that of Appetite is derived, is applied by the Romans and Latinists, to desires in general, whether they primarily related to the body or not and with obvious propriety; for the primitive signification is, the seeking after whatever may conduce either to Gratification or Happiness. Thus Cicero observes," motus "animorum duplices sunt; alteri, cogitationis; "alteri Appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo " maxime versatur; Appetitus impellit ad agen"dum." By two powers of action being thus placed in contrast to each other, and the one applied to thought simply, it is obvious that the other comprehends every species of desire, whether of a mental or corporeal nature. Metaphysicians also, who have written in the Latin language, use the word Appetitus in the same latitude.

The modern distinction has the advantage of immediately pointing out a difference in the nature and character of the objects which interest us, according as they relate to the body or to the mind. But although we shall consider the appetites as confined to corporeal wants and cravings, we must still observe that they are as frequently the occasions of passions and emotions, as other objects which are peculiarly adapted to the mind. Eager hope, joy, fear, anger, are

daily manifested by the Infant, whose desires are wholly confined to animal wants: and the keenest sensations of anger, jealousy, envy, &c. are intimately connected with the carnal Appetites of maturer age. Whatever is therefore beyond the mere instinctive appetite, becomes the province of the mind; and the influence which various cravings of nature have upon its ideas and conceptions, give rise to mental affections and passions. The subject of the present discussion obviously relates to these, without requiring particular attention to the existing

cause.

1

SECTION II.

Plans of Arrangement examined.

So numerous and multifarious are the Passions, Affections, and Emotions, in their connections and ramifactions, that it is difficult to propose a plan of Arrangement, which shall be, in every respect, unexceptionable. By preferring one method, we may be deprived of some advantages attending another; and in all, it may be necessary

to anticipate many things, which a rigid attention to order could not possibly permit. Some Writers on the Passions, have placed them in contrast to each other, as hope and fear, joy and sorrow:-Some have considered them as they are personal, relative, social:-Some according to their influence at different periods of life: -Others according as they relate to past, present, or future time; as sorrow principally refers to things past, joy and anger to present scenes, hope and fear respect futurity.

The Academicians advanced that the principal passions were fear, hope, joy, and grief. Thus Virgil:

Hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque, dolentque.

They included aversion and despair under the fourth; and hope, fortitude, and anger, under desire. But not to observe that this arrangement is much too general in some respects, and defective in others;-that the characters of hope, and of anger are too opposite to each other, to be placed under the same head;that anger has no particular claim to be classed with desire, excepting when it excites a desire of revenge, which is not always the case;and that desire is so comprehensive a term as to embrace numberless other affections;-not to

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insist upon these objections, it is manifest that the passions enumerated cannot be primitive or cardinal, since some other affections or passions must be prior to them: We must love, or hate, before we can either desire, rejoice, or fear, or grieve.

The

Dr. Hartley has arranged the Passions under five grateful and five ungrateful ones. The grateful ones, are love, desire, hope, joy, and pleasing recollection; the ungrateful are hatred, aversion, fear, grief, displeasing recollection. objections to this order are, that all these cannot be considered as cardinal passions. Love must precede desire, hope, and joy; and hatred must precede fear. Nor do the distinctions themselves appear sufficiently accurate. Hope is certainly a species of desire; pleasing recollection is a modification of love; aversion is only a particular manner of testifying hatred; and displeasing recollections are sometimes the renewal of grief, sometimes of anger.

Dr. Watts divides the Passions into primitive and derivative. The primitive he subdivides into two ranks: 1. Admiration, love, and hatred; 2. The diverse kinds of love and hatred, as esteem, contempt, benevolence, malevolence, complacency, displacency. The derivatives are desire, aversion, hope, fear, gratitude, anger, &c.

But the title of Admiration to be considered as a primitive passion, does not appear to be so valid as that of the other two associated with it. Love and hatred are in universal exercise; Admiration is merely occasional. The former indicate themselves from the instant we have any powers of discernment, or the smallest degree of experience, respecting the nature of objects; the latter is the result of some degree of knowledge: it implies a spirit of inquiry; and demands some portion of taste for particular qualities, adapted to excite this emotion. Minds the most infantile, and uncultivated, will manifest that they love and hate, long before they have an opportunity of testifying their admiration. We might also observe, that a subdivision of the primitive passions into two ranks creates a suspicion, if it do not fully indicate, that they cannot all be equally primitive; and the instances given under the second rank, may justly be considered as different modifications o the two grand principles, and not as primitives of a distinct character. It is farther obvious, that the Doctor's plan makes no distinction between the Passions and Affections, which the nature of the subject not only admits but requires.

Mr. Grove, adopting in part,

the

arrangement