and before a sale, he receives an execution against all the members of the firm for a co-partnership debt, the latter is the prior lien, and if upon sale the stock proves insufficient to satisfy it, he is justified in returning the former execution nulla bona: Eighth National Bank v. Fitch, Ib., 539.

5. S. M. & P. advertised themselves as co-partners under the firm name of J. E. S. & Co. S. in fact owned the entire interest in the property nominally of the firm, and in the profits of the business. S. failed and went into bankruptcy. In a contest between attaching creditors of the firm and the assignees in bankruptcy:

Held, that while, as matter of law, M. and P. having none of the rights of partners, could transmit none to creditors, and the property being the individual property of S., passed to his assignees; yet, that inasmuch as the creditors of the firm, who dealt with it in ignorance of the real state of facts, had a right to rely, and were presumed to have relied, not only upon the personal responsibility of the nominal partners, but upon the equitable lien upon the property resulting from that relationship, both R. and his assignees were estopped from denying that M. & P. were actual co-partners; that the firm creditors were entitled to all the rights which they would have had if such had been the fact, and therefore to a preference in the payment of their debts out of the assets nominally of the firm: Kelly v Scutt, Ib., 595.

6. The indorsement by a partner in the name of the firm, of paper not belonging to the firm, which is in effect lending or giving the credit of the firm, carries with it the presumption that the partner making it was not authorized so to do: Thomp son v. Woodyard, 5 West Virginia, 216.

7. A third party taking from a partner the signature of his firm upon his own private, individual transaction, can not hold the firm without proof of authority, adoption or ratification of the act. And the taker of a note under such circumstances must prove the assent of the other partners, for prima facie such a transaction is a fraud both on the part of the debtor and creditor: Ib.

8. A special partner, who makes such representations to any parties as to his interest in his firm, his responsibility and his share of the profits, as to lead them to suppose he is personally liable as a general partner, and to induce them thereby to sell goods to the firm, will be held liable as a general partner for all purchases so made of said parties after the date of those representations: Barrows v. Downs & Co.; Meriden Britannia Co. v. Same, 9 Rhode Island, 446.

PAWN OR PLEDGE.

A sale of goods, with delivery of possession, and without reservation of the title to the seller, with an understanding that athird person, (who is to receive a part of the purchase money) should have joint possession with the vendee until paid, but without any title conveyed to him, or control reserved to him, can not have effect against creditors as a pledge or lien, to secure such portion of the purchase money: Smith v. Atkinson, 4 Heiskell, 625.

PLEADING.

1. Where pleadings in short are put in as "replication and issue," they will be treated as covering any defense made by the evidence: Barbee v. Williams, 4 Heiskell, 522.

2. Under a general demurrer no advantage can be taken of purely formal defects in pleadings: Neal v. Hanson, 60 Me., 84.

3. Thus, in trover for a promissory note signed by the plaintiff and made payable by its terms to the defendant, the objection that the declaration does not allege

that the plaintiff was possessed of the note as of his own proper goods and chattels, or that it does not allege the value of the note, being purely formal can not be taken advantage of by general demurrer: Ib.

4. When the replication of a plea of performance of the conditions of a bond for the performance of covenants and agreements, set forth the precise amount of money received by the principal and unaccounted for, and is adjudged good on special demurrer, the sum named is a fact admitted by the demurrer, and judgment must go for that amount: State v. Peck, Ib., 498.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

1. The Supreme Court will not give an opinion for the guidance of parties, or of an inferior tribunal, in a case not properly before them, over which they have no jurisdiction, although it is desired by all parties to the cause: Weeden v. Town Couneil of Richmond, 9 R. I., 128.

2. The court will presume, after verdict rendered, that every thing was found by the jury which was necessary to support the verdict, even if not alleged in the pleadings of the party in whose favor the verdict has been found: Irons and wife v. Field and wife, Ib., 216.

3. The waiver of a jury trial in a special court case, and submission of the case under the statute, in law and fact, to the Judge holding the Court, deprives the party aggrieved by his decision of the right to review the same in matters of fact before the Supreme Court; and where the party aggrieved contends that the Judge erred in determining the legal effect of certain facts given in evidence, all the facts adduced in evidence before him must be laid before the Supreme Court, by agreed statement of facts or otherwise, before they can review his decision: Mitchell v. Wilson et al., Ib., 343.

4. A party failing to except on demurrer overruled and answering over, can not afterwards raise the points involved in the demurrer, before the Supreme Court: Highley v. Noell, 51 Mo., 145.

PLEDGE.

Plaintiff was the owner of fifty shares of New York Central stock she delivered the certificate therefor, assigned in blank, to P., to be used by him as security in stock transactions. P. transferred the certificate to defendant as security to cover any balance upon his dealings in stock with and through them, notifying them that the plaintiff was the owner. One S. acted as broker for P. in the purchase and sale of stocks, having written authority to act on P.'s behalf in any stock transactions with defendant. Subsequently, by direction of S., defendant sold the stock in question.

In an action for the conversion thereof:

Held, (Grover, J., dissenting,) that the power to S. did not include any authority to sell this stock or to interfere with the contract between the principals. That defendant having notice, P. could confer no power of sale upon them, save as pledges, in the manner and upon the notice required by law, and having sold without such notice they were liable: Porter v. Parks, 49 N. Y., 564.

PRACTICE.

A person claiming title paramount to that of the husband, may become a party to a proceeding for dower on his petition: Hill v. Bowers, 4 Heiskell 272.

PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT.

1. Where an issue of fact is by consent submitted to a Circuit Judge without a

jury, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the cause will not be remanded, if reversed, but that Court will pronounce the judgment the Circuit Court ought to have entered: Boothe v. Allen, 4 Heiskell, 258.

2. If a cause be set down as unlitigated in the Supreme Court, and it appears clearly to be a case for reversal, it will be reversed, instead of being remanded to the trial docket: Cummings v. Wallace, Ib., 102.

PRESUMPTION.

Where there is a long series of uniform decisions, asserting the same principle and reaching the same conclusion upon like facts, the fact that a point involved therein has not been in all cases raised by counsel or started by the court, is strong support to the conclusion that the point has no foundation: Webb v. R. W. & O. R. R, 49

N. Y., 420.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

1. The contract of a surety is the measure and limit of his liability. Upon the death of one of the makers of a joint promissory note, who was not liable for the debt, irrespective of the joint obligation, but who signed the note simply as surety, his estate is absolutely discharged both in law and equity, and the survivors only are liable: Getty v. Binsse, 49 N. Y., 285.

2. Defendant's vessel being ashore at the Delaware breakwater, he telegraphed to M. & D., in New York, as follows "Send me a small tow-boat.

Make the best bargain you can:"

Held, (Allen, J., Grover and Folger, JJ., concurring,) that the authority contemplated the hiring of a boat already manned and equipped, and in the absence of proof of a necessity for such action, or of proof of the existence of a custom or usage to that effect, the agents were not authorized to assume on behalf of defendant the perils of the service or the risks of the voyage, or to insure against the negli gence of any one employed in the navigation or handling of the boat: Martin v. Farnsworth, Ib., 555.

3. Where property is sold to the special agent of an undisclosed principal, on the 'credit of the agent, the principal, in a suit against him by the seller to recover the price, may show payment in full to the agent as a defense: Thomas v. Atkinson, 38 Ind., 248.

4. Notice to an agent of a corporation relating to any matter of which he has the management and control, is notice to the corporation: The P., Ft. W. & C. R. R. Co., v. Ruby, 1b., 294.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

1. A notice to an indorser merely informing him of the non-payment of the note and demanding payment of him, without stating in substance that payment has been demanded of the maker, or giving any legal excuse for not demanding it of him, is insufficient to charge the indorser: Page v. Gilbert, 60 Me., 485.

2. A statement in the official certificate of the notary that he delivered notice of the non-payment of said note to the indorser, naming him, demanding payment of him, is insufficient to charge the indorser: 1b.

Gardner v.

3. A note payable in nine months, or as A.'s horse earns the money, is absolutely payable in nine months, but sooner if the money was earned sooner: Barger, 4 Heiskell, 668.

PUBLIC LANDS OF UNITED STATES.

There can be no adverse possession of lands belonging to the government;

and

where plaintiff in ejectment claims under a grant from the United States the occupation of the land by defendant, under claim of exclusive right, for any number of years before the government parted with either the legal or equitable title, is no bar to a recovery: Whitney et al. v. Gunderson, 31 Wis., 359.

QUO WARRANTO.

A pledgor of stock, which stands on the books of a corporation in the name of the pledgee, may, by suit in equity, compel a transfer to him, or oblige the pledgee to give him a proxy to vote; but where the pledgor acquiesces for years in the control of the stock by the record owner, the pledgee, and makes no attempt to inform the corporation of his ownership until a contested election occurs, and then not until the votes are being or have been counted, it is too late to ask the interference of a court of equity with the declared result of such election: Hoppin et al. v. Buffum et al.,

9 R. I., 513.

RAILROAD CORPORATIONS.

The wife of plaintiff was a passenger upon defendant's road from New York to Mt. Vernon. Immediately upon the arrival of the train the baggage-master placed her trunk in the depot and went away. She waited fifteen minutes to get the trunk, but could find no one to deliver it. About three hours after, plaintiff's son went to the depot for it, but the baggage-master was still absent. The son went in pursuit of him, and returning with him, delivered his check and the trunk was drawn out to the door, but, meanwhile, the conveyance employed to remove the trunk had gone, and no other could be obtained, and it was thereupon left in charge of the baggage-master for the night. During the night it was broken open and rifled of its contents. In an action to recover for the loss:

Held (Allen and Folger, JJ., dissenting), that defendant's liability as common carrier had not terminated and that it was liable: Dinniny v. N. Y., and N. H. R. R., 49 N. Y., 546.

RAILROADS.

1. Railway Companies as Common Carriers of Goods. Per CURIAM: Ordinarily, when goods are shipped to be transported by several successive and connecting lines, they are to be considered in transit until they reach their final destination, and the peculiar liability of a common carrier exists continuously, although, for the convenience of the successive carriers, the goods may be temporarily deposited in depots or warehouses on the route, and the carrier in whose possession they are when destroyed or injured, is liable, as such, to the owner or consignee for the loss. Wood v. M. & St. P. R. Co., 27 Wis., 54, as to the above points overruled: Consey v. M. &. St. P. R. W. Co., 31 Wis., 619.

2. Per DIXON, C. J., arguendo: If goods are lost while waiting at the end of one carrier's line for delivery to the next carrier, such first carrier, after responding in damages to the owner or consignee, must seek his remedy against the next carrier if the loss occurred through his neglect to remove the goods within due time according to the course of business and the usage among carriers: 1b.

3. In case of an extraordinary interruption of communication along the line of transit as by storm, flood, earthquake or war), necessitating a considerable delay in transportation, the carrier in whose hands the goods are, may store them, and at once give notice to the consignee, and thus absolve himself from liability as carrier, while such interruption continues: Ib.

4. In proceedings for the condemnation of land for railroad purposes, the recep

tion by the owner of the land, of the money allowed by the commissioners on the condemnation, is not a waiver of a trespass committed by the unauthorized entry and occupancy by the agents of the road before the condemnation of the land had been perfected: Powers v. Hurmert, 51 Mo., 136.

RAILROAD STOCK.

1. The defendant, with numerous others, signed a subscription of the following tenor: We, the undersigned, agree and bind ourselves to take the amount of shares set against our respective names, in the stock of the Belfast and Moosehead Lake Railway Company, agreeably to the foregoing conditions:

Held, that the simple agreement to take imposed no personal obligation to pay for the shares: Belfast & M. L. R. R. Co. v. Moore, 60 Maine, 561.

2. Also held, that the conditions, which contained no words of promise, did not change the force of such agreement in this particular: Ib.

3. And the construction of such an agreement is not affected by a provision in the charter purporting to render the subscriber liable for the balance remaining due after a sale of his shares: Ib.

RECEIVER.

A purchase by a receiver, as agent of another, of property sold at his own sale, made under order of court, is voidable at the election of a party having a beneficial interest in the property, and when such election is promptly made, the sale will be set aside: Curr, ex'r, et al. v. Houser, adm'r, 46 Georgia, 477.

RECOGNIZANCE.

A justice of the peace must have an office, where parties, witnesses, and sureties must appear; and on changing his office, notice should be given to persons who have been required to appear at his former office; and where this was not done, a forfeiture declared for failure of the parties to appear at his new location, they hav ing appeared at his former office at the proper time, was held void: Hannum et al. v. The Stute, 38 Indiana, 32.

RECOUPMENT.

A promissory note, and an agreement which is the consideration for the note, are not such independent contracts that the breach of the one can not be set up by way of recoupment to the other: Hill v. Routhwick, 9 Rhode Island, 299.

REDEMPTION.

If the maker of a deed of trust becomes bankrupt before the sale under the deed, the right of redemption passes to the assignee and the debtor, and consequently the creditors lose the right. But this does not prevent the purchaser from advancing his bid: Toombs v. Palmer, 4 Heiskell, 321.

RE-HEARING.

Counsel should only ask for a re-hearing in the Supreme Court in cases where they can clearly show some oversight or omission, or bring to the notice of the court some new matter, really important, which was not before considered: Andrews v. Crenshaw, 4 Heiskell, 151.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

1. The right to remove an action from a State Court into the Circuit Court of the United States, under the provisions of the act of Congress of 1863, "relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases" (12 U. S. stat. at