rejected because he was too patriotick to use the indirect mode of advancing his principles by uniting with European monarchs, and involving his country in a war with France? A pamphlet written by Mr. Hamilton, suggested by this squeamishness in Mr. Adams, (as it was considered,) is said, by its effects in SouthCarolina, to have prevented Mr. Adams's re-election to the pre sidency. In point of patriotism, this step suggests a comparison between Mr. Adams and Mr. Hamilton; in point of political wisdom, between Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Jefferson. Mr. Adams would not involve his country in a war, as a mode of advancing his political opinions; and Mr. Jefferson never committed the indiscretion of defeating his great end of fixing republican prin-` eiples in the publick mind, by provoking divisions upon points of minor importance. Mr. Hamilton undermined his own party, from a thorough-going zeal for his monarchical dogmas, which disregarded the means for advancing them. Was it this distinction between the modes of attaining the same end, which awakened a congeniality with Mr. Hamilton, and an aversion to Mr. Adams? To whichever of these causes, the exclusion of one, and the adoption of the other, as an authority, are attributed, the true principles by which One of the People is actuated, are displayed.

A deep conviction of inferiority to each of the eminent men quoted, excludes the idea of a competition with either for publick confidence, and only admits a hope that the humiliating acknow ledgment may not weaken the principles in which those great characters concurred. If their concurrence in asserting state sovereignty and independence, will not outweigh a discrepance between Mr. Madison and Mr.. Hamilton, it will surely suffice to restore liberty to reason; and the authority of Mr. Jefferson thrown into the scale, ought at least to produce a counterpoise in this mode of argument. It would be well if another false weight could be as easily balanced. By not having thoroughly discharged the meconium with which we were born, it generated an English fever, which was nearly fatal in the revolutionary struggle. It produced a plot at its termination. It preyed in wardly on some political vitals, after the plot was suppressed. It disclosed its malignity to republican principles in the conven

tion. And now, weary of our refrigerating federal system, it breaks out in the guise of a national government, invested with a supreme concentrated authority. The patients afflicted with this disease have all along rejected the prescriptions of Mr. Jefferson.

The next example adduced to prove that the rights of the states are subordinate to a national supremacy, is that of the Hartford convention.

P. 12. "Who that feels any interest in the glory of his "country, does not wish the story of the Hartford convention "blotted forever from her annals? Who that regards her per"manent happiness, would not deprecate the recurrence of such "another infamous association, as the greatest calamity that could " befal her? And do we not see, almost passing before us, in "this tranquil period of peace, an example of state insubordina"tion, less glaring, but more alarming, than that to which I have just alluded?" It was impossible to select a happier example for displaying the principles of One of the People, than this of the Hartford convention; a body of men having "no in"herent original political rights," as he asserts to be the case with the state governments. Yet it was not strong enough to furnish a comparison quite satisfactory. That was only an infamous association; but state insubordination is even more alarming, and therefore deserves a harsher epithet. Let us supposc that the Hartford convention had resolved "that state rulers are "discordant, clamorous, and lawless; that the states had no ori"ginal rights; that the state governments had no political rights, 'except the right of obedience; that their attempts to control "officers of the general government are unbecoming and arro"gant; that they were worse than infamous; that they would "be aggravated if made in time of peace, and more alarming "than such attempts made by the Hartford convention in time "of war; that ambition is only desirous of performing admira"ble actions; that Congress are under no restrictions in drawing "men and money from the people, except those imposed by the "laws of nature; that ambition will not descend to petty lar"cenies for subverting liberty; that power has no allurements; "that the supremacy of Great-Britain did not usurp the domes"tick regulation of her colonies; that despotick monarchs do

"not send the rays of power into some provinces, which there"fore manage their internal concerns in their own way; and "that subordination to the federal government, instead of rights, "was reserved by the constitution to the state governments." Would this convention, in asserting that such were the true principles of the constitution, have acted with no presumption, and drawn upon themselves no odium? Had they thus anticipated One of the People, it might have furnished him either with a precedent or an admonition. As it is, a parallel between the Hartford convention and his consolidating doctrines, seems to be infinitely more proper, than one between this convention and the state governments. Its apparent intention was to destroy a fede ral government by centrifugal means; his, to destroy it by centripetal means; and it would require great casuistical skill to as sign more censure to the design of the convention, than to his. Either project would have a tendency to enthrone the author's king "anarchy to wave his horrid sceptre over the broken altars "of this happy union." The states are the altars of our federal union; break them down, and there is no union. A national government would swallow up both federal and state rights, and the whole would more probably disgorge a civil war, than either. If the success of the suspected design of the Hartford convention to impair or destroy federal powers, would have overturned the constitution, the avowed design to impair or destroy state pow ers by consolidating constructions, if successful, will also overturn it. The Hartford convention might be used as a good tem porary warming-pan, but it is too late, after it is cold, to frighten the state governments out of their rights by beating a larum upon it, and by the noise to make them settle in the hive of consolidation.

The constitution does not say that the state governments are subordinate to the federal government; and Mr. Madison and Mr. Hamilton repeatedly deny that they are so. It does not say that these governments cannot preserve the reserved rights of the people, intrusted to their care, without committing an atrocity against a supremacy so mysterious that we know not where to find it, and more alarming and reprehensible, than the design ascribed to the Hartford convention. Most, if not all the

state governments have asserted a controlling power, by attempts to check the federal government, without suspecting themselves to have been guilty of an infamous degree of arrogance. If the distinguishing feature in the constitution, preferring intelligence, weight, dignity, and an orderly resistance, to popular commotions, is lost, it will possess no superiority over the British system of government. Like that, it may be easily corrupted by a coalescence between the sympathies of ambition and avarice, collected to one centre. Some governments theoretically acknowledge the sovereignty of the people, but hang such of them as question the despotism of the government; so the consoli dating school theoretically acknowledges the state rights of the people, but calls their vindication, by the only departments able to preserve them, an infamous and alarming crime. A short parody of the language applied to the states through the medium of the Hartford convention, may both qualify the censure, and illustrate the utility of state influence. Who that feels any interest in the liberty and glory of his country, does not wish the sedition law blotted from her annals? and who that regards her permanent happiness, would not deprecate the recurrence of such another act of legislation, (I reject the word infamous,) as a great calamity? Would it be more absurd to infer, from the passage of this law, that federal powers ought to be abolished, than to infer from the story of the Hartford convention, that state powers ought to be abolished?

Attempts to bring a government into contempt, by writing or speaking, have been punishable by all sovereignties. Such laws exist in England, and were rigorously executed during the administration of the last Pitt. Our federal sedition law punished Lyon for circulating, and Callender for writing, with that intention. A man in New-Jersey was punished for speaking irreve rently of the president; and had this law then existed, the members of the Hartford convention might have been arraigned under it. If the sovereignty of South-Carolina has a law for punishing attempts by writing to render its government contemptible, the assertions" that it is ignorant, arrogant, more infamous, and as "lawless, as the Hartford convention," can hardly avoid its lash.

I object to the invective mode of reasoning, though not pu nishable judicially, as neither calculated to disclose truth, nor to ascertain principles. It is only a repetition of the old fraud of conjuring up spectres and manufacturing miracles, to conceal imposture. The consolidating school reduces its arguments to a single syllogism: "The union is our first political blessing; "the preservation of state rights will destroy the union; there "fore, state rights ought to be destroyed." If this is reasoning, any addition to it is superfluous; if it is a burlesque upon the understanding of the people, it is something worse than declamatory. By reforming the syllogism, though nothing is proved, the ques tion is left where it was. The federal republicans say, "The "union is our first political blessing; it can only be preserved "by preserving state rights; therefore, these rights ought to be "preserved." If one side substitutes assertion for reasoning, and seizes upon the settled affection of the people for the union, to create a relish for invective; and the other proposes for their consideration the essential principle of dividing and balancing powers, as adopted by the constitution, for preserving both the union and the liberties of the people; which discloses most love for the union, or merits most distrust as to its design?

P. 16. "Suppose a state legislature should pass a law, for"bidding the execution of a corfstitutional law of Congress. In "all governments there should be a supreme power." Suppositions, like syllogisms, may prove nothing, when they may be reversed with as much force as they are urged. Suppose Congress should pass a law prohibiting the execution of a constitu tional state law, or forbidding the execution of a constitutional judgment, state or federal. Or, suppose the federal court should forbid the execution of a constitutional law passed by Congress. All these suppositions only prove, that every division and balance of power must be subject to collisions, and this is no reason why they should be destroyed, or that they are unnecessary for sus taining a free form of government. If such collisions are good reasons for justifying a concentrated power, then the principle which asserts that its division alone can preserve civil liberty, false. This supposition places the question on its true ground, namely, which is the best principle for the preservation of the

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