Tyranny, in such states, does not always beat down the fences that are set around it, but it leaps over them. It mocks the efforts of the people, not because it is invincible, but because it is unknown." The justness of these reflec tions might be illustrated and confirmed by a review of the proceedings of the former council of appointment in NewYork. All efficient responsibility was there lost, by reason of the constant change of the members, and the difficulty of ascertaining the individual to whom the origin of a bad appointment was to be attributed. a tions for (2.) The constitution requires, that the President should Qualificabe a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States President. at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and that he have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and have been fourteen years a resident within the United States. Considering the greatness of the trust, and that this department is the ultimately efficient power in government, these restrictions will not appear altogether useless or unimportant. As the President is required to be a native citizen of the United States, ambitious foreigners cannot intrigue for the office, and the qualification of birth cuts off all those inducements from abroad to corruption, negotiation, and war, which have frequently and fatally harrassed the elective monarchies of Germany and Poland, as well as the Pontificate at Rome. The age of the President is sufficient to have formed his public and private character; and his previous domestic residence, is intended to afford to his fellow citizens the opportunity to attain a correct knowledge of his principles and capacity, and to have enabled him to acquire habits of attachment and obedience to the laws, and of devotion to the public welfare. pointment. (3.) The mode of his appointment presented one of the Mode of apmost difficult and momentous questions that occupied the deliberations of the assembly which framed the constitution; and if ever the tranquillity of this nation is to be disturbed, and its peace jeopardized by a struggle for power, it will be upon this very subject of the choice of a President. This is the question that is eventually to test the goodness, and try the strength of the constitution; and if we shall be able, for half a century hereafter, to continue to elect the chief magistrate of the Union with discretion, moderation, and integrity, we shall undoubtedly stamp the highest value on our national character, and recommend our republican institutions, if not to the imitation, yet certainly to the esteem and admiration of the more enlightened part of mankind. The experience of ancient and modern Europe has been unfavourable to the practicability of a fair and peaceable popular election of the executive head of a great nation. It has been found impossible to guard the election from the mischiefs of foreign intrigue and domestic turbulence, from violence or corruption; and mankind have generally taken refuge from the evils of popular elections in hereditary executives, as being the least evil of the two. The most recent and remarkable change of this kind occurred in France, in 1804, when the legislative body changed their elective into an hereditary monarchy, on the avowed ground that the competition of popular elections led to corruption and violence. And it is a curious fact in European history, that on the first partition of Poland, in 1773, when the partitioning powers thought it expedient to foster and confirm all the defects of its wretched government, they sagaciously demanded of the Polish diet, that the crown should continue elective. This was done for the very purpose of keeping the door open for foreign intrigue and influence. Mr. Paley' condemns all elective monarchies, and he thinks nothing is gained by a popular choice, worth the dissensions, tumults, and interruptions of regular industry, with which it is inseparably attended. I am not called upon to question the wisdom or a Cox's Travels in Poland, Russia, &c. vol. 1. policy of preferring hereditary to elective monarchies among the great nations of Europe, where different orders and ranks of society are established, and large masses of property accumulated in the hands of single individuals, and where ignorance and poverty are widely diffused, and standing armies are necessary to preserve the stability of the government. The state of society and of property, in this country, and our moral and political habits, have enabled us to adopt the republican principle, and to maintain it hitherto with illustrious success. It remains to be seen whether the checks which the constitution has provided against the dangerous propensities of our system will ultimately prove effectual. The election of a supreme executive magistrate for a whole nation, affects so many interests, addresses itself so strongly to popular passions, and holds out such powerful temptations to ambition, that it necessarily becomes a strong trial to public virtue, and even hazardous to the public tranquillity. The constitution, from an enlightened view of all the difficulties that attend the subject, has not thought it safe or prudent to refer the election of a president directly and immediately to the people; but it has confided the power to a small body of electors, appointed in each state, under the direction of the legislature: and, to close the opportunity as much as possible against negotiation, intrigue, and corruption, it has declared that Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall vote, and that the day of election shall be the same in every state. This security has been still further extended, by the act of Congress directing the electors to be appointed in each state within thirty-four days of the day of election. The constitutione directs that the number of electors in each state shall be equal to the whole number of senators and representatives which the state is entitled to send to Congress, and, according to the apportionment of Congress a Art. 2. sec. 4. b Act of 1st March, 1792 c Art. 2. sec. 2, 3. existing prior to 1832, the president is elected by 261 electors. And to prevent the person in office at the time of the election from having any improper influence on his re-election, by his ordinary agency in the government, it is provided that no member of Congress, nor any person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be an elector; and the constitution has in no other respect defined the qualifications of the electors. These electors meet in their respective states, at a place appointed by the legislature thereof, on the first Wednesday in December in every fourth year succeeding the last election, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, (for this last officer is elected in the same manner, and for the same period as the President,) and one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with the electors. They name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and, in distinct ballots, the person voted for as Vice-President; and they make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they sign, and certify, and transmit, sealed, to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the president of the senate. The act of Congress of 1st of March, 1792, sec. 2. directs that the certificate of the votes shall be delivered to the president of the senate before the first Wednesday of January next ensuing the election. The president of the senate, on the second Wednesday in February succeeding every meeting of the electors, in the presence of both houses of Congress, opens all the certificates, and the votes are then to be counted. The constitution does not expressly declare by whom the votes are to be counted and the result declared. In the case of questionable votes, and a closely contested election, this power may be all-important; and I presume, in the absence of all legislative provision on the subject, that the president of the senate counts the votes and deter a Art. 2. sec. 1. mines the result, and that the two houses are present only as spectators, to witness the fairness and accuracy of the transaction, and to act only if no choice be made by the electors. The house of representatives, in such case, are to choose immediately, which, I presume, may be while the two houses are so together, though they may vote after they have retired, for the constitution holds their choice to be valid, if made before the fourth day of March following. And in the cases of the elections in 1801 and 1824, the house of representatives retired and voted, and the senate were admitted to be present as spectators. The person having the greatest number of votes for President is President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; but if no person have such majority, then, from the persons having the highest number, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the house of representatives shall choose immediately by ballot the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. If the house of representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the VicePresident shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President." The person having the greatest number of votes as VicePresident, is Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then, from the two highest numbers on the list, the senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose thall consist of two thirds of the whole number of senators, and a majority of the whole number is necessary to a choice; and no person constitutionally ineligi a Amendments to the Constitution, art 12. |