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and when God is the object of affection there is in it the highest possible form of activity. A supreme love, as that of God must be, if it be at all, involves the choice of a supreme end, and that was shown in the second lecture to be the highest act of a rational being the outgrowth of his whole personal activity. From what was said at one point it might be supposed that the will, as distinguished from the affections, would be the highest, but in this love there is a coalescence of will and affection such that the love may be said to be the two united. There is in it a rational preference which belongs to the will as free; there is in it benevolence and the highest complacency and delight. These are not there as separate elements, more than the ultimate elements of the flower, the oxygen and hydrogen and carbon, are separate in that. They tend to make up the one love, which, as the joint product of the highest faculties of man, thus becomes the one 66 consummate flower" of his existence. Not unlike is it to the flower of those plants which put forth but a single one at the top, and which is the product and highest expression of their whole life.

But while the line between the natural and the moral affections is thus theoretically distinct, it is many times both difficult and important to distinguish them practically.

It is difficult, because they so conspire together, and seem to permeate each other. They are often, we may say generally, in exercise at the same time, and with the same person for their object, and the whole result becomes so blended into one as to be inseparable. When the two conspire there is a perfect complacency and satisfaction, but we cannot tell how much to attribute to each; when

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they conflict it is often difficult to say how far each should prevail.

It may also be important to separate the natural from the moral affections. It may not. What nature gives us together we may receive together. We may eat the pudding with no attempt, even in thought, to separate the sugar that pervades every particle of it from that which forms its basis; and that is the pleasantest way. Still, if we would judge accurately or even fairly of men, the line which separates the two forms of the affections must be drawn. The reason is that the natural affections are liable to be mistaken for moral character. In all that pertains to the natural affections the differences of endowment by nature, and with no reference to moral character, are as great as they are with reference to the intellect, or strength and beauty of body. In some these natural endowments are rich and free and beautiful in their spontaneous action. Such are said to be, and they are, amiable. Others are the reverse of this. It is no fault of theirs; it is an infelicity. One is the rose, and the other the nettle; one is the smooth, and the other the rough-barked tree; and nature has made the difference. Still, it is not uncommon to find the richest gifts of the natural affections as well as of the intellect associated with the deepest moral corruption. To this there seem to be even some special tendencies. It is the smooth-barked hickory that bears bitter nuts. Nor, on the other hand, is it uncommon to find from those less happy in natural endowments moral manifestations that surprise and delight us the more on that very account. They are as the good nuts from the shag-bark hickory; they are as the beautiful flowers from the prickly and angular cactus.

While, therefore, we recognize all there is in this part

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of our nature of beauty, and of desirableness for social life, we are not to confound gifts with virtues, nor natural kindness of heart and amenity of manners with moral principle. We admire the natural affections, we regard any great lack of them as a deformity, we are apt to censure it as if it must have had a moral origin; still, if the moral nature be withdrawn, there remains in them but the foreshadowing and prophecy of something yet higher.

The distinction now made is indispensable; but, in treating of what are called the natural affections in man, we are not to suppose we are treating of them alone. The light of the moral affections constantly shines through them, and gives them a radiance not their own. In what shall be said further of the affections, this distinction, therefore, need not be particularly regarded.

By most writers the affections are divided into the benevolent and the malevolent. But the term malevolent is unfortunate. Perhaps it would be better to designate them with reference to their end rather than their origin, and divide them into those intended to make others happy, and those for self-defence and punishment. We should then have for one class what we must still call the benevolent affections, and for the other the defensive and punitive. Affections strictly malevolent are not to be presumed, but self-defence and punishment are each necessary and proper, and we might expect there would be affections that should indicate these and support us in them.

In inquiring after the number of the original benevolent affections, for these come first in order, we are to be guided in the same way as when we were inquiring respecting the desires. Consciousness must be the ultimate test; but if we can ascertain what affections would be necessary to the

upbuilding of a perfect society, we may be sure we shall find just those, and no more. The provisions of God are always adequate for their end, with nothing superfluous.

The first will, of course, be those that belong to the family as a divine institution into which man is born. He does not originate it, but is born into it. Here we have the conjugal, parental, filial, and maternal affections, and where these exist in their purity and proper power, a family is as the garden of God. It is worthy of being his institution. It is the centre of the affections, the home, the sphere of the purest and best earthly happiness, and the germ and source of all civil institutions. But besides these we have "the special and distinguishing affection of man towards woman, and of woman towards man, which tends to the conjugal union. This is expressed by the word love, without any epithet." We have also sympathy, pity, gratitude, friendship, patriotism, and general benevolence, or philanthropy. These may all be included. under the word love, as their opposites may be under the word resentment.

Of the benevolent affections generally it may be said that the pleasure already noticed as connected with them may be regarded as an expression of the approbation of God, and as an invitation to us to cherish them. It expresses the wish of Him who made us that these affections should prevail, and evinces his benevolence, since they are at once happiness in those who exercise them, and productive of happiness in those towards whom they are exercised.

We are also fond of seeing excess in these affections rather than deficiency; and if duty be called upon to control them, we choose it should be for restraint and repression, rather than excitement. It is the excess of

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these affections, the preponderance of the natural element over that which is moral, which gives rise to what are called amiable weaknesses. Through these our respect for a man is diminished more than our love. The tenderness of a father for his child may be a little laughable, yet we easily forgive it, and prefer it to the least want of affection. We have thus a double provision for the encouragement of these affections, their effect upon our own happiness,

and the sympathy of others.

The terms above given may indicate sufficiently the various forms of affection to enable us to speak of them intelligibly, but those affections are constantly differing from each other and from themselves as their objects differ. What it is to love can be known only by loving, and to appreciate the different shades of affection we must ourselves have felt its nice and varying adjustment to its varying objects. A feeling of responsibility, of anxiety, which is a mixture of hope and fear, of protection and of peculiar tenderness, is blended with parental affection. Filial affection is modified by gratitude, confidence, respect, and reverence. If the graver and sterner virtues enter largely into the character of our friend, we feel for him more of respect; if he be of the softer mood our affection partakes of that character.

Of the particular benevolent affections mentioned it would be pleasant to treat particularly and at large, but they are so far of one general character and object that that will not be requisite. Like the appetites and the desires, they are to be controlled with reference to their end, and will be most for the happiness of the individual when they are so controlled as to build up the most perfect home, and the most perfect civil society.

I will only add, that as society originates, and finds its