concluding with a prayer to the Court to declare that the vessel was not liable to arrest. It appeared, from the answer filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, and from evidence which was adduced at the hearing of the petition on protest, that the Charkieh, though carrying the flag of the Ottoman navy, had come with cargo to England and had been entered at the Customs like an ordinary merchant ship, and that, at the time of the collision, which happened in the Thames, she was under charter to a British subject, and was advertised to carry cargo to Alexandria: The Court held that the Khedive was not entitled to the privilege of a sovereign prince, and pronounced against the protest: Semble, that a suit in rem to enforce a damage lien may be entertained without any violation of international law, though the owner of the res be the sovereign of a foreign state, and that such a suit may possibly be entertained even against property connected with the jus corona: Semble, that if a sovereign assumes the character of a trader, and sends a vessel belonging to him to this country to trade here, he must be considered to have waived any privilege which might otherwise attach to the vessel as the property of a sovereign: The Charkich, (Admiralty and Ecclesiastical), vol. iv, 59.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

A trader, being in insolvent circumstances, applied to a creditor, to whom he owed £2500 for goods supplied in the way of his business, to supply him with more goods on credit. The creditor refused to supply any more goods unless the debtor paid £200 on account of the goods previously supplied. The debtor said he could not pay the money, and on being pressed by the creditor, he offered to return goods to the amount of the £200, which he did not want. This the creditor agreed to, and the goods were accordingly returned to him. On the same day the debtor filed a petition for liquidation:

Held (reversing the decision of Bacon, C. J.), that the delivery of the goods to the creditor was not a fraudulent preference.

Ex parte Blackburn (Law Rep. 12 Eq., 358) approved.

Held, also, that the trustee in the liquidation was not entitled to have the goods given up by the creditor, on the ground that the delivery to him was on condition of his supplying fresh goods, which he had never done.

Two of the principal creditors of a debtor had a meeting with him, at which he admitted that unless he could get assistance from his friends, he must become bankrupt:

Held, that one of the creditors might, notwithstanding the meeting, obtain payment from the debtor of a debt previously due: Er parte Topham; in re Walker, L.JJ., vol. viii, 614, (Ch. Ap.)

GIFT TO BE VESTED AT TWENTY-ONE.

Testatrix gave a legacy of £4000, "payable" at the decease of A. to a class of persons, to be equally divided amongst them, share and share alike, the said shares to be "vested" interest on majority or marriage, and the income, in the event of A.'s death in the meantime, to be paid towards the maintenance and education of such persons. There was no gift over. Two of the class survived A., and died

under twenty-one:

Held, that by the word "vested" was meant "vested in possession," and that the shares of the deceased minors passed to their legal personal representatives: Simpson v. Peach, V.-C. B., vol. xvi, 208, (Eq. Cases.)

ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION.

A Court of Equity will not, at the instance of a settlor or his legal personal representative, adversely set aside a settlement by which the settlor confers on a stranger the absolute beneficial interest in property legally vested in trustees, although such settlement may have been made for an illegal consideration not appearing on the face of the instrument.

A widower, two days before going through the ceremony of marriage with his deceased wife's sister (which ceremony was known to both parties to be invalid), executed a deed, by which it was recited, that he was desirous of making a settlement and provision for the lady, and had transferred certain shares into the names of trustees upon the trusts thereinafter declared, being for the separate and inalienable use of the lady during her life, and after her death as she should by deed or will appoint; and they afterwards lived together as man and wife until the widower's death. Ten years after such death, and some time after the lady had married, the legal personal representative of the settlor instituted a suit to set aside the settlement, as being founded on a bad and illegal consideration:

Held, that the suit could not be maintained: Ayerst v. Jenkins, L. C. for M. R., vol. xvi, 275, (Eq. cases.)

ILLEGITIMATE CHILD,

A testator gave a fund to trustees to pay the dividends to his daughter for life, and after her decease, to transfer the principal equally amongst all the children of his said daughter, whether by her present putative husband, or by any other person whom she might marry, who should attain twenty-one, their executors, administrators and assigns. But in case his daughter should die, "leaving" no issue, then to the testator's other children.

Long before the date of the will, the testator's daughter was, with the testator's knowledge, living with a gentleman to whom she was afterwards married, and she had one son by that person, who was born four years before the date of the will, and was known by the testator to be illegitimate, and acknowledged by him as his grandson. The daughter being sixty-seven years of age, and having no other child, and her husband being dead:

Held, that the illegitimate son was entitled absolutely to the capital, and the word "leaving" being construed "having," and he being now over twenty-one, the money was ordered to be paid to the mother and son, who petitioned for payment to them jointly: In re Brown's Trust, V.-C. M., vol. xvi, 239, (Eq. Cases.) INJUNCTION BEFORE BILL FILED.

1. Where, on account of the offices of the Court being closed, the filing of a bill has been delayed, the Court may grant an injunction before bill filed, and direct the bill and affidavit to be filed as on the day when the offices were closed: Carr v. Morice, V.-C. M., vol. xvi, 125, (Eq. Cases.)

2. In an urgent case an interim injunction may be granted before bill filed: Thorneloe v. Skoines, V.-C, M., I., 126.

MARINE INSURANCE.

1. Sea Damage to part of goods insured-Consequent depreciation in value of remainder. A policy of marine insurance was expressed to be "on 1711 packages teas, valued at the sum insured, viz, $31,000," and contained a special warranty in the following terms, viz.: "warranted by the assured free from damage or injury from dampness, change of flavor, or being spotted, discolored, musty or mouldy, except caused by

actual contact of sea-water with the articles damaged occasioned by sea perils. In case of partial loss by sea damage to dry goods, cutlery, or other hardware, the loss shall be ascertained by a separation and sale of the portion only of the contents of the packages so damaged, and not otherwise, and the same practice shall obtain as to all other merchandizes, so far as practicable." The ship met with bad weather and shipped large quantities of sea-water, by contact with which 449 packages of the tea insured were greatly injured. When teas are sold they are usually sold in the order of the consecutive numbers marked on the packages, and if the numbers be broken by some being omitted, or if some of the chests be marked as damaged, a suspicion is created that the other packages may be damaged, and they do not command such high prices as if none of the shipment had been damaged. In consequence of this, the remaining 1262 packages, which had not been in contact with sea-water, sold for less than they would otherwise have fetched.

Held, that the assured could only recover in respect of the damage occasioned to the packages, which had been actually in contact with sea-water, and not in respect of the loss occasioned by injury to the reputation of the remainder; and, semble, that the effect would have been the same even in the absence of the special warranty: Cator v. The Great Wes. Ins. Co. of N. Y., C. P., vol. viii, 552.

2. Loss of Freight-Right of Charterer to throw up Charter-party where Vessel disabled. The plaintiff, on the 9th of November, 1871, effected an insurance "on chartered freight valued at 29007., at and from Liverpool to Newport in tow, whilst there, and thence to San Francisco," etc. The ship left Liverpool on the 2nd of January, 1872, and on the 4th, before arriving at Newport, took the rocks in Carnarvon Bay. She was got off much damaged, and returned to Liverpool on the 12th of April, where she was sold under circumstances which the Court held not to be justifiable; there being no satisfactory evidence of a constructive total loss. She was repaired by the purchaser, and was still under repair at the time of the trial, the 16th of April, 1872. By the charter-party the vessel was to proceed with all convenient speed (dangers and accidents of navigation excepted) from Liverpool to Newport, and there load a cargo of iron rails for San Francisco. After the vessel took the rocks, and before she was got off, viz., on the 15th of February, the charterers threw up the charter, and on the following day, they hired another ship to carry the rails (which were wanted for the construction of a railway) to San Francisco. The plaintiffs sued the underwriters for a loss of the chartered freight. The jury found that the time necessary for getting the ship off and repairing her, was so long as to make it unreasonable for the charterers to supply the agreed cargo at the end of such time, and so long as to put an end in a commercial sense to the commercial speculation entered upon by the ship-owner and the charterers:

Held, by Keating and Brett, JJ., that the charterers were absolved from loading the vessel, and that the ship-owner therefore might recover for the loss of freight:

Held, contra, per Bovill, C. J., that the charterers were not entitled to throw up the charter, and that consequently the plaintiff could not recover against the underwriters, and that the findings of the jury were immaterial: Jackson v. The Union Marine Insurance Company, Limited, C. P., vol. viii, 572.

3. Description of Voyage-Overland Transit-Hostile Detention of Goods in a besieged Town a "Restraint of Princes”—Abandonment-Total Loss. A marine policy may cover the risks during a portion of the transit to be performed overland, provided apt language be employed to express that intention.

"restraint of

The hostile detention of goods, within a besieged city or town, is a princes;" a "siege" and a "blockade" standing upon the same footing in this respect.

In a policy of insurance the course of the voyage was thus described: "At and from Japan, and [or] Shanghai to Marseilles, and [or] Leghorn, and [or] London via Marseilles, and [or] Southampton, and whilst remaining there for transit, with leave to call at any ports or places in or out of the way for all purposes, including all risks of craft to and from the steamers, etc., upon any kind of goods, etc., in the good ship or vessel called the steamers or steamer, per overland, or via Suez Canal," etc. The risks insured against were, amongst others," of the seas, men of war, enemies, surprisals, takings at sea, arrests, restraints and detainments of all kings, princes, and people," etc. In the margin of the policy was the following memorandum: "It is hereby agreed that the silks insured by this policy shall be shipped by Peninsular and Oriental Company, Messageries Imperiales steamers, and [or] the steamers of the Mercantile Trading Company of Liverpool only."

The goods insured (silks) were carried from Shanghai to Hong Kong in a steamer belonging to the Messageries Imperiales, and were there transhipped into another steamer of the same company and carried through the Suez Canal to Marseillesthis being the ordinary course of business of that company in carrying goods from Shanghai to Marseilles. Goods are carried by the Messageries Imperiales at through rates from Shanghai to London; and the freight upon the silks in question was paid to that company for the whole journey.

At the time of effecting the policy, the steamers of the Messageries Imperiales ran from the East to Marseilles, and no further. Goods were never, in the ordinary course of business, carried from China, Japan, or India to London via Marseilles, except by the Messageries Imperiales, and that company always sent such goods overland through France-by the Lyons railway from Marseilles to Paris, and thence by the Northern railway to Boulogne, and thence to London; and this course of business was well known among underwriters. The silks in question, having reached Marseilles, were forwarded by the Lyons railway to Paris, on the 3rd of September, 1870, and arrived at the Paris station on the 13th. At this time the German armies had invaded and occupied a large part of France, and were advancing upon Paris, which they had completely surrounded and besieged by the 19th, preventing all communication between Paris and all other places, so that it was impossible to remove the silks from Paris. This state of things continued until (and long after) the 7th of October, on which last-mentioned day the assured gave notice of abandonment. After the commencement of this action the silks were forwarded to London; and they arrived there in an undamaged state on the 20th of March, 1871. Upon a special case setting forth the above facts, the Court to draw inferences:

Held, first, that the policy covered the whole journey from Shanghai to London, including the overland transit from Marseilles to Boulogne; Secondly, that the detention of the silks in Paris by reason of the state of siege was a "restraint of princes" within the meaning of the policy; and, consequently, that the goods being lost to the assured for an indefinite time, they were entitled to abandon, and to recover against the underwriters as for a total loss: Rodocanachi v. Elliott, C. P., vol. viii, 649.

4. Insurable Interest-Extent of Right of Consignees (under Advances) to Insure and recover in their own Names The plaintiffs, merchants in London, were in the habit of receiving consignments of cotton from correspondents abroad, and amongst others from Bell & Co., of Bombay, making advances thereon by acceptances against the consignments. For the purpose of covering these consignments and their advances, the plaintiffs effected open floating policies with the defendants, an insurance company, expressing that the insurances were made by them "as well in their own names as for and in the name or names of all and every person and persons to

whom the same doth, may, or shall appertain, in part or in all." Each of the policies so effected was for 50001. “on cotton, etc., from Bombay to London," etc., "by ship or ships;" and, as the plaintiffs received advices of the shipments, they declared upon the policies, in the usual way, the particulars and value of the goods and names of the vessels by which they were shipped. On the 29th of April, 1870, Bell & Co. advised the plaintiffs of the shipment of 250 bales of cotton on board the Aurora, and of their having drawn upon them for 3000l., at six months' sight, on account of that shipment, and requesting them to insure the cotton. This bill was negotiated by Bell & Co., through the National Bank of India, with whom the shipping documents were lodged as security. The bill, with the shipping documents annexed, was transmitted by the bank to their manager in London, and on the 21st of May the plaintiffs accepted it "against delivery of shipping documents" for the cotton. With the assent of the National Bank, the 250 bales of cotton per Aurora, valued at 5000l., were, on the 23d of May declared by the plaintiffs (who thereby intended to insure for Bell & Co. and themselves) upon two open policies which they then had running with the defendants; and the plaintiff's wrote to the bank undertaking "to hold the amount insured at their disposal until payment of their acceptance for 3000l., due 24th November." The Aurora left Bombay with the cotton on board, and was lost at sea on the 11th of June. The plaintiffs afterwards paid their acceptance and received the bill of lading for the cotton. In an action upon the policies to recover for the loss of the goods, the declaration averred that the plaintiffs caused themselves to be insured, that they or some or one of them were or was interested in the goods to the amount of all the moneys by them insured thereon, and that the insurances were made for the use and benefit and on account · of the person or persons so interested. The defendants traversed these allegations: Held, by the whole Court, that the plaintiff's were entitled to recover upon these policies to the extent of their advance.

And, held, by Bovill, C. J., and Denman, J. (the Court being by agreement at liberty to draw inferences of fact], that the plaintiff's had an equitable interest in every part of the cotton as security for their liability under their acceptance, and, being also consignees to manage the consignment, they were entitled to insure the whole of it in their own names, and to its full value, and that, having intended by the insurances to cover the interests of all parties in the cotton, they were entitled to recover the whole amount upon a declaration averring interest in themselves; and that they would hold any surplus beyond their advance, as trustees for the other parties beneficially interested; and that their right to insure and recover was not limited to their own beneficial interest in the goods.

Held, contra, by Keating and Brett, JJ., that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover under these policies, in their own names, anything beyond their actual advance, the only interest they had in the cotton being a right by an existing contract to have the bill of lading indorsed to them on payment of their acceptance, so as to enable them to sell the cotton to pay themselves 3000l. and their expenses, and to earn their commission, and to hold the surplus proceeds as agents for the consignors; and they being at the time of the loss neither legal owners of the cotton nor in equity trustees as to the surplus for the consignors: Ebsworth v. Alliance Marine Insurance Company, C. P., vol. viii, 596.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Liability of Master for Negligence of his Servant-Scope of Employment. A stevedore employed to ship iron rails had a foreman, whose duty it was (assisted by laborers) to carry the rails from the quay to the ship after the carman had brought