not being revived, the bill was dismissed accordingly. In an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for not deducing a good title, and for fraudulently representing that he had, and would deduce a good title, the arbitrator, to whom the facts were referred, having negatived fraud:

Held by the court below (Kelly, C.B., Martin, B., and Cleasby, B.; Bramwell, B., dissenting), that the defendant was entitled to rescind. Error being brought:

Held by the Court of Exchequer Chamber (Blackburn, Keating, Brett, Archibald, and Honyman, JJ., Grove, J., dissenting), that the defendant had, by filing his bill, elected not to rescind on any of the original objections, but that the third condition applied to all objections to the title, whether appearing on the abstract or not; that the defendant was, therefore, entitled to rescind on account of the objection as to lot 4 raised by the answer, and founded on the transactions, which were omitted from the abstract; and that the delay from the filing of the answer on the 23rd of September, 1868, to the 12th of February, 1869, was not unreasonable. Quaere whether, if an action had been brought against the defendant for breach of his contract to deliver a true abstract, the plaintiff could, under the circumstances, have recovered substantial damages: Gray v. Fowler, vol. viii, Ex. (Ex. Ch.), 249. CUSTOM OF TRADE.

Written Contract-Evidence of Trade Usage-Charter-party-Principal and Agent. The defendants, acting as agents for one L., chartered a ship for the conveyance of a cargo of currants from the Ionian Islands. The charter-party was expressed to be made and was signed by the defendants, as "agents to merchants," the name of the principal not being disclosed:

Held, on the authority of Humphey v. Dale, (E. B. & E., 1004; 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 390) and Fleet v. Murton (Law Rep. 7 Q. B. 126), that evidence was admissible in an action by the ship-owners against the defendants upon the charter-party, of a trade usage, by which, if the name of the principal is not disclosed within a reasonable time, the agents themselves are personally liable: Hutchinson v. Tatham, C. P., vol. viii, 482.

CY-PRES.

Certain charitable trusts declared a century or two ago, in favor of poor prisoners in the city of London, having lapsed by reason of the abolition of the law of imprisonment for debt, and the closing of debtors' prisons, the Attorney General by a scheme proposed that all the funds should be treated as one charity, and applied to the building, establishment, and maintenance of a school for children of persons convicted of crime, and undergoing sentence:

Held, upon the construction of the bequests, that by "poor prisoners" were meant prisoners for debt, especially the poorest and most sickly of such prisoners, and in all cases adults; and that there was no intention to relieve children, or to assist education:

Held, consequently, that the proposal did not approach sufficiently near to the charitable intentions of the donors to admit of the funds being applied cy-pres in the manner proposed:

Held, further, that the proposed scheme would be unnecessary, as contemplating an object already partially or wholly, and better, provided for by the Industrial Schools Act; inconsistent with charitable intention, as tending to the relief of the public rates and taxes; and inexpedient, as resulting in the assemblage together in ore establishment of children suffering under a common misfortune, and thus perpetuating the memory of that misfortune: In re Prison Charities, V.-C. B., (Eq. Cases,) vol. xvi., 129.

DIRECTOR.

A director of a joint stock company is in a fiduciary position towards the company, and if he makes any profit on account of transactions of business when he is acting for the company, he must account for them to the company.

So, if, acting for himself, he proposes to the company a contract from the execution of which he will derive a profit, that profit belongs to the company.

Where the articles of a joint stock association declared that if a director had any interest in a contract proposed for acceptance by the association, he should declare his interest, or his place as director should be vacated, and that having declared it he should not vote on the proposal:

Held, first, that "declare his interest" meant declare the nature of his interest, and that the words were not satisfied by a mere declaration that he had an interest in the matter:

And, secondly, that the vacating of the seat would not prevent the contract itself from being treated as one made for the benefit of the association, for that the rule of equity would apply to such a case in addition to the penalty specially mentioned by the article of association.

In a joint stock association created for the purpose of carrying into effect loans and other financial operations, C. (who carried on business as a stockbroker), was a director. An article of the association required that if a director "contracts with the company, or is concerned in, or participates in the profits of any contract with the company, or participates in the profits of any work done for the company, without declaring his interest at the meeting of directors at which such contract is determined on, or work ordered," his office of director should be vacated. The article further required that he should not vote on such contract or work. C. had entered into an arrangement with P. to "place" the debentures of a railway company for a commission of 5 per cent. C., at a meeting of the directors, without mentioning his arrangement with P., but merely declaring that he had an interest in the transaction, proposed to the association that it should undertake to "place" these debentures at a commission of 11⁄2 per cent. The proposal was adopted, and debentures to a very large amount, were "placed" by the association:

Held, that C. was liable to account to the association for the difference between the two amounts of commission, so far as concerned the debentures which had been actually placed by the association.

C. had a partner, K., who was not in any way connected with the association; the transaction, however, had been a partnership transaction:

Held, that the partners were liable, jointly and severally, to make good to the association the profits of which it ought to have received in the increased amount of the commission: Imperial Mercantile Credit Company v. Coleman & Knight, (House of Lords, Eng. and I. Appeals), vol. vi, 189.

ELECTION.

After a lady, who had married during her minority, had come of age, a settlement was executed in the year 1850 to which her father was a party, by which, after reciting that on the treaty for the marriage it had been agreed that certain sums of stock belong to the husband, and a reversionary interest belonging to the wife, should be settled upon the trusts thereinafter mentioned, and that the wife's father had agreed to transfer certain bank shares to the trustees, to be held upon the trusts thereinafter mentioned; and reciting the transfer of the sums of stock and the bank shares to the trustees, trusts were declared as to the sums of stock for the husband for life, and then for the wife for her life; and as to the bank shares,

during the joint lives of the husband and wife, to pay half the income to the husband and the other half to the wife for her separate use; and after the decease of either to pay the whole income to the survivor for life, and, subject to the above life interests, the sums of stock and bank shares were to be upon the trusts therein mentioned for the children of the marriage. By another witnessing part the husband and wife purported to assign the wife's reversion to the trustees, to be held, when it came into possession, on the same trusts as the bank shares. In 1865 the marriage was dissolved by a decree of the Divorce Court. In 1871 the wife's reversion fell into possession, and she filed a bill to establish that she was not put to her election under the settlement, and to have the fund transferred to her:

Held (reversing the decision of the Master of the Rolls), that the wife was put to her election between the interests provided for her by the settlement and her right to receive this fund free from the settlement:

Held, further, that in the event of her electing to take against the settlement, she was bound to account for all income received under it since the date of the order nisi for dissolution, and that the parties disappointed by her election had a lien on the fund for what she had so received; but that she was not liable to account for income received during the coverture:

Campbell v. Ingilby, (1) considered. (21 Beav., 567; 1 De. G. & J., 393), Codington v. Lindsley, L. C. & L. JJ., (Ch. Ap.,) vol. viii, 578.

EQUITY.

Where, in the making of an agreement between two parties, there has been a mutual mistake as to their rights, occasioning an injury to one of them, the rule of equity is in favor of interposing to grant relief.

The Court of Equity will not, if such a ground for relief is clearly established, decline to grant relief merely because, on account of the circumstances which have intervened since the agreement was made, it may be difficult to restore the parties exactly to their original condition.

What is the nature of a mistake and what has been the cause of it will be considered in determining whether relief ought to be granted. The rule ignorantia juris neminem excusat applies where the alleged ignorance is that of a well-known rule of law, but not where it is that of a matter of law arising upon the doubtful construction of a grant. In the latter case, it is not decisively a ground for refusing relief.

Acquiescence in what has been done will not be a bar to relief where the party alleged to have acquiesced has acted, or abstained from acting, through being ignorant that he possessed rights which would be available against that which he permitted to be enjoyed: Earl Beauchamp v. Winn, (House of Lords, Eng. & I. Appeals,) vol. vi, 223.

EVIDENCE OF NO SETTLEMENT.

The Court will accept as evidence that there was no settlement on the marriage of a woman resident abroad on affidavit by a solicitor, disclosing facts which make it unlikely that there was a settlement, and stating positively that he was told by the lady and her husband that there was none: Woodward v. Pratt, V.-C. M., (Eq.

cases,) vol. xvi, 127.

EVIDENCE.

At the trial of an action under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, brought for the benefit of the mother, widow and children of R., claiming damages from the defendants for having, by their negligence, caused the death of R., it was proved that the deceased

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was under a covenant to pay his mother an annuity of 2001. during their joint lives. A witness was then called for the plaintiff, who stated that he was an "accountant," and that he had personal experience as to the mode in which insurance business was conducted. He gave evidence, after referring to certain tables used by insurance offices called the "Carlisle Tables," as to the average duration of life of two persons of the ages of the mother and son respectively, and as to the price for which an annuity for the mother's life could be bought. The admissibility of this evidence was objected to by the defendants, and was ruled to be admissible. In summing up, the learned judge directed the jury that they might, if they thought proper, calculate the mother's damages by ascertaining what was the sum which would purchase an annuity of 2001. for a person of her age, according to the average duration of human life; and that in calculating the widow's and children's damages, they might, if they thought proper, take as a guide the period of the probable duration of life of a person of the age of the deceased. On the argument of a bill of exceptions tendered to the ruling of the learned judge in admitting the evidence and to his direction to the jury:

Held, first (by Blackburn, Keating, Grove, and Archibald, JJ.), that the witness was competent to give evidence as to the probable duration of life and the price of the annuity, although not an actuary; and (Brett, J., dissenting), that the evidence was relevant and properly admitted. Secondly, by the whole Court, that the direction to the jury as to the calculation of the mother's damages was wrong. By Blackburn, Keating, Grove, Archibald, and Honyman, JJ. The direction was erroneous in noticing the circumstance that the annuity of the mother was on the joint lives of herself and her son, and that it was only secured by the personal covenant of her son.-By Honyman, J. The direction was also erroneous in authorizing the jury to find the term for which an annuity is to be purchased, solely by reference to the average duration of life, without taking into account the state of health of the particular annuitant.-By Brett, J. The only legal direction to the jury would have been that they ought not to attempt to give damages to the full amount of a perfect compensation for the pecuniary injury, but must take a reasonable view of the case, and give what they considered, under all the circumstances, a fair compensation; and the direction was, therefore erroneous, inasmuch as it left it open to the jury to give as damages the utmost amount which they might think was an equivalent for the pecuniary mischief done. Thirdly (by Blackburn, Keating, Grove and Archibald, JJ., Brett, J., dissenting), that the direction as to the mode of calculating the damages, recoverable by the widow and children might be construed as meaning that the probable duration of life of a person of the same age and in the same circumstances as the deceased, was an element to be taken into the calculation of the jury with the rest of the evidence, and being so construed was correct: Rowley v. London and North Western Railway Company, Ex. (Ex. Ch.) vol. viii, 221. EXECUTION CREDITOR.

P. recovered judgment for a sum exceeding £50 from a trader, and on the 8th of August lodged an execution in the hands of the sheriff, who seized six of his horses. On the 11th of August, before any sale had been made by the sheriff, the debtor agreed with P. to sell him the six horses which the sheriff' had seized for the amount of the debt and the sheriff's charges; and P. accordingly withdrew the execution, but he left the horses in the debtor's stables, and signed an agreement to let the debtor have the use of them for a certain payment per day.

On the 15th of August P. removed the horses, and soon afterwards sold them for about the same price as he gave for them. The debtor was, at the time of the sale,

insolvent, and on the 15th of August he filed a petition for liquidation, and trustees were appointed, who claimed the prices of the horses from P.:

Held, (affirming the decision of the Chief Judge), that the sale of the horses to the execution creditor, having been made for the purpose of avoiding a sale by the sheriff, was a fraudulent transfer under the 2nd sub-section of the 6th section of the Bunkruptcy Act, 1869, and was void against the creditors.

But, semble, it would not have been fraudulent if the debtor had been solvent. Held, also, by James, L.J. (dissentiente Mellish, L.J.), that the seizure by the sheriff, followed by the sale by the debtor to the creditor, constituted a seizure and sale within the 5th sub-section of the 6th section, and an act of bankruptcy:

Held, also, by James, L.J. (dubitante Mellish, L.J.), that the sale was a fraudulent preference of the creditor: Ex parte Pearson; in re Mortimor, L. JJ., vol. viii., 667, (Ch. Ap.)

EXECUTOR-Liability of.

One of three executors having employed in proving the will the solicitor who was employed by the testatrix in making it, also employed the same solicitor to negotiate for the compromise of a debt due from the estate. The executor and creditor were both living in London. In June, 1872, the solicitor wrote to the executor, informing him that a compromise had been effected of this particular debt for £260, and of another debt for £50, and asking for a cheque. The executor, on the 4th of July, sent a cheque for £310 to the solicitor, who paid it in to his own account.

The compromise, in fact, had not been effected, and the money was misappropriated; but the executor, having taken no step in the meantime, did not find out the loss until December, 1872:

Held, that the £310 ought to be allowed to the executor: In re Bird; Oriental Commercial Bank v. Savin, V.-C. B., vol. xvi, 203, (Ex. cases.)

FORBEARANCE OF BUYER AT SELLER'S REQUEST.

A manufacturer of iron contracted, in May, 1871, to sell to a company 150 tons of iron at a specified price per ton, delivery to be twenty tons per month. The deliveries were not duly made under the contract. In January, 1872, the vendor filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement. At that time a considerable quantity of iron remained to be delivered, and the market price of iron had risen very much It appeared that in some cases the company had bought iron in the market to supply the deficiency in the monthly deliveries. It did not appear that any actual request had been made by the vendor for the postponement of the deliveries:

Held, that the company could prove in the liquidation only for the differences between the contract price of the iron and the market prices of the days when the respective deficient deliveries were made:

Ogle v. Earl Vane (Law Rep. 2 Q. B., 275), distinguished: Ex parte LlansamleTin Plate Company; in re Voss, C. J. B., vol. xvi, 155, (Eq. cases.)

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN.

Jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a Suit of Damage instituted against a Vessel belonging to the Khedive of Egypt-Sovereign Prince-Maritime Lien-Proceedings in Rem -Waiver of Privilege. In a cause of damage instituted by the owners, master, and crew of the Batavier against the vessel Charkich and her freight, an appearance under protest was entered on behalf of His Highness the Khedive of Egypt and his Minister of Marine. A petition on protest was filed on their behalf, stating that the Charkieh was the property of the Khedive as reigning sovereign of the state of Egypt, and a public vessel of the government and semi-sovereign state of Egypt, and