deliberately adverse. The four ships by themselves were not strong enough to stop them: and it was in vain that they burned lights and fired guns for help-the Admiral being by this time far out of sight and hearing, and (which made it worse) far to leeward. So that by the time he heard the news the fleet was safe under the batteries; and it still took him three days to weather the point, and ascertain by inspection that he could not help it.

After all however, luck did something for him; for it was in this fruitless endeavour to intercept the main body that he fell in with three stragglers, which having already struck to Ralegh, he sent his own boats to take possession of, and which proved a good prize; the only prize of the voyage worth mentioning.

Had this been anybody's account of the matter but his own, I should not have believed it, the proceeding seems so unaccountable. Being his own, we must at least suppose that he wished it to pass for the true account; and that if his course admits of any other explanation, it was one which he could not so conveniently avow. We know however that it is at least a very imperfect account, and putting

1 It is so strange, that the reader may like to see his own words; the rather because his latest biographer, quoting the greater part of the report, omits this part altogether.

"In our passage by saile [qy. Fayal] Graciosa and Pico, we took such commodities and refreshings as those islands afforded. And in passing from them toward St. Michael, we were told that a great ship was discovered off of Graciosa: whereupon I, the General, gave order to divide and to direct the fleet into three places: the one to steer away E.N.E., and to go about the north side of Terceira; the other E.S.E., and to go by the south side of the said island: and both to meet in the road of Brazil; so as if the caracks or the West India fleet should strive to recover Terceira they should be cut off; and the third part of the fleet should ply to the westward, which way it was said that the great ship stood, and so to cut it off if it sought the road of Fayal: which, if she were kept from Terceira, was her only place she could put into: and one of these three ways she must needs stand, for the wind being at NNW. she could not go but one of these three courses.

:

"But, as I had given this direction, there came to me a small bark of Lime, whose captain did confidently assure me that he was the man that did follow the chase, and fetched it up, finding it but a small ship of our own fleet which made us resolve to continue our former intended course for St. Michael. But in this mean time, I, the General, hailing the captain of a pinnace, and willing him to call to the ships of my squadron to follow my light, and those of the Vice-Admiral's squadron to follow his light to the westward (which direction I did presently after countermand), he misheard, and willed some ships that were next to stand about to the westward: which direction, together with his not hearing of me that which was spoken to countermand it, made four of her Majesty's ships, the 'Garland,' the 'Mary Rose,' the Dreadnought,' and the Rainbow,' to stand off to the west all that night. Of which, Sir W. Mounson, in the 'Rainbow,' fell in the night with the West Indian fleet. . . . Whereupon the other three of her Majesty's ships stood off with him, but could not fetch up the Spaniards till they were gotten into Terceira road: before which, after they had strived in vain to get in to them, they plied till my coming, which was three days after; for I was hard aboard the westernmost part of St. Michael, before I heard these news."-Purchas, iv. p. 1936.

6

For the proceedings of Ralegh, see Sir Arthur Gorge's narrative (p. 1938), who was captain of Ralegh's ship. Those of Sir W. Monson in the Rainbow,' and Sir Charles Vere in the 'Mary Rose,' have been very well told by themselves.

the facts omitted and the fact of their omission together, we may, I think, make it a little more intelligible.

Essex, it must be remembered, had had no experience in this kind. of service. He had all his mistakes to make; and being naturally impatient, impetuous, and over-confident,-though at the same time (according to Sir W. Monson, whom I can very well believe) "of a flexible nature to be overruled,"-they would doubtless be many. The principal objects with which he undertook the expedition had all failed. The Spanish fleet, while it remained at Ferrol, was unassailable. If it had gone to the Azores, as reported, he might do something with it there: but it had not gone: so that chance was cut off. Could he take Terceira? No, it was too strong. Could he intercept the treasure? Yes: if it came; but was it coming? And if not, what then? He might sack the other islands, and so secure a little plunder, a few prisoners, and perhaps some glory. It would be of no real use; but might yield something to talk of; it was what the soldiers about him wished for; and it would sound better than nothing; which was the alternative. In this state of mind he waited at Flores till he was tired of waiting. He began to fear that the homeward fleet was not coming. The first ship which came with the change of wind from that quarter brought no tidings of it: perhaps it would come another way. It was absolutely necessary to do something. Now a plan had been already arranged for "taking in" the islands, as they called it: one division was to attack St. Michael, another Pico, another Graciosa, another Fayal. The last, which was the nearest, he was to undertake himself; with the assistance of Ralegh, should he arrive in time. This plan, as originally designed, was probably intended to combine with the main object of intercepting the treasure. Three parts of the fleet would still be to windward of the passage to Terceira, and though they could not be so ready in that case to give chase upon the instant as they should have been, still they were in the way and would have their chance. And this plan it was resolved to carry into effect at once: for when Ralegh arrived at Flores, he was ordered not to stay to take in water, but to follow the Admiral at once to Fayal. This order was given on the 16th of September. It seems however that something came across Essex the same day, and changed or interrupted his purpose: for when Ralegh arrived at Fayal the same evening, he found there neither Admiral nor Vice-Admiral, nor any news of them. And they did not arrive till the 22nd. What they had been doing in the interval is not hinted either in the official report, or in Essex's Apology, or in any other account of the voyage that I have met with; but I 1 See Sir Arthur Gorge's narrative, printed in Purchas.

suppose they had heard of a sail seen somewhere, and had gone suddenly off in pursuit-forgetting to send word of it to the other squadron.

However that may be, they were not to be found or heard of. And an affair happened in consequence, which, though not mentioned in the official report, I take to be the real explanation of the resolution taken shortly after, and otherwise so unaccountable, to proceed with the whole fleet to St. Michael's.

Ralegh was Rear-Admiral. He had been ordered to Fayal to assist in an attack upon the island; and had been told that he need not stay to water at Flores, because he could get what he wanted there. He was in great want of water; but found that he could not land without opposition. After waiting four days, and receiving no tidings or instructions, he determined to force a landing. Which he did; and, one thing leading to another, he followed his fortune, and succeeded in taking the town. So that when Essex arrived, he found that part of his work nearly completed, and everything ready for an attack upon the high fort, which was still in the hands of the enemy. This was so much gained. But it involved the loss of one thing which unfortunately he valued more. He might take possession of the island in the Queen's name and carry off whatever was worth taking: but he could not carry off the glory of it. The credit of the achievement was not transferable, and must go to another. This touched Essex's worst weakness: a weakness which was increasing upon him, and not only marring his work but degrading his character. His old ambition to outstrip competitors in the race of gloryan ambition not incompatible with magnanimity-was fast degenerating into intolerance of competition-a vice with which magnanimity can have nothing to do. It was not enough to win, unless the credit of winning were his own, and his own only. He had already in the course of this very service shown symptoms of the disease. Though he had been on friendly terms with Ralegh ever since it was settled that he should have the sole command himself, he had shown himself extremely apprehensive lest he should find an opportunity for individual distinction. When Ralegh was separated from the fleet off Spain by the breaking of his mainyard, and on repairing to the appointed rendezvous could hear no tidings of the Admiral, but was joined by several other ships that had in like man*ner parted company, Essex was easily persuaded that he was keeping away on purpose that he might do some work on his own account. And now that accident had presented him (being again at the appointed rendezvous and again without tidings of the Admiral) with an opportunity of doing by himself the very service which he had

been ordered thither to assist in, Essex was hardly persuaded to let him off without trial upon a capital charge. Not that he had failed. Not that by premature action he had marred any one object of the voyage. Not that what remained to be done could not be done more easily than if he had rested inactive. But he had won a little glory, which would otherwise have fallen to the commander-in-chief. For this offence it was said the proper punishment was nothing less than death. And it seems that it was ultimately passed over upon a very strange condition. Ralegh had not only to apologize for the error, but to resign the glory: which, as it could not be transferred, was to be cancelled. Such at least I infer to have been the terms upon which peace was made, from the singular fact, that in the official report of the voyage, signed by all the commanders, this particular action-the taking of Fayal-though by far the most remarkable feat performed, and really a gallant one had the object been adequate, is not mentioned or alluded to.

While such humours reigned, it is not strange if foolish things were done; and I cannot help suspecting that impatience to eclipse the capture of Fayal was the true motive of the voyage to St. Michael's, and that the poor success of that enterprise was the real reason why the first action was suppressed in the narrative and the last unexplained. Effectual precautions were taken on this occasion to exclude Ralegh from all share in the expected glory; but unfortunately the glory did not come.

But though fortune did not favour Essex in this particular, she was still to interfere most signally in his behalf in a matter of much more importance. Where was the fleet of Ferrol all this time? Finding that it had not gone to the Azores, he inferred that it would stay where it was. It does not seem to have occurred to him that though the Adelantado would not come out in face of an English fleet newly equipped to engage him, he might come out well enough when that fleet was in the middle of the Atlantic. Why he did not start sooner, is I suppose to be explained by the proverbial slowness of Spanish movements; for from the middle of September to nearly the end of October, he had the Channel to himself. But what actually happened, and how little it was owing to good management that England escaped that autumn a great disaster, I cannot better explain than in the words of Sir William Monson, one of the captains of the voyage.

"The Spaniards, who presumed more upon their advantages than their valours, thought themselves in too weak a condition to follow us to the

1 "We have missed of the Adelantado, who will not leave Ferrol this year."— Essex to Cecil, 16th September, 'Lives of the Earls of Essex,' i. p. 456.

islands, and put their fortunes upon a day's service; but subtilly devised how to intercept us as we came home, when we had least thought or suspicion of them; and their fleet, that was all the while in the Groyne and Ferrol, not daring to put forwards while they knew ours to be upon the coast, their General the Adelantada came for England, with a resolution to land at Falmouth and fortify it, and afterwards with their ships to keep the sea, and expect our coming home scattered.

Having thus cut off our sea forces, and possessing the harbour of Falmouth, they thought with a second supply of thirty-seven Levantiscos ships, which the Marquis Arumbullo commanded, to have returned and gained a good footing in England.

These designs of theirs were not foreseen by us: for we came home scattered, as they made reckoning, not twenty in number together.

We may say, and that truly, that God fought for us: for the Adelantada being within a few leagues of the island of Scilly, he commanded all his captains on board him to receive his directions; but whilst they were in consultation, a violent storm took them at east, insomuch that the captains could hardly recover their ships, but in no case were able to save their boats, the storm continued so furious, and happy was he that could recover home, seeing their design thus overthrown by the loss of their boats, whereby their means of landing was taken away. Some who were willing to stay and receive the further commands of the General kept the seas so long upon our coast, that in the end they were taken; others put themselves into our harbours for refuge and succour; and it is certainly known that in this voyage the Spaniards lost eighteen ships, the St. Luke' and the 'St. Bartholomew' being two, and in the rank of his best galleons. We must ascribe this success to God only: for certainly the enemies' designs were dangerous, and not to be diverted by our force; but by his will who would not suffer the Spaniards in any of their attempts to set footing in England, as we have done in all the quarters of Spain, Portugal, the Islands, and both the Indies."1

It was near the end of October when the fleet arrived, and found all the south coast in great alarm, and the danger not yet over. The necessity of making ready for fresh action postponed all else for the time, and I am not aware that the conduct of the voyage was ever made the subject of a formal investigation. It was rumoured however in Court that the Queen was not well pleased with Essex, either for his management of the business or for his treatment of Ralegh; and that he was already (5th November) acting the injured man.2 If to his many great gifts there had but been added the gift of profiting by his own errors in the knowledge of himself, the result of the enterprise, though worthless enough to the country, might

A true and exact account of the Wars with Spain in the reign of Queen Elizabeth of famous memory, by Sir William Monson, p. 38.

2 Sydney Papers.