of the artificial ones, is so great that the purpose of God with reference to this part of the constitution is worthy of careful study.

We now pass to the Desires.

Of these the appetites are not only the condition, but they foreshadow and symbolize them. The desires are to the mind what the appetites are to the body.

Their negative characteristics are that they do not take their rise from the body; that they are not periodical, and that they do not cease after attaining a particular object. Positively, they are cravings which have for their object the well-being of the mind, as the appetites have for theirs the well-being of the body. They act in the first place impulsively and specifically with reference to particular objects; subsequently they are adopted by the reason, and through the operation of that and the generalizing faculty, their objects come to be designated by general terms, as knowledge and power.

What the original desires are, and how many, philosophers have not been agreed. This we may ascertain as we may what the appetites are. The ultimate appeal must be to consciousness; but if we can determine beforehand or by observation what is requisite for the well-being of the body, we can tell what the appetites will be. So with the desires. If we can ascertain what is needed for the well-being of the mind, we may know what they are. Towards those things we may be sure there will be instinctive tendencies or impulses which reason is to accept, direct, and limit, but which will not wait for the discovery by her of their necessities before they act.

The desires, like the appetites, imply appropriation, a gathering in, a use and assimilation of materials by ourselves. They are related to the affections, and are for the

affections which are above them, and which imply bestowment, and giving out. As the appropriations by the appetites were not intended to be selfish or for their own sake, but for the giving forth of every form of physical and mental activity, so the appropriations by the desires were intended to furnish the material and groundwork for the activity of the affections and the will.

What, then, would be needed for the perfection of the mind itself, and that man might act most effectively through his affections for the good of others? He would need,—

1st. His own continued and secure existence. He would need property, that is, the possession of those things by which life may be sustained. He would need it both as a provision for himself, and as a condition of generosity to others. He would then need knowledge for his guidance; he would need power to reach the ends suggested by a regard for his own good and the suggestions of the affections for others; and he would need the good-will and esteem of others that he might coöperate with them, and they with him, and stand in such a relation to them as to be able to do them good. These he would need; they would be indispensable to his completeness in himself, and in his relations to others; and for each of these he has a natural and original desire.

The desires, then, which we shall consider, are,

1. The Desire of Continued Existence.

2. Of Knowledge.

3. Of Property.

4. Of Power.

5. Of Affection, Good-will, Esteem.

Besides these, it has been said of late, and almost universally, that we have the desire of happiness, and the desire of society.

That the desire of happiness cannot be placed on the same footing with the other desires, is plain,

1st. Because happiness is the result of the normal activity of each of the faculties. We know it only as such. But a desire, whose office it should be to receive the product of all the other faculties, would differ much from a simple desire that produces happiness. In other cases the desire is for a specific thing, and when that is met happiness is the result; but if we suppose an original desire of happiness, there can be no happiness back of the happiness. desired, to be its result, and so its whole constitution must be different from that of the other desires.

2d. It does not seem either simple or philosophical to make a desire for knowledge, and a desire for the happiness resulting from that, each an original and simple desire. It would be more plausible to suppose, as some do, that the desire for happiness is the only original desire, and that the desire of knowledge, like that for books, is wholly secondary. But this will not do, because, if we had had no original desire for knowledge, we could never have begun to seek it, and should have found no happiness in its pursuit.

3d. In all other cases the desire goes directly to its own object. It finds that, and happiness is the result. But no man ever sought, or can seek, directly for happiness; he must have something else as his direct object, and find that indirectly.

4th. As each desire impels directly to its own end, and knows of nothing else, it may, in a measure, be its own guide; but, as happiness may result from different and often incompatible desires and faculties, there is far more need of a higher power than any blind impulsion to guide in its pursuit.

What, then, is the relation of this to the other desires? To me it seems to be the same as that of consciousness to the several specific faculties of cognition. Consciousness is not a separate faculty, but accompanies and pervades all the acts of each faculty. In the same way the desire of happiness is not a separate and specific desire, but accompanies and pervades each act of such desire. As good is the immediate product of the activity of our faculties, it must be given in the original act of consciousness. Every such act involves the conception, first, of being; second, of activity, since consciousness is activity; and, third, if the act be normal, of good as the result. But good thus known must be desired, otherwise it could not be conceived of as good. In this way it is that a desire of good enters into every specific form of desire, and that, as consciousness is the generic form of cognition, so the desire of good or of happiness is the generic form of all the desires.

For the existence of a specific desire of society the authority is high. That society is the natural sphere of man there can be no doubt, and it is surprising that the hypothesis of Hobbes, that the state of nature is a state of warfare, should have been deemed worthy of a labored refutation. Man," it has been well said, "is born in society, and there he remains." The state of nature is a state of society.

But, while it cannot be doubted that man was formed for society, I yet esteem it rather a condition of his being than the object of a specific desire. He has desires and affections the exercise of which implies society, and it is, as it seems to me, the direct exercise of these, and not society itself apart from this exercise, that he desires. Take from him the desire of esteem, of power, of loving and being beloved, all those specific desires, and affections,

and sympathies, which are mentioned by the philosophers. separately, and which imply society for their exercise, and the residuum that would be left of a desire of society, as such, would be little or nothing. Observing a certain effect, the combined effect of all our faculties, they seem to have contrived a new faculty to account for it, extracting and compounding it from all the others. Certain it is that our delight in society arises chiefly from the exercise of other desires and affections which there find their sphere, and if any shall choose to say that there is, besides the effect resulting from the combined influence of these, an instinct or desire for society, I am content.

Though happiness and society are not inaugurated and guarded by a particular desire, yet the design of God in regard to them is even more clearly and strongly indicated than if they were. To me these seem to be, the one like warmth, and the other like the atmosphere, pervasive and enfolding conditions of our activity, and hence more intimately associated with it, and more fully cared for than any single principle of action. in mathematics that are essential at every step in the reasonings, as compared with the definitions and hypotheses. on which particular demonstrations depend.

They are like the axioms

I shall close this lecture with some remarks on the first of the desires mentioned, that of Continued Existence. This is often mentioned as the strongest of the desires. We say, (6 as dear as life itself." Yet it yields to that of reputation, and revenge, and sometimes gives way before mere weariness and ennui. Nor is the fact that there are so few suicides certain evidence of the power of this desire, since men often fear death greatly who desire life feebly, or not at all.

It is the object of this desire to guard life in sudden