the other, and mortgages it back to secure payment of a certain sum as purchase money, the mortgagor can not resist a foreclosure on the ground that he had a perfect title before accepting such conveyance, and therefore the mortgage was without consideration, unless he can show that such settlement was procured by fraud in the mortgagee, or through some serious mistake of fact on his own part: Kercheval v. Doty et al., 31 Wisconsin, 476.

CONFEDERATE MONEY.

1. The payment of the debts of the decedent, which were created before the war, by an administrator, out of his own funds collected from debts due him prior to the war, in Greenbrier County, in the years 1862 and 1863, at the instance and request of the widow and heirs, and with a view to save the real estate from being sold during the war (the personalty being exhausted), in Confederate Treasury notes, is a valid payment or advancement, for which the administrator is entitled to be reimbursed out of the real estate descended: Surber's heirs v. Kent, Paine & Co., 5 West Va., 96. 2. C., as executor, received payment in Confederate Treasury notes, in Greenbrier County, in satisfaction of a bond for the amount of legacy ordered to be loaned, and so loaned by him, before the rebellion, without any coercion on the part of the debtor. He invested the same in Confederate bonds at the instance of counsel. He seeks to be relieved upon the ground that he acted under advice, and as a prudent man would have done, etc.:

Held, he is not entitled to relief, because it nowhere appears that he was compelled to receive the fund by the coercion of the debtor. The investment in Confederate bonds was, per se, wholly illegal; and no court ought to excuse or exonerate a trustee or fiduciary, from loss or liability resulting from their acts, which were in themselves not only illegal, but in contravention of public policy: Copeland, Ex., v. McCue et al., Ib., 264.

3. A case re-asserting the doctrine decided in Beard v. Livesay, 4 W. Va., 637, that a note executed after the war, in lieu of, or in renewal of, one executed in Greenbrier County in 1861, the consideration of which latter was Confederate Treasury notes, is valid and binding on the promissor: McLaughlin, adm'r, v. Beard & McNeal, Ib., 538. CONSOLIDATION (OF SUITS).

The rule for the consolidation of suits is alike in equity or at law, and the matter is always addressed to the discretion of the court. The proper mode for bringing the subject to the attention of the court is by motion for a rule to show cause why the suits or actions should not be consolidated: Beach v. Woodyard, 5 West Va., 231.

CONSTITUTION.

Where the terms of a written constitution are clear and unambiguous, and have a well understood meaning and application, effect must be given to the intent of its framers as indicated by the language employed. The operation and effect of the instrument will not be extended by construction beyond the fair scope of the terms employed, merely because the more restricted and literal interpretation might be inconvenient or impolitic, or because a case may be supposed to be to some extent within the reasons which led to the introduction of some particular provision, plain and precise in its terms: Settle v. Vun Ecrea, 49 New York, 280.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. The issuing of executions by the Comptroller-General, to collect the public revenues due to the State, is the act of the Executive department of the government; and the Courts have no power to prescribe the kind or sufficiency of the evi

dence which shall be necessary to authorize the process of execution to issue against defaulting officers or agents, or to restrain that department in pursuing this course: Scofield et al. v. Perkerson et al.; Hinton et al. v. Rame, 46 Georgia, 350.

2. Statutes which allow the benefits resulting to a land owner from the construction of highways across his land to be offset against the value of the land taken to make such improvements, and the injury done to his adjoining lands, and provide that if the benefits exceed the damages, the balance shall be assessed upon his land -are valid as an exercise of the taxing power: Hatton v. Milwaukee, 31 Wisconsin, 37.

3. The legislature can not legally and constitutionally exercise the right of taxation in such manner and to such extent as to compel or coerce the citizen to aid in the establishment of purely private enterprises or objects, nor for the payment of municipal bonds issued in aid of such private enterprises; and statutes enacted for such purposes are unconstitutional and void: In the United States Circuit Court for the District of Kansas: National Bank v. City of Iola, 9 Kan., 689.

4. Taxation is a mode of raising revenue for public purposes. When it is prostituted to objects in no way connected with the public interests, it ceases to be taxation, and becomes plunder: Ib.

CONTESTED ELECTIONS.

The right to contest an election is not a vested right. Given by one legislature, it may be taken away by another: Gilleland v. Schuyler, 9 Kan., 569.

CONTRACTS.

1. When the language of a contract is such as to impose a personal liability, and there is nothing therein indicative of a different intent, the addition to the signature of the contracting party of the words "special committee" does not affect his lia bility; nor does the fact that he was, at the time, to the knowledge of the other party to the contract a "special committee" appointed by a bank, with authority to execute the contract on its behalf, and that he intended simply to contract as such committee; inasmuch as he does not carry out his authority or intent, but executes an agreement not binding upon or giving any rights of action against the bank, his mistake, as to the legal effect of the instrument, can not deprive the other of his remedy, without fault or fraud upon his part: Orchard v. Binninger, 51 New

York, 652.

2. A contract made between the Mayor and Council on one side, and City Treasurer on the other, that the Treasurer may use the funds of the city and pay a per centage therefor, is illegal and void, and does not authorize the Treasurer to use the funds: Manly v. City of Atchison, 9 Kan., 358.

3. A loan by a wife to her husband of money she had at the time of her marriage or has since acquired as the earning of her personal labor and services, creates a valid indebtedness against her husband. A subsequent payment of such loan by the husband works no fraud upon creditors, and creates no trust in their favor: Monroe v. May, Ib., 466.

4. In this State, a married woman may contract and be contracted with, concerning her separate real or personal property; sell, convey and incumber the same, and sue and be sued with reference thereto, in the same manner, to the same extent, with like effect, and as freely as any other person may in regard to his real or personal property: Knaggs v. Mastin, 9 Kan., 532.

5. On November 13, 1869, A. contracted with the plaintiff, bridge company, to furnish materials and build two granite piers of Hallowell granite, according to

certain specifications, for fourteen dollars per cubic yard, five hundred dollars to be paid down, and five hundred dollars monthly, until the piers shall be completed and accepted, when the balance is to be paid, and all to be completed before the following spring freshets. Thereupon A. procured the blocks of granite, hauled them upon the land leased by him near the contemplated location of the bridge, and commenced dressing and fashioning them. The plaintiff duly paid the first four installments, and before the next one became due, and before any of the granite was placed in the piers, it was attached by A.'s creditor. In replevin by the bridge company:

Held, that the plaintiffs acquired no title by virtue of the contract and the payments made, or any rights or interest in the granite as against the attaching creditor: Fairfield B. Co. v. Nye, 60 Maine, 372.

6. Also held, that the bridge company could not hold the stone as against the attaching creditor by virtue of an absolute bill of sale thereof from A. to the company, the consideration of which was the four payments made in accordance with the terms of the original contract: 1b.

7. It is a general rule that contracts are void which are repugnant to justice, or founded upon an immoral consideration, or which are against the general policy of the common law, or contrary to the provisions of any statute (even where such statute does not expressly declare them void); and a party, who is obliged to trace through such a contract his right to a debt alleged to be due him, can not recover: Melchoir v. McCarty, 31 Wisconsin, 252.

8. Where two parties contract, one to do a particular piece of work and the other to pay for it, the latter may, at any time, countermand the completion of it, in which case the former will be entitled only to pay for his part of performance, and compensation for his loss on the remainder of the contract: Collyer & Co. v. Moulton et al., 9 Rhode Island, 90.

9. If the parties ordering such a piece of work are in partnership at the time it was ordered, they remain joint contractors, so far as the party from whom it was ordered is concerned, after a dissolution of the co-partnership. Either of them has a right to countermand the order before completion, whereupon the joint contractor remains liable as before stated: Ib.

10. A simple contract agreement, so long and so far as the contract remains executory and before breach, may be annulled by agreement of all parties; but after it has been broken and a right of action has accrued, it can only be released for a consideration, so far as it is an executory contract, the agreement to annul on one side may be taken as the consideration for the agreement to annul on the other: Ib.

11. Hence, where M. and B., co-partners, ordered a certain piece of work of C., an agreement made between C. and M., after the dissolution of this co-partnership between M. and B., that M. should be released from his liability for the work already performed, would be void for want of consideration, where no promise was made on the part of the other partner B. to assume the liability. But such promise, if made by B., would have made a valuable consideration for the release, one debt having been substituted for the other: Ib.

12. A bill filed by an agent to obtain compensation for running cotton, during the war, from the Confederate to the Federal lines, and there making sale of it, can not be maintained: Rhodes v. Summerhill, 4 Heiskell, 204.

13. Knowledge on the part of a lender that money was borrowed for an illegal purpose, does not affect his right to recover, unless it was his object and purpose that it should be so used: Bond v. Perkins, lb., 364.

14. A contract for a horse, showing on its face that it was intended for service in

the Confederate States cavalry, is not void for illegality, if the contract was made within the Confederate lines: Gardner v. Barger, Ib., 668.

15. Defendant contracted to sell and deliver plaintiff, at Brooklyn, within three months, 400,000 brick at $10.50 per thousand. Defendants delivered 213,500 during the specific time. In an action to recover damages for the non-delivery of the residue:

Held (Peckham, J., dissentin g), that the delivery of the entire quantity was a condition precedent of the right of defendants to demand payment, and the fact that, when they discontinued the delivery, plain tiff had not paid for those delivered, was not an excuse for the non-delivery of the residue; also, that it was not necessary, as a condition precedent to a right of action, for plaintiff to make a formal demand of the brick, and tender payment therefor at the place of delivery; that it was enough if he was ready and willing to receive and pay on delivery; nor was it necessary that plaintiff should have had, during the whole time specified, a sum of money on hand sufficient to pay the whole purchase price; it was sufficient if he had the means and resources at command which would have enabled him to pay if the brick had been delivered: Mount v. Lyon, 49 New York, 552.

CONVERSION.

1. Where the holder of warehouse receipts for grain delivered them to the warehouseman in pursuance of a contract to sell him the grain for cash, such delivery of the receipts vested in the warehouseman the title to the grain, subject to a right in the vendor to reclaim the property on refusal of payment: Fenelon v. Hogoboom, 31 Wisconsin, 172,

2. The receipts were taken from the warehouseman's possession by an officer under an attachment against the goods of a third person; and in an action against the warehouseman for a conversion of the wheat, he offered in evidence the record in the attachment suit:

Held, that it was immaterial, unless accompanied by proof that the attachment defendant owned the wheat: Ib.

3. The abuse of a lawful possession may constitute a conversion: Neal v. Hanson, 60 Maine, 84.

CONVEYANCE.

1. If one having no title to land, conveys the same with warranty to A. by a deed which is duly recorded, and he afterwards acquires a title and conveys to B., the purchaser of B. is estopped from averring that the grantor was not seized at the time of his conveyance to A. the first grantee. The after acquired title will feed the estoppel created by the conveyance to A., and conclude the grantor and all persons claiming under him. And this, although the deed to A. was a deed poll, notwithstanding the obiter dictum in Gordon v. Greene, 5 R. I., 104: McCusker v. Mc Evey, 9

Rhode Island, 528.

2. The right of the purchaser of A. to insist on the estoppel is not impaired by admitting, in an action for the possession of land, that A.'s grantor had no title when he conveyed to him: Ib.

3. The holder of a majority of the stock in a corporation known as "The Proprietors of Central Bridge,” held their stock in trust for the city of Providence. At a meeting of the corporation, they voted to deed their corporate property to the city of Providence, in consideration of the payment by said city of their debts, (not exceeding $4,000,) and refused to accept an offer of $5,000 made by a third party: Held, that the purchase was equitably that of a trustee to himself, and conseuently the deed was void: Wilson v. Proprietors of Central Bridge et al., Ib., 590.

4. A conveyance by one tenant in common of his interest in distinct parcels of a common estate, is valid as between the parties to it, although it will not bind his co-tenants to whose interests it is prejudicial: Crocker v. Tiffany, Ib., 505.

5. The acknowledgment of a deed of trust taken by the grantee therein as Notary Public, is void: Dail v. Moore, 51 Mo., 589.

6. A deed can not be read in evidence without some proof of its execution: Ib. 7. The removal of a son to certain land, on the faith of a promise by his father to give him the land, the father being at that time in good circumstances; and the fact that afterwards, the son parted with said land for the purpose of effecting the exchange, is a valuable consideration to support a conveyance by the father to the son of other lands; even though at the time of the latter conveyance, the father had become insolvent: Rumbold v. Parr, Ib., 592.

8. In a suit on a covenant of warranty where plaintiff held by a title adverse to defendant, he will not be compelled to show an eviction in order to recover. If he prove that the title purchased was a good one and superior to his own, and that it was purchased at a fair and reasonable price, that is sufficient. The measure of damages in such a case is the amount paid for the outstanding title, if it does not exceed the price originally paid for the land: Hall v. Bray, Ib.

CORPORATIONS.

1. A stockholder in an insurance company, the charter of which provided, at the time he purchased his stock, “that the stockholders should not be liable to any responsibility further than the amount of their respective shares and interest thereon, for or on account of any damage or loss sustained by said company for or on account of any debt due thereon," can not object to an assessment made upon him under and in conformity to the provisions of chapter 635 of the Statutes, which provides that "whenever the capital stock of any insurance company shall be diminished by reason of losses, or from any other cause, the stockholders of said company, at any legal meeting thereof called for the purpose, may (after making due allowance from the assets of the company of such amount as may be required to re-insure its outstanding risks) assess such further sum as may be necessary to fill up the capital stock to its original amount, upon the several stockholders in proportion to the amount of stock owned by each, and the stock of every stockholder shall be pledged and liable for such assessment," although said named act was passed subsequently to his purchase of stock;-when the General Assembly have expressly reserved to themselves the power in the charter to alter, amend, or repeal it at pleasure: Gardner v. Hope Insurance Company, 9 Rhode Island, 194.

2. When a holder of stock in a corporation really holds it in trust for another, but such trust does not appear on the books, and is not disclosed by the trustee, votes of the trustee on such stock, at a corporation meeting, are valid, at least where it does not appear that such votes were not in accordance with the wishes of his cestui, or that the cestui was not content that the stock should stand in the name of the person voting, without any trust be disclosed (compare Hopkins v. Buffum, 513): Wilson v. Proprietors of Central Bridge et al., Ib., 590.

3. It does not require a unanimous vote to surrender the franchise of a corporation. One member can not by his objections prevent such a surrender, if it is the wish of the majority: Ib.

4. When stock is transferred partly in payment of a precedent debt and partly for a consideration paid at the time, the purchaser will not be regarded as a holder for value as against one having the legal title or a prior equity, so far as the assignment was received in payment of the precedent debt (Grover, J., dissenting), but is