states, by telling them, that the proposed government was federal, and that the constitution divided by a line the delegated sederal rights, from the sovereign state rights reserved? The indignity of such a suspicion, and the absurdity of supposing that member who had contended for a federal government, every had renounced his opinion and subscribed to a falsehood, are the foundations upon which the doctrine, "that the government is "national," must rest.

The journal and Yates's notes unequivocally discover, that the difference between a federal and national government, was thoroughly understood in the convention, and that the members unanimously admitted, that the two forms were incompatible. The national form was honestly allowed by its advocates, as nearly annihilating the idea of states, and as not intended for a federal government. It was admitted that a national government, consisting of a supreme executive, judicial, and legislative power, would operate the exclusion of a federal government. That the resolutions for the national plan were adopted, upon a supposition that a federal government was impracticable. That a general and national government would annihilate the state distinctions and operations; and that such a government once established, would maintain itself. To prevail with the convention to propose a national government, the several doctrines "that the states were never sovereign and "independent; that they were only corporations; that they "were like counties; that the rights of sovereignty were always "vested in Congress; that the rich ought to have aristocratical 66 powers; and that a government by compact, is no govern"ment at all," were urged. These admissions and doctrines candidly stated the question, then secretly debated, and now openly, but with less candour, renewed. If a national and a federal government were then incompatible, as the whole convention believed, they must be so still. If the former would then annihilate the latter, it will yet do so. If a national government

be the case.

was then very remote from the idea of the people, such may still And if the people were not prepared to surrender their principles then, an attempt to overturn them now, by construction, may produce the convulsion then apprehended.

There was no substantial difference between the Virginia plan and Mr. Hamilton's. One proposed that states should continue to exist as corporations or counties, but as subjects of a government invested with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial powers; the other, that the state governinents should be directly and not indirectly abolished. One gave them rights upon paper, subject to supreme negatives, without any means of defending those rights; the other more candidly denied to them any rights at all. The two plans resemble two plans for defending a country; one, by a mercenary army combined with a militia, but refusing to intrust the militia with arms, lest they should use them against the army; the other, by a mercenary army alone. The Virginia plan opposed paper to power; Mr. Hamilton's tore the frail sanction to pieces, to save power the trouble of disorganizing conflicts, or of quelling abortive oppositions whilst doing the same thing gradually. Those who approved of but could not carry Mr. Hamilton's plan, saw in the Virginia plan a kindred alterna tive; and dericing its federal preachment, adopted its circuitous and strifeful mode of effecting their object, because they could effect it in no other. Although neither the Virginia plan nor Mr. Hamilton's succeeded in the convention, they embraced a mass of talents, too proud and powerful for humility and submis sion; and they resorted to the engine of construction, to be directed by many an Archimedes. But at this point the two par ties began to split. Encroachments upon the paper rights of the states soon appeared, and then Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Madison divided. One acted and the other preached, cach in accordance with his own principles as displayed in the convention. The gentlemen who first contended for a federal supremacy over state rights, but yet sincerely wished that this supremacy should preserve these rights, bethought themselves of lodging it exclusively in the supreme federal court, insisted that this court should use it impartially, and that Congress should have no share of it. Their later associates laugh at these paper chains, as only the scru ples of good souls; and Congress soon believed, that which is unquestionably true, that its right to supremacy was as good, and indeed better, than that of the judiciary. In virtue of this su premacy, contended for by Mr. Hamilton, in the Federalist,

Congress construed the constitution in one way, and Mr. Madison's didactick federalism, construed it in another; as in the cases of the bank law, the sedition law, and the decision of the supremo court, that the supremacy of Congress has a right to remove every obstruction in its way. And a union between federal legislative and judicial supremacy, has composed an imperative high mightiness, subject to no check, and equivalent to the monarchical and national projects, advocated in the convention.

The origin of the coalition between the monarchists and consolidators in the convention, is visible in the journal. It arose from the question of representation. The deputies from the most populous states naturally contended for an absolute preponderance of numbers; those from the small states, for the moral equality of sovereignties. The gentlemen in favour of monarchy or consolidation, united with great address, to use this contest, as the means for effecting their object; and acted with more skill and foresight, than the didactick federalists. They aimed at a possibility; the didactick federalists entertained the hopeless idea of reconciling contradictions. A monarchy or a consolidated government might be established; but a union of states in conjunction with either, was an impossibility. If we believe that a substantial distinction between different forms of government exists, we must conclude that a national government, and a union of states, cannot subsist together, however the appearance of such a fellowship may for a time be kept up, by the courtesy or policy of the supreme associate; just as Augustus retained republican words to confirm imperial power. The verbal federalists however advocated this hopeless experiment, and the advo cates of a monarchical or national government, profiting by the example of the Roman triumvir, gladly joined them, as knowing that the experiment would accelerate one of these ends. Hap pily the experiment was defeated by the establishment of a federal form of government; but we are again told by the gentlemen who prefer monarchy or a national government, that a national and federal government may be made to subsist together, by giving to Congress and its court an absolute supremacy over the state governments, and securing the states by federal words, just As the Roman republick was secured by republican words.

If we should even admit, with Mr. Madison, that the govern ment is semi-federal, and semi-national, the question arises, by what means can it be kept so? These aro ascertained by the means necessary to maintain a government semi-republican and semi-monarchical. Each moioty must counterpoise and check the other. If one principle possesses a supremacy over the othe principle, and can remove out of its way all the obstacles which the balancing principlo may place in it, the consequences are ind vitable; because power can only be checked by power. There fore an equal capacity in each moiety to maintain a governmen half federal and half national, is as indispensable, us in the cas of a government half republican and half monarchical. If the state governments individually, or a bare majority of the states were supreme, or had a negative over the acts of the federal go vernment, that moiety would soon perish; and in like manner if the federal government should acquire the same powers ove the state governments, they must perish; just as a limited mo narchy would perish if one of its principles obtains a supremacy over the other.

SECTION VIII.

THE FEDERALIST..

I have arrived at the most difficult portion of the contempora neous construction of the constitution, urged for the purpose of obtaining its ratification; difficult, as ingenious ambiguities and contradictions are to be detected. A conscious inferiority to its accomplished authors in a capacity for investigation, except that which arises from equal integrity, renders the task truly alarming. These gentlemen believed that a supreme national government was best for the United States, and I believe that a genuine federal system is more likely to secure their liberty, prosperity, and happiness. Two of them had avowed their preference in the convention, and although they were defeated, yet the opinions by which their efforts had been excited, could not have been obliteratod. How unfortunate it was, that these two chief authors of the Federalist were not divided between a federal and national system of government! Had this been the case, the question would have been discussed by the most eminent talents; and the publick might have been assisted by all the arguments on both sides, couched in the most elegant style.

The turbulence of a free government is perpetually contrasted with the repose of tyranny, by those who plead for power, and dread the untractableness of checks devised for its control. Men are apt to see very clearly, whatever they wish or fear; and often surrender the soundest principles to their imaginary apparitions. Tinctures of such impressions are discerniblo in the Federalist, in suggestions of the disorderly and discordant proceedings of the state governments, and in captivating pictures of the safety and splendour to be expected from a supreme national government. Its authors had a difficult task to perform, and they performed it with an ability, which must excite our admiration, though it may fail to reconcile contradictions. They laboured to gratify both their own propossessions and those of the states;