statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a scepter had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, after securing a sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives."

Nevertheless, these arguments did not appease the critics. They returned to the attack in every State Convention for passing on the Federal Constitution, and the topic has been a favorite theme for discussion from that day to this.

Beginning with 65 members, the apportionment after the census of 1790 raised the number of the lower House of Congress to 106; after 1800 to 142; after 1810 to 186. This was alarming. Ezekiel Whitman in the Maine Convention of 1819 called it a very inconvenient size. "It is with difficulty," he declared, "that the House can transact the public business. Hence it is that we have seen a simple proposition debated in that body for weeks in succession. The case of John Anderson and the questions relative to the Seminole War, and to internal improvements, consumed a fortnight each." Nevertheless, after 1820 the number jumped to 213, and after 1830 to 242. Then a determined stand was made and the total was kept close to that figure until after the Civil War. With the census of 1870, however, pressure became too strong and the apportionment added a fifth to the number, bringing it to 293.

It was in this decade that Senator George F. Hoar, writing in the "North American Review" for February, 1879, on "The Conduct of Business in Congress," said that "the great point, the restoration to the House of its function as a deliberative assembly, can only be fully accomplished by a reduction of its members." After the census of the following year, the number was increased to 332, then after 1890 to 357, and after 1900 to 385, increased to 391 upon the admission of Oklahoma. While

it was at that figure, a competent observer, one of the keenest of Washington correspondents, Robert Lincoln O'Brien, discussed in the "Outlook" (December 2, 1905) "The Troubles of the New Congressman." "Why cannot the work in the House be important?" he asked. "What is the matter? A fundamental source of trouble lies in the present size of that body.. New legislation, aside from the routine appropriations, should be added to the statute-books only after great deliberation, and a small group can do this better than a mass-meeting. The size of the House is the reason always assigned for the code of rules which concentrates power in the hands of the old members. And why is the House so large? Because the absurd practice has grown up of making the apportionment after each census in such a way that no State will lose representation. Until some Congressional leader arises with the nerve to say that two hundred members would make a good working body, adjusting the ratio of representation accordingly, the disillusionment which Washington brings to the new Congressman will go on.'

Then after 1910 the number was increased to 435!

The House of Commons is much larger. Its membership, 670 before the Representation of the People Act enlarged it to 707 in 1918, has become 615 as a result of the establishment of the Irish Free State. Criticism of the size is not wanting. For instance, Lord George Hamilton, speaking with the weight of long personal experience, declares: "The House of Commons is numerically far too large for the purposes of debate or legislation." He points out that "the chamber of the House itself, including the accommodation of the galleries, from which members cannot speak, will barely contain half its number." However, only on rare occasions of political importance are the benches filled. The chamber of our House of Representatives is more commodious and I have never seen the seating capacity taxed by the House itself.

1

The House of Lords is nominally even larger than the House of Commons. When the Lords debated the subject through nearly all of the sitting of March 22, 1923, Marquess Curzon said there were 741 on the Roll, but deducting some names duplicated, with minors not effective members, and the Royal Princes, who do not take part in debates, he made about 700

1 Parliamentary Reminiscences, 210.

the total of those who could, if they chose, take part in the proceedings. The motion of Lord Newton, "That it is desirable that the members of this House should be reduced," was agreed to, but no attempt was made to fix upon an exact number. In 1921 (July 18), resolutions outlining the reform scheme of the Government, moved by Viscount Peel, contemplated a House of about 350. As the purpose of the motion was to get the opinions of the Peers, action was postponed. A bill of Lord Lansdowne in 1911 following prolonged investigation had proposed 350; and the Bryce Conference of 1918 had suggested 342.

Do not infer from the figures of the present membership of the House of Lords that in action it is an unwieldy body. Lord Newton, speaking in 1923, had found that in the previous three sessions an average of 208 of the Peers had not attended at all, and 207 did not appear as much as ten times in a session. However, the situation is viewed as dangerous because of the possibility ever present that the habitual absentees may be induced to attend at a time of crisis, the fear being that, ignorant of parliamentary processes and not having heard debate, they may turn the scale unwisely. One of the purposes contemplated in the various schemes for reconstituting the House is the securing of better attendance from a varied membership, even with its total of but one half that of to-day.

With the perplexities of the English problem in the foreground, the men who drafted the Constitution for the Irish Free State created a Senate of fifty-six members, in addition to those from the Universities. Still smaller will be the upper branch of what seems to be meant for the chief lawmaking body in Russia. In the "Council of Nationalities" each of the four "united and autonomous socialist soviet republics" is to be represented by five members, each of the autonomous provinces by one member, and two other republics each by one member. Supposing that the number of autonomous provinces, which is not specified, will not in any case be large, the total bids fair to seem remarkably small for so huge a country.

The lower branch in Russia, the "Union Council," is to have 371 members. The French Chamber has 626 members; the Italian, 508. The new German Constitution said nothing about size. There is to be one member of the Reichstag for every 60,000 votes cast for a list under the system of proportional

representation adopted, so that the size is determined by the extent of the voting, and likewise the number of members from each district. The lower branch in Czecho-Slovakia is to have 300 members; the upper, 150. The Canadian House as a result of the latest census will have 245 members.

The mass of argument in this matter may be summed up as follows:

Large Houses are likely to secure representation of a greater variety of social interests, by having in their membership men of all the professions and many pursuits. A much more extensive knowledge of local conditions and local opinion is available. Venal influences cannot turn a large body from the path of duty. Bribery and corruption have less chance, log-rolling is harder, all secret influences are hampered. In speeches and votes personal friendships are less likely to embarrass or swerve. Many more citizens can profit by a share in the educating effect of legislative service, and in turn the schooling in public affairs is much more widely diffused by them throughout the community. More voters know their Representatives and therefore take personal interest in the work of the Legislature. Statewide acquaintance is fostered. Large bodies move more slowly and therefore with less danger from hasty change. There are more men among whom to divide the work of committees.

On the other hand, as Cardinal de Retz said, every assembly of more than a hundred is a mob. In other words, large bodies are subject to the mob spirit, which replaces reason with impulse. Prejudice and passion sway large bodies. They tempt to partisan debate, which has been called the foe of reasonableness; to oratory, likewise called the foe of logic. Deliberation is declared impossible. Compromise and concession are hindered. It is harder to recede or accept correction before hundreds than before tens. A smaller proportion of the membership takes part in the business. Time is wasted; sessions are protracted.

Small Houses show less disposition to talk and to abuse freedom of debate. Their members are less inclined to pose. Yet each feels himself of more consequence, adding to his sense of responsibility. What every member does, is known. He can be watched and be strictly held accountable. The members get more thoroughly educated in public affairs. Party spirit is mitigated by friendly relations. Fewer bills are introduced,

and sessions are correspondingly shortened. Money for salaries is saved.

On the other hand, in a small House the single member has dangerous power. His one vote has the greater chance to defeat a good bill or pass a bad bill. This makes the absence of a few members a more serious matter.

Such a contradiction of arguments so numerous makes it gross presumption for any one man to speak dogmatically. Appreciating the need of modesty where so many thoughtful men have failed to reach anything like agreement, I venture a conclusion of my own with no other hope than that as an opinion it may count for one. It is to the effect that for the purpose of embodying the common will in statutes of general purport concerned with principles and policies, the larger the House the better; and that for the purpose of transacting the business of government, the administrative business now so unwisely imposed on representative bodies elected by popular vote, the smaller the House the better. When the time comes that these two distinct functions are separated, with the legislature restricted to principles and policies, and with the making of rules and regulations transferred to some sort of administrative agency, then the type of House found in New Hampshire and Massachusetts or at Washington will prove the safer and wiser.