of England which is, par excellence, esteemed the model of a constitutional government, this result has become the rule, and is held up as a maxim of liberty. The monarchical element of the British government is literally only a form-the government being in fact an aristocracy with an infusion of the democratic element. The monarchy is firmly established, is hereditary and permanent, but the occupant of the throne is a cypher. The Prime Minister, who holds his place not at the will of the Sovereign in reality, whatever may be the theory, but at the will of Parliament, is the real "power behind the throne greater than the throne itself." The titular Sovereign is a simulacrum, like the spiritual ruler of Japan. The government is, therefore, an elective monarchy, as much so as the consular government at Rome, or the government of the Directory of France. This result in England is of modern growth, and has been largely brought about by the long imbecility of George III. The effect thus far has been very happy, for while retaining the advantage of the hereditary system, the change has ingrafted thereon the benefits of the elective system. These benefits are the entrusting the executive power to temporary and responsible agents, and the limitation of the tenure of office to the period during which the incumbent retains the confidence of the electors.

Sismondi, in his Etudes sur les Constitutions des Peuples Libres, does not hesitate to give the preference to the elective over the hereditary monarchy. He contrasts the two in the cases of the German Empire and the French Kingdom, and shows, by the actual statistics, that the wars which were originated in each by the form of government-that is to say, growing out of differences of opinion as to the person elected, or the person entitled to office by hereditary right, were more numerous, longer and fiercer under the hereditary than the elective system. He insists, also, that the elective form was eminently successful for several hundred years in the case of the Roman consuls, who were elected only for a single year,—and for a thousand years in the case of the Doges of Venice elected for life. It is the unity of will, not its duration, he says, which constitutes the monarchical element. This unity was ensured in the case of the Roman consuls by making each independent of the other, and supreme for the province assigned to him. He dwells upon the fact, that although clothed with such extensive powers, always at the head of armies, and often elevated by victories, the consuls, for over four hundred years, made no attempt to abuse or perpetuate their authority. "No other government in the world,"

he emphatically adds, "has ever presented so long a guaranty against the temptations to usurpation; where it no longer sufficed to this end, it was because Rome, already corrupt by the conquest of the world, was no longer capable of good government." This is in marked contrast with DeLolme's readings of Roman history, when, in his treatise on the English Constitution, he undertakes to compare the elective with the hereditary system, and always in favor of the latter, for which he was an uncompromising advocate.

The monarchical element is not, therefore, dependent upon the ostensible form of government. It may exist in a Republic,-it may be absent in an Autocracy except in name. The President of the United States has more power than the Queen of England; nay, for that matter, if existing facts are a test of right, he has as much power as the Czar of Russia. The consuls of Rome were as supreme, during their year of office, as either the first or third Napoleon. On the other hand, a rich and powerful nobility does not necessarily constitute an aristocracy. They may be only a privileged caste without possessing any political power. This was eminently true of the ancienne noblesse of France. The Senate of Rome and the Senate of Venice, although elective, were, on the contrary, a real power. It is obvious, therefore, that to ascertain the true nature of a government we must go below the surface, and examine the internal machinery. A combination of the elements may exist under any of the ostensible forms. The object of the statesman should be to regulate those clements, not upon any preconceived ideas of abstract theory or philosophical ratiocination, but in view of the past history, the acquired feelings and prejudices, and the peculiar idiosyncracies of the people over whom he may be called to preside. To transfer the liberal features of the really aristocratic government of England to France, would be at once to produce anarchy-for France has no aristocracy to act as a fly-wheel in the powerful machinery, and no natural gifts or long and gradual training in the body of the people to enable them to perform that function for themselves. To introduce the form of monarchy into America would be the height of folly, for the whole nature of the American would revolt at the external paraphernalia, while it cheerfully submits to the really monarchical element in the unity and power of the Federal Executive. What every nation requires, according to the habitudes and peculiarities of its people, is so much of the monarchical system as implies a prompt, firm, and independent executive; so much of the aristocratic system as ensures the

wisdom, prudence, vigilance, and experience of a permanent legislative class—a senatorial element; and, lastly, so much of the democratic system as will secure an efficient and healthful vitality by the infusion of new blood and fresh vigor into the body politic at proper intervals. A head to give unity of action, a senate to produce regularity of motion, and a popular element to create the motive power-these are the essentials of a good government, call it by whatever name you will.

In the formation of society, the first form of government is obviously the patriarchal. The father, as head of the family, performs the functions of leader, law-maker, and judge—the law-making being usually coincident with the judgment. The clan or tribe is only an enlargement of the family, the chief being at first, no doubt, of the blood of the common ancestor, and owing his position to the direct or tacit choice of the whole tribe. The hereditary quality, so far as it contemplates a fixed and invariable line of descent, is not necessarily attached to the position; on the contrary, such a quality is, in the origin of society, incompatible with the necessities of the infant State. The chief must be capable of command, and of sufficient experience to enable him to decide satisfactorily the differences and disputes of the members of the tribe. It is only after society has become settled, and the people have learned that these functions may be performed by proxy, that the doctrine of the descent of authority by right of birth can grow into being. Obviously, therefore, this principle is not inherent in the monarchical system, but only a modification of that system. In the selection of the chief, whether by direct vote or tacit assent, all the tribe at first have a voice. The democratic element, consequently, lies at the foundation of all government beyond that of the family. The tribe or people join in selecting a chief to rule over them. The democratic element almost always exists, also, at the outset, in another form-and that is in a council of elders or chiefs. The old men of the tribe, by that reverence for age which nature has implanted in us, form a council to aid and assist the chief. After a time, the younger members of the tribe, who may have early distinguished themselves by deeds of daring or by the exhibition of superior capacity, are admitted into the council. In this way the aristocratic element comes into being, the quality of hereditary descent being no more essential to its existence than to that of the kingly office. The democratic element, then, lies at the foundation of the monarchical and aristocratic systems. In addition, although

in the beginning the decision of the chief in each case as it arises is the only law, the next step which follows of laying down a rule-of conduct is almost always first approved by the body of the tribe. The act of the chief, or chief and council, is submitted to the people before being enforced. In the early stages of society, when the only avocation of the men is war, and when all the drudgery is performed by women or slaves, this system naturally prevails, and embodies, as is manifest, all the different elements of existing governments. As the nation enlarges its limits, and increases its population, and as the varied interests of society develop themselves, modifications of the primitive system are gradually introduced. In the first place, the chief ceases to perform in person all the functions of his office, and becomes the source of power rather than the power itself. This change renders the personal qualifications of the incumbent of the throne less important, and the principle of right by birth becomes possible. In the second place, the assent of the people in the selection of the chief and council becomes more difficult with every new addition of territory and population, and less important as the active co-operation of these functionaries in the performance of executive duties diminishes. It is apt to cease altogether when the doctrine of hereditary right has grown into consistency. For ordinary purposes the authority of the chief and council is deemed sufficient for an act or an ordinance, and it is only on extraordinary occasions that the people are consulted. From this the step is easy to the entire absorption of authority by the governing class. When a nation has attained a certain growth, a return to the democratic element becomes impossible, except upon the principle of representation-a principle of modern development. Even the principle of division of power upon which civilization now rests, has been of such slow and uncertain growth that Sismondi can say, as he does, that the separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial functions is rather a fact than a principle. At first they were all centered in the chief, then in the chief and people, then in the chief, council and people, then in the chief and council, and finally in particular persons or bodies designated for the specific execution of distinct functions.

The people act at first directly and, doubtless, by majorities, but, as population increases, the franchise has not been, in point of fact, equally and proportionally extended. The actual progress seems to have been made not by individuals but by masses. If another tribe or people were incorporated in the nation, it was taken as a

unit. The vote, therefore, to use a modern word, upon national questions would be by families and tribes, not by individuals. Wise legislators, such as the early kings of Rome, took advantage of this existing fact, and so arranged the tribes, centuries, or voting bodies, as to give greatest weight to that part of the community in which was found the most intelligence. After the tribal status ceased to exist, the same result has been attained, whenever the popular element has been allowed a voice, by incorporations. The free cities, trades, and guilds of the middle ages are noted instances. Universal suffrage, in the modern acceptation, has never prevailed, until within the present century, except in very small communities—and those slave communities, that is to say, where there was a servile class who performed all the drudgery of life, and who were themselves excluded from the exercise of the privilege. The principle is, therefore, one which remains yet to be fully tested by experience. It owes its existence to the philosophic teachings of the last century in relation to the rights of man and the universal brotherhood of the human family. These ideas, combined with the rapid development of free thought which marks that era, led to a belief in. the continuous progress and ultimate perfectibility of man, and this sentiment was so strong that the element of time was lost sight of. Like the apostles of our Saviour, whose conception of their Master's second coming was so vivid that the event was daily looked for, the apostles of freedom dreamed that all men would be rendered capable of self-government by the very existence of so great a boon. This is no impugnment of the truth of their philosophy, any more than the mistake of the Apostles of Christ can be considered as a denial of their high mission. The inspiration of the latter extended only to the fact of the second coming; not to its date which, as their great Head Himself said, was known only unto the Father. That they should have leaped to the conclusion that the great event would happen speedily, evidences their genuine enthusiasm. So, the closet politicians of the last century were equally misled by their zeal, want of experience, and the natural inclination of the human mind to carry out a theory at once to its practical results. Time and experience are required in all cases to temper the logic of theory by "the inexorable logic of facts," and to convince us that the material world does not act with the rapidity of thought. The young and enthusiastic are ever prone to lose sight of this fact, and the discoverers of, and converts to new theories are always in the