To the question, what were the powers of the Witena-gemót, Mr. Kemble gives an answer embracing the following details. They possessed in general a consultative voice and right to consider every public act which could be authorized by the king. They deliberated upon the making of new laws, which when made, were promulgated by their own and the king's authority. They had the power of making alliances and treaties of peace, and of settling their terms. They had the power to elect the king, and to depose him; and in concert with the king, to appoint prelates, and to regulate ecclesiastical affairs so far as these affected the laity. The king with the Witena-gemót had also power to levy taxes, and to raise land and sea forces. Their consent is constantly found to be appended to charters containing grants of land, or authorizing the conversion of folcland into bócland. They acted as a supreme court of justice, and adjudged the lands of offenders and intestates to be forfeit to the king.

The members of the parliaments gave their wed or pledge to observe and cause to be observed, the laws which they had enacted. It appears too, that the king sent his messengers,* usually the shire-reeves into the different shires to take the wed of the freemen to the same effect. This certainly implies that the freemen were considered a constituent part of the legislative body, and that their consent was necessary, so that in a strict sense they were not conceived of as acting through their representatives. That the people were sometimes present at the gemóts, may be argued from several charters said to be passed 'tota populi generalitate,' and 'tota plebis generalitate ovante;' and from another record where occur the words, 'decretum est ab omni populo.' But these and a few similar expressions, on which Mr. Kemble lays some stress, may perhaps be the language of an old formula still retained, after the custom which justified it had died out, or the consent of the people may have been presumed and procured afterwards. The deposition of one of the kings is said to have taken place in an assembly of the proceres and the populus, which certainly looks as if the free proprietors were at the meeting.

The closing chapters of Mr. Kemble's second volume relate to the state of the towns, to ecclesiastical persons and their support, and to the poor. The examination of these topics would open interesting views of Anglo-Saxon society; but having now finished our brief sketch of the political institutions, we propose to lay down the pen at this point, thinking to take it up again when another portion of Mr. Kemble's work shall have been given to the public.

* The evidence for this is of the age of Athelstan, in the tenth century.

ART. VI. MORELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

The Philosophy of Religion; by J. D. MORELL, A. M. 12mo, pp. 359. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1849.

MR. MORELL is extensively known as the author of "An Historical and Critical View of the speculative philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century." This book, though not above criticism, is generally if not universally allowed to be the best work of the kind in our language. It is both Historical and Critical. So far as it is historical, it is a clear and pleasant record of the opinions of others. So far as it is critical, it involves to a limited extent the statement and vindication of the author's own opinions. These critical notices, however, do not fully reveal his strength or his weakness, as a philosophical thinker.

In this new volume, he presents himself as an independent thinker, on some of the most important as well as most intricate subjects which can task the intellect of man. The title, "The Philosophy of Religion," has a strange sound to English ears. It is a translation of the "Religions-Philosophie" of the Germans, and signifies a scientific examination into the foundations of religion. Such an inquiry includes the critical study of the nature of man, as a being capable of religion, and of the sources of religious truth, as found in man himself, in nature and in revelation. Such an inquiry is also essential to every consistent system of theology. No system of theology can be thorough and scientific without it. It too often happens indeed, that the first principles which ought to have been ascertained by severe investigation and a close analysis, are taken for granted as foregone conclusions and thus an imposing structure is reared, without a foundation; or the foundation is left loose and shifting as the sand. But though these inquiries are necessary to every system of theology, they are not necessarily a part of any particular scheme. They are rather preliminary to all theology. It might almost be said, that a theology could be Mohammedan, Jewish or Christian, and still be based on the same "Philosophy of Religion." It certainly is true in fact, that very different views of Christian truth, have been professedly derived from the same general principles. On the other hand, it is equally true, that different conclusions, as to these fundamental points, must greatly influence the particular views both of religion and theology, which are consistently derived from them, by a rigid and logical deduction. Inquiries into these "foundation truths" derive an especial interest at this moment, from their relation to the times in which we live. This interest is both speculative and practical. The present age is generally thought to be practical only and not

speculative, and in some quarters, special efforts are made to bring contempt upon close thinking and sharp definition, especially in regard to the foundations of religion, as metaphysical, frivolous and antiquated. And yet it is true, that there never was a time, when speculation was more busy with religious truth than at the present. Especially is it true that there never was a time, when the truths and principles which are vital to all religious faith and feeling, were subjected to a closer and more irreverent scrutiny on the part of thousands, we had almost said millions, of thinking men, than at this instant. Error and skepticism have withdrawn themselves from the attack upon particular doctrines of the Christian system, as objects too trivial for their notice, and have fallen back upon the great verities, which are vital to all religious faith and feeling. Certainly, they do most audaciously deny the possibility or necessity of any supernatural communication from God to man, the attestation of such a communication by miracles, and the record of it in an inspired writing. At such a time as this when a speculative skepticism, upon points necessarily and in their very nature philosophical and even metaphysical, has taken possession of entire and extended classes of thinking men; it would seem that the discussion of speculative questions, was never more called for, and could never be more timely.

The relation of these discussions to our practical religion is equally intimate. If we live in times of earnest thought about speculative principles, they are also times in which fundamental principles are boldly pushed forward to their practical results, and in which practical views already taken, will find or make a theory for their justification. As the present is an age of wavering and of unbelief, so is it an age of marvelous credulity and dogged mysticism. It is not strange that it should be so-for skepticism and mysticism produce each other-not only in the same age among different minds by the law of antagonism; but they are now and then prominent in the same mind, like strangely assorted bed-fellows fighting for the occupancy. The reason is plain. If a man can not or will not justify his faith to his intellect, he will blindly grasp it by his feelings. He will then proceed to deny that the intellect has jurisdiction upon points of faith, and will construct a "Philosophy of Religion" accordingly. Or having adopted his philosophy at the outset, he will carry it out in his religious life. If he is a Deist, he will seek to bask in the roseate but cheerless rays of a natural pietism; if a Christian, he will cheat himself and others by the fond fancies of a sickly mysticism. No man, who has his eyes open upon the signs of the times, can fail to see, that such a mysticism, both Christian and Infidel, is gaining rapid progress and is defended by its own philosophy of religion.

The publication of this work we regard as altogether timely; and whatever may be the merit or the fate of many of the opinions which it propounds, the attempt to make these fundamental points the subject of a separate treatise, deserves the highest commendation. We are pleased also with the tone and manner of the discussion. The author does not write like a divine, but like a philosopher. He does not adopt the technical terms of any class of religionists, but employs the language of thinking men.

But while, for the reasons already given, we are prepared to examine such a volume as this with especial interest, we find in the doctrines advanced in this book, an argument still more cogent for subjecting it to a careful scrutiny. To describe these doctrines by a word is impossible. We shall indicate the school to which Mr. Morell belongs, when we say that he believes in "the reason" rather than in reasoning, and that he exalts feeling and depreciates logic. That many who aspire to the name of philosophers belong to this school, our readers can not be ignorant. It is still more notorious, that there is a much larger class of religionists, who are prepared to welcome any opinions which exalt the sentiments and dispense with logic-who are animated with an extraordinary zeal in this direction, without knowing whether there is any philosophy in their favor, but who will accept anything in the form of an argument which favors their position. Logic as we are told has had its day. It has corrupted our theology and chilled our piety, and it is time that it should adopt a more modest tone, and yield the place to a higher authority.

This treatise is the first formal and elaborate attempt, in our language, to show the scientific grounds for these opinions-the first effort to defend, by reasons purely philosophical, the views which we have indicated.

It seems therefore to demand especial attention. We can not promise to go over all the ground traversed by our author; nor can we discuss, at length, all the questions which he has raised. All that we propose is to venture a few strictures on some of his positions.

A word only of the Preface. It consists mainly of a series of expostulations with the English public, in reply to several objections which the author anticipates will be raised against his book. It will be objected, he remarks, 1, that these views are German and neological; 2, that they are rationalistic; 3, that they are a departure from the simplicity of the gospel; 4, that they can lead to no useful result, inasmuch as they will tend to the substitution of a philosophical system for the gospel; and if we have the gospel, that is all we require; 5, that they are premature. These objections, if the author correctly represents the tone and spirit in which they will be urged by his countrymen, only show that there is as great ignorance and narrowness of mind on such subjects

in portions of the religious public in England as there is in this country. The author might, however, have been less impatient in his replies to these objections.

Leaving the preface, we proceed to the work itself. Chapter I, is entitled, "On the Faculties of the mind." The object of this chapter is, to inquire into the nature of those faculties in man which render him capable of religion. To express briefly at the outset, what the author thinks he finds as the result of this examination, is a little difficult. He does not begin with a clear and pointed statement of his positions, and though he endeavors to give us the result of his investigations-yet even here, his language is vague, and poetical rather than precise. We understand him to hold, that there is in man a religious faculty, or powers appropriate to the exercise of religious faith and feeling; that to this faculty are revealed the objects of faith and feeling; further that these objects are directly revolved to its inspection or intuition, but are in no sense reached by any process of combination or deduction; and finally that this religious faculty is not simply intellectual nor simply emotional, but that it partakes of a double nature, being to use the author's own language, a "kind of intellectual sensibility." To substantiate this view, he conducts us through a brief survey of the powers of the mind. He begins with the lowest, the sensational faculty. First of all, as he propounds, the mind is active but undeveloped. Before it is conscious of a distinct sensation, and while it is ignorant of any object separate from itself, it exists in "a dim undefinable state of consciousness," "designated as bare feeling." From this state the mind emerges, and its separate functions of intellectual and emotional activity begin to be performed. Then ensues the condition of mere sensation, corresponding to which, is a peculiar condition of emotion, called instinct -next is perception, with its appropriate emotions in the animal passions. Then is developed the logical faculty, with the emotions that arise on the perception of abstract truth. Last of all comes faith in the beautiful, the good, and the true, which like the faith of infaney is first given in that blended form, in which intellect and feeling are lost in a higher unity, from which unity they are developed in their separate agency. For the accuracy of this analysis, and its fidelity to nature, the author gives no voucher. He doubtless thinks it confirms itself, and would simply refer us to consciousness as its authority. We must own it is a very pretty piece of fancy, by which the mind is made to set off in its lowest stages from the condition of bare feeling, and is then brought around again in its highest attainment to the same condition, in which the mind must first feel, in order that it may know. It has a savor of piety too, thus to require man again to become a little child, before he can enter into the kingdom of heaven. But is it true, and if it is not true, what are the reasons by which it is made to appear to be true?