enjoyment, blessedness, according to the faculties that act. Of these the conception is simple and undefinable except by synonymous terms. They are that in which we rest, in which we are so satisfied that, within a given sphere, we look for nothing beyond. From our activity as excited in taste, by odors, by music, in admiration of beauty, in love, there may be a satisfaction which shall be the measure of our capacity in that direction. This all concede to be a good. We say, then, that in the satisfaction attached by God to the normal activity of our powers, we find a good, an end that is wholly for its own sake. We say, too, that it is only in, and from such activity that we can have the notion of any satisfaction, enjoyment, blessedness, either for ourselves or others; and that that form and proportion of activity which would result in our perfect blessedness would be right.

Such a form of activity will be to the mind what health is to the body, and in the maintenance of that will be found the highest duty and the highest good of man, his wisdom and his virtue. From it must result to others all the good he is capable of doing; and to himself all he is capable of enjoying. Here, as in health, what man has to do, is to maintain the activity, and God gives the result.

It will appear, from what has been said, that there may be as many forms of good as there are faculties or forms of activity; and these forms of good may differ not only in degree, but in kind. Has man a sensitive nature? There is, from the activity of that, and from each modification of that activity, as in the different senses, a sensitive good. It is multiform, but one. Has he an intellectual nature? There is from the activity of that an intellectual good. We may, indeed, conceive of the intellect simply as a capacity for knowing, and as acting without the slightest

enjoyment, as light without heat. But this is not its actual constitution. Call it what you please, derive it whence you will, there is enjoyment in the very process and activity of the mind in the driest mathematical demonstration. Has man, again, an aesthetic, a rational, a moral, a religious nature? There is, from the activity of each of these, a corresponding good. It is clear, then, that the whole good of man would arise from a combination in the highest possible degree of all these forms of good; also, that the highest good would be from the activity of the highest powers in a right relation to their highest object. Nor is this highest good any mere happening, as is sometimes said of happiness; nor is it the mere satisfying of any craving; it is that result in God's creatures that was intended by him, and is an image of his own rational and holy blessedness in the activity of those powers in which we are made in his image.

Of the conditions of good the above statement is the most general that can be made, and admits of no exception. It implies nothing in relation to the direction of the activity as designed to produce our own good, or that of others. If there are in man no faculties except for promoting the well-being of the agent himself, then the wellbeing of the agent will be found in the highest activity of those faculties. But if there are also faculties capable of working disinterestedly, and that were designed to promote the good of others, then, whatever good can come to the individual through those faculties, will come from their highest activity for the very end for which they were made. That man, as social, has such faculties, there can be no doubt; and it may be that it is only in the activity of these for the good of the whole that the end and high- ̈ est good of the individual can be found.

U

In the view just given, we have the basis of a conception of the spiritual universe analogous to that given in astronomy of the physical universe, but far higher. In astronomy, no less than in mind, activity, movement, is at the basis of all order, and beauty, and beneficence. But there the motion is impressed from without; here it is from within; there it is unintelligent; here it comprehends itself; there it is necessitated; here it is free; there there is no consciousness and no emotion; here the movement is reflected in the consciousness, and every faculty sings. Think, then, of creatures, intelligent, moral, free, with susceptibilities high and keen, in numbers far outnumbering the starry hosts. See in each a central personality — a mysterious selfhood, with its attendant faculties revolving, like satellites, harmoniously about it. See these planetary intelligences in their myriad heavens, each moving in his own bright orbit, at once of duty and of freedom, mutually giving and receiving, and singing together that song which was typified when the morning stars sang together of old, -and you have a spectacle which He who sits upon the central throne may well look upon with complacency, and pronounce "very good."

That the account now given is correct, appears from this. If we suppose enjoyment, satisfaction, blessedness, to be wholly withdrawn from the universe, we should feel, whatever state or form of activity there might be, that its value was gone. It would be a vast machine producing nothing. But if we suppose the highest possible blessedness of God and of his universe secured, we are satisfied. It must surely be difficult to satisfy those who cannot find an adequate end and good in their own highest blessedness, and in the highest blessedness of God and his uni

verse.

THE GROUND OF OBLIGATION.

55

If the statements now made be correct, we are prepared to answer the second question mentioned above. The first was, What ought to be done? and the general answer was, To ascertain the end for which we were made, and to seek to accomplish that. The second question was, Why ought it to be done? and the answer is, Because of the intrinsic excellency and worth of that end. Man, and all moral beings, are capable, as such, of a high and holy blessedness which can be compared with nothing else, which is the fruit and crown of all virtuous and holy activity, which has no exchangeable value, but has, in itself, an infinite worth.

If it be still asked why a man ought to seek an end which has this intrinsic worth, the reply is that this idea of obligation or oughtness is a simple idea, and therefore that we can only state the occasion on which it arises. Of its presence in connection with our choice of this end we can give no account, except that such is our constitution. This, however, does not compel us to say that we ought to seek a thing simply because we ought. The sense of obligation or oughtness may or may not precede the choice, but could have no place if there were not a ground of action besides itself. It does not come up out of vacancy. A man ought to choose that which is congruous to his nature. It would seem that an act of choice must be from something in the thing chosen thus congruous. He ought to choose his own well-being rather than the contrary; but he ought to choose it not simply because he ought, but because it is well-being. If there were nothing valuable in itself, there would be nothing that ought to be either chosen or done.

For those who adopt the general line of thought we are now pursuing, this question concerning good is funda

mental, because there is involved in it the rule for right action. According to this, any course of action which will secure the whole good for which man was made must be right.

But among those who believe that the rule has its basis in the highest good, there is a difference of opinion as to what that good is. On this subject I cannot enter at large, but will refer briefly to two different views. These make the good consist in that which is conditional for the results, and not in the results themselves.

The first is that of Jouffroy. His view is that good consists in universal order. "When," says he, "reason first perceives that, as there is a good for us, so is there for all creatures whatsoever, and that thus the particular good of each creature is but an element of universal order, of absolute good, then does the idea of good, so disengaged and elevated to the sphere of absolute being, appear to our reason as obligatory."* Here two questions may be asked. The first is, whether the reason does necessarily form this idea of universal order. Since the reason has been so much spoken of, nothing has been more common than to mistake the results of abstraction and generalization for its immediate and necessary ideas. That this is not one of those ideas, may be inferred from the fact that men are not agreed in what the order consists. Universal order may be either that form and extent of activity which would secure universal blessedness; or that perfect distribution of good and evil which would constitute moral order, but would involve punishment and suffering.

But if this idea of universal order be an idea of reason, it would not follow that the highest good was in that. It would be only conditional for blessedness. This it doubt

* Introduction to Ethics.