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Evangelists and holy writings, or are not mentioned in them. If the appearance of the star, the history of the presentation in the temple, etc., had been related by none of the Evangelists, and by none of the apostles, they must also have been rejected, at least not made matters of necessary belief.

No testimony of the fathers, made a hundred and more years afterwards, can impart credibility. As now Peter's abode in Rome, and his bishopric there, are passed over in silence in all the Holy Scriptures, though there was the most urgent necessity to mention them, the negative proof taken from this silence, is of unusual, irrefragable force, and stands like any positive one.

The opposers too kick as much as they possibly can, now, against the consequence drawn from that silence; but it is only when this consequence is adduced against them; while, where it affords them an advantage, they welcome any negative proof. Let us look at some examples.

The Acta Marcelli accuse a certain pope of open idolatry. "That is a scandalous falsehood and calumny of this most venerable pope," cries out Baronius,' for if the accusation had been true, the Donatists, and Augustines also, would not have been silent respecting it; as it would have shown in the capital of the world, before the emperor, so that what happened in the city, would have been known through the whole earth."

Irenæus writes, that the church at Rome was built up proportionately by Peter and Paul. That Leo Allatius will not admit, because thus Peter's authority suffers, and he boldly uses the negative argument against Irenæus. "In this matter to sustain themselves merely on the assertions of the fathers, when other proof fails, is wasting time and labor; for although the fathers maintain it, it is not so." 2

We see from these few examples, to which hundreds might be added, how different the views of these men are in reference to the force of negative proof.

Ad. a. 302, n. 98, 99.

2 Leo Allat. de perpetuo consensu, L. I. c. V. p. 15.

ARTICLE IV.

THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE.

BY PROF. E. P. BARROWS, ANDOVER.

We cannot but attach a high significance to the fact, that of all the writers who have denied the doctrine of eternal punishment, in the proper sense of the words, not one, so far as our knowledge extends, has begun with the direct scriptural argument. Not one appears to have been led by the simple declarations of the Bible concerning the future state of the wicked to the conclusion either that they will all be finally made blessed, or that they will all be annihilated. So far as our observation goes, they have always begun with the proposition, that the received doctrine of the eternal punishment of the wicked cannot be consistent with God's goodness, and therefore cannot be true; and, after laboring at great length to fortify this position, they have then come to the work of bringing the declarations of Scripture into harmony with it. A striking illustration of this method of procedure we have in a volume now before us, entitled: The Doctrine of a Future Life, in which the author labors to establish the position that the everlasting punishment of the wicked will consist in their annihilation after the final judgment. The body of the work consists of 468 pages. Of these only 67 are devoted to the scriptural argument," and of these sixtyseven pages, the last eleven are occupied with the consideration of the "indirect scriptural argument," drawn from the supposed opinions of the Jews on the subject of the future state in our Lord's day. In the 169 pages that precede this scriptural argument, the author labors to show that, upon none of the philosophical grounds upon which the doctrine of eternal punishment has been maintained, can it possibly

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1 Debt and Grace, as related to the Doctrine of a Future Life. By C, F. Hudson. Boston: Published by John P. Jewett and Company. Cleveland, Ohio: H. P. B. Jewett. 1857. pp. viii and 472. 12mo.

be defended. He is fully in earnest to show that the eternal persistence of moral evil is and must be in irreconcilable contradiction with the true idea of God. The following extracts, taken, one from the portion preceding, the other from that following, the Biblical Argument, are samples of the manner in which he discourses on this solemn and awful theme. Speaking of the argument for the necessity of endless penalty as a means to maintain confidence in the divine government he says:

"Must the eternal peace and happiness of all beings depend on the coeternal anguish of those who have begun to sin? Are the delights of Paradise and the 'fulness of joy' not sufficient to restrain the world from plunging into the abyss of annihilation? So far as human beings have lost confidence in God or creature, is it not more restored by the renewal of a single heart in the image of Christ, than by the supposed exposure of millions to eternal woe? How do earthly rulers restore the lost confidence of their subjects? Which is the stronger government-that in which the most dreadful punishments are inflicted, or that in which the mere loss of place or favor is so dire that infliction is not needed? And must God forever afflict the guilty, that the innocent may learn to trust in him?” 84, 85.

PP.

Here he assumes that, in a moral government rightly constructed and administered, "the mere loss of place or favor," without any positive infliction of penal evil, should be a sufficient protection against sin and its consequences; an assumption which he can never establish, and which would be as conclusive against the actual government of God in the present world, as against the doctrine which he is combatting. Again he says:

"If man is created absolutely immortal, subject to the alternative of eternal happiness or eternal misery, he seems to have hardly a fair trial here; we should suppose that instead of being exposed to any dangerous temptations, the heavenly Father would have furnished every motive to virtue, and would have allowed no motive to sin; and we need not wonder if such fair trial for so fearful an alternative is sought in some preëxistent state." p. 240.

Here he assumes, again, that a moral government administered by law over free beings may be so constructed as to exclude all " dangerous temptations," and furnish "every

motive to virtue," while it allows "no motive to sin." Whoever discourses in this manner concerning God's moral government is certainly talking quite at random, understanding not what he says, nor whereof he affirms.

With such foregone conclusions he comes to the examination of the scriptural argument. Now to deny the success of this or that particular attempt to defend the doctrine of eternal punishment upon the ground of human reason and philosophy, is one thing; but to affirm explicitly, or assume implicitly, that it is absolutely irreconcilable with the divine attributes, and therefore cannot be true, is quite another thing. We are very ready to admit that many unsatisfactory theories of reconciliation have been proposed. If one chooses to maintain that no adequate solution of the difficulty has yet been found, we shall not contend with him. But we shall remind him that this argument, drawn from the limitation of human faculties, is a two-edged sword cutting both ways. If, as he affirms, no one has yet shown, on the ground of human reason and philosophy, how the doctrine in question is consistent with the divine attributes, it is equally true that no one has ever shown or can show, on the same ground, that it is not consistent with them. The ultimate appeal, then, must be to the declarations of holy writ. Here alone our faith can find a firm restingplace. Inasmuch, however, as the main body of the work now under review is devoted to extra-scriptural arguments and considerations, it seems proper, before proceeding to the question of the biblical doctrine, to examine a few of his leading positions which belong to

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT.

1. Dualism. True dualism is the doctrine of two opposite eternal principles, each self-existent, and therefore each independent of the other in its being and attributes. From the conflict between these arises to each a perpetual restraint and hindrance. Neither has power to do what it would, because of the opposing power of the other. It is

not necessary to insist upon the obvious fact that this theory denies the very idea of a self-sufficient omnipotent God. The god of the dualist does simply as well as he can in contending forever against a coördinate nature wholly external to himself, of which he is not the author, and which, therefore, he can only resist without the ability to destroy or control. Such a necessity, imposed upon God from without in spite of his own free will, would be dualism. But a so-called "moral necessity," arising not from the defect of the divine attributes, but from their infinite fulness, however absolute it may be, is not dualism. This necessity the Scriptures boldly ascribe to God. It is "impossible," say they, "for God to lie." The necessity of speaking the truth rests upon God absolutely and eternally. But it is the necessity of his infinite perfection. It is self-imposed, and therefore altogether free. Now precisely the same necessity rests upon God in respect to holiness and sin. In spite of our theories the latter exists under his moral government, as well as the former. It is "impossible" that he should not love and reward holiness. It is equally impossible that he should not hate and punish sin—and, for anything that our finite reason can determine, punish it eternally. There is no limitation to the divine power in the one case, any more than in the other. It is no eternal conflict with an unconquerable self-persistent power, but simply the treatment of sin as the infinite reason of God sees it right and good to treat it. God's power to annihilate the wicked no sane man will deny. But this does not teach us what he will do. What he might have done, had he seen best, to prevent sin, or to bring sinners to repentance, we are not called upon to affirm. He has done that which his infinite perfections dictated. If the above plain distinction between a moral necessity, which has its ground in the very fulness of the divine perfections, and which leaves God free in the fullest sense of the term; and a natural necessity imposed upon him either from within by the limitation of his own attributes, or from without by a coördinate self-existent power (which implies, however, as has been shown, an inward limitation also) - if this plain

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