be lost.

This is liberal; it speaks volumes to the credit of Mr. Calhoun and justifies the remark of the eccentric John Randolph, who was sitting near that great statesman, while speaking in defense of his resolutions in the Senate on the 26th of February, 1833: "Take away that hat; I want to see Webster die, muscle by muscle." Indeed, this concession is about all the States' Rights School contended for; the result was conceived to follow logically in their favor. "But," says the writer, "now arises the true point of contest between the two opposing theories, which is this: What sort of compact was that Constitution, and what was the result of its adoption?" He says Mr. Calhoun stickles for the term constitutional compact, and he endeavors to show that it is a social compact, the result of which was to blend the parties into a composite State. He asks, "Might not a compact blend States previously separate into one? Might not the nations of Europe, if desired by all of them, consolidate themselves into one nationality, by adopting, each for itself, an instrument providing for this result? Yet this transaction would derive all its force from the principles of a compact. Every party would be free to adopt or reject. Writers on government refer its obligation ultimately to a social compact between previously independent individuals. But do they not all

concede that when the compact has been executed, the parties become blended into a community, their independence and right of private judgment being surrendered up to the society formed by the compact; and that the powers conferred upon the government thus constituted can only be withdrawn by a revolution? Now the only actual cases of social compact," he continues, "have been where the parties were States. Political societies have been formed by the aggregation of previously independent communities, whilst there is no precedent of a community formed by the association of previously independent individuals. Any arrangement by which the contracting parties, whether individuals or States, form them-. selves into a body politic under a common government is a social compact. And the result of the adoption of a social compact is to blend into one entity, to the extent comprehended by the scope of the compact, the parties thereto. The assertion that the States after taking the plunge of ratification, did not blend, is pure assumption."

This is specious reasoning and deserves close scrutiny; upon it his premises are founded, and upon the truth or falsity of them, it is conceived, the whole question theoretically depends.

It is certainly true that a compact may blend States previously separate into one, and that the nations of Europe, by adopting a compact, may consolidate themselves into one nationality, and that such transactions would derive all their force from the principles of compacts; but such compacts must have no other terms than those which blend the sovereign parties, for any others would, of course, become nugatory at the will of the consolidated government, their independence and right of private judgment being surrendered up to the society, formed by the compact, its will would be the law of all. It will also be admitted that the only actual cases of social compacts have been when the parties were States, and that the result of the adoption of a social compact is to blend into one entity (or entirety) the parties thereto, whether individuals or States. If a blending is provided for, the extent comprehended by the compact, though, is a meaningless expression; for, according to the quotation just made, and ex vi termini, the blending into an entity makes its will the law for the whole government, restrictions as to the extent to the contrary notwithstanding. An entity is an entire thing; a blending can not be partial. The composite government, if there is a blending, is sovereign, and though it usurps powers expressly reserved by the component parts, it can not be rescinded except by revolution. It makes but little difference, therefore, whether according to Jefferson, Madison and Calhoun, the Constitution be called a constitutional compact, or, as the writer denominates it, a social compact. It is but a stickling for terms; for this is the logical result of a blending by compact, social or constitutional.

It must be confessed that such a view of our Constitution would have startled even the national fathers themselves, and if sound, would have more than satisfied Mr. Hamilton's desire for a strong government. It would also have been eagerly grasped by both Webster and Story. Our Constitution would verily be a paper one, so far as limitation and restrictions are concerned. The writer says, the assertion that the States, after taking the plunge of ratification, did not blend, is pure assumption; but it is submitted that unless he has shown, or does show from the compact itself, that the States are thereby blended into an entity, his assumption that they did blend is, especially in view of the result, at least equally as pure. He certainly does not mean that the mere entering into a compact has the effect of blending nations; for any executed treaty, such as one in regard to boundaries, etc., is a compact, but he must be understood to mean the entering into a compact, the

VOL. III.-NO. I.-4

terms of which blends the parties and surrenders the previously existing sovereignties to the entity. Still he does assume, without mentioning a single clause to justify it, that by the adoption of the Constitution, the States became parties to a social compact, the result of which was to blend them into a composite state. He, however, subsequently reasons from the clause in the Constitution providing for amendments, and as his argument is quite ingenious, and constitutes his premises, indulgence is asked for quoting it in full.

"They (the States,) became thenceforth (after the adoption of the Constitution), one as to foreign relations, as to commerce, as to the operation of the national laws. The coin, the flag, the army, the navy, became national. But the essence of the transformation consisted, in the last analysis, in this, that the SoVEREIGNTY was transferred from its former seat to a new one. The word 'Sovereignty,' is less understood than any other in the political vocabulary. Not one man in a hundred who uses it has any definite notion even of what he himself means by it. And the highest authorities unguardedly misuse it. Thus we often hear from courts and text writers, that sovereignty in this country is divided between the States and the United States. Sovereignty can not, in the very nature of things, be divided. It signifies the ultimate, absolute, illimitable power that exists somewhere in every independent society. In Great Britain it resides in Parliament. When Louis XIV. exclaimed "L'etat c'est moi!" he asserted that the sovereignty of France was concentrated in him. In Russia, I presume, sovereignty now abides in the Czar. Before the adoption of the Constitution, The State then knew no supesovereignty resided in each State. rior. Its will was limited only by its physical power. But the States are not now sovereign in any sense. They are now restrained by the Constitution of the United States, etc. Congress is not sovereign, for it has only powers affirmatively granted-expressly or impliedly. But the power which can amend the Constitution of the United States is illimitable. Here then we arrive at the sovereignty in our system. Here resides the WHOLE potentiality of the system, which may re-partition the powers of the States and the composite State;-may re-distribute the functions now divided between the local governments and the general government; may contract or dilate the sphere of either, ad libitum; may reduce the central agency to a shadow, or erect it into an empire. The only possible security in the nature of things against the exercise in any given

manner of this power, lies in the genius of our people. The State governments and the General Government are the mere creatures of this Omnipotence, mere tenants at will. Now the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, was a surrender of the sovereignty by the States individually to the States united. This alone need be looked to, to show that the United States is not a confederacy, but a composite State. It is an axiom of political science that where the sovereignty abides, there the allegiance is due. Also, that unless there is allegiance, there can be no treason, in the strict sense of the term, which involves a breach of allegiance.

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"Now the Constitution recognizes that treason may be committed against the United States. I know that the State laws provide for a crime which they denominate treason, but it is not properly treason, though justly punishable by them. I know, also, it is common to hear of a paramount allegiance due to the United States, and a subordinate allegiance due to the State. But there is no allegiance, in the strict sense, due to the State. Allegiance is due to the composite whole, in which the sovereignty resides, of which the States are members. * * * * * It results, then, that the Southern movement, right or wrong, was a rebellion, and those concerned in it are seen, through merely legal spectacles, to have been guilty of treason."

This lengthy quotation has been made so that there can be no mistaking the position assumed, or the applicability of the reply. The definition of sovereignty above given, is, of course, accepted and approved. It has frequently been "unguardedly misused," for want of a better term to express the powers of the United States Government and those of the States, but it is not understood that there has been any difficulty in defining it; the dictionaries do this very well.

Is it not strange that so much stress should be laid upon the amending clause, when the Constitution itself, under the supposition. of its ratification, blending the States into an entity, can be abrogated or set at naught by a single act of the composite government? For surely a consolidated composite State can change its form of Government in any manner that those having the power see proper, and an unsuccessful resistance by any of its integral parts would subject the inhabitants thereof to the penalties of treason, however just their cause. But, says the writer, it is admitted that the President, the Judiciary, and the Congress, (in other words, the actual government of the United States), are not sovereign, for they have

only powers affirmatively granted, the real sovereignty against which only treason can be committed, is the power which can amend the Constitution. Now, if this be true, does it not falsify the assumption that the States became blended by the ratification? What was the use of nominating any amending power when it was already possessed in as ample a manner as the nature of any composite government will allow? If there had been no amending clause, the Constitution could then have been amended only by all the States giving their assent as States, just as the Constitution itself was formed, and if any State refused, the new Constitution would have been binding only "between the States so ratifying the same." One refractory State could have defeated the Constitution, severed its connection, or it would have become a subjugated province, but, in any event, its people would not be punishable as traitors. These results are certainly not consistent with the definitive idea of a composite blended State. If every State had to be consulted, and its assent obtained before the most immaterial change could be made, what is the Government but a league or confederacy? Would not the essential of a composite Government be wanting?

Is it to be understood then that the amending clause works such a change in the nature of the compact? Certainly this is ascribing to it a very novel capacity, and one, it is thought, entirely foreign to the object which the clause was really intended to accomplish.

It will be admitted that three-fourths of the States may blend themselves and the rest into an entity, and surrender to it their sovereignty, by an amendment providing for such a result. But it does not follow that such is their present condition. If several sovereign nations enter into a strict league and agree to a clause providing for an amendment with the assent of a majority so as to make one composite government of them all, (if such a case is conceivable), would such a clause prevent any one of the nations from determining the casus feoderis, and repudiating the league for what it deemed an infraction? Eleven of the States of this Union attempted to sever their connection with it, and if the States were not already blended, there was not left enough to amend the Constitution so as to include these eleven. How could they be affected by the amending

power? Where would the sovereignty be then?

It is thought that the mistake of the writer is, in assuming, for his premises, what the United States may become by an unlimited amendment or abrogation of the Constitution, instead of taking it as it existed at the beginning of the late war.