plexity as higher than mere primitive cognition or rational intuition. In the first two classes of intellectual products above mentioned, the intellectual element is almost sole. In the third there is the synthesis of a rational product with that of sensibility. But here, not only intellect and feeling are involved, as in the mere contemplation of the beautiful, the will is also reached. The idea of obligation is nothing except as there is in it not only feeling, but a requisition upon the will. As a product of the moral reason is an idea, there is in it intellect; as it is an idea of obligation, there is in it feeling; and as this feeling is that of an imperative upon the will, it is clear that in a normal state the activity of the moral reason would involve that of the whole man. It is as nearly a synthesis of intellect, feeling, and will, as is possible, and leave the will free. Between ideas of the moral reason and others there is the same difference as between a cannon-ball that is heated and one that is not. They do not lie still and cold, but respect action, and are of such a nature that we cannot be indifferent to them.

This coalescence of ideas and affections, this fusion and blending of them so that it is possible to give them but a single name, together with their immediate proximity to the will, is a characteristic of the moral nature that has not been sufficiently noticed. In it we have moral ideas and moral affections interpenetrating and moulding each other, and thus a combination, as of light and heat, that is the highest possible. As the product of the moral reason, these ideas and the accompanying feelings arise necessarily in all men; if they did not, we should not have a moral nature; and because the moral reason is reason and something more, it raises us, according to our principle of classi fication, to the highest grade of earthly, and, indeed, of

conceivable existence. It will thus be seen, too, that moral science must find its basis, not in any considerations of outward utility, or perception of external relations, but in the deepest and most fundamental intuitions of our nature. The power by which moral ideas are thus originated, originated by necessity, so that they spring up from the depths of our being, together with the emotion that accompanies and forms a part of them, is an essential element of personality. It is not something which the person may use, but which being withdrawn, personality would remain; it enters into its very framework. This is that by which we are especially made in the image of God. It is the organ of rational and spiritual intuitions. It is not exhausted by those ideas which all men must have that they may be men, but being held in right relations, it is capable of receiving, and in the progress of the man is necessitated to receive, new and higher ideas, still having the same characteristics of universality and necessity for all who reach the same point.

We saw in the third lecture how man is connected with all that is below him, through the laws that govern all below, and extend up to him. We now reach the point at which he is, or has the capacity to be, connected with that which is above him. As rational and in the image of God he must have, in kind, the capacities of the very highest creature, and be subject to every fundamental law of the spiritual world. The laws of that world reach down to him, as those of the world below reach up.

After reason the next element of personality and condition of moral action is a Rational Will,—a Will in Freedom.

Without freedom of some kind, connected with an act at some point, all are agreed that there can be no obliga

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tion or responsibility. A man is not responsible for the movement of the earth in its orbit, because it has no connection of any kind with his will. To awaken a sense of obligation in regard to anything which has thus no connection with the will, direct or indirect, proximate or remote, is impossible. When, therefore, we see a man perform an act that we call moral, the element of will and of choice is presupposed.

By some, by most indeed, this element of will is supposed to be the chief one in personality, and there are those who regard it as the only one. Others again think of it as the executive of a person already constituted. To me it seems that the moral ideas that are given by reason, in the light of which we choose and act, through which, indeed, the will is a rational instead of a brute will, are quite as necessary to personality as the power of choosing and acting, and that both are indispensable.

But with these two, - reason and free will, including moral ideas and affections, and so conscience, whatever we may think of the part that belongs to each, we have the a priori elements of personality, and so the power of doing a moral act.

I have spoken of personality as composed of elements. It seemed necessary to speak thus; and yet I am inclined to think that our idea of a person is simple. A person is something more than reason and will. We get misty and lose ourselves by always using abstract terms and the names of attributes. A person is a substance, a being that has reason and will. Here we reach an agent, and the true point of responsibility, the man himself. It is the man himself, the person, the self, the ego, the me, whatever you please to term it, that we hold responsible and praise or blame. It is this mysterious-mysterious as all things

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are that are simple - this mysterious and inscrutable person, this self-conscious, thinking, comprehending, electing being, it is the man himself that we approve or disapprove. Aside from their origin in him, actions have no moral quality. Constitutional tendencies, desires, affections, have no moral character till he adopts them, and consents, or elects that they shall move in a particular direction.

Of a person thus constituted the three characteristics are that he is rational, free, and moral. Such a being may perform acts merely instinctive; but as the moral reason, with its necessary products of moral ideas and affections, enters as an element into the conception of personality, it can never be optional with him whether he will have a moral character. He must have one involving the very essence of his being, and his only option is whether it shall be good or bad.

We have now the powers prerequisite to a moral act. But there is another condition. A moral act must be also rational, and as such must have reference to an end. This necessity which a rational being is under of acting with reference to an end, so that his doing this is a test of his rationality, would seem to imply that his conception of an end is the fundamental one for man as an active being. As has been said, the ideas of reason have a history and an order. For man, as speculative, the idea of existence is first. It is implied in all assertions respecting identity and causation. In the same way, the idea of an end involving a good is implied in all acts of rational choice. As a will, rational and free, is essential to morality, so must everything be that is a prerequisite of the action of such a will. But to a free and rational act of willing, the conception of an end is necessary. The moral sentiment, or

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conscience, is evolved only in connection with the action of free will with reference to an end. This may, therefore, be considered as the fundamental and primitive conception of man as active and moral.

But if reason would act reasonably it must not only know an end, but its own end. Would, then, a rational being naturally know his own end, or what he ought to choose? If not, he would be lost. Without a capacity for this, such a being would be an absurdity. The gropings of a baffled instinct would be nothing in comparison with his blindness and helplessness. This end may be known, either from the insight of reason, or from revelation; but however known, there must be a capacity in reason to recognize its own end; and the test of such an end as adequate must be that it shall always suffice to call forth the highest normal activity of the highest powers. In anything short of this a want would be felt. In such an end, if we consider the capacities, the worth and grandeur of spiritual being, there may be an infinite good. There may and must be that which should cause it to be adopted by the whole energy of the will.

We have now the prerequisites for a moral act. We have a person knowing his end. But a rational being knowing his end cannot but know his law, since the law is revealed in the end. Thus, and thus only, can he become "a law to himself." It is in the apprehension by a person of his end that the moral nature manifests itself in the immediate and necessary affirmation of obligation to choose that end. This is the moral law, and the whole of it. It is wholly spiritual, simply requiring choice. Lying in immediate proximity to the will, it cannot become a rule; no means can be used; and nothing but a want of will can prevent its being obeyed. Obligation to choose