tial to a right understanding of the structure by him who would study it; it is in its relation to this that the structure has its perfection and appropriate use; and from this that the value of all rules and laws for, and in its use arises. Of whatever can be comprehended and used, even of man himself, all this may be affirmed.

Let us, then, apply these principles to man.

As man was made by a wise and good being, he must have been made for some end, and the conception of this end must have controlled the formation and adjustment of every part of his complex structure.

From the study of this structure we may gain some knowledge of its end. Aside from revelation, this is our only knowledge on this point. Nor is the amount of knowledge to be thus gained small. Of some parts of the body, as the hands, the feet, the eyes, the teeth, the end is revealed at once in the structure. It is this knowledge of structure as related to use that gives comprehension. Only in the light of it can we have complacency in the structure when right, or the power to correct it when wrong. In the same way the faculties of the mind, in their relation to each other, reveal their end, and thus the law of their use. An intelligent being whose end should not be revealed in itself would be an absurdity. If the end were not revealed to itself, it would be lost. It is the possibility and measure of such knowledge that determines the possibility and measure of any philosophy of man.

The perfection of man, viewed merely as a product of divine power, must consist in his adaptation and capacity to attain the end for which he was made.

That, and that only, is the right use of the faculties of man, of all his susceptibilities and powers of agency,by which they attain the end for which they were made.

AN END ATTAINED IN THREE WAYS.

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If man could see the end for which he was made as God sees it, and dispose himself perfectly for its attainment, he would be in harmony with God; his faculties would work in harmony with each other, and he would do all that he ought to do.

Laws and rules for the conduct of man, whether confessedly human, or claiming to be divine, are valid only as they are based on a true perception of the relation between the human constitution and its proper end. If a course of conduct, prescribed by what claims to be law, could be shown to be opposed to the attainment of the end for which man was made, it would not be right to pursue it. The will of God is revealed in the end, and he cannot contradict himself.

In the following discussions the word end, as applied to man, will be of frequent use, and, to avoid ambiguity, it may be well to say that the idea it involves is complex. As intelligent and responsible, the end of man is to choose something; as an agent, it is to do something; as capable of enjoyment, it is to enjoy something; and as a creature made by God, his end is to be that which will enable him to do and to enjoy all that God intended he should. He is to be something, to choose and do something, and to enjoy something; and his whole end will be, to be what God intended he should be, to choose and do what He intended he should choose and do, and to enjoy what He intended he should enjoy. He who should fail in any of these would fail of attaining his whole end; and if the word should at any time seem to refer particularly to one of these elements, it will not be to the intentional exclusion of the others.

An end may be attained in three ways. 1st. It may be attained by instinct.

And,

Here the agent

has no knowledge or rational comprehension of the end, but is guided by a blind impulse.

2d. An end may be attained by obeying a rule implicitly. Here there may, or there may not be a conception of the specific end, but the connection between the means and the end is never seen. In this way children are governed. Here the principle is not instinct, but faith. They follow the rule, that is, they do as they would if they understood the connection between the means and the end, and so receive the same benefit. To a finite being faith is a necessary principle of action, and becomes practical wisdom when there is a rational ground of confidence in the word of another because it is his word, or of implicit obedience to his commands.

3d. An end may be attained understandingly and rationally. The structure may be known, now regarded simply as a means; the end may be known; and there may also be a clear perception of the mode in which the structure must be used to attain the end. In this mode of action man would not act from law, but from a knowledge of the reasons of the law. He would be wholly a philosopher. Viewing the end as God views it; voluntarily choosing this end; applying all his powers as they were intended for its attainment, he would do all that he ought to do, would have the approbation of God, the approbation of his own conscience, and the sanction of reason.

But if, in thus attaining the end for which he was made, man would, as has just been said, do all that he ought to do, then have we answered, in a general way, one of the questions mentioned above. Would he thus do all that he ought to do? If we say yes, then Moral Philosophy will be the science which teaches man the end for which he was made, why he should attain that end, and how to attain it.

MORAL SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY.

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To the above definition it may be objected, that it includes theology and religion. It does so only so far as to justify a consideration of our duties towards God, and that is found in all treatises on morals. Moral philosophy differs from theology in taking for granted the being and attributes of God; and religion differs from morality because it includes all our duties towards men as commanded by God; and also because it implies an order of faculties, and a class of duties, as those of worship, of which mere morality could know nothing. Still, the science of duty, of obligation, must be one. No satisfactory account of the moral nature of man and of its full sphere can be given on any other supposition. We may, if we choose, divide our duties into those towards God, and those towards man; but moral science must go wherever the word ought can be applied.

But if not faulty on this ground, the definition has an advantage in regard to Christianity. We are able, in the light of it, to state precisely, which has not always been done, the relation between Christianity, as a remedial system, and moral philosophy. This is entirely different from that of natural religion. It is that of medicine to physiology. Physiology can know nothing of medicine except as it would restore the system to health; and moral philosophy, if we accept the above definition, can recognize as obligatory no precept peculiar to Christianity, except as it can be shown to be necessary, in our present state, to the attainment of the end for which man was made. Let this be shown of any such precept, and its obligation will not only be recognized, but it will be an evidence that the religion is from God; and a demonstrated capacity in the religion to bring man fully to his end would be a demonstration of its truth. From the consti

tution of man moral philosophy would find his end. In the end it would find revealed the will of God, and in the relation between the constitution in its various parts and its end would find revealed the law of God, and those rules in accordance with which his faculties must act for the attainment of the end. Christianity, on the other hand, is wholly remedial. It supposes man to have broken law, and it harmonizes with moral philosophy and can be accepted by it only as it can attain for man his original end, — or, it may be, something better, though of that moral philosophy could know nothing.

Shall we, then, accept the above definitions? Let us do so, so far, at least, as to make further explorations in this direction. The definition speaks of an end; but ends are of different kinds, and these we shall need to consider. An end may be subordinate, ultimate, or supreme.

A subordinate end is one chosen for the sake of some end beyond itself. Thus books are chosen for the sake of knowledge, and the implements of husbandry for the sake of a crop. A subordinate end, regarded by itself, is not necessarily a good. It may be the reverse.

An ultimate end is one that is chosen for its own sake, and without reference to anything beyond. It must be some form of good. The enjoyment there is in viewing a beautiful prospect is valuable for its own sake, and is the ultimate end in making the ascent whence the prospect may be seen.

An ultimate end, it is to be noticed, is always the result of action, and never the action itself. It never lies proximate to the volition, and so cannot be the immediate object in any act of volition, and is never commanded. The formula is"do this and live." It is the thing to be done that is commanded, and that is to be willed; the