Canadian voyageurs joined the column, and were distributed among the battalions and corps in boats; and a boat-repairing party, under Lieutenant Kenney, R.E., arrived with repairing material. Its two boats' crews were from that moment almost incessantly at work.

While the work of organisation was going on, General Earle, with his own hand, drew up a series of rules for the movement of the troops in boats, for embarkations and disembarkations, for the bivouac, and for precautions on the march. He also designed special tactical formations for the march, with a view to rapidly passing from column into square, and square into column. These memoranda, together with others drawn up on the system of supply during the advance, and the medical arrangements for the troops, were circulated; and during our stay at Hamdab, the troops were frequently practised by General Earle, in the tactical formations he had devised, over the very roughest ground.

CHAPTER IV.

HAMDAB-CONCENTRATION.

5th to 23d IT seemed at one time, during the earlier

Jan.

6th Jan.

8th Jan.

9th Jan.

portion of our period of concentration at Hamdab, that the necessities of the desert column, on which SO much depended, would seriously cripple us of the river route. Colonel Burnaby had been promised to us; and General Earle had hoped to have him for the command of the mounted troops; but on the 6th January General Buller telegraphed, "I must steal Burnaby. I do not know who else is to command Metemmeh." On the 8th General Buller still counted on sending us the West Kent Regiment, to take up posts on our line of communications; but on the 9th the

first note of alarm to us was sounded.

66

Every endeavour," General Buller wrote, "will be made to complete the infantry of your force up to 100 days' rations per man before they start; but it is possible the difficulties of transport may make it almost impossible to do this within a reasonable time. It is desirable, therefore, for you to consider whether it may not be possible for you to advance, say two battalions of infantry and a portion of your artillery and mounted men, through the Monassir country to Abu Hamed, and so open the line of supply from Korosko." In this case, General Earle was to keep touch of his rear battalions; the Mudir's troops assisting him to do this by occupying the Monassir country; and he was reminded that for the present his main objective was the capture of Berber, and that for this purpose he must concentrate his force.

To this minute General Earle replied roth Jan. that he should be prepared to advance with two battalions and the mounted troops as

soon as he had two battalions of infantry complete with 100 days' supply, together with the portion of the transport company allotted to his column, by which time he hoped to have collected forage for the animals and food for the Egyptian troops. He considered all his small force of mounted troops should accompany his advanced brigade, and he did not propose to divide them, as opposition was to be expected to that brigade in the Monassir country. He wished the Mudir's troops to march parallel to us upon the right bank, and to be ready to occupy the Monassir country as soon as he had defeated the Monassir tribe. He asked for two companies of a regiment from the line of communications to occupy Hamdab and a post in the Monassir country; and in that case. anticipated no military difficulty for the troops following the leading brigade, moving in half battalions. General Earle trusted that before he moved, his naval boat, with a Gardner gun, his boat officers

and voyageurs, and boat - repairing party
might have reached his camp.
He urged,

also, that his commissariat staff should be
promptly and considerably increased.

In reply General Earle was informed, on 15th Jan. the 15th, that most of his requests were in course of fulfilment ; but that Lord Wolseley did not approve his proposal to take with him two companies of a line of communication regiment for the purpose of forming posts on his line. He was instructed that his force was to be a flying column; that the General of communications would not occupy the line behind us; and further, that it was improbable the West Kent Regiment could be rationed sufficiently in advance to enable it to follow us up the river. Our, at that time, very insufficient commissariat staff could not yet be increased, because there was no one at Korti to send to us. Our land transport was on the 14th only leaving Dongola; but Lord Wolseley was anxious that our leading battalions should advance at the very earliest moment to