "War, therefore, seemed to be the inevitable consequence of such a state of things; I was far from considering it an alternative, which ought to be preferred, to the arrangement, which was offered to us. When I took into view the prosperous and happy condition of the United States, compared with that of other nations; that, as a neutral power they were almost the exclusive carriers of the whole world; and that, in commerce, they flourished beyond example, notwithstanding the losses, which they, occasionally suffered, I was strong in the opinion, that these blessings ought not to be hazarded, in such a question."

The hasty rejection of this treaty, (the best, no doubt, that could have been made, at that time, as Mr. Jay's was, in 1794,) ultimately led, as Mr. Munroe had predicted, to a war with Great Britain.

In entering upon the consideration of the situation of the United States, during the second period, commencing at the close of 1807, when their whole external commerce was, at once, withdrawn from the ocean—a commerce, which in the three years immediately preceding, in imports and exports, exceeded three hundred millions of dollars for each; we deem it not improper to advert to some of the immediate causes, which led to this proceeding on the part of the American government.

D. CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, ORDERS IN COUNCIL, AND EMBARGO

1 The French emperor, Napoleon, was at this period in the full tide of success and conquest, having subdued and brought under 1 Williams, Statesman's Manual, I, 254-257, 258-259, 262-263.

his control a large part of continental Europe. But the English navy had nearly destroyed the French power at sea. The battle of Trafalgar annihilated the united fleets of France and Spain; and all the principal ports of the French empire, with a long extent of seacoast, were held in vigorous blockade by the British squadrons. To retaliate on the British, the Emperor Napoleon devised a new plan of attack, which he called the Continental System. The object of this scheme was to cut off all intercourse between the continent of Europe and Great Britain, and thus weaken England by destroying this portion of her commerce.

On the 21st of November, 1806, Napoleon, having defeated the Prussians, and entered Berlin, the capital of that kingdom, issued from the royal palace of that city his celebrated Berlin decree; by which he declared the British isles in a state of blockade; and, consequently, that every American or other neutral vessel going to, or coming from, these isles, was subject to capture. The same decree provided that all merchandise belonging to England, or coming from its manufactories, or colonies, although belonging to neutrals, should be lawful prize on land. This provision was carried into effect.

General Armstrong, American minister at Paris, regarded the Berlin decree at first as inapplicable to American commerce, on account of the treaty then existing between the United States and France, but in October, 1807, in answer to his inquiry as to the effect of the decree the French minister of foreign relations informed him of his mistake. The condemnation of American vessels commenced in November following.

The British government, in retaliation of Napoleon's Berlin decree, issued their famous orders in council, dated November 11, 1807. By these orders, all direct trade from America to any part of Europe at war with Great Britain, or which excluded the British flag, was totally prohibited. Goods, however, were allowed to be landed in England, and, after paying duties, might be re-exported to Europe. On the 17th of December succeeding, the orders in council were followed by the Milan decree of Napoleon, which declared that every vessel that should submit to be searched by a British man-of-war, or which should touch at a British port, or