§ 3. Christ did not satisfy the Distributive Justice of God for us.

The Distributive Justice of God prompts him to inflict the punishment which sin deserves. One theory of divines is, that the atonement satisfied the distributive justice of God, because in the atonement Christ endured the very punishment which sin deserves. Another theory of divines is, that Christ did not satisfy God's distributive justice, because he did not endure any punishment at all; but Christ did satisfy the benevolent God in forbearing to inflict the punishment which distributive justice requires. The second of these theories is advocated by Dr. Griffin. As he did not believe that the law was literally satisfied, so he could not consistently believe that the distributive justice of the Lawgiver was literally satisfied by the atonement. He strenuously objects to the notion of a "legal oneness" between Christ and the redeemed; "a legal imputation, a legal obligation to suffer, a legal punishment, a legal satisfaction, and a legal claim on the part of the redeemed." "We deny," he says, "that either of these is legal. The mistake of supposing them such has wholly arisen from drawing literal conclusions from figurative premises." Among these erroneous literal conclusions from figurative premises, he specifies the following: "Because the Lawgiver demanded satisfaction of him [Christ] by commanding him to die, law and justice made the demand. Because the iniquity of all is said to have been laid on him, he sustained the literal and legal punishment of sin. Because he was dragged to execution like a criminal, and fell under the stroke of him who was wont to act as the legal executioner, law and justice were literally executed upon him. Because he rendered full satisfaction to the Protector of the law, by securing its authority as fully as though it had been literally executed, he satisfied both law and justice." "Thus," he continues, " by pressing, in some instances, the figurative language of Scripture into a literal meaning, and by twisting the truth a very

little in others," the advocates of a legal satisfaction, etc., "arrive at all the conclusions which have been enumerated." (pp. 132-134; see likewise, pp. 88, 132 seq., 166 seq., 194,

etc.

That neither the law nor the justice of God is satisfied by the atonement, harmonizes, according to our author, "with the consciousness of every true believer, whatever systematic phrases he may be accustomed to use. "When he is humbled in the dust at the feet of his Maker, it is farthest from his thoughts to make demands on justice." "Every day of his life he confesses that it would still be just in God to send him to perdition. And if it would be just, justice still demands his death. And if justice demands his death, justice is not satisfied. The literal truth is, that Christ answered all the purposes to the divine law which could have been accomplished by the actual satisfaction of its demands against believers, and the actual satisfaction of justice upon them. And this being done, it may be said by an easy figure, that law and justice are satisfied. And though these expressions are not scriptural, but of human invention, I do not object to their use in prayer and popular discourses. But every divine and every Christian ought to know that they are figurative expressions, and not attempt to draw from them literal conclusions." (pp. 165, 166.)

§ 4. The Law and the Distributive Justice of God eternally demand the punishment of every one who has sinned.

One theory of theologians is, that Christ, having obeyed the law, and suffered its penalty for the elect, has cancelled the entire demand of law and distributive justice against the elect; has released them from all guilt, all desert of punishment; and rendered it impossible to condemn them justly for all or any of their sins. Another theory is, that Christ has not obeyed the law or suffered punishment for men; that men who are at any time morally guilty, are so at all times; that, if they once deserve eternal punishment, they forever deserve it, and that the Law and Distributive Justice

of God demand all the holiness and all the punishment which they have ever demanded. Of these two theories Dr. Griffin held the second. He believed moral guilt to be inextinguishable in its very essence. Having frequently asserted that the law and the Divine Justice were not satisfied by the atonement, he adds:

"If law and justice were not literally satisfied even in regard to believers, then law and justice do not adjudge to believers a discharge, much less to the unregenerate elect. Law and justice eternally demand the death of the persons who have once sinned; and the security of believers is, that they are not under the law but under grace. They really deserve to suffer as much as though Christ had never died. To them eternal punishment, though it would be a breach of promise, would not be unjust. It would indeed be unjust to Christ thus to deprive him of his stipulated reward; but it would not be unjust to them, because they personally deserve it. They do not merit what he merits. They cannot claim from justice what he claims from justice." (pp. 158, 159.) "A man may make over his property and render a pauper rich; but a holy person cannot make over his moral character and render a sinner personally righteous, nor transfer the benefit of his sufferings so as to render a transgressor personally undeserving of punishment. By suffering for him. he may render it unnecessary to the public good for him to suffer; and the ruler, finding the necessities of the law answered, though not one of its demands, may graciously forgive: yea he may have promised to forgive, and may be bound to pardon by truth and wisdom, and even by justice to the substitute, but not by justice to the sinner himself, so long as it remains true that he personally deserves punishment.

"But let us examine this subject to the bottom. A man personally deserving to die, it is said, may demand from justice, in other words from law, an acquittal, under the claim of another who has suffered for him. But how came the substitute by such a claim? He may indeed have a demand on the ruler, founded on a promise, for the pardon of the offender; but who gave him a claim on the law for a sentence that the transgressor has never broken it? or a demand binding the law to pardon? (the law pardon!) or binding the law to accept an innocent victim for the guilty? The law, which, (to make the case a parallel one,) is the exact and unchanging measure of justice, said that the sinner, not an innocent substitute, should die. That then, and nothing but that, is the claim of justice, the unchangeable, indestructible claim of justice. How came a substitute possessed of a demand which annihilates this, and renders the immutable claim of justice unjust? Even the administrator of the law cannot be bound by justice, (other than that justice to the substitute which arises out of a promise of reward,) to accept the sufferings of an innocent person in the room of the guilty." (pp. 160, 161; see likewise, p. 18.)

§ 5. The Atonement did not involve a work of superero

gation.

A work of supererogation is a work which the moral law does not require of the performer. One theory of divines is, that, although Christ obeyed the divine command in our stead, yet his obedience was not required of him by the moral law; that it was a gratuitous work, and could be, therefore, as it was in fact, transferred, made over to us, and it thus became our own obedience. Another theory is, that if there be any holiness possible, it is required by the law; that every moral agent is obligated to obey the law so far forth as he can obey it; that a right act cannot be performed without a previous obligation to perform it; that rectitude and duty are essentially correlative, and therefore there cannot be a work of supererogation. The latter of these two theories was maintained by Dr. Griffin. He says:

"One of the duties enjoined upon him [Christ] was to lay down his life. So far as that was a duty it was obedience, and no further than it was a duty was it entitled to a reward. That act was of greater merit than other acts of obedience, because it involved greater self-denial; but the sufferings bore no other relation to the reward than as being the highest test of obedience. Christ was rewarded for his obedience unto death,' not for his sufferings viewed as uncommanded; not therefore for sufferings in themselves considered. What claim could uncommanded sufferings have to a reward? Should a creature in any part of the universe inflict pain on himself which God had never required, who would be bound to recompense him? There is no such duty of supererogation in the kingdom of God." (p. 57.)

"A moral agent then is a being capable of deserving praise and blame. But as there are no works of supererogation, and no moral goodness among creatures but what lies in conformity to the will of God, nothing is entitled to praise from him but the fulfilment of an obligation, or to blame from him but the violation of an obligation. A moral agent then, (to carry back the idea one step further,) is a creature capable of fulfilling or violating obligations. But as he cannot fulfil or violate an obligation of which he is not susceptible, the radical definition of a moral agent is, a creature susceptible of obligations. And as the bonds are actually imposed by divine authority on all who are capable of receiving them, the definition which accords with matter of fact is, a creature under obligations." (p. 224.)

All then, who are capable of meriting a reward from God, are capable of obligation; and all who are capable of obligation, are, in fact, under obligation; and all who are under obligation, are unable to free themselves from it, and are, therefore, unable to perform a supererogatory work. Such a work being impossible, could not have been involved in the atonement (see pp. 31, 32, 36, et al.).

§ 6. The Atonement consisted not in the obedience, but in the sufferings of Christ.

It is the theory of one class of divines that the atonement consisted entirely in Christ's active obedience. It is the theory of a second class, that the atonement consisted partly in Christ's active obedience, and partly in his sufferings. It is the theory of a third class, that the atonement consisted entirely in the sufferings of Christ. To this third class Dr. Griffin belonged. He says:

"In examining this subject [the matter of the atonement] it is necessary to keep immovably before the eye the end which an atonement was intended to answer in the government of God. It was the same that would have been answered by punishment. And what was that? To furnish practical proof that God would support the authority of his law by executing its penalty on transgressors. When that proof was given, and the end of punishment was thus answered, the Protector of the law was satisfied. The thing which produced that satisfaction, was the atonement or cover for sin. When I ask after the matter of the atonement, I ask what that thing was. What was that by which the Protector of the law furnished the same practical proof of his resolution to execute the penalty, that he would have given by punishment itself? My general answer is, it was humiliation imposed and sufferings inflicted by his own authority and hand on his beloved Son. What could so naturally show that God would inflict evil for sin, as the actual infliction of evil on account of sin? as the tokens of wrath discharged against the Son of his love standing avowedly in the place of sinners?" (p. 28.)

"Shall we then say that the action of the Father helped to make atonement? No, for while all the testimony came from him, all the atonement came from the Son. The matter of atonement then came from the Son. This brings us to the conclusion that the matter of atonement was that which answered to these two descriptions; it was something yielded by the Son, (not the act of yielding,) and something by which the Father testified that he would punish sin. Now certainly the testimony of Christ was not