sin. What could the testimony or obedience of another do to that end? Nothing would answer but sufferings unsparingly inflicted on the Son of his love with his own hand. And when he had drained upon him the cup of trembling, as Guardian of the law he was satisfied. Had the person of the sinner stood before him unshielded by a Substitute, he would have shown with his own arm his resolution to punish by sufferings inflicted on, the sinner. This would have been the satisfaction demanded in the case; and no part of it would have consisted in the consent of the sufferer. If the sinner was to escape, the satisfaction demanded was an opportunity to inflict sufferings on a Substitute, which should give out the same testimony as from his own lips, or rather should shed the same practical proof from the awful gleamings of his own sword. And when he had actually inflicted these sufferings to the full extent which the necessity of the case demanded, and had thus testified by the tremendous voice of his own authority, he was satisfied." (pp. 45, 46.)

"The ultimate design of the mediation of Christ was to fill the universe with motives, by bringing out to view the secrets of the Eternal Mind. He came to be "the image of the invisible God;""the face," in which he should be seen; "the word" by which he should be expressed." John 1: 1. 2 Cor. 4: 4, 6. Col. 1: 15. (p. 290.)

§ 9. The Atonement consisted in such sufferings of Christ as render the sins of believers pardonable.

Some suppose the atonement to be such, in its very nature, as not only causes the sin of believers to be pardonable, but also such as inevitably secures the forgiveness of the elect; not only such as to make the law allow the salvation of the penitent, but also such as to make the law demand the salvation of all who were predestined unto life; not only such as to make the forgiveness of the regenerate consistent with the honor of the law, but also such as to make the rewards of the elect requisite to fulfil the very nature of the law; not only such as to remove all legal obstacles to the eternal happiness of the believer, but also such as to introduce a legal necessity for the eternal happiness of those who were predestinated to be believers. These divines affirm: "The Hebrew word for atonement signifies to cover; and when sins in the Old Testament are spoken of as atoned, the meaning always is that they were covered, removed, never to be charged on the person who committed them. A

transaction which only renders it possible for sin to be pardoned is no atonement, whatever else it may be." Others suppose that the atonement merely makes the sin of the penitent pardonable; that is, consistent with the honor of the law, and unobstructed by any of the obstacles which the law, left to itself, throws into the way of the believer's forgiveness. Dr. Griffin need not have adopted either of these theories. He might have favored a doctrine interme diate between the two; but he did advocate the second of the theories. He says often that "the proper office of the atonement" is "merely to render sin pardonable" (p. 49; see also pp. 80, 81, 90, 91). By this he means, first, that the atonement renders the pardon of sin consistent with the honor of the law; and, secondly, that it removes all legal barriers to this pardon. Therefore he writes:

"The atonement therefore rendered it consistent with the honor of the law, so far as the influence of the penalty was concerned, to bestow regenerating grace on men, without any previous faith or repentance. And this is what I mean by removing the curse of abandonment." (p. 20.)

"When I say that the curse of abandonment was removed, I do not mean that the law ceased to pronounce the sentence on men. The law never ceases to pronounce any part of its sentence against those who have once sinned, even after they are pardoned. But what I mean is, that it was as consistent with the honor of the law to give the Spirit to men, as though the curse of abandonment had not been pronounced or incurred. (p. 18.)

"The mere cover for sin [Heb. atonement] so far from securing the gift of faith, could not even render it consistent with the honor of the law. It would only remove the penal bar which stood in the way." (p. 84.)

"We are reconciled by the atonement, because that is the ground of our reconciliation: but atonement is not itself reconciliation or pardon, neither does it contain the influence which secures reconciliation." (p. 74.)

"The name [atonement] is applicable only to that which answered the end of punishment, by showing the universe that God would support his law by executing its penalty on transgressors; which thus secured the authority of the law and satisfied its Protector, and besides removing the curse of abandonment, reconciled with the honor of the law the pardon of believers, (whether of all indiscriminately who would believe, or of those only who it was foreseen would believe ;) which thus removed the legal impediments to the acquittal of believers, and rendered their sins pardonable, and so became the ground of pardon." (p. 80.)

§ 10. The Antecedents and the Consequents of the Atonement distinguished from the Atonement itself.

Some theologians consider the active obedience of Christ one part of the atonement. Others regard it a logical antecedent of the atonement. Dr. Griffin favored the latter of these two views. He believed that the entire obedience of Christ was pre-requisite to the expiation, first, in order "to qualify Christ to make atonement," in order "to set him forth as the beloved Son, and thus to render his sufferings sufficiently expressive of God's inflexible resolution to punish sin;" secondly, in order to make the atonement, both in fact and in appearance, a result of the Father's action (see pp. 30, 37). But this logical antecedent of the expiation, although not separable, is yet distinguishable, from the expiation itself. Dr. Griffin says:

"There is a distinction to be set up here between the matter of atonement and the making of atonement. The matter of atonement was the thing which satisfied, the making of atonement was the presenting of that thing. When Aaron offered an expiating victim he was said to make atonement, though the atoning power did not lie in Aaron's arm, but in the bleeding lamb; and though Aaron's action could have no other effect than to present the victim to God according to his appointment, in other words, to bring it, with whatever power it had, into the necessary relation to God. According to the same form of expression, the Priest of the New Testament is said "to atone for the sins of the people," and "to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." The same form of expression is used whenever we speak of Christ's making atonement. And it is common also in other matters. It is medicine, and not the act of the physician, which works the cure. But it must be administered, and administered in a right way. And when this is done we commonly say, the physician healed the patient. So it was the sufferings of Christ and not his action which satisfied but they must be presented by the Priest, and presented in a right way, that is, unmixed with any disobedience in his life: and when all this is done we very properly say that Christ made atonement; not only ascribing to him the effect of his sufferings, but referring to his act in presenting them." (pp. 29, 30.)

"We do not put into the matter of atonement the passible nature and humanity of Christ, though they were necessary qualifications to fit him to make expiation; nor yet his dignity, though that was necessary for much the same reason that his general obedience was. Why then should his obedience be thus distinguished?" (p. 35; see also

p.

37 seq.)

As it is supposed by some that the obedience of Christ is an integral part of the atonement, so it is supposed that his merit is an essential constituent of the same. It is thought that the atonement itself secures the salvation of the elect, because the atonement consists in Christ's meritorious obedience, and his legal punishment. It is thought by others, however, that the merit of Christ is a logical consequent of his obedience, and that his obedience, although necessary to the atonement, is no part of its essence. The latter is the opinion of Dr. Griffin. He says: "We mean by atonement nothing more than that which is the ground of release from the curse, and we separate it entirely from the merit of Christ, or his claim to a reward" (p. 11). It is his favorite remark that "we can distinguish between atonement and a claim to reward for making atonement." (p. 51.) "The thing which was offered for sin, and which came in the room of punishment, and which laid the foundation for pardon was no other than suffering" (p. 49); but Christ "is rewarded only for the merit of obedience, and neither for sufferings as such, nor for any testimony which his action gave out" (p. 52). "That which rendered sin pardonable is the mere sufferings of the beloved Son, inflicted by the Father's hand; that which constitutes the claim of Christ to the gift of faith is the merit of his obedience; as wide a difference as between passion and action." (p. 68.) Dr. Griffin attempts to show a coincidence of the doctrine that the atonement partly consists in Christ's merit, with the Socinian doctrine that the value of Christ's mission may be resolved into his virtue. He says:

"This leads us to see the immense importance of discriminating between the matter of atonement and the merit of obedience, in order to separate the proper influence of the expiation from a claim to reward. Our brethren have a strong reason for retaining obedience in the matter of atonement. It is vital to their system to place merit there, in order to give to the atonement a power to secure the gift of faith, and thus to accomplish actual reconciliation. Without an influence to secure the gift of faith it must either fail to accomplish reconciliation by its own power, or must obtain remission for stubborn unbelievers. Our brethren therefore are willing to comprehend in the atonement the whole influence of Christ; and

if they succeed in this they carry their point, at least so far as relates to the meaning and proper application of the term. For if the atonement contains an influence which secures the gift of faith, there is atonement for none but those who will ultimately believe."

"In those who are under law merit is obedience, considered as deserving a legal reward. It is obedience viewed purely in its relation to a recompense. If then we put merit into the matter of atonement, we place it there, not as that by which anything is to be proved (for that would be a testimony, not a merit); not therefore as anything which is to witness that God will punish sin (indeed how can the merit of one prove that God will punish another?); not therefore as anything which is to answer in the room of punishment. Here then we abandon the whole end of the atonement, and give up the need of a vicarious sacrifice altogether. It comes out that the release of the sinner is granted to Christ purely as a reward. And this is the ground taken by those who deny a vicarious sacrifice, and place the whole atonement in obedience. But the fault of this scheme is, that such an atonement furnishes no proof that God will execute his law, and answers in no degree the end of punishment, and therefore is not fitted to come in the room of punishment and to be a cover for sin."—" Nor can you make merit partially the ground of pardon without proportionably drawing after it the same effects. In exact proportion' as pardon is dispensed on the ground of being a reward to Christ, and not on the ground of substituted sufferings, you abate the evidence that sin must always receive a frown. Indeed there is no halving of things in this way. If the legal impediment to pardon is partly taken away by Christ's deserving a reward, it must have been such as could not need a vicarious sacrifice to remove it. For if the impediment was, that the law had threatened sufferings, and sufferings must come in their room, how could the merit of a Substitute touch the difficulty? And what need, I further ask, of anything but the sufferings of the Son of God to clear away such an impediment as this?

"What possible influence could merit have in removing the impediments to pardon? To what does the proposition amount? That the sins of believers are pardonable because Christ deserved a reward! What conceivable relation can exist between these two things? Christ's desert of reward, considered by itself, could lend no influence to render sin pardonable. Where is the text that asserts or hints at any such thing? On the contrary have we not seen that sufferings, and sufferings alone, are played in the Scriptures as the ground of remission?" (pp. 52-55; see also on the general subject pp. 48, 51. 56.)

every where dis

§ 11. Comprehensive View of the Work of Christ. According to the preceding quotations, the work of Christ consists of two parts. One of them is his atonement, which consists in his humiliation and sufferings; another is his