the end is affirmed in view of it as good; and such a choice is approved as right.

It is here that we find the point of coalescence between intuitional or a priori systems of morality, and those that are inductive. At some point these must come together, for it is impossible that the great thinkers in either line should be wholly wrong. The intuitional element here finds its sphere in the immediate recognition by reason of its own end, and in the necessary affirmation of obligation to choose that end. The practical nature, asking, “Who will show me any good?" is also satisfied, because the end thus chosen is a good, and the good; and because there is in all questions of right a constant call for the activity of the inductive powers.

By some beings it may be that their true end alone is seen and embraced. They may know no other as possible, and so never be tempted. But for others there is an alternative so presented that there must be a choice between this end and its opposite. Let now the true end be chosen, and the star finds its orbit; there is moral order, there is peace, there is "joy in heaven."

Choosing thus his end, with an apprehension of the worth of spiritual being, with a consciousness of worthiness in having thus chosen, such a being would move on in peace, —not the peace of quiescence, but of a tranquil and deep joy,- till there should arise from within or from without some disturbing influence that might come between him and his end. Then, in proportion to his sense of the worth of the end, and of the obligation to choose and seek it, must be his abhorrence and condemnation of an opposite choice, and his opposition to anything that would divorce him from his end. Hence virtue is necessarily bi-polar. As such, it becomes holiness. This is reason

vindicating its right to attain its end. It is personality expressing its sense of the value of its end, now in complacency with it, and with all that would promote it, and now in indignation and opposition towards all that would oppose it. From the evolution on the one side comes all that is mild and winning in virtue; from that on the other all that is stern and awful. It is by the term holithat is, wholeness-that this double aspect, and so

ness

the completeness of virtue, is best expressed.

That the above may not seem opposed to our consciousness, it may be well to state that in choosing a supreme end it is not necessary that we should know or choose it abstractly and formally, but simply that our individual and specific choices should involve it, and be instances under it. So it is that we know and act under the idea or principle of causation, and so under mathematical axioms. The act of a child may involve the axiom that the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts, and yet the child may never have heard of the axiom, and in that form could not comprehend it.

In thus choosing a supreme end, if that end be the good of others, we reach the highest significance of the word love. This is an act both of the affections and the will, and carries every faculty and choice of the soul along with it. In it the man disposes of himself. It lies back of specific choices and volitions, and determines character. Springing from a synthesis of the rational sensibility and the will, it is the highest product of our highest powers, the consummate flower of our existence.

From what has been said above, we shall readily see what that form of activity is to which responsibility ultimately attaches. It is not volition regarded simply as an executive act; it is preference. It is that immanent act of

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preference in which we dispose of ourselves, and on which character depends. It is this that gives its set to the current of the soul, and determines the character of subsequent specific acts of preference and volition under it. It is an act of will, as distinguished from the feelings. It is either that impartial love which is commanded by the moral law; or a giving up of the soul to be governed by the propensities. It is at this point that we find moral freedom. That the ultimate point of responsibility must rest here, appears from the effect of such a preference in controlling the thoughts and modifying the feelings, and, as thought and feeling act and react upon each other, in changing the very principles of association. Nothing is so cunning of fence as such an underlying preference when anything would interfere with it. As already intimated, it may so control the laws of evidence as perceived by us, that a man shall really believe and act upon a lie, and mistake the reality of such belief for that genuine sincerity and coming to the light of which our Saviour speaks. Hence it is that a man may verily think that he is doing God service while he is persecuting his people, and doing his utmost to overthrow his cause in the earth.

The word "intention" is often used by moralists to indicate what is ultimate when they would reach the source of morality; but it does not do this. Intention refers to specific volition, and implies an opportunity, real or supposed, to carry out the intention. Hatred of a person

whom we were sure we never could reach would not be an intention, nor would it give rise to any intention of injuring him. All intentions that indicate character spring from some form of settled preference, which may multiply itself in such intentions without number or exhaustion.

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Hence this preference, which in the Scriptures is called the heart, is compared to a fountain.

At this point there seems to be a general agreement among writers on morals on three things:

The first is, that man is responsible for his preferences, his choices, the acts of his will generally, for these and their results, and for nothing else. It will be found that those writers, as Edwards, who speak of man as responsible for the affections or heart, either regard these as synonymous with will, or as a part of it. Says Edwards, "The will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will." There are, indeed, some whose language might lead us to suppose that they hold to an inherent moral quality in affections that are purely spontaneous; but on reflection it will be found impossible to attach responsibility to a being incapable of rational preference, and so of the choice of an end.

It is agreed, in the second place, that there is a broad distinction between what is called, sometimes an immanent preference, sometimes a governing purpose, sometimes an ultimate intention, and those volitions which are merely executive, and precede specific acts under such a purpose.

In the third place, it is agreed that character is as the governing preference or purpose that it consists in an original and thorough determination by a man of himself with reference to some end chosen by him as supreme.

In connection with the choice of a supreme end all the phenomena of a moral life are evolved. In view of the end there arises, as has been said, a sense of obligation to choose it. From these two arise the idea of moral law; for moral law is the affirmation by reason of the obliga

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tion to act rationally. A divine law is the same law proclaimed by the authority of the Infinite Reason, and accompanied by sanctions. So is it that while the man is a law to himself, the divine law is recognized at once as the law of the inner life; and so will its full revelation, if the inner law has become obscured, be but as the clear light of day after the dim twilight. It will not be a thing wholly new and strange, but homogeneous, and but the increase and fulness of "that light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." It is into this light that men may come more fully and walk in purity, or they may withdraw from it, and walk in darkness.

After the ideas of obligation and of law, must arise those of merit or demerit, of self-approbation or of self-condemnation, as the true end, or its alternative, has been chosen. Merit and demerit are supposed to arise chiefly in connection with something done outwardly, but if the end be chosen with a paramount affection, as a supreme end must be, outward acts according with the choice will follow of course. These simply indicate the strength of the inward principle, and in that is the only merit.

Again, in a sense of merit or demerit there is not only a present satisfaction or dissatisfaction, but a promise or a threat for the future, and these may become elements of great power. We thus get the notion of reward and punishment, and through these of responsibility, for, if there were no reward and no punishment, there could be no responsibility. It is at this point that the moral nature of man is connected with the government of God as outwardly revealed. If there were no consequences of acts in the way of rewards and punishments through the will of another we could not be under the government of that other, or responsible to him; and if those consequences