affairs have time to set them right, before a new election comes on. As to faction and sedition, sir, I will grant that is monarchical and aristocratical governments, it gene. rally arises from violence and oppression; but in democratical governments, it always arises from the people's having too great a share in the government; for in all countries, and in all governments, there always will be many factious and unquiet spirits, who can never be at rest either in power or out of power when in power, they are never easy, unless every man submits entirely to their direction; and when out of power, they are always working and intriguing against those that are in, without any regard to justice, or to the interest of their country s in popular governments such men have too much game, they have too many opportunities for working upon and corrupting the minds of the people, in order to give them a bad impression of, and to raise discontents against those that have the managenent of the public affairs for the time: and these discontents often break out into seditions and insur、' rections. This, Sir, would, in my opinion be our misfortune if our Parliaments were either annual or triennial; by such frequent elections, there would be so much power thrown into the hands of the people as would destroy that equal mixture, which is the beauty of our constitution: in short, our govern ment would really become a democratical government, and might thence very probably diverge into a tyrannical. Therefore, in order to preserve our constitution, in order to prevent our failing under tyranny and arbitrary power, we ought to pre. serve that law, which I really think has brought our constitution to a more equal mixture, and consequently to greater perfection than it was ever in, before that law took place As to bribery and corruption, Sir, if it were possible to influence, by such base means, the majority of the excctors of Great Britain, to chuse such men as would would probably give up their liberties: if it were possible to influence, by such means, a majority of the members of this house, to consent to the establishment of arbitrary power, I would readily allow that the calculations made by the gentlemen of the other side were just, and their inference true; but I am persuaded that neither of these is possible. As the menibers of this house generally are, and must always be gentlemen of fortune and figure in their country; is it possible to suppose. that any of them could, by a pension or a post, be influenced to consent to the overthrow of our constitution; by which the enjoyment, not only of what he got, but of what he before had, would be rendered altogether precarious will allow, Sir, that, with respect to bribery, the price must be higher or lower, generally in proportion to the virtue of the man who is to be bribed; but it must likewise be granted, that the humour he happens to be in at the time, the spirit he happens to be endowed with, adds a great deal to his virtue. When no encroachments are made upon the rights of the people, when the people do not think themselves in any danger. there may be many of the electors, who by a bribe of ten guineas, might be induced to vote for one candidate rather than another; but if the court were making any encroach ments upon the rights of the people, a proper spirit wou d, without doubt, arise in the nation; and in such a case, I am persuaded, that none, or very few, even of such electors, could be induced to vote for a court candidate ; no, not for ten times the sum. There may, Sir, be some bribery and corruption in the nation: I am afraid there will always be some; but it is no proof of it, that strangers are sometimes chosen; for a gen leman may have so much natural influence over a borough in his neighbourhood, as to be able to prevail with them to choose any per. son he pleases to recommend;and if upon such recom. mendation they choose one or two of his friends, who are perhaps strangers to them, it is not thence to Q be be inferred that the two strangers were chosen their representatives by the means of Dribery and corrup tion. any To insinuate, Sir, that money may be issued from the public treasu: y for bribing elections, is really something very extraordinary; especially in those gentlemen who know how many checks are upon every shilling that can be issued from thence; and how regularly the money granted in one year for the public service of the nation, must always be accounted for, the very next session in this house, and like. wise in the other, if they have a mind to call for such account. And as to the gentlemen in offices. if thay have any advantage over country gentlemen, in having something else to depend on b side their own private fortunes, they have likewise many disadvantages: they are obliged to live at London with their families, by which they are put to a much greater expense, than gentlemen of equal fortunes who live in the country: this lays them under a very great disadvantage, with respect to the supporting their interest in the country. The country gentleman, by living among the electors, and purchasing the necessaries for his family from them, keeps up an acquaintance and corespondence with them without puting himself to any extraordinary charge; whereas a gentleman who lives in London, has no other way of keeping up an acquaintance or correspondence among his friends in the country, but by going down once or twice a year at a very extraordinary charge, and often without any other business; so that we may conclude, a gentleman in office cannot, even in seven years, save much for distri buting in ready money, at the time of an election; and I really believe, if the fact were narrowly inqui red into, it would appear that the gentlemen in office are as little guilty of bribing the electors with ready money, as any other set of gentlemen in the kingdom. That there are ferments often rising among the people without any just cause, is what I am surpri seu to hear controverted, since very late experience may convince us of the contrary: do not we know what a ferment was raised in the nation, toward the latter end of the late Queen's reign? And it is well known, what a fatal change in the affairs of this nation was introduced, or at least confirmed, by an elections coming on while the nation was in that ferment: do not we know what a ferment was raised in the nation, soon after his late Majesty's accession? And if an election had then been allowed to come on, while the nation was in that ferment, it might perhaps have had as fatal effects as the former; but thank God, this was wisely provided against by the very law, which is now wanted to be repealed. As such termenis may hereafter often happen, I mus think that frequent elections will always be dangerous; for which reason, as far as I can see at present, I shall, I believe, at all times, think it a very dangerous experiment to repeal the septennial bill. LORD LITTLETON'S SPEECH On the Repeal of the Act called the Jew Bill, in the Year 1753. MR. SPEAKER, I SEE no occasion to enter at present into the merits of the bill we passed the last session for the na tualization of Jews; because I am convinced, that, in the present temper of the nation, not a single fo. reign Jew will think it expedient to take any benefit of that act; and therefore the repealing of it is giv. ing up nothing. I assented to it last year in hopes. it might induce some wealthy Jews to come and settle among us: In that light I saw enough of utility in it, to make me incline rather to approve than dislike itz but, that any man alive could be zealous, either for or against it, I confess i had no idea, What affects. our religion, is maeed of the hig est and most seri ous importance. God forbid we should be ever maif. Q2 ferent ferent about that! but, I thought this had no more to do with religion than ony turnpike act we passed in that session; and, after all the divinity that has been preached on the su! ject, I think so still, Resolution and steadiness are excellent qualities ; but it is the application of them upon which their value depends. A wise government, Mr. Speaker. will know where to yield, a well as where to resist: and there is no surer mark of littleness of mind in an administration, than obstinacy in trifles. Public wisdom on some occasions must condescend to give way to popular folly, especially in a free country, where the humour of the people must be considered as attentively, as the humour of a king in an absolute monarchy. Under both forms of government a prudent and honest ministry will indulge a sm Il folly, and will resist a great one. Not to vouchsafe now and then a kind indulgence to the former, would discover an ignorance of human nature; not to resist the latter at all times, would be meanness and servility. Sir, I look on the bill we are at present debating, not as a sacrifice made to popularity, (for it sacri fices nothing) but as a prudent regard to some consequences arising from the nature of the clamour raised against the late act for naturalizing Jews, which seem to require a particular consideration. It has been hitherto the rare and envied felicity of his Majesty's reign, that his subjects have enjoyed such a settled tranquillity, such a freedom from an、 gry religious disputes, as is not to be paralieilea in any former times. The true Christian spirit of mode. ration, of charity, of universal benevolence,has prevail. ed in the people, has prevailed in the clergy of all ranks and degrees, instead of those narrow princi. ples, those bigotted prejudices, that furious, that im placable,that ignorant zeal, which had often done so much hurt both to the church and state But from the ill understood,insignificant act of parliament you are now moved to repeal, occasion has been taken to deprive us of this inestimable advantage. It is a pretence to disturb the peace of the church, to infuse |