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lief, or whatever we may choose to call them, could have been made before the time of Hume, he would probably never have been heard of as a philosophical skeptic. The mind of Hume had in perfection the acuteness of the skeptic, which enabled him to see defects, and so to destroy, but had not the comprehensiveness needed for construction.

What can be more intimate

But to take a plainer case. to a man, or more perfectly known, than that of which he is conscious? If a man cannot know what he is conscious of, it would seem that he cannot know anything; and yet the whole question, between Reid and Hamilton on the one side, and the great mass of philosophers on the other, respects simply the fact whether there is or is not given in an act of consciousness, both a subject and an object that are not, in the last analysis, identical. What consciousness testifies to must be accepted. This all allow. Not to do it would be suicidal even to the skeptic; for he would have no ground for affirming that he doubted. The only question is, what it is that consciousness gives. If we say that it does thus give both the subject and the object, that sim ple affirmation sweeps away in a moment the whole basis of the ideal and skeptical philosophy. It becomes as the spear of Ithuriel, and its simple touch will change what seemed whole continents of solid speculation into mere banks of German fog. If we say that the subject and object are not both given, we are then left to find as we may a solid basis for our belief in the existence of an external world. But however we may decide it, the fact that the great philosophical dispute of the day would be settled at once by a precise statement of what is given in the consciousness of every man, shows clearly that our investigations become more difficult as we approach the

centre of our being. It shows, too, how far apart, on subjects like these, men may be in their statements, whose belief is really the same; for the consciousness is really the same in all, and is accepted by all.

What has now been said relates indeed to the intellect; but the moral nature is not less central, and presents, to say the least, equal difficulties on this ground.

In connection with the above, it may be well to notice a peculiarity of all advances and discoveries made in this direction, as they are related to the mass of men who are not philosophers. It is, that the more profound and difficult the discoveries are, the more they will seem, when clearly announced, to be a matter of course, and no discoveries at all. Though few men are able to state what is really contained and implied in their own consciousness, yet, when it is stated by another, there can be in it nothing strange to them; they recognize it and say, "Yes," "Certainly," and it seems to them they could have made the same statement. The continent is discovered, the egg is set on end, and nothing could have been easier.

A fourth reason, which has been implied already, and which has operated both as cause and effect, has been the want of definite terms. Science requires that terms should be used uniformly in the same sense, and that they should convey the same impression to all who use them. This can be done perfectly only in mathematics, may be approximated in dealing with objects of sense, but is most difficult in all that pertains to mental and moral science. In these the terms are borrowed from material objects, and so can be applied only figuratively; and then in applying them there is a difficulty that does not belong to physics." When I point a child to a particular star and say, "That is Jupiter," I am sure that we both see the same object; and

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when speaking of it thereafter, we cannot fail of understanding each other. But when I speak to him of "the reason," as distinguished from "the understanding," or of "first truths of reason," as distinguished from "empirical knowledge," or of conscience, I speak to him of what is in my own mind, and he must respond respecting what is in his mind. But differing as we do in age, constitution, and education, we can never be sure that our impressions are alike. What," said a master to his man who had refused to do his bidding on the ground of conscience, "what do you mean by conscience?" "It is," said he, "something in here that says, I won't." In the opinion of Paley, if conscience be anything original and native to the mind, it cannot be distinguished from prejudices and habits. Some think it simply the power of moral discrimination; others add an emotive element to reward and punish, and others still an impulsive power. Some regard it as the voice of God, and nearly or quite infallible; others as simply a form of judgment, like any other, and equally liable to error. Here the same word is used; and so it is, only with a difference of meaning somewhat wider, when we speak of a sign of a tavern, and of a sign of the zodiac; and till there is agreement in the meaning of the term, no progress can be made in discussion.

How, then, shall we be freed from this difficulty? Who shall have the right to say what the term conscience shall include? No one. But as thought is concentrated, as it will be, more and more upon man himself, the facts of his moral nature will come into more distinct consciousness, and the discriminations thus made will demand the narrowing down of old terms, or the invention of new ones, and these will gradually become definite and generally accepted. When terms are thus gained, they will react upon

thought, as instruments invented react upon the inventive power; for language is not only a product, but an instrument of thought.

This process is going on, slowly but satisfactorily, in moral, and particularly in mental science. In the latter, the old classification of the faculties was into those of the understanding and the will. This sufficed till further examination showed that all the facts could not be ranged under these. We not only think and will, we also feel; and accordingly, after long discussion and some aid from abroad, the threefold division of the faculties into those of Thought, of Feeling, and of Action, is almost universally accepted. Under each of these a distinct science, or, if you please, department, is formed, in which a similar process must go on. In that of thought, or, as he terms it, of cognition, Sir William Hamilton has introduced new terms and classifications, some of which will doubtless be adopted. The same will be done in the other departments, till the whole shall assume all the definiteness and completeness of which the science, from its nature, is capable.

This difficulty from a want of terms, and of uniformity in their usage, has been felt from the first, and will be appreciated the more as the subject is more studied. It is one concerning which it is easy to give precepts, but difficult to follow them. Of this difficulty no one has been more fully aware than Locke. He wrote largely upon it, and gave wise precepts; and yet used the word idea so loosely that on the great subject of the origin of knowledge it is still uncertain what he really believed. On the Continent he was so interpreted as to be made the father of materialism. Many of the English admitted of no such interpretation, and both parties sustained themselves by

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adequate quotations. On this subject I make no promises.

The next, and the last consideration I shall adduce to account for the slower progress of moral science, is the failure of men in practical virtue.

That there has been such failure no one will deny; and it has operated in various ways. When a science, as formerly that of war, is regarded as at the basis of the great business of life, it will be studied. Attention will be concentrated upon it, and it will be carried to the greatest possible perfection. But let the subject be one for which, while every one acknowledges its importance, few have any practical regard; let it be thought of as something which will do for the closet and the schools, but not for practical life; let there be a general impression that its maxims are repeated in a perfunctory way, as a cover to the real principles of action, and any earnest or general study of the science is impossible. Theories there may be. They are needed for conversation and the Reviews; but only as there is a real, heartfelt, practical interest in virtue, can there be a genuine struggle for the truth as vital. The general failure of men in practical virtue has created an atmosphere unfavorable to an earnest search after the truth in morals. The set of the current in society has been against it.

Again, under this head, in proportion as men are vicious, not only will they lack interest in the science, but they become disqualified for its pursuit.

This is in accordance with the laws of all the faculties. The faculties are strengthened by exercise; they can be strengthened in no other way; and they are exercised rightly only by doing just the work which God intended they should do. The moral powers, as a whole, can be so exer