CHANCERY PRACTICE.

1. The answer of one co-defendant can not be read against another who has no identity of interest with him. The answer of a Sheriff as to an execution lately in his hands, can not be read against the plaintiff in the execution, who has agreed that the proceeds may be applied to the satisfaction of an execution against him: Turner v. Collier, 4 Heiskell, 89.

2. Lands decreed to be sold under a mortgage, were brought to sale after the death of the mortgagee, but the case was revived by sci. fa., against his heirs, and the sale confirmed. It seems this was a valid sale, without the aid of the revivor, but with the revivor it was clearly good: Bryant v. McCollum, Ib., 511.

3. That a guardian ad litem was appointed, an answer filed, an order for report, proof, and report and order of sale at the same time, is no grounds of exception by a purchaser, to the validity of a sale: Martin v. Porter, Ib., 497.

4. A purchaser who has bought after the death of a party to a decree, with knowledge of his death, and who did not ask to be released from his bid at the first term, will not be relieved because of such death, and because for want of confirmation, he has been delayed in obtaining possession for eight months after the sale: Bryant v. McCollum, Ib., 511.

5. It is usual in sales under decree, not to vest the title until the purchase money is paid, but it may be done, retaining a lien to secure the purchase money: Ib. 6. The proper mode of setting aside a sale for matter not in the record, is by petition, and not by exceptions to the report: Ib.

7. The owner of land sold at a judicial sale is entitled to receive the rent as against the purchaser until confirmation: Armstrong v. McClure, Ib.

CHARITIES.

1. Under the Revised Code of this State, our Courts of Chancery have jurisdiction to carry into effect charitable bequests, the objects of which are definite and specific, and capable of being executed: Newsom, Ordinary, et als. v. Starke, Admr.,

et als., 46 Ga., 88.

2. In determining what bequests for charitable purposes are definite and specific, and capable of being executed, the Court is to be guided by the well settled rules of the Court of Chancery in England, in the exercise of its inherent chancery jurisdiction, over charities, as distinguished from its jurisdiction as the agent of the King in the exercise of his prerogative power to direct and give effect to indefinite charitable bequests: 1b.

3. A bequest to the Inferior Court of a county of a sum of money to be placed in the hands of four men, who are to give bond and security, whose duty it shall be to loan out said amount and pay over the interest annually to the Inferior Court, to pay for the education of poor children belonging to the county, and providing no part of the principal shall be used for that purpose, is, according to the well settled rules for the exercise of the inherent power of a Court of Chancery over charities, sufficiently definite and specific in its objects, and sufficiently capable of execution to authorize our Courts of Chancery to give it effect: Ib.

4. It is the duty of the Inferior Court, on its acceptance of the trust, in such case, to appropriate the money, as directed, and if any difficulties arise, or any uncertainties exist, as to the precise object, or as to the mode of applying the fund, to apply to the Chancellor, who will direct by decree, the leading details of the scheme to be adopted: Ib.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

One C., an infant, executed a chattel mortgage upon his horse to defendants to

secure a prior indebtedness. Upon the same day he sold and delivered the horse to plaintiff, and refused to deliver it on defendants' mortgage. After the mortgage became due defendants took the horse from plaintiff's possession; shortly after, C. became of age, and then ratified the bill of sale to plaintiff by indorsement thereon. In an action to recover possession of the horse:

Held, that defendants were trespassers in taking the horse, and plaintiff was entitled to recover: Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y., 407.

CHILDREN.

The word children is a word of purchase and not of limitation, where there is nothing to control this sense of the word: Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Heiskell, 293.

CLAIM AND DELIVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

In an action to recover the possession of personal property, where the property has a usable value, the value of its use, during the time of its detention, is a proper item of damages: Allen v. Fox, 51 N. Y., 562.

COMMISSION MERCHANT.

It seems, that in the absence of restrictions from his consignor, a commission flour merchant has the authority to warrant the quality and condition of flour sold by him: Randale v. Kehlor, 60 Me., 37.

COMMON CARRIERS.

1. If A. has property upon which he has received advances from B., under an agreement that he will ship it to B. to be sold to pay the advances, or to pay any indebtedness, he may or may not comply with this contract. He may ship to C. or to B. upon conditions, but if he ships to B. in pursuance of his contract, the title vests in B. upon the shipment. The highest evidence that he has so shipped is the

consignment and unconditional delivery to B. of the bill of lading. But if A. retains the bill of lading, and notifies B. by letter that he has shipped the property for him in pursuance of the agreement, or if in any other manner the intent thus to ship is evinced, the title passes as effectually, as between them, as if the bill of lading had been delivered: Bailey v. H. R. R. R., 49 New York, 70.

2. Where, therefore, goods are so shipped, and the carrier receipts for the same, and agrees to transport safely and deliver to B., the former is chargeable with knowledge of the rights of the latter, and if by the subsequent direction of A. he delivers the goods to another person, he is liable to B. for a conversion thereof: Ib.

3. When one who is not in business as a common carrier, but who is the owner of a canal boat used generally in the transportation of freight for himself, applies to a common carrier who has knowledge of the facts and receives a load of freight, such owner is not subject to liability as a common carrier. The fact that the common carrier, as such, contracted with others for the carriage of the freight, and that the owner of the boat was aware of this, does not affect the liability of the latter. His liability is determined by the business in which he is engaged, and the character of his own employment, not that of his employer: Fish v. Clark, Ib., 122.

4. To sustain an action against a common carrier for a failure to deliver goods, the plaintiff must be the owner thereof, or have some special interest in them: Thompson v. Fargo, Ib., 188.

5. Prima facie, the consignee is the owner. If the goods are ordered of the consignor by the consignee stating where, but not how, to send them, the consignor has sufficient title to maintain the action: Ib.

6. A common carrier of animals is not an insurer against injuries resulting from

their nature and propensities, and which could not be prevented by foresight, diligence and care. Where they are transported under a special agreement, the liability of the carrier is to be determined by the agreement. He is only liable for the performance of the duty undertaken thereby or for some wrongful act either willful or negligent: Penn v. B. and E. R. R. Co., Ib., 204.

7. Defendant received from plaintiff five car loads of cattle, to be transported from Erie to Buffalo under a written agreement, by the terms of which plaintiff assumed all risks of injuries "from delays, or in consequence of heat, suffocation, or the ill effects of being crowded on the cars;" the agreement provided that plaintiff should load and unload the cattle at his own risk, the defendant furnishing assistance as required; an agent of the owner was to ride free and take the care and charge of the stock; the cattle were in charge of such agent. At Dunkirk the train was detained by a snow storm three days. The cattle could have been nloaded by constructing a platform; this defendant declined to do, and they remained in the cars twenty-four hours, in consequence of which three of the cattle died and others were injured:

Held, that under the contract the duty of defendant had respect simply to the transportation and not to the care of the cattle while in transitu; that provision for loading and unloading had reference to the terminus of the transportation and not to an intermediate station, and defendant was not required to unload at Dunkirk or furnish facilities for so doing; that the injury was attributable to the negligence of the plaintiff's agent (Peckham, J., dissenting): Ib.

8. In an action against a common carrier, the question as to what is reasonable time for a consignee of goods to remove them after notice of their arrival, where there is no dispute as to the facts, is a question of law for the court. A submission of the question to the jury is error, and, in case the jury finds different from what the law determines, it is ground for reversal: Hedges v. A. R. R. R., Ib., 223.

9. A consignee can not, after notice of the arrival of property for him, defer taking it away while he attends to his other affairs. It is his duty, at once, and with diligence, to act upon the notice, to seek delivery, and continue until delivery is complete. So much time as he gives to his other business, to the neglect of taking charge of the property and removing it from the custody of the carrier, can not be allowed to him in estimating what is reasonable time in which to take delivery: Ib. 10. Where, by the contract with a common carrier, he is exempted from liability for loss or damage, unless the same be proved to have occurred by fraud or gross negligence of him, his agents or servants, in an action against such carrier the onus is upon the plaintiff of proving such fraud or negligence. Negligence must not only be shown, but it must appear to have caused, or at least contributed to the injury. A defendant in such an action has a right to rely upon his exception to an erroneous ruling of the court as to the burden of proof and to decline to introduce further evidence, and the decision will not be sustained upon the ground that the evidence as it stood showed negligence: Cochran v. Dinsmore, Ib., 249.

11. Defendant received of plaintiff at Newark a car load of sheep, to be transported to Albany under a contract which contained a clause by which plaintiff agreed to go or send some one with the sheep "who would take all the risks of personal injury from whatever cause, whether of negligence of defendants, its agents, or otherwise." After the sheep were loaded, plaintiff, who was intending to accompany them, and had a drover's pass, in passing by the tender of the engine, was injured by a stick of wood negligently thrown therefrom:

Held, that, under the contract, defendant was exempted from liability: Poucher v. N. Y. C. R. R., Ib., 263.

12. Plaintiff went with his baggage to defendant's depot in Philadelphia to take passage to Chicago; upon presenting his baggage, the baggage-master, in accordance with a rule of the defendant, declined to check until plaintiff had procured his passage tickets; in his absence the baggage-master caused it to be placed in the baggage car, and on plaintiff's return with tickets, the baggage-master refused to give him the checks without his paying extra compensation on account of extra weight beyond what, by defendant's regulations, the tickets purchased would carry free. Plaintiff refused to pay the extra charge and demanded his baggage; this the baggage-master refused to deliver, for the reason that it was covered by other baggage, and in order to reach and return the trunks it would delay the train beyond the time fixed for starting. Plaintiff declined to take passage without his checks; his baggage was taken through to Chicago, and on the night after its arrival was destroyed by fire. The action was for the conversion of the baggage:

Held, that defendant did not occupy the position of common carrier of the plaintiff, and could not avail itself of any of the rules which have been established as to the liabilities of common carriers of passengers. Also, that defendant was liable for the acts of the baggage-master, though that act should be held wrongful. It was further held by Folger, J., (Allen, J., concurring,) that the question whether the reason given for the retention of the baggage was a sufficient qualification of the refusal to deliver, to rebut the evidence of conversion furnished by such demand and refusal, was a question of fact for the jury. By Church, Ch. J., and Rapallo, J., that as matter of law there was no conversion. By Grover and Peckham, J. J., that as matter of law there was a conversion: McCormick v. P. C. R. R., Ib., 303. 13. A common carrier has not performed his contract as carrier until he has delivered or offered to deliver the goods to consignee, or done what the law esteems equivalent to delivery. When the consignee is unknown to the carrier, a due effort to find him and notify him of the arrival of the goods is a condition precedent to the right to warehouse them; and if a reasonable and diligent effort is not made, the carrier is liable for the consequence of the neglect. What is due and reasonable effort depends upon the circumstances of each case, and is a question of fact for the jury: Linn v. N. J. S. Co., Ib., 442.

14. Where, because of neglect of the carrier to find the consignee, and the consequent delay in delivery of the goods, they have depreciated in value, the fact that the consignee, after receiving notice, neglects to remove them in a reasonable time, does not raise a question of concurrent negligence. After such notice and reasonable time, the goods are at the risk of the owner, and the carrier is not liable for subsequential depreciation. The duties of carrier and consignee are not concurrent, but in succession, that of the latter growing out of the performance of duty by the former, and their acts of negligence can not contribute to the same injury: Ib.

15. Where a common carrier has transported freight under a special contract limiting his common law liability, and by which he undertook, for an agreed compensation, to carry it to the terminus of his route, and then deliver it to another carrier, no authority results from the relation or from the contract, empowering him to enter into a special contract on behalf of the owner with the next carrier, limiting or restricting the liability of the latter; the whole duty of the first carrier terminates with the delivery of the goods to the second, and the common law liability of the latter attaches at once by necessary implication upon the receipt thereof: Babcock v. L. S. and M. R. R. R., Ib., 491.

16. When a carrier undertakes, for a specified compensation, to transport over his own route, and to deliver at the terminus thereof, goods marked to a consignee beyond such terminus, a through contract will not be implied from the fact that in

the description of the goods in the contract, the marks, showing the ultimate destination, are given. Nor is such a contract extended, or affected, by the fact, that in making it a printed blank is used, adapted to a through contract extending over other and connecting lines and making the contract to read ostensibly for and on behalf of all the carriers over whose lines the goods may pass. The written portions of the

contract will control, and only so much of the printed matter in the blank form used as is consistent therewith is of any effect; all that is compatible with or inappropri ate to the extent of the parties, as indicated by the written portions, is to be rejected: Ib.

17. Where a common carrier contracts for the transportation of freight over his route, and for the delivery thereof to another carrier, to be forwarded over connecting lines to its ultimate destination, the fact that the contract fixes the price for the entire carriage does not make the contract a through contract, so as to entitle the succeeding carriers to the benefit of exceptions from liability contained in the contract: Etna Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, Ib., 616.

18. Where there is an agreement between two common carriers, operating connecting lines, for the carriage of freight over both routes at an agreed price to be divided between them, and where they have, at the point of connection, a warehouse used in common for the transfer of freight from one line to the other, the expenses of handling being paid in common, a delivery of freight at the warehouse by one common carrier destined to pass over the line of the other, with notice to the latter of its arrival and ultimate destination, places it in the possession of the latter, and imposes upon him the duties and liabilities of a common carrier in reference thereto: Ib.

19. A carrier is not liable for goods lost beyond the end of his route, unless by special contract: Skinner v. Hall, 60 Maine, 477.

20. Defendants contracted to transport a quantity of barley for plaintiff from Albany to Baltimore to be delivered in good order, the dangers of the seas alone excepted. There were two customary or usual routes-one, the inside or canal route, the other, outside or ocean route. Defendants' vessel took the latter, and the barley was injured by a peril of the seas. In an action to recover the damages, plaintiff offered to prove in substance that defendant, before signing the bill of lading, knowing that plaintiff designed to effect an insurance, and that it was necessary to effect that purpose to designate the route, agreed to transport the barley by the inside route; that relying upon such agreement, he caused the barley to be insured by that route, and in consequence of the taking of the other route, lost his insurance and suffered the damage claimed. The evidence was objected to and excluded:

Held, no error; that by the contract defendants had the choice of routes, and it was not competent to vary it by parol, nor was the evidence competent by way of estoppel: Weite v. Ashton, 51 New York, 280.

21. A common carrier is not concluded by the statement in a bill of lading of the amount of goods delivered to him. It is prima facie evidence merely, and may be explained or contradicted by parol evidence: Abbe v. Eaton, Ib., 410. COMMON LAW.

The common law of England is in force in this State only so far as it is in harmony with its institutions, and its principles applicable to the state of the country and the condition of society: Powell v. Sims, 5 West Virginia, 1. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT.

Where two persons, claiming title to the same piece of land, enter into a negotiaion and settlement, in pursuance of which one accepts a conveyance of the land from