3. Although one purchasing property after the completion of the roll agrees to pay the tax thereon, this confers no jurisdiction upon the assessors to change the assessment, nor does it operate as a waiver of the legal rights of the purchaser. It is a matter resting in contract between the parties, and is to be enforced in the usual way: Ib.

4. A substantial compliance with the statute in the measures preliminary to the taxations of persons and property, in all matters which are of the substance of the procedure, and designed for the protection of the tax-payers, is a condition precedent to the legality and validity of the tax: Westfall v. Preston, Ib., 349.

5. It is only for an improvement lawfully made, and for work done and expenses incurred, as authorized by law, that an assessment can lawfully be levied, and the property of the citizen taxed: People ex rel. v. Haines, Ib., 587.

6. A departure by assessors from the standard fixed by statute for estimating the value of property placed upon the assessment roll, can not be corrected upon certiorari, nor can their failure to assess the property of a corporation, as required, be so corrected. The Court may reverse the assessment as made, and direct a re-assessment; but after the roll has been delivered to the Board of Supervisors and the power of the assessors over it has ceased, a certiorari should not be allowed, and, if allowed, should be quashed even after return made: People ex rel. v. Delany, Ib., 655.

ASSIGNEE.

An assignee of a bond taken in payment of purchase money of land, although he may have notice of fraud in the sale of the land, can not be placed in a worse condition than his assignor, the vendor, with reference to the payment of such purchase money: Highland et al. v. Highland et al., 5 West Virginia, 63.

ASSIGNMENTS.

A merchant being indebted to certain judgment creditors, and being in failing circumstances, turned over his merchandise to an agent to be sold, and the proceeds to be distributed pro rata among his creditors:

Held, that if the proceedings were in good faith, the goods would not be subject to execution on behalf of one creditor to satisfy his own individual claim: Wettmore v. Hastings, 51 Mo., 171.

ASSUMPSIT.

1. A mechanic can not maintain assumpsit against the guardian of a minor for labor performed upon a ward's building: Rob nson v. Hersey, 60 Maine, 225.

2. When the fraudulent representations of the seller of property, whereby the purchaser was induced to buy, were such as give the latter the right to rescind, and he does rescind the sale and surrender profession to the vendor, the law implies a promise, on the part of the seller, to pay the purchaser for labor and materials in making reasonable repairs upon the property: Farris v. Ware, Ib., 482.

3. Thus the defendant fraudulently represented the water power connected with his tannery, to be sufficient to work it continuously throughout the year, and the plaintiff, having no knowledge of the premises, and relying upon the representations, was thereby induced to purchase the tannery, and thereupon, after taking a bond thereof and giving his notes for the price, the plaintiff entered into possession and under the advice of the defendant, expended large sums in repairs; but the water failing, the plaintiff abandoned the property and notified the defendant that he considered the contract of purchase rescinded, whereupon the defendant took

possession of the premises and had the benefit of the repairs. recover for the labor and materials in making the repairs:

Held, that the action was maintainable: Ib

ATTACHMENT.

In assumpsit to

1. An attachment bill alleging that complainant is surety for defendant; that since he became so, defendant has become dissipated, careless, almost a sot; is greatly in debt, and daily becoming more so, and is utterly insolvent; that complainant has reason to believe and does believe, that defendant will convey and dispose of his groceries and articles in his grocery in order to defraud his creditors; shows no sufficient ground for an attachment: Jackson v. Burke, 4 Heiskell, 610.

2. An allegation is an attachment bill "that defendants, in conveying their property, will endeavor to defeat the collection of complainant's debts; that they have avoided, and, as he believes, they intend, by future and fraudulent conveyances and transfers, to evade, and avoid pavment of the debt," is not ground for issuing the writ: Me Haney v. Cawthorn, Ib., 608.

3. An ancillary attachment issued without affidavit will be quashed on motion of the defendant, after judgment on the merits: Watt v. Carnes, 1b., 532.

4. An affidavit neither signed nor certified is no affidavit: 1b.

5. The affidavit is part of the record not subject to be aided or attacked by parol: Ib.

6. A judgment rendered upon answer of a garnishee not in writing, or not signed by the garnishee, is erroneous, and will be reversed: Pickler v. Rainey, Ib., 335.

7. Where one creditor by bill in equity seeks to set aside a sale of his debtor's property as fraudulent, and attaches the property, and another creditor proceeds by subsequent bill for the same purpose, but in addition attaches the purchase money due on the sale, and prays relief against the purchaser of the sale is found to be fair; on holding the sale fair, the latter creditor will have a prior right to the fund to the first, who only attached the property: Sloane v. Williamson; Hansboro v. Williamson, Ib., 506.

8. The plaintiff as an officer, having on July 13th, attached a debtor's personal property, took from the present defendant an alternative receipt to pay a certain sum or re-deliver the goods attached on demand, whereupon the goods went back into the debtor's possession.

On September 2d, the debtor filed his petition in bankruptcy, and on the succeeding 27th was adjudged a bankrupt, in an action on the receipt in the name of the officer for the benefit of the assignee of the debtor:

Held, that the attachment was dissolved by the taking of the receipt: Mitchell v. Gooch, 60 Maine, 110.

9. The fraudulent assignment of a bond and mortgage by a debtor does not prevent his creditor from acquiring a lien thereon by attachment; and where such lien has been acquired by the service of the attachment, with the proper notice upon the obligor and mortgagor, the attachment creditor, after perfecting judgment and issuing execution, may maintain an equitable action in his own name to enforce the lien, by setting the fraudulent transfer aside: M. and T. Bank v. Dakin, 51 New York, 519.

10. There is an original jurisdiction in a court of equity, independent of the statute in relation to attachments, to take cognizance of actions of this character: Ib.

AWARD.

1. A charge in a bill that one of the arbitrators acted as the "adviser and partisan"

of the party appointing or selecting him, is a sufficient charge of partiality and misconduct, to give a court of equity jurisdiction of a case asking to set aside an award: Wheeling Gas Company v. The City of Wheeling, 5 West Virginia, 448.

2. It is not alone the fact, but the aspect of perfect fairness, which must be preserved, and an arbitrator can not be too careful as to his conduct, holding this end in view. It is not a conscientious intent to be honest, on the part of the arbitrator, nor his conviction that he is so, that can suffice. It is his external actions that will be subjected to scrutiny, and if these do not satisfactorily bear the test the award will fall: Ib.

3. An award should be in its terms reasonably certain, and not leave its own meaning open to further controversy. Hence, an award that the defendants "have the right to keep up and maintain the caplog or permanent rolling way of their said dam to the top of the great rock in their pond above said dam and no higher, and to keep on said caplog flash boards twelve inches wide, at all times except in times of freshet," must be set aside for uncertainty-the word "freshet" so varying in its meaning as to necessitate constant litigation; as, in case of a suit, a jury could only determine whether the state of the water in the particular case before them did or did not constitute a freshet: Harris v. Social Manufacturing Company, 9 Rhode Island, 99.

BAILMENT.

1. Where the bailor instructs the bailee not to deliver his property to any person except upon his written order, a delivery to the wife of the bailor without such order is not equivalent to a delivery to the husband, and does not discharge the bailee from his liability: Kowing v. Manly, 49 New York, 193.

2. Although, where a wife has obtained possession of the husband's property from his bailee by a fraud, the bailee could maintain an action against both husband and wife for the wrong, that is not a defense to and will not bar a recovery by him against the bailee: Ib.

BANK DIRECTORS.

1. Where no qualification is required and there is no usage to control, a person who is elected a bank director is presumed to accept the office unless he declines it. This presumption may be rebutted. Whether simple non-action as a director, for five months, would be ordinarily sufficient to rebut it—query. But where the stockholders of a bank in an instrument authorizing its conversion from a State to a National Bank, named all the directors who had been elected at the last annual election as those "who are now the directors of said bank, the court can not hold that two of those so named were not directors at the time of such conversion, because they had never acted in that capacity since their election five months previously: Lockwood et al., Trustees, v. Mechanics' National Bank et al., 9 Rhode Island, 308.

2. By the provisions of section 44 of the National Currency Act of 1864 (chapter 106, 1st session 38th Congress), upon the conversion of a State to a National Bank, all the directors of the former become those of the latter, until an election or appointment by the National Bank. Semble, that no oath is required from these ad interim directors, the oath prescribed by section 9 of the aforesaid act being designated for those regularly elected by the National Bank, but, assuming its necessity, a majority of those who were the directors of the State Bank before its conversion is necessary to make a quorum of the board of the National Bank: Ib. BANKRUPT ACT.

A judgment in an action of trespass for assault and battery is a debt discharga

ble under the National Bankrupt Act of 1867: Manning and Wife v. Keyes, 9 Rhode Island, 224.

BANKRUPTCY.

1. The Supreme Court will not take cognizance of a plea of discharge in bankruptcy since the appeal from the judgment below: Riggs v. White, 4 Heiskell,

503.

2. A discharge in bankruptcy does not release a mortgage or other lien on property created prior to the commencement of the proceeding, nor prevent the enforcement of the lien: Truitt et al. v. Truitt, 38 Indiana, 16.

BANKS.

1. When a note, payable at bank, is placed in a bank for collection, it is the duty of the bank to see to it that it is properly presented for payment, and on its dishonor, to have it duly protested, and notice given to its indorsers: Georgia National Bank v. Henderson, 46 Georgia, 487.

2. When a bill of exchange payable at

was sent to a bank for collection, and the bank treating it as a bank check, and not entitled to days of grace, presented it for payment, and had it protested, etc., on the day of its maturitywithout days of grace-by means of which the indorser was discharged, and it was in evidence that the bank was notified by the indorser at the time, that he claimed the paper to have days of grace:

Held, that the bank was liable to the person who deposited the paper for collection for damages, for its negligence in not presenting the check, as required by law, and causing notice of its non-payment to be given to the indorser: Ib.

3. A State Bank, not specially authorized by its charter to do so, could not, in 1862, issue any of its bills, intended to be used as money, redeemable otherwise than with gold or silver coin. Where it did issue bills at that date, in the usual form, it is inadmissible in a suit on them by a bona fide holder, who did not receive them from the bank, but purchased them from others, to prove that they were intended by the bank to be payable in Confederate currency, and were so understood by the community in which the bank was located: Manufacturers' Bank of Macon v. Lamar, Ib., 563.

BILLS AND NOTES.

1. Where it was agreed at the time of the execution of a note, that either it or its proceeds should go to a third party, in such case the latter would be the substantial creditor, and if the payee gave no consideration for it, he would be a mere naked trustee, and neither he nor his assigns could set up an interest against the real beneficiary: Callaway v. Johnson, 51 Mo., 33.

2. The signature on the back of a note of one who is neither payee nor indorser, is prima facie that of maker. But this presumption may be repelled by parol evidence. It may be thus shown that in fact he signed only as guarantor: Seymour v. Farrel, Ib., 95.

3. A note made to C. II. Morris, agent, is payable to him personally. The word agent after his name is merely describo persona: Toledo Agricultural Works v. Hewing's Adm., Ib., 128.

4. The maker of a promissory note whose signature is obtained without his consent, will not be held on the note, even in the hands of an innocent holder for value before maturity: Briggs v. Ewart, Ib., 245.

5. A forged insertion of rate of interest in a negotiable promissory note by the payee, will not impair the liability of a subsequent indorser to an innocent holder for value, before maturity, but will discharge the maker: Washington Savings Bank v. Eckey, Ib., 272.

6. When a surety on a promissory note has been compelled under a judgment rendered against him to pay the note, his right of action against the maker of the note is on contract as on an implied promise to re-pay the money and not on the note itself; that is merged in the judgment. And where the note was for an amount within a justice's jurisdiction, but the judgment was for an amount exceeding his jurisdiction in actions founded on contract, the surety's action was without the jurisdiction of the justice: Blake v. Downey, Ib., 437.

7. Where A. sells and transfers to B., the note of C., and guarantees its payment, the transfer is valid, and B. may enforce the note against C., even though the guaranty is void for usury: Armstrong v. Gilson, 31 Wisconsin, 61.

8. The presumption that a note is unpaid, arising from the payee's possession thereof, uncancelled, and unextinguished by indorsed payments, is not sufficiently met by showing payments of money by the maker to the payee, without further showing that there were no other dealings between the parties, upon which such payments might have been made: Somervail v. Gilies, Ib., 152.

9. Where such absence of other dealings is shown, proof of moneys paid by the maker to the payee would create a strong and almost conclusive presumption that they were paid upon the note: Ib.

10. The rule of law requiring protest of a foreign bill of exchange is wholly founded upon the custom of merchants; and in an action against a notary for neglect to make presentment and demand, evidence that it is the common and universal usage at the place where the bill was payable for notary's clerks to make such presentment and demand, and that the bill in question was presented and demanded of payment made by the clerk of the defendant, is proper and admissible. A knowledge, on the part of plaintiff, of this usage, is not necessary to its validity: Com. Bank of Ky. v. Varnum, 49 New York, 269.

11. A notary is not presumed to be a lawyer who is to revise or reverse the decision of his employer as to the character of a bill, and as to whether it is entitled to days of grace or not. If, therefore, a bill is delivered to him with directions to make demand and protest upon the wrong day, a right of action does not arise against him on account of the error; Ib.

12. A memorandum upon a note made cotemporaneously with and delivered with it, and intended as a part of the contract, is a substantial part of the note, and qualifies it the same as if inserted in the body of the instrument, and with it constitutes a single contract: Benedict v. Cowden, Ib., 396.

13. Where such memorandum is an essential part of the note, modifying the obligation, the severence of it from the note without the consent of the maker is a material alteration, and destroys the note even in the hands of an innocent indorser for value: Ib.

14. Where one sells promissory notes less than their face, representing them to be business papers, when in fact they are accommodation notes, and thus usurious and void in the hands of the vendee, the latter may rescind the contract and recover back the purchase-money, although their be no fraud or warranty. It is no answer that the parties to the paper might waive defense and pay them: Webb v. Odell, Ib., 583.

15. The next day after presentment and demand of payment of a note payable at a place in the city of New York, the clerk of the Notary examined the city direc