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thinking by willing it. He must think. He may control the current of his thoughts, but think he must; and if his thoughts had flowed on forever, as they do in dreams, without the intervention of a personal power, he would have been a thinking thing. Man, also, feels desires. springing up. These he may or may not gratify, but there they are, a part of his nature. The natural affections, too, put forth their tendrils like the vine, and quite as independently of any will of man.

With these faculties the self-conscious, rational, personal being, with powers of supervision and comprehension, is endowed; into this nature is put, or rather we may say is so incorporated with it that it becomes a part of himself. This nature is an epitome of all that is below him, and he was put into it not only that he might govern himself, but govern it, as we saw in the last lecture, after the model of that government which God exercises over nature itself. This is the garden into which man is put that he may dress it and keep it.

Am I, then, distinctly understood at this point? Is it seen that there are activities going on within, not only our bodies, but our minds, with which our wills have as little to do as with the springing up of the grass? These faculties and activities are one thing, and we are another. We are responsible for the activities only as we can control them directly or indirectly.

In this original and spontaneous nature there are characteristics common to all men, and also diversities apparently as great as in natural scenery. Some natures are richer and grander than others; they tower up like the great mountains. Some are more easy of control, and some more difficult.

We now proceed, as was proposed, to the consideration

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and classification of our various faculties and powers as they are related to ends.

In this aspect the faculties or powers may be divided into two great classes:

I. Those which are instrumental for the attainment of ends beyond themselves. This is the first class. Here we find,

1st. Those which indicate ends. These are the Instincts, the Appetites, the Desires, and the Natural Affections. And,

2d. The Intellect, in the light of which we pursue ends. These are the Instrumental Powers, and do not necessarily imply a moral nature. They require to be governed.

II. The second great class of powers are those in whose activity we find ends beyond which there are no others. These are our Moral Nature. By them we elect and sanction ends. They govern, or, at least, ought to govern. These are the powers that belong to man as a person. They are Reason, Moral Affections, and Free-will.

The Instrumental Powers are neither good nor bad in themselves, but as they are used. Generically we share them with the animals, but they are much modified by being taken into connection with a higher nature.

Let us, then, first consider those powers which indicate ends.

In the conception of an end the primary element is not intellectual. If there were no original, no rational apprehension of good involving desirableness, congruity, automatic tendency, impulse, appetency or craving, revealing some want to be satisfied, or capacity of enjoyment to be met, we could have no conception of an end. In our analysis in this direction this is the last thing that we reach, and so is conditional for all the rest. The intellect is im

plied. There must be consciousness. Every mental operation, whether perceptive or impulsive, must take place in the light of that. But consciousness being given, the impulse towards an end or the apprehension of it as having in it a good, is the primary element in our conception of an active, as distinguished from a contemplative being. Without such impulse or apprehension, the objects we now seek might be known as they are in themselves, but not as ends for us. There would be no motive for the voluntary exertion of the intellect even. As a part of our nature, these impulses are generically the same in all men, but reveal themselves in different proportions, and in them we find what have been called the active powers of man. By this it is not meant that the contemplative powers are not active, but that they do not, and these do, lead to action.

The powers which indicate ends are commonly, and, as it seems to me, correctly divided into the Instincts, the Appetites, the Desires, and the Affections. Of these there is no question respecting any except instinct, the existence of which in man has sometimes been doubted.

Instinct, which we shall first consider, is defined by Paley to be "a propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction." It leads animals obviously destitute of either understanding or reason to perform the same acts as if possessed of those powers in the highest degree. In building her cells the bee proceeds on the principles of mechanics and of the abstruser mathematics. In incubation the hen seems to have a knowledge of the doctrine of different specific gravities, and turns her eggs over regularly because the yolk is slightly heavier than the white. Animals with migratory, and those with acquisitive instincts, proceed on an apparent knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies for months in the future.

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In all animals of the same species instinct is mostly uniform, and, as we descend in the scale of creation, becomes, in the inverse ratio of understanding and reason, more uniform, more blind, and more perfect. A pure and unperverted instinct may always be trusted implicitly. A marvellous and a beautiful thing it is to see "the stork in the heaven knowing her appointed times; and the turtle, and the crane, and the swallow, observe the time of their coming." Surely, here "He leadeth the blind in a way that they know not." Here extremes meet Here extremes meet the perfec

tion of reason and the perfection of ignorance.

But as the light of understanding and reason increases, the glimmerings of instinct seem lost. Accordingly, most writers on morals have not noticed this as one of the active powers, or, if they have, have spoken of it as confined almost wholly to animals. But if instinct is needed by rational creatures we shall be sure to find it, for God does not care less for them than for the ant and the bee. It would be in accordance with all we have hitherto seen of the order of the universe, and of the mode in which its unity is secured, if we should find this, like gravitation, passing up and blending itself with the activity of the very highest power of its own order. Or, if any should suppose that this, the lowest form of intelligent action, cannot blend with those intuitions of reason which it so much resembles, it is yet pleasing to see in its certain guidance the best analogon and symbol of perfect reason, just as gravitation, which is the lowest motive power, is the best symbol of love, which is the highest of all.

I suppose, however, that something of instinct does blend with the activity of our highest powers. For this, it is not necessary that we should be under the guidance of any specific instinct, for wherever there is a tendency.

in our nature that is automatic, there we find the instinctive element. Hence we may, and do, speak of rational instincts. In every created nature, however high, there must be tendencies and yearnings by which the true end of the being shall be revealed to itself, and in which the first movements towards that end shall originate. That a good of any kind should begin to be sought in any other way, is not conceivable. And so the Scriptures represent it. They speak of thirsting for God; and the Saviour said, "If any man thirst, let him come to me and drink."

Our associations with instinct may be low; but it is really a high and sacred thing. In it we see the Highest stooping to the lowest, and illustrating that care and guidance of which they may feel secure who follow the promptings of any nature that is unperverted, and as it came from his hand.

We now proceed to the Appetites. These are those cravings of the animal nature which have for their object the well-being of the body and the continuance of the race.

These are to be distinguished from a desire for those pleasures of the palate, for example, with which they become so intimately associated that they are seldom thought of separately. The craving is purely instinctive, and, as such, has in a healthy state the infallibility of instinct, both in indicating and measuring the wants of the system; but the pleasure of eating and drinking will be according to the quality and condiments of the material taken. This pleasure may be perpetuated far beyond the point at which the craving is satisfied; and the modes of causing it may be reduced to a system and a science. The science of cookery will be useful as it fits substances to satisfy the craving, and so for assimilation; it will be injurious as it merely stimulates the palate. If the substance

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