tution bill (an administration measure), and the Chaffee indiarubber extension patent, which kept a band of lobbyists in pay at Washington for two years. Both measures failed, though more than $100,000 was spent. The testimony before the Covode committee of investigation did not show corruption in a single member of Congress. In the case of President Johnson's trial by impeachment, in 1868, there was an extensive lobby operating back and forth between Washington and New York, and early knowledge of the unexpected acquittal was traded upon by men outside of Congress, but the managers found no evidence whatever that any Senator received money for his vote. In the case of the Pacific mail steamship subsidy lobby, in 1872, more than $800,000 was expended, of which $300,000 went to an ex-Congressman, and remained entirely unaccounted for, and the rest was divided among lobbyists, journalists, and obscure employees for supposed influence in House or Senate. The subsidy, which was passed, was for the annual sum of $500,000, but the grant was repealed two years later, and the Ways and Means committee reported, on investigation, that no money was found to have been paid to any member of Congress. At times in our history there has been a British lobby, with the most polished accompaniments, devoted to watching legislation affecting the great importing and shipping interests. We have even had a French lobby, more than once, since M. Genet undertook to influence American opinion against the neutrality policy of Washington in 1793. There was what was called a Danish lobby in 1868, having as an object Mr. Seward's treaty for the purchase of the Danish West Indies, but no money was used, save for writing and printing.

Something may be gathered about the rise of lobbying as an occupation in the State Legislatures, from the delightful description by L. E. Chittenden, in his "Personal Reminiscences" (p. 33 et seq.), of his membership in the "Third House" at the capital of Vermont in 1850. There were few general laws; railroads, banks, bridges, turnpikes, cemeteries, almost all corporations were created by special charter. Banks, railroads, and other corporations occupied three fourths of the time of the Legislature. Much of the legislation was absurd, more of it dangerous. Existing corporations found it necessary to be represented by counsel at the State capital during the whole

session. There were thus brought together many lawyers who had little to do but to watch the daily Journal and the interests of their corporation clients. "We had come to be known as the 'Third House.' We met daily in the State Library, and lampooned everybody who deserved our attention, especially the members of the two lower Houses. More effective work for our clients was accomplished by the satirical items which we made for the newspapers than by our legitimate work before the committees." The rogues organized in burlesque, with a Speaker and ludicrous standing committees. They made a great success by publishing the "Third House Journal," the climax of which they capped with the "Magna Charta of the Moosalamoo Bank." Chittenden gives it in full and says it will become known to future generations, if historians do justice to the Third House, not only as the most comprehensive, but as positively the last special bank charter presented to the Vermont Legislature. "Republics are notoriously ungrateful, and instead of approving our patriotic labors, the members of the lower House denounced us as a set of pestiferous scamps who lay awake nights to invent new schemes for ridiculing our superiors." Apparently the evil of special bank charters was laughed out of Vermont. Herein may be found a useful hint for reformers.

Special legislation was the noisome fount from which at the same period sprang the same evil in Massachusetts. Henry Wilson told of it in the Convention of 1853. The previous Legislature had passed 158 acts increasing the capital stock of corporations, or creating new corporations. "Those of us who have been here during the past seven years," said Wilson, "know how the members have been bored by this lobby system, that has grown up under this system of granting special acts for manufacturing, banking, insurance, railway, and other business purposes. Sir, I want to see this lobby system, which corrupts and degrades legislation, broken up, and it can only be done by removing the cause which created it. The removal of that cause, the destruction of this lobby system, will not only shorten sessions at least one third, but it will tend to the purification of legislation. General laws for corporation purposes will save us from the disgraceful scenes which have been enacted. here during the past few years, when the State House has been made an encampment of the agents of antagonistic corporation

interests who have beleaguered the Legislature for days and weeks." 1

Later in the Convention Mr. Wilson declared: "I do not believe there has been a Legislature during the last six years, aye, ten years, through which we could carry any proposition against the railway influence and power." Otis P. Lord, of Salem, agreed with him "that the railroad interest is now too strong even for the Legislature; and when it gets to be too strong for the Legislature, everything else is as a mere rope of sand."2 James S. Whitney, of Conway, thought "the gentleman has well said that the railroad corporations in this State constitute a power greater than any other in the State." In another debate Robert Rantoul, of Beverly, said: "The fair page of the history of Massachusetts has never yet been sullied by the record of any instance of corruption or wickedness; but I know, sir, from my own observation, and from the information I have derived elsewhere, that there has been a vast amount of outside influence exercised in regard to getting matters through the Legislature." 4

In the course of the next quarter of a century the evil of lobbying grew until it became important enough to win recognition in the Constitutions. Alabama seems to have been the first State to dignify it with notice, saying in 1874: "The offense of corrupt solicitation of members of the General Assembly, or of public officers of this State, or of any municipal division thereof, and any occupation or practice of solicitation of such member or officers to influence their official action shall be defined by law, and shall be punished by fine and imprisonment." The statute in accordance therewith follows the wording of the provision in the Constitution, which, it will be seen, does not necessarily mean that the practice of solicitation shall have the element of corruption, in order to entail punishment. However, in the statutory definition of bribery the limiting "corruptly" is used, and presumably the court would imply it here.

Three years later the Georgia Constitution was made to say, succinctly and absurdly: "Lobbying is declared to be a crime, and the General Assembly shall enforce this provision by suitable penalties." That meant nothing, for it did not define. 2 Ibid., 11, 259, 260.

1 Debates in Mass. Conv. of 1853, 1, 785.
Ibid., 265.
4 Ibid., 1, 847.

There was no more agreement then than there is now, as to what is lobbying. It would be impossible to put into words that would meet the needs of a criminal court, a definition likely to find general acceptance as covering the phases of the practice urged as reprehensible. California, the second State to make a constitutional declaration, tried to define and palpably failed. It said, in 1879: "Any person who seeks to influence the vote of a member of the Legislature by bribery, promise of reward, intimidation, or any other dishonest means, shall be guilty of lobbying, which is hereby declared a felony." Promise of reward is one kind of bribery. Intimidation should probably be classed as contempt, a breach of privilege. The catch-all, "any other dishonest means," leaves wide open the question of what is dishonest, and is quite useless unless the courts are to create crimes after the fashion of the old common law.

The propriety of treating such a subject in a Constitution is open to grave question. It is matter for statutes. There can be no question of the complete authority of a Legislature to regulate its own processes and to protect itself. Upon this authority many of the Legislatures have taken action. Massachusetts was the first to go into the matter thoroughly. In 1887 a legislative investigation showed that about $20,000 had been distributed among men supposed to be able to exercise influence in the matter of a town-division bill. The measure was vetoed by the Republican Governor on the ground that whatever its merits, the methods used were so reprehensible as to call for disapproval by withholding signature. Because the Republicans, controlling the Legislature, failed to take any steps to suppress the evil of which this was a symptom, the Democrats made it a party issue, and their ablest orator, William E. Russell, young and brilliant, presently helped arouse public opinion to the point of compelling legislation. In the House they had an efficient legislator in the person of Josiah Quincy, who wrote the report of a committee that investigated the passage of an elevated railroad bill on which about thirty-five counsel and lobbyists had been employed, at a total expense paid or specifically contracted of about $33,000, with much more yet to be paid. Accompanying the report was a bill that became law as Chapter 456 of the Acts of 1890 and has served as the model for numerous like laws elsewhere.

The reliance was to be on publicity. Men who for hire work to help or hinder legislation, whether as legislative counsel (those who appear at public hearings) or as legislative agents (lobbyists), must register their employment in advance, and at the end of the session their employers must report the amount paid.

Laws of such a type have in view only the moral effect, and bearing that in mind, it may be fairly said that the publicity laws have been salutary. It was neither the intention that they should, nor the expectation that they would, stop lobbying. Unfortunately some of their advocates gave the opposite impression in argument or prophecy, and the public has been correspondingly disappointed. All that was hoped, or could reasonably be hoped, was the restraint on improper practices that comes from publicity.

Could publicity have been completely secured, such evil as there is in lobbying would have become insignificant. It has been secured only in part. The record of payments to legislative counsel is fairly thorough, save that the attorneys employed by some corporations receive annual salaries and the part that might properly be charged up to legislative work is not known. This, however, does no mischief of consequence unless the salary is used to cover up on the corporation books certain classes of questionable outlay. The record of payments to legislative agents, the real lobbyists, is generally believed to be grossly incomplete. As in the case of the laws against corrupt practices at elections, only the honest man obeys, the very man you do not worry about. The man who will bribe, will lie about it.

If this were all the story, no credit would attach to the publicity laws, but there is another side to the matter, and one of real importance. These laws have played a useful part in the campaign for raising the standards of conduct by and toward legislators that has accomplished so much in the last two or three decades. They have given formal, official recognition to the fact that for attorneys to appear before legislative committees is a legitimate and honorable practice. They have declared it to be the creed of the community that paid argument addressed otherwise to legislators is honorable at least when it is aboveboard. To establish these things has been worth while.