beauty and blessedness in these affections, so it will react upon them. That form of society and those habits of life are, therefore, to be preferred which give to these the best theatre and widest scope. Especially is it to be said that the breaking up of the home for any system of communism or socialism must be equally opposed to the intentions of God and to the highest happiness of man.

But besides the benevolent affections there are, as has been said, those that have been called malevolent. Concerning the origin and character of these there has been great diversity of view. There still is. But the part they have played in the history of the race is so conspicuous, and they are so difficult of control, that they ought to be well understood.

Concerning these, two remarks may be made, the opposite of those made concerning the benevolent affections.

The first is, that this class of affections, at least so far as they are malevolent, are painful to those who exercise them, thus indicating the will of God that they should not be indulged in.

The second remark is, that mankind are pleased to see these passions repressed and moderated below their nat ural standard rather than suffered to rise above it.

As, then, we found a double provision for the encouragement of the benevolent affections, our own satisfaction and the sympathy of others, so now we find a double provision to repress these opposite affections, - our own pain and the disapprobation of others.

Since the time of Butler a distinction has been made between "sudden," as he called it, or, as it has since been called, instinctive resentment, and that which is deliberate. The first is the guard appointed by nature against any sudden attack. It is the assertion by whatever is, of its

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right to be, and confers a promptness and energy which reason could never bestow. This is purely the work of nature, and cannot be wrong. It is only concerning deliberate resentment that there can be a question.

And here my wish is, by tracing its origin, to vindicate this part of our constitution from the charge of anything malevolent, properly so called, and to show its propriety. This will give us the key to its proper use.

Let us then suppose two moral beings, one perfectly good, the other perfectly bad, to meet together. It is clear that they could have no coincident wishes, but would naturally array themselves against each other. "What communion hath light with darkness?" If now the evil being should exert a particular act of injury towards the good, what would be the feeling of the latter? It could not be the same that he would have towards a being perfectly good. What will you call that necessary opposition, that sense of repugnance, of dislike, of condemnation, of abhorrence even, which the good being could not but feel?

It is this opposition of virtue to vice, of holiness to sin, that is the proper foundation of resentment, and that becomes the only resentment that is justifiable when vice exerts itself towards us in a definite act. In this view of it, resentment is nothing more than a sense of ill-desert where it really exists, and a desire to punish it so far as is necessary; and so far from being opposed to goodness, in the wide and proper sense of that word, it is a necessary part of it. The hatred of vice is the opposite pole to the love of virtue, and the positive cannot be evolved without the negative side. Of necessity, the strength of the one is the measure of that of the other. Moral purity, virtue, holiness, whatever we may choose to call it, is not a mere passive, undiscriminating quality. Nothing can be more

positive, active, and uncompromising. Against whatever is opposed to it, it arrays itself in a conflict that can know of no cessation and of no compromise till one or the other is completely triumphant; and this opposition cannot be malevolent, since precisely as it prevails happiness is extended, precisely as it fails misery bears sway. If this were not so, there could be nothing venerable or awful about goodness. It would not command our respect, or be worthy of the throne of the universe. This is what is termed in the Scriptures the anger of God, without malice, without revenge, without respect of persons except as good or evil; and it will be the misery of those who shall be finally opposed to God, that they will be opposed to Infinite Goodness, and that Infinite Goodness will be opposed to them, not because it is malevolent, but because it is Infinite Goodness. Here we find the source of all penal law. Without this, there could be no security, punishment, or redress. It is this feeling, which, on the perception of wickedness and ill-desert, if the injury be ours, we term resentment; if it be upon others, indignation; but the principle is the same, and is entirely different from malevolence. This was no part of the human constitution as made by God.

When we speak of the opposition of virtue and vice, it will be remembered that these are mere abstractions. Strictly speaking, there are only virtuous and vicious persons, and hence the punishment of vice must involve the infliction of personal misery, though without malevolence.

But it will be asked, If there be in man no other malevolent principle than this, how shall we account for the jealousy, the envy, the hatred, the malice and revenge that fill and disfigure the earth? They may, I think, all be traced to the perverting influence of selfishness on the

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original and natural principle of resentment. To be satisfied of this, a brief reference to each will suffice.

Jealousy is an affection which has direct and sole reference to self. We are jealous of no one who is not or may not be a rival. It is when interests are likely to conflict that selfishness, without provocation, stirs up that form of ill-will which we call jealousy. The same may be said of envy. Indeed, envy and jealousy are the same affection towards persons differently situated. That which is jealousy towards those who we fear may surpass us, becomes envy when once we are fairly distanced in the competition. In witnessing a contest, we feel no envy. Envy is the dislike of those who are above us because they are above us, and a desire to pull them down to our own level. It is, therefore, directly to selfishness that these two evil affections may be traced.

But jealousy and envy are apt to become settled hatred. Hear those who are, or have been competitors, speak of each other, and you will find the reason. You will find that they impute the success of their opponent to unfairness in him or others, to some cause which will justify them in showing resentment. Their self-estimation will

not permit them to think otherwise. With her jaundiced eye selfishness can convert even the excellences of others into faults, and then, having something that she supposes she can fairly blame, she usurps the place of conscience, and calls upon resentment, which in this unholy alliance becomes malice, to pursue them. Hatred does not spring up naturally from the relations in which we find ourselves in society, as do the natural affections, but requires as its condition some injury real or supposed. So with revenge. By its very nature and definition it implies previous injury, and it is nothing more than the natural feeling of resent

ment exaggerated by selfishness, and abused into a settled and inveterate passion.

The extent of these passions, and the slight occasions on which they are permitted, are indeed wonderful, but they may all be traced to the combination of selfishness with the natural and necessary principle of resentment. If we distinguish between actions that are simply injurious but not malevolent, as when a robber plunders another, not from any hatred of him, but from a love of his money; and if we make due allowance for the operation of a perverted and perverting selfishness on the natural feeling of resentment, we may see how far man may be said to have originally affections that should be called malevolent.

Here, as elsewhere, evil is from the perversion of that which was good. That part of our constitution from the perversion of which these affections arise, we vindicate. It is essential to goodness itself. It guards our highest interests; it is the basis of penal law, keeping crime and tyranny lurking in their lair; and no character which cannot, and, if need be, will not reveal itself as opposed with the force of the whole being to moral evil, can command our respect.

But while we thus vindicate this part of our constitution as it was originally given, we utterly condemn all jealousy and envy, all hatred, malice and revenge. They are not a part of our original constitution, and were never made by God. Jealousy and envy are not only among the basest, but are the meanest, of the passions. They are indulged in only by those who are conscious of inferiority, and are not only malignant, but are a confession of that degrading consciousness. These, as well as malice and envy, bring their own punishment with them. They bring it in the disquiet which they necessarily cause to their possessor