can politician. For this reason every attempt to complete the reform is doggedly fought, and we are yet far from that full acceptance of the merit system which alone will make it possible to undertake with safety and advantage the great extensions of public ownership and management, the great broadening of the field of public service, in these days so strenuously urged. Meanwhile the burden of the spoils system on lawmakers is as irksome as it is needless.

LEGITIMATE LOBBYING

IN the general denunciation of lobbying, the sheep and the goats have suffered alike. It has too often been forgotten that high-minded men, animated by unselfish motives, legitimately resort to organization for giving effect to their views. No reason appears why they should not employ spokesmen, whether counsel or agents. The laborer is worthy of his hire; all of us must live; and the man who toils for righteousness must be fed and clothed and housed just as the man who works for iniquity. To be sure, righteousness and iniquity may depend on the point of view, but for the present purposes let us assume that they are to be discriminated by the degree of self-interest. If, then, reasonably unselfish purpose is to be encouraged, shall we restrain it by forbidding its achievement through paid argument? So little reason suggests itself for such restraint that it might be ignored were it not for the frequency with which we hear complaint of the presence of representatives of philanthropic, commercial, and industrial organizations at committee hearings and in the lobbies and corridors of capitols. Supersensitive legislators every now and then resent the pressure thus brought to bear.

The complaint is not reasonable. To be sure, unfair methods may be used by the men with virtuous purpose as well as by those who seek only private gain, and no word is to be spoken in defence of threats and persecution, but in practice it turns out that the methods of men with philanthropic motive are usually frank and honorable. Such men really benefit legislation. Even though we grant that the ideal of representative government would be secured by a body of statesmen who, unaided, unguided, self-sufficing, would out of their own consciousness evolve wisdom reflecting the public will, we know that no such

body ever has existed or, while human nature is imperfect, ever will exist. If, then, legislators must to greater or less extent look elsewhere for information and judgment, where can they better turn than to the organizations of citizens who cooperate in behalf of principles?

There is one phase of the work of these organizations to which surely nobody can object. Besides giving information to legislators, they get information about legislation, and this is to the advantage both of Legislatures and of the public. No more useful opportunity is open to Chambers of Commerce and like bodies than that of watching and reporting what goes on in legislative halls. Their legislative agents may come near to being the often wished-for "people's lobbyists." Such agents should spread knowledge about the bills introduced, the times of committee hearings, amendments adopted on the floor; behind them should be Committees on Legislation ready to act at a moment's notice if occasion arises to defeat a bad bill making headway or to help a good bill in danger.

It is also perfectly proper and not undesirable that public service and other business corporations shall have watchers in the capitols. Corporation directors are trustees for stockholders whose numbers often run up into the thousands, and may well construe it to be part of their duty to see that at least there is knowledge of hostile legislation proposed. Likewise may be commended the growing practice of having the big municipal corporations represented in the lobbies. Boston has protected itself on many an occasion by the activities of the member of its law department entrusted with the work on Beacon Hill.

Along the same lines is the work of the legislative agents of the labor organizations. They give help to any legislator broad enough to be willing to consider the other man's point of view, and they carry back to their unions the broadening they themselves unconsciously get through contact with the representatives of the other classes in the community. Of course the capitalist group can hardly be expected to look with equanimity on the efforts of the labor lobbyists, but the labor men return the distrust with good measure, and the conflicts of interest that follow help on the whole toward well-balanced, equitable legislation.

With attention called to all these varieties of lobbyists and

the useful purposes that many of them serve, will the reader be surprised to learn that most legislators deem it useful, desirable, and in no way dishonorable, to give ear to such men? No less notable and reputable a lawmaker than Thomas B. Reed used to say when he was in the House that there were no terrors for him in a call from a lobbyist, and that he was always willing to go out and see one, unless he had reason to believe the man a rascal. "If any person can tell me more about a pending bill than I know already," he would ask, "why should it be my duty to shun him?" All Mr. Reed insisted upon was that the lobbyist should be clean-handed, stick to his legitimate business, and hold his interviews with Congressmen outside the legislative chambers.

No lawmaker can know too much about the work before him. Of much the greater part he can have no personal knowledge, but must get it where he can. If he is a man intelligent enough to make laws, he will be able to discount self-interest on the part of his informant, to recognize truth and disregard falsehood, to winnow the chaff from the grain. It is not a case of being defiled by touching pitch, nor even of consorting with men of doubtful quality. By far the greater part of the men whose duty it is regularly or occasionally to communicate with lawmakers are men of high character and clean lives. A few are knaves. In the public mind their brand of yeast spoils the whole loaf. That belief is unwarranted and is unfair.

EXAGGERATION OF THE EVIL

A REVIEW of the history of lobbying, the judicial opinions to which it has given rise, the discussions that have led to the laws on the subject, and all the rest of its literature, leads to astonishment that so much is charged and so little is known. To be sure, the mercenary phases of lobbying do not warrant the hope of copious or exact information, for they are naturally veiled in secrecy. A lobbyist is rarely called upon to give to his principal a detailed report of his expenditures, and vouchers are almost never required. Of course this creates the most powerful temptation to exaggerate and falsify. The more the lobbyist says he has used in bribes, the bigger his chance to profit in so far as he pockets the money himself. Manifestly the result is to add largely to the erroneous beliefs on the

subject. When such beliefs cannot be disproved by recorded facts, it is permissible to turn to the judgments of men in the best position to form them. In this instance they are the men who have had long experience in public life. If improper solicitation of legislators really goes on to anything like the degree charged by the muckrakers, surely those who are in the midst of it ought to know. Yet legislators of the highest standing, exceptional perspicacity, and years of opportunity for knowledge will be found almost unanimous in saying that the volume of the evil is most grossly exaggerated.

Should you say that they are the men never improperly approached, and that pride in their associations prompts too generous defence, let me call as a witness an observer, A. R. Spofford, who as Librarian of Congress had the advantage of intimate acquaintance without the handicap of being one of the men under fire. Said he: "While there is no reason to doubt that what is known as the lobby has existed in one or another form in the legislative history of all free governments, it is certain that the organization and power of this indefinite influence in political life has often been grossly exaggerated. In times of partisan excitement, when the advocates and opponents of any measure before the legislative body are full of zeal, wild stories are spread abroad through the press, connecting the names of public men with allegations of bribery and corruption. These stories are in the majority of cases utterly unfounded, and yet are as industriously circulated to meet a real or fancied public appetite for scandal, as if there were no law of libel in existence. Probably there is no public man of any notoriety in our political history who has not at some time been charged with acting or voting under the influence of the lobby."

And farther on: "The existence of a powerful and organized body has been assumed as successfully endeavoring to control our national legislation. Numerous as are the men whose casual employment may justify the application to them of the term lobbyist, the power and influence of the congressional lobby has been greatly over-rated. Congress is not a body of venal reprobates ready to be corrupted, but a body fairly representing the average intelligence and morality of the people. Bad legislation, of which we have more than enough, is the fruit of ignorance, not of corruption." 1

"Lobby," Lalor's Cycl. of Pol. Science, 11, 779-81.

Take a concrete example given by Mr. Spofford: "Enormous stories were told of a Russian lobby; how that only $5,000,000 out of the $7,200,000 paid for the purchase of Alaska ever reached Russia. The facts were that not a dollar was paid to a Congressman, but $27,000 was invested in skillful attorneys, and $3000 paid to one Washington newspaper, while the $2,170,000 was expended by the Russian minister, under instructions from his government, in munitions of war and machinery."

Is it surprising that some knowledge of what had been the facts in such cases led many of us to be skeptical when in May of 1913 President Wilson, provoked by the opposition to the tariff bill, attacked the lobby he averred to be working against it? May those of us with some actual experience in legislative surroundings, not be pardoned if we saw flaws in his argument? He described a lobby as "insidious" when "newspapers are filled with paid advertisements calculated to mislead the judgments of men." Since all advertisements imply payment and are commonly so understood by the public; since their purpose is to shape judgment and everybody so knows; and since whether they are "calculated to mislead" is a matter of opinion that much of the President's charge was oratorical.

He went on to call a lobby insidious when "money without limit is being paid to sustain such a lobby." This was hyperbole, and hyperbole often has its legitimate use. The implication, however, that the use of money to shape opinion is per se objectionable, may not be instantly accepted. Were it true without qualifications, sorry would be the plight of a President elected as a result of opinion in part shaped through campaign expenditure of amounts running up into the millions.

Further he said that a lobby is insidious when "great bodies of astute men seek to create an artificial opinion and to overcome the interests of the public for their private profit." It may be suggested that any opinion which is created is artificial and that almost all opinion is created. However, that may be captious. Note rather the vital point, the implication that great bodies of astute men do in fact seek to overcome the interests of the public for their private profit. This I have no hesitation in absolutely denying. Of a dozen reasons, one might suffice, that it is utterly impossible to combine great bodies of men for any such purpose. It ought also to be said