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"a further confirmation," he thinks, of "the airy nature of these beings." Was then the soul of man, according to Homer, "composed of" air, cloud, or smoke? For in the theory of Dr. Voelcker, "each seems either." But let us try this construction of a simile elsewhere. Homer has used surprisingly similar language in describing and illustrating the movements of divine persons. Thetis, coming to the interview with her son,

ἀνέδυ πολιῆς ἁλὸς, ή ΰτ ̓ ὀμίχλη.

Must we conclude, then, that she was an "airy being," "composed of" "fog," a "mere phantom," a "deceptive appearance," "destitute of mental faculties?" Athene

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Does this indicate what she was "composed of?" Or was the expression in each case, whether used of a god or a human soul, a mere similitudo ex levitate et celeritate? By Dr. Voelcker's critical process, Aias must at once, have been composed of" mason-work and brute matter and nature; for Homer has, on different occasions, likened him to a tower, a lion, and an ass.

"Among the expressions in the Iliad and Odyssey," says Dr. Voelcker," for the animating and spiritual principle in man, the most important are ἦτορ, στῆθος, κραδίη and φρένες. They denote different localities of the vital powers in the body; and as in all languages, for reasons easy to be understood, usage mostly unites the animating and the spiritual in the same expression, they comprehend the mental part in their signification; but being organs of the body which are annihilated with it, they cannot pass into Hades."

It can hardly be that Dr. Voelcker intended this as an argument for his materialistic theory of Homer. Ἦτορ, κραδίη, and opéves undoubtedly signify (like the reins in Hebrew, the brain in English, and the heart in all languages) at once bodily organs and mental or spiritual faculties. "They can

1 II. 1. 359.

2 Od. 1. 320.

not pass into Hades." Of course not. This impossibility is common to Homer with all writers and all languages. The laws of speech and of thought would not allow it to be said of a dead man that his breast, reins, heart, or brain had departed to the invisible world. These terms represent spiritual faculties in the case of the living man, but not of the dead; because the very ground of the metaphor lies in the intimate connection supposed to exist between certain mental faculties and bodily organs, and is lost when that connection ceases in death.

But why does Dr. V. pronounce these "the most important expressions for the animating and spiritual principle in man?" Probably they enjoy this distinction in his scale, because they are borrowed from the body, and their spiritual sense is supposed to be only secondary; thus deriving from his classification a little aid to his theory of the materialistic and mortal nature of the soul. Few readers of Homer will agree with Dr. V., that these ȧupißola are "the most important" Homeric terms for the mind and its operations. Eros, in Homer, never signifies "the animating and spiritual principle" at all. It is simply a bodily seat or locality of the mind or feelings, nothing more. Θυμός, ἦτορ, νόος ἐνὶ στήθεσσι are of constant occurrence, but never στῆθος as itself an "expression for the animating and spiritual principle.1

The remaining terms on which the Homeric psychology turns cardinally are θυμός, νόος, and μένος. As these writers have decreed the extinction of the Juuós, they can afford to exalt it at the expense of the yuxý. Nägelsbach (as we have seen) makes it "the spiritual soul," " correlate to the animal soul, ux." If he is right, it is the spiritual soul which prompts a man to drink (πιεῖν ὅτε θυμὸς ἀνώγοι It is the spiritual soul which finds satisfaction in a hearty dinner (οὐδέ τι θυμὸς ἐδεύετο δαιτὸς είσης). It is the spiritual soul

ψυχή.”

1 Nägelsbach defines it more correctly. Eros ist lediglich dass ausserliche Behältniss der Seelenkräfte. p. 339, n. So Damm. and Crusius. In the singular, it is only the material breast.

2 II. 4. 263.

3 II. 1. 468.

which animates lambs, oxen,2 horses," stags, and swine! 5 Or rather, the term which often denotes these and many other purely animal ideas and functions, is the distinctive and pre-eminent Homeric word to express the "incorporeal, the soul-principle of the spiritual life!" Such absurd and impossible psychological ideas would this theory fasten upon the greatest of poets. The truth is, Juuós, one of the "most important" and general psychological words of Homer, denotes the vital energy, and all its conceivable forms and manifestations. Plato defines it from its derivation, "the rush, outflow, or boiling up of the yux. According to him, therefore, it differs from yuxý as a part from the whole, an attribute or operation from its subject. This will be found generally to square with the Homeric usage. In mere animals, it is mere animal life. In man, too, it is life or any of its energies or faculties, whether lower or higher, whether sensual or spiritual. It is the mind, the seat of thought, the heart, the seat of the affections, of anger,1o of pity," of hope," of sensual love,18 of gladness.14 In fact, there is no sort of vital function, impulse, or manifestation, from the lowest animal longing to the highest and purest mental or spiritual operation which is not performed by the Homeric Supós. It can often be rendered by the English spirit, and is only inferior to ʊx in comprehensiveness. Its departure is death: ἀπὸ δ ̓ ἔπτατο θυμός, describes the death of a horse and of a bird, just as vμòv ȧπоπνεív does that of a hero. Death is Svμopaïorns, life-destroyer. Nóos in Homer, as elsewhere, is "the thinking and reflecting faculty," and is so defined by Dr. Voelcker. Mévos is force, energy. It is the projectile force of a spear; the elemental force of fire; 16 the material force of rivers and of winds; 17 the animal force of a horse; 18 and the combined physical and moral force of a hero,19 which is

1 II. 3. 294.

6 11. 12. 150.

15

2 II. 13. 704.

8

4 Od. 10. 163.

3 II. 16. 469.
6 Η ζωτικὴ ψυχική δύναμις. Damm.

* Θυμὸς ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοι ἂν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα. Crat. 419.

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exhibited in its highest form when his sagacity, valor, and strength are exalted by a special inspiration (euvevσis) from God. This word figures largely in the ȧpioreiat of the several Homeric heroes.

Dr. Voelcker thus proceeds to kill off these remaining faculties of the Homeric soul. "It is worthy of remark that they" (vuós, vóos, and μévos) "are never said to go into Hades." The assertion is, in itself, a sufficient proof of the inaccuracy of Dr. Voelcker. Homer distinctly expresses the idea of death by the passing of the Juuós into Hades :

Θυμὸν ἀπὸ μελέων δύναι δόμον Αϊδος εἴσω,1

ψυχή.

3

and predicates both vuós2 and μévos of those who are in Hades. These, however, are rare instances. We do not remember any other. For their rare occurrence, there is an obvious and sufficient reason. The departed man-man spoken of as surviving death and existing in another state, is not denominated by any one of his vital functions, however important, but by that which expresses his whole incorporeal personality, yux. As little would the nature of language, or the apprehensions we form of the condition of the departed, permit us now to say of a dead man, that his mind, will, or understanding had taken its flight to the invisible world. To express this conception, we occasionally use the word spirit, but generally soul; and so does Homer. Once he has used vuós to denote humanity as it passes through and survives the change of death; in all other cases, as nearly as we remember, yuxý.

In the mere act of departing, it is used in common with Juuós, μévos, alwv, etc. But as gone and disembodied, that θυμός, αἴων, which survives of humanity is (with this one exception) on. ly called yux. Achilles thus discourses of its final and irrevocable departure :4

̓Ανδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν, οὔτε ληϊστή,

Οὔθ ̓ ἑλετὴ, ἐπεὶ ἄρ κεν ἀμείψεται ἕρκος οδόντων.

1 II. 7. 131.

2 Od. 11. 39. and 561.

3 Od. 11. 561.

4 II. 9. 408 seq.

And Antikleia (having herself passed through it) thus describes the process and consequence of dying:1

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· αὕτη δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε κέν τε θάνωσιν·
Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσιν,
Αλλὰ τὰ μέν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αιθομένοιο
Δαμνᾷ, ἐπεί κε πρῶτα λίπῃ λευκ ̓ ὀστέα θυμός·
Ψυχὴ δ' ηΰτ ̓ ὄνειρος, ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται.

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The whole question, then, of the Homeric soul and postmortal state turns upon this point: What is the yuxń which passes from the lips" with the last breath, "flies away," and "leaves the flesh and white bones," no longer animated by the " nervous energy" and "motive force to be decomposed or "demolished by the powerful force of glowing fire," and when it has once gone, can never be brought back by force, nor return of choice? What are the nature and attributes of this yuxý? Is it, as Nägelsbach assures us, something "bewustlos," "wesenlos," possessing "kein Geist, kein Gefühl, kein Denke, kein Wille" - sans everything, in fact, but a sort of shadowy visibility and immaterial animality," with respect to physical existence unapprehensible and ungraspable, and with respect to spiritual state doomed to unconsciousness?" - or, as Dr. Voelcker describes it, "neither soul nor spirit," "destitute of mental faculties," "destitute of everything corporeal;" - was the Homeric xý thus a "being" without any of the attributes of being, or was it the soul of man, the whole life of humanity, except "this muddy vesture of decay," which it puts off in death?

That it survives, the full as we could desire.

concessions of these writers are as "It outlasts the fire of the funeral Nägelsbach. "It continues to exist after death," says Voelcker; "it will continue to live and last." "There is a prolongation of life,—on that point there is no doubt."

pile," says Nägelsbach.

1 Od. 11. 217 seq.

2

— ἵνα μὲν τὴν ἐκ τῶν νεύρων ἰσχὺν . . . κίκον δε τὴν τοῦ κίειν ὁ ἐστι πορευέσθαι dúvauv, Eust. on Od. 11. 212, 13.

3 Nicht Fassbares nicht Greifbares mehr. pp 341, 2.

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