first wish is to see the Government put into quiet and successful operation; and to afford any service that may be acceptable from me for that purpose. My second wish, if that were to be consulted, would prefer, for reasons formerly hinted, an opportunity of contributing that service in the House of Representatives, rather than in the Senate; provided the opportunity be attainable from the spontaneous suffrage of the Constituents. Should the real friends of the Constitution think this preference inconsistent with any primary object, as Colonel Carrington tells me is the case with some who are entitled to peculiar respect, and view my renouncing it as of any material consequence, I shall not hesitate to comply. You will not infer from the freedom with which these observations are made, that I am in the least unaware of the probability that, whatever my inclinations or those of my friends may be, they are likely to be of little avail in the present case. I take it for certain that a clear majority of the Assembly are enemies to the Government, and I have no reason to suppose that I can be less obnoxious than others on the opposite side. An election into the Senate, therefore, can hardly come into question. I know also that a good deal will depend on the arrangements for the election of the other branch; and that much may depend, moreover, on the steps to be taken by the candidates, which will not be taken by me. Here again, therefore, there must be great uncertainty, if not improbability, of my election. With these circumstances in view, it is impossible that I can be the dupe of false calculations, even if I were in other cases disposed to indulge them. I trust it is equally impossible for the result,

whatever it may be, to rob me of any reflections which enter into the internal fund of comfort and happiness. Popular favor or disfavor is no criterion of the character maintained with those whose esteem an honorable ambition must court. Much less can it be a criterion of that maintained with one's self. And when the spirit of party directs the public voice, it must be a little mind, indeed, that can suffer in its own estimation, or apprehend danger of suffering in that of others.161

INTRODUCTION.

NOTE. The following paper is copied from a rough draught in the handwriting of Mr. Madison. The particular place it was intended to occupy in his works is not designated; but as it traces the causes and steps which led to the meeting of the Convention of 1787, it seems properly to preface the acts of that body. The paper bears evidence, in the paragraph preceding its conclusion, that it was written at a late period of the life of its author, when the pressure of ill health combined with his great age in preventing a final revision of it.

As the weakness and wants of man naturally lead to an association of individuals under a common authority, whereby each may have the protection of the whole against danger from without, and enjoy in safety within the advantages of social intercourse, and an exchange of the necessaries and comforts of life; in like manner feeble communities, independent of each other, have resorted to a union, less intimate, but with common councils, for the common safety against powerful neighbours, and for the preservation of justice and peace among themselves. Ancient history furnishes examples of these confederate associations, though with a very imperfect account of